The provider of an SSL key/trust store is different from that store's
type. However, the broker currently doesn't differentiate these and uses
the provider for both. Changing this *may* potentially break existing
users who are setting the provider, but I don't see any way to avoid
that. This is a bug that needs to be fixed in order to support use-cases
like PKCS#11.
Change summary:
- Added documentation.
- Consolidated several 2-way SSL tests classes into a single
parameterized test class. All these classes were essentially the same
except for a few key test parameters. Consolidating them avoided
having to update the same code in multiple places.
- Expanded tests to include different providers & types.
- Regenerated all SSL artifacts to allow tests to pass with new
constraints.
- Improved logging for when SSL handler initialization fails.
Change summary:
- Remove the existing Xalan-based XPath evaluator since Xalan appears
to be no longer maintained.
- Implement a JAXP XPath evaluator (from the ActiveMQ 5.x code-base).
- Pull in the changes from https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/AMQ-5333
to enable configurable XML parser features.
- Add a method to the base Message interface to make it easier to get
the message body as a string. This relieves the filter from having
to deal with message implementation details.
- Update the Qpid JMS client to get the jms.validateSelector parameter.
- Adding a paragraph about addressing and distinct queue names
- Renaming match on peers, senders and receivers as "address-match"
- Changing qpid dispatch test to use a single listener
- Fixing reconnect attemps message
Both authentication and authorization will hit the underlying security
repository (e.g. files, LDAP, etc.). For example, creating a JMS
connection and a consumer will result in 2 hits with the *same*
authentication request. This can cause unwanted (and unnecessary)
resource utilization, especially in the case of networked configuration
like LDAP.
There is already a rudimentary cache for authorization, but it is
cleared *totally* every 10 seconds by default (controlled via the
security-invalidation-interval setting), and it must be populated
initially which still results in duplicate auth requests.
This commit optimizes authentication and authorization via the following
changes:
- Replace our home-grown cache with Google Guava's cache. This provides
simple caching with both time-based and size-based LRU eviction. See more
at https://github.com/google/guava/wiki/CachesExplained. I also thought
about using Caffeine, but we already have a dependency on Guava and the
cache implementions look to be negligibly different for this use-case.
- Add caching for authentication. Both successful and unsuccessful
authentication attempts will be cached to spare the underlying security
repository as much as possible. Authenticated Subjects will be cached
and re-used whenever possible.
- Authorization will used Subjects cached during authentication. If the
required Subject is not in the cache it will be fetched from the
underlying security repo.
- Caching can be disabled by setting the security-invalidation-interval
to 0.
- Cache sizes are configurable.
- Management operations exist to inspect cache sizes at runtime.
Justin Bertram
Andy Taylor
gtully
AntonRoskvist
Erwin Dondorp
sebthom
Jan Šmucr
Clebert Suconic
Ryan Yeats
Domenico Francesco Bruscino
Urs Roesch
Howard Gao
Shrikant Chavan
Robbie Gemmell