YARN-4017. container-executor overuses PATH_MAX. Contributed by Sidharta Seethana

This commit is contained in:
Varun Vasudev 2015-10-13 12:48:30 +05:30
parent 69b025dbba
commit 5b6bae0094
4 changed files with 28 additions and 22 deletions

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@ -929,6 +929,8 @@ Release 2.8.0 - UNRELEASED
YARN-4230. RM crashes with NPE when increasing container resource if there is no headroom left.
(Meng Ding via jianhe)
YARN-4017. container-executor overuses PATH_MAX. (Sidharta Seethana via vvasudev)
Release 2.7.2 - UNRELEASED
INCOMPATIBLE CHANGES

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@ -95,12 +95,12 @@ static int is_only_root_writable(const char *file) {
*/
char *resolve_config_path(const char* file_name, const char *root) {
const char *real_fname = NULL;
char buffer[PATH_MAX*2 + 1];
char buffer[EXECUTOR_PATH_MAX*2 + 1];
if (file_name[0] == '/') {
real_fname = file_name;
} else if (realpath(root, buffer) != NULL) {
strncpy(strrchr(buffer, '/') + 1, file_name, PATH_MAX);
strncpy(strrchr(buffer, '/') + 1, file_name, EXECUTOR_PATH_MAX);
real_fname = buffer;
}

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@ -18,6 +18,10 @@
#include <stddef.h>
/** Define a platform-independent constant instead of using PATH_MAX */
#define EXECUTOR_PATH_MAX 4096
/**
* Ensure that the configuration file and all of the containing directories
* are only writable by root. Otherwise, an attacker can change the

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@ -68,17 +68,17 @@ void set_nm_uid(uid_t user, gid_t group) {
* get the executable filename.
*/
char* get_executable() {
char buffer[PATH_MAX];
snprintf(buffer, PATH_MAX, "/proc/%" PRId64 "/exe", (int64_t)getpid());
char *filename = malloc(PATH_MAX);
ssize_t len = readlink(buffer, filename, PATH_MAX);
char buffer[EXECUTOR_PATH_MAX];
snprintf(buffer, EXECUTOR_PATH_MAX, "/proc/%" PRId64 "/exe", (int64_t)getpid());
char *filename = malloc(EXECUTOR_PATH_MAX);
ssize_t len = readlink(buffer, filename, EXECUTOR_PATH_MAX);
if (len == -1) {
fprintf(ERRORFILE, "Can't get executable name from %s - %s\n", buffer,
strerror(errno));
exit(-1);
} else if (len >= PATH_MAX) {
} else if (len >= EXECUTOR_PATH_MAX) {
fprintf(ERRORFILE, "Executable name %.*s is longer than %d characters.\n",
PATH_MAX, filename, PATH_MAX);
EXECUTOR_PATH_MAX, filename, EXECUTOR_PATH_MAX);
exit(-1);
}
filename[len] = '\0';
@ -1060,8 +1060,8 @@ char* parse_docker_command_file(const char* command_file) {
int run_docker(const char *command_file) {
char* docker_command = parse_docker_command_file(command_file);
char* docker_binary = get_value(DOCKER_BINARY_KEY);
char* docker_command_with_binary = calloc(sizeof(char), PATH_MAX);
snprintf(docker_command_with_binary, PATH_MAX, "%s %s", docker_binary, docker_command);
char* docker_command_with_binary = calloc(sizeof(char), EXECUTOR_PATH_MAX);
snprintf(docker_command_with_binary, EXECUTOR_PATH_MAX, "%s %s", docker_binary, docker_command);
char **args = extract_values_delim(docker_command_with_binary, " ");
int exit_code = -1;
@ -1207,11 +1207,11 @@ int launch_docker_container_as_user(const char * user, const char *app_id,
char *script_file_dest = NULL;
char *cred_file_dest = NULL;
char *exit_code_file = NULL;
char docker_command_with_binary[PATH_MAX];
char docker_wait_command[PATH_MAX];
char docker_logs_command[PATH_MAX];
char docker_inspect_command[PATH_MAX];
char docker_rm_command[PATH_MAX];
char docker_command_with_binary[EXECUTOR_PATH_MAX];
char docker_wait_command[EXECUTOR_PATH_MAX];
char docker_logs_command[EXECUTOR_PATH_MAX];
char docker_inspect_command[EXECUTOR_PATH_MAX];
char docker_rm_command[EXECUTOR_PATH_MAX];
int container_file_source =-1;
int cred_file_source = -1;
int BUFFER_SIZE = 4096;
@ -1256,7 +1256,7 @@ int launch_docker_container_as_user(const char * user, const char *app_id,
goto cleanup;
}
snprintf(docker_command_with_binary, PATH_MAX, "%s %s", docker_binary, docker_command);
snprintf(docker_command_with_binary, EXECUTOR_PATH_MAX, "%s %s", docker_binary, docker_command);
FILE* start_docker = popen(docker_command_with_binary, "r");
if (pclose (start_docker) != 0)
@ -1268,7 +1268,7 @@ int launch_docker_container_as_user(const char * user, const char *app_id,
goto cleanup;
}
snprintf(docker_inspect_command, PATH_MAX,
snprintf(docker_inspect_command, EXECUTOR_PATH_MAX,
"%s inspect --format {{.State.Pid}} %s",
docker_binary, container_id);
@ -1307,7 +1307,7 @@ int launch_docker_container_as_user(const char * user, const char *app_id,
goto cleanup;
}
snprintf(docker_wait_command, PATH_MAX,
snprintf(docker_wait_command, EXECUTOR_PATH_MAX,
"%s wait %s", docker_binary, container_id);
FILE* wait_docker = popen(docker_wait_command, "r");
@ -1318,7 +1318,7 @@ int launch_docker_container_as_user(const char * user, const char *app_id,
fflush(ERRORFILE);
}
if(exit_code != 0) {
snprintf(docker_logs_command, PATH_MAX, "%s logs --tail=250 %s",
snprintf(docker_logs_command, EXECUTOR_PATH_MAX, "%s logs --tail=250 %s",
docker_binary, container_id);
FILE* logs = popen(docker_logs_command, "r");
if(logs != NULL) {
@ -1347,7 +1347,7 @@ int launch_docker_container_as_user(const char * user, const char *app_id,
}
}
snprintf(docker_rm_command, PATH_MAX,
snprintf(docker_rm_command, EXECUTOR_PATH_MAX,
"%s rm %s", docker_binary, container_id);
FILE* rm_docker = popen(docker_rm_command, "w");
if (pclose (rm_docker) != 0)
@ -1766,7 +1766,7 @@ int mount_cgroup(const char *pair, const char *hierarchy) {
#else
char *controller = malloc(strlen(pair));
char *mount_path = malloc(strlen(pair));
char hier_path[PATH_MAX];
char hier_path[EXECUTOR_PATH_MAX];
int result = 0;
if (get_kv_key(pair, controller, strlen(pair)) < 0 ||
@ -1778,7 +1778,7 @@ int mount_cgroup(const char *pair, const char *hierarchy) {
if (mount("none", mount_path, "cgroup", 0, controller) == 0) {
char *buf = stpncpy(hier_path, mount_path, strlen(mount_path));
*buf++ = '/';
snprintf(buf, PATH_MAX - (buf - hier_path), "%s", hierarchy);
snprintf(buf, EXECUTOR_PATH_MAX - (buf - hier_path), "%s", hierarchy);
// create hierarchy as 0750 and chown to Hadoop NM user
const mode_t perms = S_IRWXU | S_IRGRP | S_IXGRP;