<chapter xmlns="http://docbook.org/ns/docbook" version="5.0" xml:id="authz-arch"
    xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
    <info>
        <title>Authorization Architecture</title>
    </info>
    <section xml:id="authz-authorities">
        <info>
            <title>Authorities</title>
        </info>
        <para>As we saw in the <link xlink:href="#tech-granted-authority">technical overview</link>,
            all <interfacename>Authentication</interfacename> implementations store a list of
            <interfacename>GrantedAuthority</interfacename> objects. These represent the authorities
            that have been granted to the principal. The
            <interfacename>GrantedAuthority</interfacename> objects are inserted into the
            <interfacename>Authentication</interfacename> object by the
            <interfacename>AuthenticationManager</interfacename> and are later read by
            <interfacename>AccessDecisionManager</interfacename>s when making authorization
            decisions.</para>
        <para><interfacename>GrantedAuthority</interfacename> is an interface with only one method:
            <programlisting>
  String getAuthority();
    </programlisting> This method allows
            <interfacename>AccessDecisionManager</interfacename>s to obtain a precise
            <literal>String</literal> representation of the
            <interfacename>GrantedAuthority</interfacename>. By returning a representation as a
            <literal>String</literal>, a <interfacename>GrantedAuthority</interfacename> can be
            easily <quote>read</quote> by most
            <interfacename>AccessDecisionManager</interfacename>s. If a
            <interfacename>GrantedAuthority</interfacename> cannot be precisely represented as a
            <literal>String</literal>, the <interfacename>GrantedAuthority</interfacename> is
            considered <quote>complex</quote> and <literal>getAuthority()</literal> must return
            <literal>null</literal>.</para>
        <para>An example of a <quote>complex</quote> <interfacename>GrantedAuthority</interfacename>
            would be an implementation that stores a list of operations and authority thresholds
            that apply to different customer account numbers. Representing this complex
            <interfacename>GrantedAuthority</interfacename> as a <literal>String</literal> would be
            quite difficult, and as a result the <literal>getAuthority()</literal> method should
            return <literal>null</literal>. This will indicate to any
            <interfacename>AccessDecisionManager</interfacename> that it will need to specifically
            support the <interfacename>GrantedAuthority</interfacename> implementation in order to
            understand its contents.</para>
        <para>Spring Security includes one concrete <interfacename>GrantedAuthority</interfacename>
            implementation, <literal>GrantedAuthorityImpl</literal>. This allows any user-specified
            <literal>String</literal> to be converted into a
            <interfacename>GrantedAuthority</interfacename>. All
            <classname>AuthenticationProvider</classname>s included with the security architecture
            use <literal>GrantedAuthorityImpl</literal> to populate the
            <interfacename>Authentication</interfacename> object.</para>
    </section>
    <section xml:id="authz-pre-invocation">
        <info>
            <title>Pre-Invocation Handling</title>
        </info>
        <para> As we've also seen in the <link xlink:href="#secure-objects">Technical
            Overview</link> chapter, Spring Security provides interceptors which control access to
            secure objects such as method invocations or web requests. A pre-invocation decision on
            whether the invocation is allowed to proceed is made by the
            <interfacename>AccessDecisionManager</interfacename>. </para>
        <section xml:id="authz-access-decision-manager">
            <title>The AccessDecisionManager</title>
            <para>The <interfacename>AccessDecisionManager</interfacename> is called by the
                <classname>AbstractSecurityInterceptor</classname> and is responsible for making
                final access control decisions. The
                <interfacename>AccessDecisionManager</interfacename> interface contains three
                methods:
                <programlisting>
 void decide(Authentication authentication, Object secureObject,
     Collection&lt;ConfigAttribute&gt; attrs) throws AccessDeniedException;
 boolean supports(ConfigAttribute attribute);
 boolean supports(Class clazz);
      </programlisting>
                The <interfacename>AccessDecisionManager</interfacename>'s
                <methodname>decide</methodname> method is passed all the relevant information it
                needs in order to make an authorization decision. In particular, passing the secure
                <literal>Object</literal> enables those arguments contained in the actual secure
                object invocation to be inspected. For example, let's assume the secure object was a
                <classname>MethodInvocation</classname>. It would be easy to query the
                <classname>MethodInvocation</classname> for any <literal>Customer</literal>
                argument, and then implement some sort of security logic in the
                <interfacename>AccessDecisionManager</interfacename> to ensure the principal is
                permitted to operate on that customer. Implementations are expected to throw an
                <literal>AccessDeniedException</literal> if access is denied.</para>
            <para>The <literal>supports(ConfigAttribute)</literal> method is called by the
                <classname>AbstractSecurityInterceptor</classname> at startup time to determine if
                the <interfacename>AccessDecisionManager</interfacename> can process the passed
                <literal>ConfigAttribute</literal>. The <literal>supports(Class)</literal> method is
                called by a security interceptor implementation to ensure the configured
                <interfacename>AccessDecisionManager</interfacename> supports the type of secure
                object that the security interceptor will present.</para>
        </section>
        <section xml:id="authz-voting-based">
            <title>Voting-Based AccessDecisionManager Implementations</title>
            <para>Whilst users can implement their own
                <interfacename>AccessDecisionManager</interfacename> to control all aspects of
                authorization, Spring Security includes several
                <interfacename>AccessDecisionManager</interfacename> implementations that are based
                on voting. <xref linkend="authz-access-voting"/> illustrates the relevant
                classes.</para>
            <figure xml:id="authz-access-voting">
                <title>Voting Decision Manager</title>
                <mediaobject>
                    <imageobject>
                        <imagedata align="center" fileref="images/access-decision-voting.png"
                            format="PNG" scale="75"/>
                    </imageobject>
                </mediaobject>
            </figure>
            <para>Using this approach, a series of
                <interfacename>AccessDecisionVoter</interfacename> implementations are polled on an
                authorization decision. The <interfacename>AccessDecisionManager</interfacename>
                then decides whether or not to throw an <literal>AccessDeniedException</literal>
                based on its assessment of the votes.</para>
            <para>The <interfacename>AccessDecisionVoter</interfacename> interface has three
                methods:
                <programlisting>
int vote(Authentication authentication, Object object, Collection&lt;ConfigAttribute&gt; attrs);
boolean supports(ConfigAttribute attribute);
boolean supports(Class clazz);
</programlisting>
                Concrete implementations return an <literal>int</literal>, with possible values
                being reflected in the <interfacename>AccessDecisionVoter</interfacename> static
                fields <literal>ACCESS_ABSTAIN</literal>, <literal>ACCESS_DENIED</literal> and
                <literal>ACCESS_GRANTED</literal>. A voting implementation will return
                <literal>ACCESS_ABSTAIN</literal> if it has no opinion on an authorization decision.
                If it does have an opinion, it must return either <literal>ACCESS_DENIED</literal>
                or <literal>ACCESS_GRANTED</literal>.</para>
            <para>There are three concrete <interfacename>AccessDecisionManager</interfacename>s
                provided with Spring Security that tally the votes. The
                <literal>ConsensusBased</literal> implementation will grant or deny access based on
                the consensus of non-abstain votes. Properties are provided to control behavior in
                the event of an equality of votes or if all votes are abstain. The
                <literal>AffirmativeBased</literal> implementation will grant access if one or more
                <literal>ACCESS_GRANTED</literal> votes were received (i.e. a deny vote will be
                ignored, provided there was at least one grant vote). Like the
                <literal>ConsensusBased</literal> implementation, there is a parameter that controls
                the behavior if all voters abstain. The <literal>UnanimousBased</literal> provider
                expects unanimous <literal>ACCESS_GRANTED</literal> votes in order to grant access,
                ignoring abstains. It will deny access if there is any
                <literal>ACCESS_DENIED</literal> vote. Like the other implementations, there is a
                parameter that controls the behaviour if all voters abstain.</para>
            <para>It is possible to implement a custom
                <interfacename>AccessDecisionManager</interfacename> that tallies votes differently.
                For example, votes from a particular
                <interfacename>AccessDecisionVoter</interfacename> might receive additional
                weighting, whilst a deny vote from a particular voter may have a veto effect.</para>
            <section xml:id="authz-role-voter">
                <title><classname>RoleVoter</classname></title>
                <para> The most commonly used <interfacename>AccessDecisionVoter</interfacename>
                    provided with Spring Security is the simple <classname>RoleVoter</classname>,
                    which treats configuration attributes as simple role names and votes to grant
                    access if the user has been assigned that role.</para>
                <para>It will vote if any <interfacename>ConfigAttribute</interfacename> begins with
                    the prefix <literal>ROLE_</literal>. It will vote to grant access if there is a
                    <interfacename>GrantedAuthority</interfacename> which returns a
                    <literal>String</literal> representation (via the
                    <literal>getAuthority()</literal> method) exactly equal to one or more
                    <literal>ConfigAttributes</literal> starting with the prefix
                    <literal>ROLE_</literal>. If there is no exact match of any
                    <literal>ConfigAttribute</literal> starting with <literal>ROLE_</literal>, the
                    <literal>RoleVoter</literal> will vote to deny access. If no
                    <literal>ConfigAttribute</literal> begins with <literal>ROLE_</literal>, the
                    voter will abstain.</para>
            </section>
            <section xml:id="authz-authenticated-voter">
                <title><classname>AuthenticatedVoter</classname></title>
                <para> Another voter which we've implicitly seen is the
                    <classname>AuthenticatedVoter</classname>, which can be used to differentiate
                    between anonymous, fully-authenticated and remember-me authenticated users. Many
                    sites allow certain limited access under remember-me authentication, but require
                    a user to confirm their identity by logging in for full access.</para>
                <para>When we've used the attribute <literal>IS_AUTHENTICATED_ANONYMOUSLY</literal>
                    to grant anonymous access, this attribute was being processed by the
                    <classname>AuthenticatedVoter</classname>. See the Javadoc for this class for
                    more information. </para>
            </section>
            <section xml:id="authz-custom-voter">
                <title>Custom Voters</title>
                <para>Obviously, you can also implement a custom
                    <interfacename>AccessDecisionVoter</interfacename> and you can
                    put just about any access-control logic you want in it. It might
                    be specific to your application (business-logic related) or it
                    might implement some security administration logic. For example, you'll find
                    a <link xlink:href='http://blog.springsource.com/2009/01/02/spring-security-customization-part-2-adjusting-secured-session-in-real-time/'>
                    blog article</link> on the SpringSource web site which describes how to
                    use a voter to deny access in real-time to users whose accounts have
                    been suspended.
                    </para>
            </section>
        </section>
    </section>
    <section xml:id="authz-after-invocation-handling">
        <info>
            <title>After Invocation Handling</title>
        </info>
        <para>Whilst the <interfacename>AccessDecisionManager</interfacename> is called by the
            <classname>AbstractSecurityInterceptor</classname> before proceeding with the secure
            object invocation, some applications need a way of modifying the object actually
            returned by the secure object invocation. Whilst you could easily implement your own AOP
            concern to achieve this, Spring Security provides a convenient hook that has several
            concrete implementations that integrate with its ACL capabilities.</para>
        <para><xref linkend="authz-after-invocation"/> illustrates Spring Security's
            <literal>AfterInvocationManager</literal> and its concrete implementations. <figure
            xml:id="authz-after-invocation">
            <title>After Invocation Implementation</title>
            <mediaobject>
                <imageobject>
                    <imagedata align="center" fileref="images/after-invocation.png" format="PNG"
                        scale="75"/>
                </imageobject>
            </mediaobject>
            </figure></para>
        <para>Like many other parts of Spring Security, <literal>AfterInvocationManager</literal>
            has a single concrete implementation, <literal>AfterInvocationProviderManager</literal>,
            which polls a list of <literal>AfterInvocationProvider</literal>s. Each
            <literal>AfterInvocationProvider</literal> is allowed to modify the return object or
            throw an <literal>AccessDeniedException</literal>. Indeed multiple providers can modify
            the object, as the result of the previous provider is passed to the next in the
            list.</para>
        <para>Please be aware that if you're using <literal>AfterInvocationManager</literal>, you
            will still need configuration attributes that allow the
            <classname>MethodSecurityInterceptor</classname>'s
            <interfacename>AccessDecisionManager</interfacename> to allow an operation. If you're
            using the typical Spring Security included
            <interfacename>AccessDecisionManager</interfacename> implementations, having no
            configuration attributes defined for a particular secure method invocation will cause
            each <interfacename>AccessDecisionVoter</interfacename> to abstain from voting. In turn,
            if the <interfacename>AccessDecisionManager</interfacename> property
            "<literal>allowIfAllAbstainDecisions</literal>" is <literal>false</literal>, an
            <literal>AccessDeniedException</literal> will be thrown. You may avoid this potential
            issue by either (i) setting "<literal>allowIfAllAbstainDecisions</literal>" to
            <literal>true</literal> (although this is generally not recommended) or (ii) simply
            ensure that there is at least one configuration attribute that an
            <interfacename>AccessDecisionVoter</interfacename> will vote to grant access for. This
            latter (recommended) approach is usually achieved through a <literal>ROLE_USER</literal>
            or <literal>ROLE_AUTHENTICATED</literal> configuration attribute.</para>
        <!-- TODO: Move to ACL section and add reference here -->
        <!--
    <section xml:id="after-invocation-acl-aware">
      <info>
        <title>ACL-Aware AfterInvocationProviders</title>
      </info>

      <para>A common services layer method we've all written at one stage or another looks like
        this:</para>
      <para>
        <programlisting>public Contact getById(Integer id);</programlisting>
      </para>
      <para>Quite often, only principals with permission to read the <literal>Contact</literal>
        should be allowed to obtain it. In this situation the
          <interfacename>AccessDecisionManager</interfacename> approach provided by the
          <classname>AbstractSecurityInterceptor</classname> will not suffice. This is because the
        identity of the <literal>Contact</literal> is all that is available before the secure object
        is invoked. The <classname>AclEntryAfterInvocationProvider</classname> delivers a solution,
        and is configured as follows: <programlisting><![CDATA[
<bean id="afterAclRead"
   class="org.springframework.security.acls.afterinvocation.AclEntryAfterInvocationProvider">
  <constructor-arg ref="aclService"/>
  <constructor-arg>
    <list>
      <ref local="org.springframework.security.acls.domain.BasePermission.ADMINISTRATION"/>
      <ref local="org.springframework.security.acls.domain.BasePermission.READ"/>
    </list>
  </constructor-arg>
</bean>
]]></programlisting> In the above example, the <literal>Contact</literal> will be retrieved and
        passed to the <classname>AclEntryAfterInvocationProvider</classname>. The provider will
        thrown an <classname>AccessDeniedException</classname> if one of the listed
          <literal>requirePermission</literal>s is not held by the
          <interfacename>Authentication</interfacename>. The
          <classname>AclEntryAfterInvocationProvider</classname> queries the acl service to
        determine the ACL that applies for this domain object to this
          <interfacename>Authentication</interfacename>.</para>
      <para>Similar to the <classname>AclEntryAfterInvocationProvider</classname> is
          <classname>AclEntryAfterInvocationCollectionFilteringProvider</classname>. It is designed
        to remove <literal>Collection</literal> or array elements for which a principal does not
        have access. It never thrown an <classname>AccessDeniedException</classname> - simply
        silently removes the offending elements. The provider is configured as follows: <programlisting><![CDATA[
<bean id="afterAclCollectionRead"
  class="org.springframework.security.acls.afterinvocation.AclEntryAfterInvocationCollectionFilteringProvider">
  <constructor-arg ref="aclService"/>
  <constructor-arg>
    <list>
      <ref local="org.springframework.security.acls.domain.BasePermission.ADMINISTRATION"/>
      <ref local="org.springframework.security.acls.domain.BasePermission.READ"/>
    </list>
  </constructor-arg>
</bean>
]]>    </programlisting> As you can imagine, the returned <literal>Object</literal> must be a
          <literal>Collection</literal> or array for this provider to operate. It will remove any
        element if the <literal>AclManager</literal> indicates the
          <interfacename>Authentication</interfacename> does not hold one of the listed
          <literal>requirePermission</literal>s.</para>
      <para>The Contacts sample application demonstrates these two
          <literal>AfterInvocationProvider</literal>s.</para>
          </section>   -->
    </section>
    <section xml:id="authz-hierarchical-roles">
        <title>Hierarchical Roles</title>
        <para>
            It is a common requirement that a particular role in an application should automatically
            <quote>include</quote> other roles. For example, in an application which has the concept of
            an <quote>admin</quote> and a <quote>user</quote> role, you may want an admin to be able to
            do everything a normal user can. To achieve this, you can either make sure that all admin users
            are also assigned the <quote>user</quote> role. Alternatively, you can modify every access constraint
            which requires the <quote>user</quote> role to also include the <quote>admin</quote> role.
            This can get quite complicated if you have a lot of different roles in your application.
        </para>
        <para>
            The use of a role-hierarchy allows you to configure which roles (or authorities) should include others.
            An extended version of Spring Security's <link xlink:href="#authz-role-voter"><classname>RoleVoter</classname></link>,
            <classname>RoleHierarchyVoter</classname>, is configured with a <interfacename>RoleHierarchy</interfacename>,
            from which it obtains all the <quote>reachable authorities</quote> which the user is assigned.
            A typical configuration might look like this:
<programlisting><![CDATA[
<bean id="roleVoter" class="org.springframework.security.access.vote.RoleHierarchyVoter">
    <constructor-arg ref="roleHierarchy" />
</class>
<bean id="roleHierarchy"
        class="org.springframework.security.access.hierarchicalroles.RoleHierarchyImpl">
    <property name="hierarchy">
        ROLE_ADMIN > ROLE_STAFF
        ROLE_STAFF > ROLE_USER
        ROLE_USER > ROLE_GUEST
    </property>
</bean>]]>
</programlisting>
            Here we have four roles in a hierarchy <literal>ROLE_ADMIN => ROLE_STAFF => ROLE_USER => ROLE_GUEST</literal>.
            A user who is authenticated with <literal>ROLE_ADMIN</literal>, will behave as if they have all four roles when
            security contraints are evaluated against an <interfacename>AccessDecisionManager</interfacename> cconfigured
            with the above <classname>RoleHierarchyVoter</classname>. The <literal>&gt;</literal> symbol can be thought of
            as meaning <quote>includes</quote>.
        </para>
        <para>
            Role hierarchies offer a convenient means of simplifying the access-control configuration data for your
            application and/or reducing the number of authorities which you need to assign to a user. For more
            complex requirements you may wish to define a logical mapping between the specific access-rights your
            application requires and the roles that are assigned to users, translating between the two when loading
            the user information.
            <!-- TODO: Extend when authority-mapping layer is added  -->
        </para>
    </section>

</chapter>
