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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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[[ns-requires-channel]]
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== HTTPS
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= HTTPS
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=== Adding HTTP/HTTPS Channel Security
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== Adding HTTP/HTTPS Channel Security
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If your application supports both HTTP and HTTPS, and you require that particular URLs can only be accessed over HTTPS, then this is directly supported using the `requires-channel` attribute on `<intercept-url>`:
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[source,xml]
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@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
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[[headers]]
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[[ns-headers]]
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== Security HTTP Response Headers
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= Security HTTP Response Headers
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This section discusses Spring Security's support for adding various security headers to the response.
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=== Default Security Headers
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== Default Security Headers
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Spring Security allows users to easily inject the default security headers to assist in protecting their application.
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The default for Spring Security is to include the following headers:
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@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ If necessary, you can disable all of the HTTP Security response headers with the
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----
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[[headers-cache-control]]
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=== Cache Control
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== Cache Control
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In the past Spring Security required you to provide your own cache control for your web application.
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This seemed reasonable at the time, but browser caches have evolved to include caches for secure connections as well.
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This means that a user may view an authenticated page, log out, and then a malicious user can use the browser history to view the cached page.
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@ -229,17 +229,17 @@ public class WebMvcConfiguration implements WebMvcConfigurer {
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----
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[[headers-content-type-options]]
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=== Content Type Options
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== Content Type Options
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Historically browsers, including Internet Explorer, would try to guess the content type of a request using https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_sniffing[content sniffing].
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This allowed browsers to improve the user experience by guessing the content type on resources that had not specified the content type.
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For example, if a browser encountered a JavaScript file that did not have the content type specified, it would be able to guess the content type and then execute it.
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[NOTE]
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====
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===
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There are many additional things one should do (i.e. only display the document in a distinct domain, ensure Content-Type header is set, sanitize the document, etc) when allowing content to be uploaded.
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However, these measures are out of the scope of what Spring Security provides.
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It is also important to point out when disabling content sniffing, you must specify the content type in order for things to work properly.
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====
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===
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The problem with content sniffing is that this allowed malicious users to use polyglots (i.e. a file that is valid as multiple content types) to execute XSS attacks.
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For example, some sites may allow users to submit a valid postscript document to a website and view it.
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@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ WebSecurityConfigurerAdapter {
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----
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[[headers-hsts]]
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=== HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)
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== HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)
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When you type in your bank's website, do you enter mybank.example.com or do you enter https://mybank.example.com[]? If you omit the https protocol, you are potentially vulnerable to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-middle_attack[Man in the Middle attacks].
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Even if the website performs a redirect to https://mybank.example.com a malicious user could intercept the initial HTTP request and manipulate the response (i.e. redirect to https://mibank.example.com and steal their credentials).
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@ -298,10 +298,10 @@ Once mybank.example.com is added as a https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6797#sectio
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This greatly reduces the possibility of a Man in the Middle attack occurring.
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[NOTE]
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====
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===
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In accordance with https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6797#section-7.2[RFC6797], the HSTS header is only injected into HTTPS responses.
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In order for the browser to acknowledge the header, the browser must first trust the CA that signed the SSL certificate used to make the connection (not just the SSL certificate).
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====
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===
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One way for a site to be marked as a HSTS host is to have the host preloaded into the browser.
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Another is to add the "Strict-Transport-Security" header to the response.
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@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ WebSecurityConfigurerAdapter {
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----
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[[headers-hpkp]]
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=== HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP)
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== HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP)
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HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) is a security feature that tells a web client to associate a specific cryptographic public key with a certain web server to prevent Man in the Middle (MITM) attacks with forged certificates.
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To ensure the authenticity of a server's public key used in TLS sessions, this public key is wrapped into a X.509 certificate which is usually signed by a certificate authority (CA).
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@ -372,9 +372,9 @@ When the client visits the server again, it expects a certificate containing a p
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If the server delivers an unknown public key, the client should present a warning to the user.
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[NOTE]
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====
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===
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Because the user-agent needs to validate the pins against the SSL certificate chain, the HPKP header is only injected into HTTPS responses.
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====
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===
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Enabling this feature for your site is as simple as returning the Public-Key-Pins HTTP header when your site is accessed over HTTPS.
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For example, the following would instruct the user-agent to only report pin validation failures to a given URI (via the https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7469#section-2.1.4[*_report-uri_*] directive) for 2 pins:
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@ -435,16 +435,16 @@ WebSecurityConfigurerAdapter {
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----
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[[headers-frame-options]]
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=== X-Frame-Options
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== X-Frame-Options
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Allowing your website to be added to a frame can be a security issue.
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For example, using clever CSS styling users could be tricked into clicking on something that they were not intending (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3mk0RySeNsU[video demo]).
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For example, a user that is logged into their bank might click a button that grants access to other users.
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This sort of attack is known as https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clickjacking[Clickjacking].
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[NOTE]
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====
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===
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Another modern approach to dealing with clickjacking is to use <<headers-csp>>.
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====
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===
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There are a number ways to mitigate clickjacking attacks.
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For example, to protect legacy browsers from clickjacking attacks you can use https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Clickjacking_Defense_Cheat_Sheet#Best-for-now_Legacy_Browser_Frame_Breaking_Script[frame breaking code].
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@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ WebSecurityConfigurerAdapter {
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----
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[[headers-xss-protection]]
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=== X-XSS-Protection
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== X-XSS-Protection
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Some browsers have built in support for filtering out https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_Reflected_Cross_site_scripting_(OWASP-DV-001)[reflected XSS attacks].
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This is by no means foolproof, but does assist in XSS protection.
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----
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[[headers-csp]]
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=== Content Security Policy (CSP)
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== Content Security Policy (CSP)
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https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/[Content Security Policy (CSP)] is a mechanism that web applications can leverage to mitigate content injection vulnerabilities, such as cross-site scripting (XSS).
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CSP is a declarative policy that provides a facility for web application authors to declare and ultimately inform the client (user-agent) about the sources from which the web application expects to load resources.
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[NOTE]
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====
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===
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Content Security Policy is not intended to solve all content injection vulnerabilities.
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Instead, CSP can be leveraged to help reduce the harm caused by content injection attacks.
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As a first line of defense, web application authors should validate their input and encode their output.
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====
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===
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A web application may employ the use of CSP by including one of the following HTTP headers in the response:
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If the site violates this policy, by attempting to load a script from _evil.com_, the user-agent will send a violation report to the declared URL specified by the _report-uri_ directive, but still allow the violating resource to load nevertheless.
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[[headers-csp-configure]]
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==== Configuring Content Security Policy
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=== Configuring Content Security Policy
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It's important to note that Spring Security *_does not add_* Content Security Policy by default.
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The web application author must declare the security policy(s) to enforce and/or monitor for the protected resources.
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----
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[[headers-csp-links]]
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==== Additional Resources
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=== Additional Resources
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Applying Content Security Policy to a web application is often a non-trivial undertaking.
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The following resources may provide further assistance in developing effective security policies for your site.
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https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/[W3C Candidate Recommendation]
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[[headers-referrer]]
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=== Referrer Policy
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== Referrer Policy
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https://www.w3.org/TR/referrer-policy[Referrer Policy] is a mechanism that web applications can leverage to manage the referrer field, which contains the last
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page the user was on.
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The Referrer-Policy response header instructs the browser to let the destination knows the source where the user was previously.
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[[headers-referrer-configure]]
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==== Configuring Referrer Policy
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=== Configuring Referrer Policy
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Spring Security *_doesn't add_* Referrer Policy header by default.
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[[headers-feature]]
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=== Feature Policy
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== Feature Policy
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https://wicg.github.io/feature-policy/[Feature Policy] is a mechanism that allows web developers to selectively enable, disable, and modify the behavior of certain APIs and web features in the browser.
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These policies restrict what APIs the site can access or modify the browser's default behavior for certain features.
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[[headers-feature-configure]]
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==== Configuring Feature Policy
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=== Configuring Feature Policy
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Spring Security *_doesn't add_* Feature Policy header by default.
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----
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[[headers-clearsitedata]]
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=== Clear Site Data
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== Clear Site Data
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https://www.w3.org/TR/clear-site-data/[Clear Site Data] is a mechanism by which any browser-side data - cookies, local storage, and the like - can be removed when an HTTP response contains this header:
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This is a nice clean-up action to perform on logout.
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[[headers-clearsitedata-configure]]
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==== Configuring Clear Site Data
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=== Configuring Clear Site Data
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Spring Security *_doesn't add_* the Clear Site Data header by default.
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The reason for this is that any session state, say the `JSESSIONID` cookie, would be removed, effectively logging the user out.
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[[headers-custom]]
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=== Custom Headers
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== Custom Headers
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Spring Security has mechanisms to make it convenient to add the more common security headers to your application.
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However, it also provides hooks to enable adding custom headers.
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[[headers-static]]
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==== Static Headers
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=== Static Headers
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There may be times you wish to inject custom security headers into your application that are not supported out of the box.
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For example, given the following custom security header:
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----
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[[headers-writer]]
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==== Headers Writer
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=== Headers Writer
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When the namespace or Java configuration does not support the headers you want, you can create a custom `HeadersWriter` instance or even provide a custom implementation of the `HeadersWriter`.
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Let's take a look at an example of using an custom instance of `XFrameOptionsHeaderWriter`.
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[[headers-delegatingrequestmatcherheaderwriter]]
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==== DelegatingRequestMatcherHeaderWriter
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=== DelegatingRequestMatcherHeaderWriter
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At times you may want to only write a header for certain requests.
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For example, perhaps you want to only protect your log in page from being framed.
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You could use the `DelegatingRequestMatcherHeaderWriter` to do so.
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Reference in New Issue