From e4a2ac27d6b96eade5fbe941ae5525d815aea362 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Konstantin Filtschew Date: Fri, 20 Jun 2025 14:37:12 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] Fixed link to CSRF checks --- docs/modules/ROOT/pages/features/exploits/csrf.adoc | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/docs/modules/ROOT/pages/features/exploits/csrf.adoc b/docs/modules/ROOT/pages/features/exploits/csrf.adoc index 28a1903e5f..34184006af 100644 --- a/docs/modules/ROOT/pages/features/exploits/csrf.adoc +++ b/docs/modules/ROOT/pages/features/exploits/csrf.adoc @@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ This lets the expected CSRF token outlive the session. + One might ask why the expected CSRF token is not stored in a cookie by default. This is because there are known exploits in which headers (for example, to specify the cookies) can be set by another domain. -This is the same reason Ruby on Rails https://weblog.rubyonrails.org/2011/2/8/csrf-protection-bypass-in-ruby-on-rails/[no longer skips a CSRF checks when the header X-Requested-With is present]. +This is the same reason Ruby on Rails https://rubyonrails.org/2011/2/8/csrf-protection-bypass-in-ruby-on-rails[no longer skips a CSRF checks when the header X-Requested-With is present]. See https://web.archive.org/web/20210221120355/https://lists.webappsec.org/pipermail/websecurity_lists.webappsec.org/2011-February/007533.html[this webappsec.org thread] for details on how to perform the exploit. Another disadvantage is that by removing the state (that is, the timeout), you lose the ability to forcibly invalidate the token if it is compromised.