spring-security/doc/docbook/acegi.xml

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<book>
<bookinfo>
<title>Acegi Security System for Spring</title>
<subtitle>Reference Documentation</subtitle>
<releaseinfo>1.0.0</releaseinfo>
<authorgroup>
<author>
<firstname>Ben</firstname>
<surname>Alex</surname>
</author>
</authorgroup>
</bookinfo>
<toc></toc>
<preface id="preface">
<title>Preface</title>
<para>This document provides a reference guide to the Acegi Security
System for Spring, which is a series of classes that deliver
authentication and authorization services within the Spring
Framework.</para>
<para>I would like to acknowledge this reference was prepared using the
DocBook configuration included with the Spring Framework. The Spring team
in turn acknowledge Chris Bauer (Hibernate) for his assistance with their
DocBook.</para>
</preface>
<chapter id="security">
<title>Security</title>
<sect1 id="security-before-you-begin">
<title>Before You Begin</title>
<para>For your security, each official release JAR of Acegi Security has
been signed by the project leader. This does not in any way alter the
liability disclaimer contained in the License, but it does ensure you
are using a properly reviewed, official build of Acegi Security. Please
refer to the <literal>readme.txt</literal> file in the root of the
release distribution for instructions on how to validate the JARs are
correctly signed, and which certificate has been used to sign
them.</para>
</sect1>
<sect1 id="security-introduction">
<title>Introduction</title>
<para>The Acegi Security System for Spring provides authentication and
authorization capabilities for Spring-powered projects, with optional
integration with popular web containers. The security architecture was
designed from the ground up using "The Spring Way" of development, which
includes using bean contexts, interceptors and interface-driven
programming. As a consequence, the Acegi Security System for Spring is
useful out-of-the-box for those seeking to secure their Spring-based
applications, and can be easily adapted to complex customized
requirements.</para>
<para>Security involves two distinct operations, authentication and
authorization. The former relates to resolving whether or not a caller
is who they claim to be. Authorization on the other hand relates to
determining whether or not an authenticated caller is permitted to
perform a given operation.</para>
<para>Throughout the Acegi Security System for Spring, the user, system
or agent that needs to be authenticated is referred to as a "principal".
The security architecture does not have a notion of roles or groups,
which you may be familiar with from other security implementations,
although equivalent functionality is fully accommodated by Acegi
Security.</para>
<sect2 id="security-introduction-status">
<title>Current Status</title>
<para>The Acegi Security System for Spring is widely used by members
of the Spring Community. The APIs are considered stable and only minor
changes are expected. Having said that, like many other projects we
need to strike a balance between backward compatibility and
improvement. Effective version 0.6.1, Acegi Security uses the Apache
Portable Runtime Project versioning guidelines, available from
<literal>http://apr.apache.org/versioning.html</literal>.</para>
<para>We are now at release 0.9.0, and a lot of effort has been made
to implement all non-backward compatible changes either in or before
this release. Some minor improvements are currently intended to the
1.0.0 release, although they will in no way modify the project's
central interfaces or classes. Users of Acegi Security System for
Spring should therefore be comfortable depending on the current
version of the project in their applications. Please note that we will
be changing the package name prefix in the 1.0.0 release, but this
should be a simple "find and replace" type operation in your
code.</para>
</sect2>
</sect1>
<sect1 id="security-high-level-design">
<title>High Level Design</title>
<sect2 id="security-high-level-design-key-components">
<title>Key Components</title>
<para>Most enterprise applications have four basic security
requirements. First, they need to be able to authenticate a principal.
Second, they need to be able to secure web requests. Third, enterprise
applications need to be able to secure services layer methods.
Finally, quite often an enterprise application will need to secure
domain object instances. Acegi Security provides a comprehensive
framework for achieving all of these four common enterprise
application security requirements.</para>
<para>The Acegi Security System for Spring essentially comprises eight
key functional parts:</para>
<itemizedlist spacing="compact">
<listitem>
<para>An <literal>Authentication</literal> object which holds the
principal, credentials and the authorities granted to the
principal. The object can also store additional information
associated with an authentication request, such as the source
TCP/IP address.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>A <literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal> which holds the
<literal>Authentication</literal> object in a
<literal>ThreadLocal</literal>-bound object.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>An <literal>AuthenticationManager</literal> to authenticate
the <literal>Authentication</literal> object presented via the
<literal>ContextHolder</literal>.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>An <literal>AccessDecisionManager</literal> to authorize a
given operation.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>A <literal>RunAsManager</literal> to optionally replace the
<literal>Authentication</literal> object whilst a given operation
is being executed.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>A "secure object" interceptor, which coordinates the
authentication, authorization, run-as replacement, after
invocation handling and execution of a given operation.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>An <literal>AfterInvocationManager</literal> which can
modify an <literal>Object</literal> returned from a "secure
object" invocation, such as removing <literal>Collection</literal>
elements a principal does not have authority to access.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>An acess control list (ACL) management package, which can be
used to obtain the ACLs applicable for domain object
instances.</para>
</listitem>
</itemizedlist>
<para>A "secure object" interceptor executes most of the Acegi
Security key classes and in doing so delivers the framework's major
features. Given its importance, Figure 1 shows the key relationships
and concrete implementations of
<literal>AbstractSecurityInterceptor</literal>.</para>
<para><mediaobject>
<imageobject role="html">
<imagedata align="center"
fileref="images/SecurityInterception.gif"
format="GIF" />
</imageobject>
<caption>
<para>Figure 1: The key "secure object" model</para>
</caption>
</mediaobject></para>
<para>Each "secure object" interceptor (hereinafter called a "security
interceptor") works with a particular type of "secure object". So,
what is a secure object? Secure objects refer to any type of object
that can have security applied to it. A secure object must provide
some form of callback, so that the security interceptor can
transparently do its work as required, and callback the object when it
is time for it to proceed with the requested operation. If secure
objects cannot provide a native callback approach, a wrapper needs to
be written so this becomes possible.</para>
<para>Each secure object has its own package under
<literal>org.acegisecurity.intercept</literal>. Every other package in
the security system is secure object independent, in that it can
support any type of secure object presented.</para>
<para>Only developers contemplating an entirely new way of
intercepting and authorizing requests would need to use secure objects
directly. For example, it would be possible to build a new secure
object to secure calls to a messaging system that does not use
<literal>MethodInvocation</literal>s. Most Spring applications will
simply use the three currently supported secure object types (AOP
Alliance <literal>MethodInvocation</literal>, AspectJ
<literal>JoinPoint</literal> and web request
<literal>FilterInterceptor</literal>) with complete
transparency.</para>
<para>Each of the eight key parts of Acegi Security are discussed in
detail throughout this document.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-high-level-design-supported-secure-objects">
<title>Supported Secure Objects</title>
<para>As shown in the base of Figure 1, the Acegi Security System for
Spring currently supports three secure objects.</para>
<para>The first handles an AOP Alliance
<literal>MethodInvocation</literal>. This is the secure object type
used to protect Spring beans. Developers will generally use this
secure object type to secure their business objects. To make a
standard Spring-hosted bean available as a
<literal>MethodInvocation</literal>, the bean is simply published
through a <literal>ProxyFactoryBean</literal> or
<literal>BeanNameAutoProxyCreator</literal> or
<literal>DefaultAdvisorAutoProxyCreator</literal>. Most Spring
developers would already be familiar with these due to their use in
transactions and other areas of Spring.</para>
<para>The second type is an AspectJ <literal>JoinPoint</literal>.
AspectJ has a particular use in securing domain object instances, as
these are most often managed outside the Spring bean container. By
using AspectJ, standard constructs such as <literal>new
Person();</literal> can be used and full security will be applied to
them by Acegi Security. The
<literal>AspectJSecurityInterceptor</literal> is still managed by
Spring, which creates the aspect singleton and wires it with the
appropriate authentication managers, access decision managers and so
on.</para>
<para>The third type is a <literal>FilterInvocation</literal>. This is
an object included with the Acegi Security System for Spring. It is
created by an included filter and simply wraps the HTTP
<literal>ServletRequest</literal>, <literal>ServletResponse</literal>
and <literal>FilterChain</literal>. The
<literal>FilterInvocation</literal> enables HTTP resources to be
secured. Developers do not usually need to understand the mechanics of
how this works, because they just add the filters to their
<literal>web.xml</literal> and let the security system do its
work.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-high-level-design-configuration-attributes">
<title>Configuration Attributes</title>
<para>Every secure object can represent an infinite number of
individual requests. For example, a
<literal>MethodInvocation</literal> can represent the invocation of
any method with any arguments, whilst a
<literal>FilterInvocation</literal> can represent any HTTP URL.</para>
<para>The Acegi Security System for Spring needs to record the
configuration that applies to each of these possible requests. The
security configuration of a request to
<literal>BankManager.getBalance(int accountNumber)</literal> needs to
be very different from the security configuration of a request to
<literal>BankManager.approveLoan(int applicationNumber)</literal>.
Similarly, the security configuration of a request to
<literal>http://some.bank.com/index.htm</literal> needs to be very
different from the security configuration of
<literal>http://some.bank.com/manage/timesheet.jsp</literal>.</para>
<para>To store the various security configurations associated with
different requests, a configuration attribute is used. At an
implementation level a configuration attribute is represented by the
<literal>ConfigAttribute</literal> interface. One concrete
implementation of <literal>ConfigAttribute</literal> is provided,
<literal>SecurityConfig</literal>, which simply stores a configuration
attribute as a <literal>String</literal>.</para>
<para>The collection of <literal>ConfigAttribute</literal>s associated
with a particular request is held in a
<literal>ConfigAttributeDefinition</literal>. This concrete class is
simply a holder of <literal>ConfigAttribute</literal>s and does
nothing special.</para>
<para>When a request is received by the security interceptor, it needs
to determine which configuration attributes apply. In other words, it
needs to find the <literal>ConfigAttributeDefinition</literal> which
applies to the request. This decision is handled by the
<literal>ObjectDefinitionSource</literal> interface. The main method
provided by this interface is <literal>public
ConfigAttributeDefinition getAttributes(Object object)</literal>, with
the <literal>Object</literal> being the secure object. Recall the
secure object contains details of the request, so the
<literal>ObjectDefinitionSource</literal> implementation will be able
to extract the details it requires to lookup the relevant
<literal>ConfigAttributeDefinition</literal>.</para>
</sect2>
</sect1>
<sect1 id="security-request-contexts">
<title>Request Contexts</title>
<sect2 id="security-contexts-history">
<title>Historical Approach</title>
<para>Prior to release 0.9.0, Acegi Security used a
<literal>ContextHolder</literal> to store a <literal>Context</literal>
between sessions. A particular subclass of <literal>Context</literal>,
<literal>SecureContext</literal> defined an interface used for storage
of the <literal>Authentication</literal> object. The
<literal>ContextHolder</literal> was a <literal>ThreadLocal</literal>.
A fuller discussion of the <literal>ThreadLocal</literal> usage with
Acegi Security follows in this document.
<literal>ContextHolder</literal> and <literal>SecureContext</literal>
was removed from 0.9.0 after discussion with other Spring developers
for the sake of consistency. See for example
<literal>http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.java.springframework.devel/8290</literal>
and JIRA task SEC-77. This history is mentioned as the long period
<literal>ContextHolder</literal> was used will likely mean that
certain documentation you encounter concerning Acegi Security might
still refer to <literal>ContextHolder</literal>. Generally you can
just substitute "<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal>" for
"<literal>ContextHolder</literal>", and
"<literal>SecurityContext</literal>" for
"<literal>SecureContext</literal>", and you'll have the primary
meaning of such documentation.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-contexts-security-context">
<title>SecurityContext</title>
<para>The Acegi Security System for Spring uses a
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal> to store the
<literal>SecurityContext</literal>. The
<literal>SecurityContext</literal> contains a single getter/setter for
<literal>Authentication</literal>. All Acegi Security classes query
the <literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal> for obtaining the current
<literal>SecurityContext</literal> (and in turn the principal).
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal> is a
<literal>ThreadLocal</literal>, meaning it is associated with the
current thread of execution.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-contexts-storage">
<title>Context Storage</title>
<para>Central to Acegi Security's design is that the contents of the
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal> (which is simply a
<literal>SecurityContext</literal> implementation) can be stored
between web requests. This is so that a successfully authenticated
principal can be identified on subsequent requests through the
<literal>Authentication</literal> stored inside the
<literal>SecurityContext</literal> obtained from the
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal>. The
<literal>HttpSessionContextIntegrationFilter</literal> exists to
automatically copy the contents of a well-defined
<literal>HttpSession</literal> attribute into the
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal>, then at the end of each
request, copy the <literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal> contents
back into the <literal>HttpSession</literal> ready for next
request.</para>
<para>It is essential - and an extremely common error of end users -
that <literal>HttpSessionContextIntegrationFilter</literal> appears
before any other Acegi Security filter. Acegi Security filters expect
to be able to modify the <literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal>
contents as they see fit, and something else (namely
<literal>HttpSessionContextIntegrationFilter</literal>) will store
those between requests if necessary. This is why
<literal>HttpSessionContextIntegrationFilter</literal> must be the
first filter used.</para>
<para>You can define a custom <literal>SecurityContext</literal>
implementation be used in your application by setting the
<literal>context</literal> property on the
<literal>HttpSessionContextIntegrationFilter</literal> bean.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-localization">
<title>Localization</title>
<para>From 1.0.0, Acegi Security supports localization of exception
messages that end users are likely to see. Such exceptions include
authentication failures and access being denied (authorization
failures). Exceptions and logging that is focused on developers or
system deployers (including incorrect attributes, interface contract
violations, using incorrect constructors, startup time validation,
debug-level logging) etc are not localized and instead are hard-coded
in English within Acegi Security's code.</para>
<para>Shipping in the <literal>acegi-security-xx.jar</literal> inside
the <literal>org.acegisecurity</literal> package is a
<literal>messages.properties</literal> file. This should be referred
to by your <literal>ApplicationContext</literal>, as Acegi Security
classes implement Spring's <literal>MessageSourceAware</literal>
interface and expect the message resolver to be dependency injected at
application context startup time. Usually all you need to do is
register a bean inside your application context to refer to the
messages. An example is shown below:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;bean id="messageSource" class="org.springframework.context.support.ReloadableResourceBundleMessageSource"&gt;
&lt;property name="basename"&gt;&lt;value&gt;org/acegisecurity/messages&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>The <literal>messages.properties</literal> is named in
accordance with standard resource bundles and represents the default
language supported by Acegi Securtiy messages. This default file is in
English. If you do not register a message source, Acegi Security will
still work correctly and fallback to hard-coded English versions of
the messages.</para>
<para>If you wish to customize the
<literal>messages.properties</literal> file, or support other
languages, you should copy the file, rename it accordingly, and
register it inside the above bean definition. There are not a large
number of message keys inside this file, so localization should not be
considered a major initiative. If you do perform localization of this
file, please consider sharing your work with the community by logging
a JIRA task and attaching your appropriately-named localized version
of <literal>messages.properties</literal>.</para>
<para>Rounding out the discussion on localization is the Spring
<literal>ThreadLocal</literal> known as
<literal>org.springframework.context.i18n.LocaleContextHolder</literal>.
You should set the <literal>LocaleContextHolder</literal> to represent
the preferred <literal>Locale</literal> of each user. Acegi Security
will attempt to locate a message from the message source using the
<literal>Locale</literal> obtained from this
<literal>ThreadLocal</literal>. Please refer to Spring documentation
for further details on using <literal>LocaleContextHolder</literal>
and the helper classes that can automatically set it for you (eg
<literal>AcceptHeaderLocaleResolver</literal>,
<literal>CookieLocaleResolver</literal>,
<literal>FixedLocaleResolver</literal>,
<literal>SessionLocaleResolver</literal> etc)</para>
</sect2>
</sect1>
<sect1 id="security-interception">
<title>Security Interception</title>
<sect2 id="security-interception-all-secure-objects">
<title>All Secure Objects</title>
<para>As described in the High Level Design section, each secure
object has its own security interceptor which is responsible for
handling each request. Handling involves a number of
operations:</para>
<orderedlist>
<listitem>
<para>Store the configuration attributes that are associated with
each secure request.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>Extract the <literal>ConfigAttributeDefinition</literal>
that applies to the request from the relevant
<literal>ObjectDefinitionSource</literal>.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>Obtain the <literal>Authentication</literal> object from the
<literal>SecurityContext</literal>, which is held in the
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal>.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>Pass the <literal>Authentication</literal> object to the
<literal>AuthenticationManager</literal>, update the
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal> with the response.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>Pass the <literal>Authentication</literal> object, the
<literal>ConfigAttributeDefinition</literal>, and the secure
object to the <literal>AccessDecisionManager</literal>.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>Pass the <literal>Authentication</literal> object, the
<literal>ConfigAttributeDefinition</literal>, and the secure
object to the <literal>RunAsManager</literal>.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>If the <literal>RunAsManager</literal> returns a new
<literal>Authentication</literal> object, update the
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal> with it.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>Proceed with the request execution of the secure
object.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>If the <literal>RunAsManager</literal> earlier returned a
new <literal>Authentication</literal> object, update the
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal> with the
<literal>Authentication</literal> object that was previously
returned by the <literal>AuthenticationManager</literal>.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>If an <literal>AfterInvocationManager</literal> is defined,
pass it the result of the secure object execution so that it may
throw an <literal>AccessDeniedException</literal> or mutate the
returned object if required.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>Return any result received from the
<literal>AfterInvocationManager</literal>, or if no
<literal>AfterInvocationManager</literal> is defined, simply
return the result provided by the secure object execution.</para>
</listitem>
</orderedlist>
<para>Whilst this may seem quite involved, don't worry. Developers
interact with the security process by simply implementing basic
interfaces (such as <literal>AccessDecisionManager</literal>), which
are fully discussed below.</para>
<para>The <literal>AbstractSecurityInterceptor</literal> handles the
majority of the flow listed above. As shown in Figure 1, each secure
object has its own security interceptor which subclasses
<literal>AbstractSecurityInterceptor</literal>. Each of these secure
object-specific security interceptors are discussed below.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-interception-aopalliance">
<title>AOP Alliance (MethodInvocation) Security Interceptor</title>
<para>To secure <literal>MethodInvocation</literal>s, developers
simply add a properly configured
<literal>MethodSecurityInterceptor</literal> into the application
context. Next the beans requiring security are chained into the
interceptor. This chaining is accomplished using Springs
<literal>ProxyFactoryBean</literal> or
<literal>BeanNameAutoProxyCreator</literal>, as commonly used by many
other parts of Spring (refer to the sample application for examples).
Alternatively, Acegi Security provides a
<literal>MethodDefinitionSourceAdvisor</literal> which may be used
with Spring's <literal>DefaultAdvisorAutoProxyCreator</literal> to
automatically chain the security interceptor in front of any beans
defined against the <literal>MethodSecurityInterceptor</literal>. The
<literal>MethodSecurityInterceptor</literal> itself is configured as
follows:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;bean id="bankManagerSecurity" class="org.acegisecurity.intercept.method.aopalliance.MethodSecurityInterceptor"&gt;
&lt;property name="validateConfigAttributes"&gt;&lt;value&gt;true&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="authenticationManager"&gt;&lt;ref bean="authenticationManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="accessDecisionManager"&gt;&lt;ref bean="accessDecisionManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="runAsManager"&gt;&lt;ref bean="runAsManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="afterInvocationManager"&gt;&lt;ref bean="afterInvocationManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="objectDefinitionSource"&gt;
&lt;value&gt;
org.acegisecurity.context.BankManager.delete*=ROLE_SUPERVISOR,RUN_AS_SERVER
org.acegisecurity.context.BankManager.getBalance=ROLE_TELLER,ROLE_SUPERVISOR,BANKSECURITY_CUSTOMER,RUN_AS_SERVER
&lt;/value&gt;
&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>As shown above, the <literal>MethodSecurityInterceptor</literal>
is configured with a reference to an
<literal>AuthenticationManager</literal>,
<literal>AccessDecisionManager</literal> and
<literal>RunAsManager</literal>, which are each discussed in separate
sections below. In this case we've also defined an
<literal>AfterInvocationManager</literal>, although this is entirely
optional. The <literal>MethodSecurityInterceptor</literal> is also
configured with configuration attributes that apply to different
method signatures. A full discussion of configuration attributes is
provided in the High Level Design section of this document.</para>
<para>The <literal>MethodSecurityInterceptor</literal> can be
configured with configuration attributes in three ways. The first is
via a property editor and the application context, which is shown
above. The second is via defining the configuration attributes in your
source code using Jakarta Commons Attributes or Java 5 Annotations.
The third is via writing your own
<literal>ObjectDefinitionSource</literal>, although this is beyond the
scope of this document. Irrespective of the approach used, the
<literal>ObjectDefinitionSource</literal> is responsible for returning
a <literal>ConfigAttributeDefinition</literal> object that contains
all of the configuration attributes associated with a single secure
method.</para>
<para>It should be noted that the
<literal>MethodSecurityInterceptor.setObjectDefinitionSource()</literal>
method actually expects an instance of
<literal>MethodDefinitionSource</literal>. This is a marker interface
which subclasses <literal>ObjectDefinitionSource</literal>. It simply
denotes the <literal>ObjectDefinitionSource</literal> understands
<literal>MethodInvocation</literal>s. In the interests of simplicity
we'll continue to refer to the
<literal>MethodDefinitionSource</literal> as an
<literal>ObjectDefinitionSource</literal>, as the distinction is of
little relevance to most users of the
<literal>MethodSecurityInterceptor</literal>.</para>
<para>If using the application context property editor approach (as
shown above), commas are used to delimit the different configuration
attributes that apply to a given method pattern. Each configuration
attribute is assigned into its own <literal>SecurityConfig</literal>
object. The <literal>SecurityConfig</literal> object is discussed in
the High Level Design section.</para>
<para>If you are using the Jakarta Commons Attributes approach, your
bean context will be configured differently:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;bean id="attributes" class="org.springframework.metadata.commons.CommonsAttributes"/&gt;
&lt;bean id="objectDefinitionSource" class="org.acegisecurity.intercept.method.MethodDefinitionAttributes"&gt;
&lt;property name="attributes"&gt;&lt;ref local="attributes"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;bean id="bankManagerSecurity" class="org.acegisecurity.intercept.method.aopalliance.MethodSecurityInterceptor"&gt;
&lt;property name="validateConfigAttributes"&gt;&lt;value&gt;false&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="authenticationManager"&gt;&lt;ref bean="authenticationManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="accessDecisionManager"&gt;&lt;ref bean="accessDecisionManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="runAsManager"&gt;&lt;ref bean="runAsManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="objectDefinitionSource"&gt;&lt;ref bean="objectDefinitionSource"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>In addition, your source code will contain Jakarta Commons
Attributes tags that refer to a concrete implementation of
<literal>ConfigAttribute</literal>. The following example uses the
<literal>SecurityConfig</literal> implementation to represent the
configuration attributes, and results in the same security
configuration as provided by the property editor approach
above:</para>
<para><programlisting>public interface BankManager {
/**
* @@SecurityConfig("ROLE_SUPERVISOR")
* @@SecurityConfig("RUN_AS_SERVER")
*/
public void deleteSomething(int id);
/**
* @@SecurityConfig("ROLE_SUPERVISOR")
* @@SecurityConfig("RUN_AS_SERVER")
*/
public void deleteAnother(int id);
/**
* @@SecurityConfig("ROLE_TELLER")
* @@SecurityConfig("ROLE_SUPERVISOR")
* @@SecurityConfig("BANKSECURITY_CUSTOMER")
* @@SecurityConfig("RUN_AS_SERVER")
*/
public float getBalance(int id);
}</programlisting></para>
<para>If you are using the Spring Security Java 5 Annotations
approach, your bean context will be configured as follows:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;bean id="attributes" class="org.acegisecurity.annotation.SecurityAnnotationAttributes"/&gt;
&lt;bean id="objectDefinitionSource" class="org.acegisecurity.intercept.method.MethodDefinitionAttributes"&gt;
&lt;property name="attributes"&gt;&lt;ref local="attributes"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;bean id="bankManagerSecurity" class="org.acegisecurity.intercept.method.aopalliance.MethodSecurityInterceptor"&gt;
&lt;property name="validateConfigAttributes"&gt;&lt;value&gt;false&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="authenticationManager"&gt;&lt;ref bean="authenticationManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="accessDecisionManager"&gt;&lt;ref bean="accessDecisionManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="runAsManager"&gt;&lt;ref bean="runAsManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="objectDefinitionSource"&gt;&lt;ref bean="objectDefinitionSource"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>In addition, your source code will contain the Acegi Java 5
Security Annotations that represent the
<literal>ConfigAttribute</literal>. The following example uses the
<literal>@Secured</literal> annotations to represent the configuration
attributes, and results in the same security configuration as provided
by the property editor approach:</para>
<para><programlisting>import org.acegisecurity.annotation.Secured;
public interface BankManager {
/**
* Delete something
*/
@Secured({"ROLE_SUPERVISOR","RUN_AS_SERVER" })
public void deleteSomething(int id);
/**
* Delete another
*/
@Secured({"ROLE_SUPERVISOR","RUN_AS_SERVER" })
public void deleteAnother(int id);
/**
* Get balance
*/
@Secured({"ROLE_TELLER","ROLE_SUPERVISOR","BANKSECURITY_CUSTOMER","RUN_AS_SERVER" })
public float getBalance(int id);
}</programlisting></para>
<para>You might have noticed the
<literal>validateConfigAttributes</literal> property in the above
<literal>MethodSecurityInterceptor</literal> examples. When set to
<literal>true</literal> (the default), at startup time the
<literal>MethodSecurityInterceptor</literal> will evaluate if the
provided configuration attributes are valid. It does this by checking
each configuration attribute can be processed by either the
<literal>AccessDecisionManager</literal> or the
<literal>RunAsManager</literal>. If neither of these can process a
given configuration attribute, an exception is thrown. If using the
Jakarta Commons Attributes method of configuration, you should set
<literal>validateConfigAttributes</literal> to
<literal>false</literal>.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-interception-aspectj">
<title>AspectJ (JoinPoint) Security Interceptor</title>
<para>The AspectJ security interceptor is very similar to the AOP
Alliance security interceptor discussed in the previous section.
Indeed we will only discuss the differences in this section.</para>
<para>The AspectJ interceptor is named
<literal>AspectJSecurityInterceptor</literal>. Unlike the AOP Alliance
security interceptor, which relies on the Spring application context
to weave in the security interceptor via proxying, the
<literal>AspectJSecurityInterceptor</literal> is weaved in via the
AspectJ compiler. It would not be uncommon to use both types of
security interceptors in the same application, with
<literal>AspectJSecurityInterceptor</literal> being used for domain
object instance security and the AOP Alliance
<literal>MethodSecurityInterceptor</literal> being used for services
layer security.</para>
<para>Let's first consider how the
<literal>AspectJSecurityInterceptor</literal> is configured in the
Spring application context:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;bean id="bankManagerSecurity" class="org.acegisecurity.intercept.method.aspectj.AspectJSecurityInterceptor"&gt;
&lt;property name="validateConfigAttributes"&gt;&lt;value&gt;true&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="authenticationManager"&gt;&lt;ref bean="authenticationManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="accessDecisionManager"&gt;&lt;ref bean="accessDecisionManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="runAsManager"&gt;&lt;ref bean="runAsManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="afterInvocationManager"&gt;&lt;ref bean="afterInvocationManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="objectDefinitionSource"&gt;
&lt;value&gt;
org.acegisecurity.context.BankManager.delete*=ROLE_SUPERVISOR,RUN_AS_SERVER
org.acegisecurity.context.BankManager.getBalance=ROLE_TELLER,ROLE_SUPERVISOR,BANKSECURITY_CUSTOMER,RUN_AS_SERVER
&lt;/value&gt;
&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>As you can see, aside from the class name, the
<literal>AspectJSecurityInterceptor</literal> is exactly the same as
the AOP Alliance security interceptor. Indeed the two interceptors can
share the same <literal>objectDefinitionSource</literal>, as the
<literal>ObjectDefinitionSource</literal> works with
<literal>java.lang.reflect.Method</literal>s rather than an AOP
library-specific class. Of course, your access decisions have access
to the relevant AOP library-specific invocation (ie
<literal>MethodInvocation</literal> or <literal>JoinPoint</literal>)
and as such can consider a range of addition criteria when making
access decisions (such as method arguments).</para>
<para>Next you'll need to define an AspectJ <literal>aspect</literal>.
For example:</para>
<para><programlisting>package org.acegisecurity.samples.aspectj;
import org.acegisecurity.intercept.method.aspectj.AspectJSecurityInterceptor;
import org.acegisecurity.intercept.method.aspectj.AspectJCallback;
import org.springframework.beans.factory.InitializingBean;
public aspect DomainObjectInstanceSecurityAspect implements InitializingBean {
private AspectJSecurityInterceptor securityInterceptor;
pointcut domainObjectInstanceExecution(): target(PersistableEntity)
&amp;&amp; execution(public * *(..)) &amp;&amp; !within(DomainObjectInstanceSecurityAspect);
Object around(): domainObjectInstanceExecution() {
if (this.securityInterceptor != null) {
AspectJCallback callback = new AspectJCallback() {
public Object proceedWithObject() {
return proceed();
}
};
return this.securityInterceptor.invoke(thisJoinPoint, callback);
} else {
return proceed();
}
}
public AspectJSecurityInterceptor getSecurityInterceptor() {
return securityInterceptor;
}
public void setSecurityInterceptor(AspectJSecurityInterceptor securityInterceptor) {
this.securityInterceptor = securityInterceptor;
}
public void afterPropertiesSet() throws Exception {
if (this.securityInterceptor == null)
throw new IllegalArgumentException("securityInterceptor required");
}
}</programlisting></para>
<para>In the above example, the security interceptor will be applied
to every instance of <literal>PersistableEntity</literal>, which is an
abstract class not shown (you can use any other class or
<literal>pointcut</literal> expression you like). For those curious,
<literal>AspectJCallback</literal> is needed because the
<literal>proceed();</literal> statement has special meaning only
within an <literal>around()</literal> body. The
<literal>AspectJSecurityInterceptor</literal> calls this anonymous
<literal>AspectJCallback</literal> class when it wants the target
object to continue.</para>
<para>You will need to configure Spring to load the aspect and wire it
with the <literal>AspectJSecurityInterceptor</literal>. A bean
declaration which achieves this is shown below:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;bean id="domainObjectInstanceSecurityAspect"
class="org.acegisecurity.samples.aspectj.DomainObjectInstanceSecurityAspect"
factory-method="aspectOf"&gt;
&lt;property name="securityInterceptor"&gt;&lt;ref bean="aspectJSecurityInterceptor"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>That's it! Now you can create your beans from anywhere within
your application, using whatever means you think fit (eg <literal>new
Person();</literal>) and they will have the security interceptor
applied.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-interception-filterinvocation">
<title>FilterInvocation Security Interceptor</title>
<para>To secure <literal>FilterInvocation</literal>s, developers need
to add a filter to their <literal>web.xml</literal> that delegates to
the <literal>SecurityEnforcementFilter</literal>. A typical
configuration example is provided below: <programlisting>&lt;filter&gt;
&lt;filter-name&gt;Acegi HTTP Request Security Filter&lt;/filter-name&gt;
&lt;filter-class&gt;org.acegisecurity.util.FilterToBeanProxy&lt;/filter-class&gt;
&lt;init-param&gt;
&lt;param-name&gt;targetClass&lt;/param-name&gt;
&lt;param-value&gt;org.acegisecurity.intercept.web.SecurityEnforcementFilter&lt;/param-value&gt;
&lt;/init-param&gt;
&lt;/filter&gt;
&lt;filter-mapping&gt;
&lt;filter-name&gt;Acegi HTTP Request Security Filter&lt;/filter-name&gt;
&lt;url-pattern&gt;/*&lt;/url-pattern&gt;
&lt;/filter-mapping&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>Notice that the filter is actually a
<literal>FilterToBeanProxy</literal>. Most of the filters used by the
Acegi Security System for Spring use this class. Refer to the Filters
section to learn more about this bean.</para>
<para>In the application context you will need to configure three
beans:</para>
<programlisting>&lt;bean id="securityEnforcementFilter" class="org.acegisecurity.intercept.web.SecurityEnforcementFilter"&gt;
&lt;property name="filterSecurityInterceptor"&gt;&lt;ref bean="filterInvocationInterceptor"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="authenticationEntryPoint"&gt;&lt;ref bean="authenticationEntryPoint"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;bean id="authenticationEntryPoint" class="org.acegisecurity.ui.webapp.AuthenticationProcessingFilterEntryPoint"&gt;
&lt;property name="loginFormUrl"&gt;&lt;value&gt;/acegilogin.jsp&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="forceHttps"&gt;&lt;value&gt;false&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;bean id="filterInvocationInterceptor" class="org.acegisecurity.intercept.web.FilterSecurityInterceptor"&gt;
&lt;property name="authenticationManager"&gt;&lt;ref bean="authenticationManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="accessDecisionManager"&gt;&lt;ref bean="accessDecisionManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="runAsManager"&gt;&lt;ref bean="runAsManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="objectDefinitionSource"&gt;
&lt;value&gt;
CONVERT_URL_TO_LOWERCASE_BEFORE_COMPARISON
\A/secure/super/.*\Z=ROLE_WE_DONT_HAVE
\A/secure/.*\Z=ROLE_SUPERVISOR,ROLE_TELLER
&lt;/value&gt;
&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting>
<para>The <literal>AuthenticationEntryPoint</literal> will be called
if the user requests a secure HTTP resource but they are not
authenticated. The class handles presenting the appropriate response
to the user so that authentication can begin. Three concrete
implementations are provided with the Acegi Security System for
Spring: <literal>AuthenticationProcessingFilterEntryPoint</literal>
for commencing a form-based authentication,
<literal>BasicProcessingFilterEntryPoint</literal> for commencing a
HTTP Basic authentication process, and
<literal>CasProcessingFilterEntryPoint</literal> for commencing a Yale
Central Authentication Service (CAS) login. The
<literal>AuthenticationProcessingFilterEntryPoint</literal> and
<literal>CasProcessingFilterEntryPoint</literal> have optional
properties related to forcing the use of HTTPS, so please refer to the
JavaDocs if you require this.</para>
<para>The <literal>PortMapper</literal> provides information on which
HTTPS ports correspond to which HTTP ports. This is used by the
<literal>AuthenticationProcessingFilterEntryPoint</literal> and
several other beans. The default implementation,
<literal>PortMapperImpl</literal>, knows the common HTTP ports 80 and
8080 map to HTTPS ports 443 and 8443 respectively. You can customise
this mapping if desired.</para>
<para>The <literal>SecurityEnforcementFilter</literal> primarily
provides session management support and initiates authentication when
required. It delegates actual <literal>FilterInvocation</literal>
security decisions to the configured
<literal>FilterSecurityInterceptor</literal>.</para>
<para>Like any other security interceptor, the
<literal>FilterSecurityInterceptor</literal> requires a reference to
an <literal>AuthenticationManager</literal>,
<literal>AccessDecisionManager</literal> and
<literal>RunAsManager</literal>, which are each discussed in separate
sections below. The <literal>FilterSecurityInterceptor</literal> is
also configured with configuration attributes that apply to different
HTTP URL requests. A full discussion of configuration attributes is
provided in the High Level Design section of this document.</para>
<para>The <literal>FilterSecurityInterceptor</literal> can be
configured with configuration attributes in two ways. The first is via
a property editor and the application context, which is shown above.
The second is via writing your own
<literal>ObjectDefinitionSource</literal>, although this is beyond the
scope of this document. Irrespective of the approach used, the
<literal>ObjectDefinitionSource</literal> is responsible for returning
a <literal>ConfigAttributeDefinition</literal> object that contains
all of the configuration attributes associated with a single secure
HTTP URL.</para>
<para>It should be noted that the
<literal>FilterSecurityInterceptor.setObjectDefinitionSource()</literal>
method actually expects an instance of
<literal>FilterInvocationDefinitionSource</literal>. This is a marker
interface which subclasses <literal>ObjectDefinitionSource</literal>.
It simply denotes the <literal>ObjectDefinitionSource</literal>
understands <literal>FilterInvocation</literal>s. In the interests of
simplicity we'll continue to refer to the
<literal>FilterInvocationDefinitionSource</literal> as an
<literal>ObjectDefinitionSource</literal>, as the distinction is of
little relevance to most users of the
<literal>FilterSecurityInterceptor</literal>.</para>
<para>If using the application context property editor approach (as
shown above), commas are used to delimit the different configuration
attributes that apply to each HTTP URL. Each configuration attribute
is assigned into its own <literal>SecurityConfig</literal> object. The
<literal>SecurityConfig</literal> object is discussed in the High
Level Design section. The <literal>ObjectDefinitionSource</literal>
created by the property editor,
<literal>FilterInvocationDefinitionSource</literal>, matches
configuration attributes against <literal>FilterInvocations</literal>
based on expression evaluation of the request URL. Two standard
expression syntaxes are supported. The default is to treat all
expressions as regular expressions. Alternatively, the presence of a
<literal>PATTERN_TYPE_APACHE_ANT</literal> directive will cause all
expressions to be treated as Apache Ant paths. It is not possible to
mix expression syntaxes within the same definition. For example, the
earlier configuration could be generated using Apache Ant paths as
follows:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;bean id="filterInvocationInterceptor" class="org.acegisecurity.intercept.web.FilterSecurityInterceptor"&gt;
&lt;property name="authenticationManager"&gt;&lt;ref bean="authenticationManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="accessDecisionManager"&gt;&lt;ref bean="accessDecisionManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="runAsManager"&gt;&lt;ref bean="runAsManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="objectDefinitionSource"&gt;
&lt;value&gt;
CONVERT_URL_TO_LOWERCASE_BEFORE_COMPARISON
PATTERN_TYPE_APACHE_ANT
/secure/super/**=ROLE_WE_DONT_HAVE
/secure/**=ROLE_SUPERVISOR,ROLE_TELLER
&lt;/value&gt;
&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>Irrespective of the type of expression syntax used, expressions
are always evaluated in the order they are defined. Thus it is
important that more specific expressions are defined higher in the
list than less specific expressions. This is reflected in our example
above, where the more specific <literal>/secure/super/</literal>
pattern appears higher than the less specific
<literal>/secure/</literal> pattern. If they were reversed, the
<literal>/secure/</literal> pattern would always match and the
<literal>/secure/super/</literal> pattern would never be
evaluated.</para>
<para>The special keyword
<literal>CONVERT_URL_TO_LOWERCASE_BEFORE_COMPARISON</literal> causes
the <literal>FilterInvocationDefinitionSource</literal> to
automatically convert a request URL to lowercase before comparison
against the expressions. Whilst by default the case of the request URL
is not converted, it is generally recommended to use
<literal>CONVERT_URL_TO_LOWERCASE_BEFORE_COMPARISON</literal> and
write each expression assuming lowercase.</para>
<para>As with other security interceptors, the
<literal>validateConfigAttributes</literal> property is observed. When
set to <literal>true</literal> (the default), at startup time the
<literal>FilterSecurityInterceptor</literal> will evaluate if the
provided configuration attributes are valid. It does this by checking
each configuration attribute can be processed by either the
<literal>AccessDecisionManager</literal> or the
<literal>RunAsManager</literal>. If neither of these can process a
given configuration attribute, an exception is thrown.</para>
</sect2>
</sect1>
<sect1 id="security-authentication">
<title>Authentication</title>
<sect2 id="security-authentication-requests">
<title>Authentication Requests</title>
<para>Authentication requires a way for client code to present its
security identification to the Acegi Security System for Spring. This
is the role of the <literal>Authentication</literal> interface. The
<literal>Authentication</literal> interface holds three important
objects: the principal (the identity of the caller), the credentials
(the proof of the identity of the caller, such as a password), and the
authorities that have been granted to the principal. The principal and
its credentials are populated by the client code, whilst the granted
authorities are populated by the
<literal>AuthenticationManager</literal>.</para>
<para><mediaobject>
<imageobject role="html">
<imagedata align="center" fileref="images/Authentication.gif"
format="GIF" />
</imageobject>
<caption>
<para>Figure 3: Key Authentication Architecture</para>
</caption>
</mediaobject></para>
<para>As shown in Figure 3, the Acegi Security System for Spring
includes several concrete <literal>Authentication</literal>
implementations:</para>
<itemizedlist spacing="compact">
<listitem>
<para><literal>UsernamePasswordAuthenticationToken</literal>
allows a username and password to be presented as the principal
and credentials respectively. It is also what is created by the
HTTP Session Authentication system.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>TestingAuthenticationToken</literal> facilitates
unit testing by automatically being considered an authenticated
object by its associated
<literal>AuthenticationProvider</literal>.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>RunAsUserToken</literal> is used by the default
run-as authentication replacement implementation. This is
discussed further in the Run-As Authentication Replacement
section.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>CasAuthenticationToken</literal> is used to
represent a successful Yale Central Authentication Service (CAS)
authentication. This is discussed further in the CAS
section.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>PrincipalAcegiUserToken</literal> and
<literal>JettyAcegiUserToken</literal> implement
<literal>AuthByAdapter</literal> (a subclass of
<literal>Authentication</literal>) and are used whenever
authentication is completed by Acegi Security System for Spring
container adapters. This is discussed further in the Container
Adapters section.</para>
</listitem>
</itemizedlist>
<para>The authorities granted to a principal are represented by the
<literal>GrantedAuthority</literal> interface. The
<literal>GrantedAuthority</literal> interface is discussed at length
in the Authorization section.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-authentication-manager">
<title>Authentication Manager</title>
<para>As discussed in the Security Interception section, the
<literal>AbstractSecurityInterceptor</literal> extracts the
<literal>Authentication</literal> object from the
<literal>SecurityContext</literal> in the
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal>. This is then passed to an
<literal>AuthenticationManager</literal>. The
<literal>AuthenticationManager</literal> interface is very
simple:</para>
<programlisting>public Authentication authenticate(Authentication authentication) throws AuthenticationException;</programlisting>
<para>Implementations of <literal>AuthenticationManager</literal> are
required to throw an <literal>AuthenticationException</literal> should
authentication fail, or return a fully populated
<literal>Authentication</literal> object. In particular, the returned
<literal>Authentication</literal> object should contain an array of
<literal>GrantedAuthority</literal> objects. The
<literal>SecurityInterceptor</literal> places the populated
<literal>Authentication</literal> object back in the
<literal>SecurityContext</literal> in the
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal>, overwriting the original
<literal>Authentication</literal> object.</para>
<para>The <literal>AuthenticationException</literal> has a number of
subclasses. The most important are
<literal>BadCredentialsException</literal> (an incorrect principal or
credentials), <literal>DisabledException</literal> and
<literal>LockedException</literal>. The latter two exceptions indicate
the principal was found, but the credentials were not checked and
authentication is denied. An
<literal>AuthenticationServiceException</literal> is also provided,
which indicates the authentication system could not process the
request (eg a database was unavailable).
<literal>AuthenticationException</literal> also has a
<literal>CredentialsExpiredException</literal> and
<literal>AccoungtExpiredException</literal> subclass, although these
are less commonly used.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-authentication-provider">
<title>Provider-Based Authentication</title>
<para>Whilst the basic <literal>Authentication</literal> and
<literal>AuthenticationManager</literal> interfaces enable users to
develop their own authentication systems, users should consider using
the provider-based authentication packages provided by the Acegi
Security System for Spring. The key class,
<literal>ProviderManager</literal>, is configured via the bean context
with a list of <literal>AuthenticationProvider</literal>s:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;bean id="authenticationManager" class="org.acegisecurity.providers.ProviderManager"&gt;
&lt;property name="providers"&gt;
&lt;list&gt;
&lt;ref bean="daoAuthenticationProvider"/&gt;
&lt;ref bean="someOtherAuthenticationProvider"/&gt;
&lt;/list&gt;
&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para><literal>ProviderManager</literal> calls a series of registered
<literal>AuthenticationProvider</literal> implementations, until one
is found that indicates it is able to authenticate a given
<literal>Authentication</literal> class. When the first compatible
<literal>AuthenticationProvider</literal> is located, it is passed the
authentication request. The <literal>AuthenticationProvider</literal>
will then either throw an <literal>AuthenticationException</literal>
or return a fully populated <literal>Authentication</literal>
object.</para>
<para>Note the <literal>ProviderManager</literal> may throw a
<literal>ProviderNotFoundException</literal> (a subclass of
<literal>AuthenticationException</literal>) if it none of the
registered <literal>AuthenticationProviders</literal> can validate the
<literal>Authentication</literal> object.</para>
<para>The <literal>ProviderManager</literal> also has several other
important functions. It integrates with concurrent session handling
supoprt, and it also converts any exceptions thrown by an
<literal>AuthenticationProvider</literal> and publishes a suitable
event. The events that are published are located in the
<literal>org.acegisecurity.event.authentication</literal> package and
advanced users can map different exceptions to different events by
configuring the <literal>ProviderManager.exceptionMappings</literal>
property (generally this is not required and the default event
propagation is appropriate - especially as events will simply be
ignored if you don't have an <literal>ApplicationListener</literal>
configured in the <literal>ApplicationContext</literal>).</para>
<para>Several <literal>AuthenticationProvider</literal>
implementations are provided with the Acegi Security System for
Spring:</para>
<para><itemizedlist spacing="compact">
<listitem>
<para><literal>TestingAuthenticationProvider</literal> is able
to authenticate a <literal>TestingAuthenticationToken</literal>.
The limit of its authentication is simply to treat whatever is
contained in the <literal>TestingAuthenticationToken</literal>
as valid. This makes it ideal for use during unit testing, as
you can create an <literal>Authentication</literal> object with
precisely the <literal>GrantedAuthority</literal> objects
required for calling a given method. You definitely would not
register this <literal>AuthenticationProvider</literal> on a
production system.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>DaoAuthenticationProvider</literal> is able to
authenticate a
<literal>UsernamePasswordAuthenticationToken</literal> by
accessing an authentication respository via a data access
object. This is discussed further below, as it is the main way
authentication is initially handled.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>RunAsImplAuthenticationProvider</literal> is able
to authenticate a <literal>RunAsUserToken</literal>. This is
discussed further in the Run-As Authentication Replacement
section. You would not register this
<literal>AuthenticationProvider</literal> if you were not using
run-as replacement.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>AuthByAdapterProvider</literal> is able to
authenticate any <literal>AuthByAdapter</literal> (a subclass of
<literal>Authentication</literal> used with container adapters).
This is discussed further in the Container Adapters section. You
would not register this
<literal>AuthenticationProvider</literal> if you were not using
container adapters.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>CasAuthenticationProvider</literal> is able to
authenticate Yale Central Authentication Service (CAS) tickets.
This is discussed further in the CAS Single Sign On
section.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>JaasAuthenticationProvider</literal> is able to
delegate authentication requests to a JAAS
<literal>LoginModule</literal>. This is discussed further
below.</para>
</listitem>
</itemizedlist></para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-authentication-concurrent-login">
<title>Concurrent Session Support</title>
<para>Acegi Security is able to stop the same principal authenticating
to the same web application multiple times concurrently. Put
differently, you can stop user "Batman" from logging into a web
application twice at the same time.</para>
<para>To use concurrent session support, you'll need to add the
following to web.xml:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;listener&gt;
&lt;listener-class&gt;org.acegisecurity.ui.session.HttpSessionEventPublisher&lt;/listener-class&gt;
&lt;/listener&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>In addition, you will need to add the
<literal>org.acegisecurity.concurrent.ConcurrentSessionFilter</literal>
to your <literal>FilterChainProxy</literal>. The
ConcurrentSessionFilter requires only one property, sessionRegistry,
which generally points to an instance of
<literal>SessionRegistryImpl</literal>.</para>
<para>The <literal>web.xml</literal>
<literal>HttpSessionEventPublisher</literal> causes an
<literal>ApplicationEvent</literal> to be published to the Spring
<literal>ApplicationContext</literal> every time a
<literal>HttpSession</literal> commences or terminates. This is
critical, as it allows the <literal>SessionRegistryImpl</literal> to
be notified when a session ends.</para>
<para>You will also need to wire up the
<literal>ConcurrentSessionControllerImpl</literal> and refer to it
from your <literal>ProviderManager</literal> bean:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;bean id="authenticationManager" class="org.acegisecurity.providers.ProviderManager"&gt;
&lt;property name="providers"&gt;
&lt;!-- your providers go here --&gt;
&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="sessionController"&gt;&lt;ref bean="concurrentSessionController"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;bean id="concurrentSessionController" class="org.acegisecurity.concurrent.ConcurrentSessionControllerImpl"&gt;
&lt;property name="maximumSessions"&gt;&lt;value&gt;1&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="sessionRegistry"&gt;&lt;ref local="sessionRegistry"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;bean id="sessionRegistry" class="org.acegisecurity.concurrent.SessionRegistryImpl"/&gt;</programlisting></para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-authentication-provider-dao">
<title>Data Access Object Authentication Provider</title>
<para>The Acegi Security System for Spring includes a
production-quality <literal>AuthenticationProvider</literal>
implementation called <literal>DaoAuthenticationProvider</literal>.
This authentication provider is able to authenticate a
<literal>UsernamePasswordAuthenticationToken</literal> by obtaining
authentication details from a data access object configured at bean
creation time:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;bean id="daoAuthenticationProvider" class="org.acegisecurity.providers.dao.DaoAuthenticationProvider"&gt;
&lt;property name="authenticationDao"&gt;&lt;ref bean="inMemoryDaoImpl"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="saltSource"&gt;&lt;ref bean="saltSource"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="passwordEncoder"&gt;&lt;ref bean="passwordEncoder"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>The <literal>PasswordEncoder</literal> and
<literal>SaltSource</literal> are optional. A
<literal>PasswordEncoder</literal> provides encoding and decoding of
passwords obtained from the authentication repository. A
<literal>SaltSource</literal> enables the passwords to be populated
with a "salt", which enhances the security of the passwords in the
authentication repository. <literal>PasswordEncoder</literal>
implementations are provided with the Acegi Security System for Spring
covering MD5, SHA and cleartext encodings. Two
<literal>SaltSource</literal> implementations are also provided:
<literal>SystemWideSaltSource</literal> which encodes all passwords
with the same salt, and <literal>ReflectionSaltSource</literal>, which
inspects a given property of the returned
<literal>UserDetails</literal> object to obtain the salt. Please refer
to the JavaDocs for further details on these optional features.</para>
<para>In addition to the properties above, the
<literal>DaoAuthenticationProvider</literal> supports optional caching
of <literal>UserDetails</literal> objects. The
<literal>UserCache</literal> interface enables the
<literal>DaoAuthenticationProvider</literal> to place a
<literal>UserDetails</literal> object into the cache, and retrieve it
from the cache upon subsequent authentication attempts for the same
username. By default the <literal>DaoAuthenticationProvider</literal>
uses the <literal>NullUserCache</literal>, which performs no caching.
A usable caching implementation is also provided,
<literal>EhCacheBasedUserCache</literal>, which is configured as
follows:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;bean id="daoAuthenticationProvider" class="org.acegisecurity.providers.dao.DaoAuthenticationProvider"&gt;
&lt;property name="authenticationDao"&gt;&lt;ref bean="authenticationDao"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="userCache"&gt;&lt;ref bean="userCache"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;bean id="cacheManager" class="org.springframework.cache.ehcache.EhCacheManagerFactoryBean"&gt;
&lt;property name="configLocation"&gt;
&lt;value&gt;classpath:/ehcache-failsafe.xml&lt;/value&gt;
&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;bean id="userCacheBackend" class="org.springframework.cache.ehcache.EhCacheFactoryBean"&gt;
&lt;property name="cacheManager"&gt;
&lt;ref local="cacheManager"/&gt;
&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="cacheName"&gt;
&lt;value&gt;userCache&lt;/value&gt;
&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;bean id="userCache" class="org.acegisecurity.providers.dao.cache.EhCacheBasedUserCache"&gt;
&lt;property name="cache"&gt;&lt;ref local="userCacheBackend"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>All Acegi Security EH-CACHE implementations (including
<literal>EhCacheBasedUserCache</literal>) require an EH-CACHE
<literal>Cache</literal> object. The <literal>Cache</literal> object
can be obtained from wherever you like, although we recommend you use
Spring's factory classes as shown in the above configuration. If using
Spring's factory classes, please refer to the Spring documentation for
further details on how to optimise the cache storage location, memory
usage, eviction policies, timeouts etc.</para>
<para>For a class to be able to provide the
<literal>DaoAuthenticationProvider</literal> with access to an
authentication repository, it must implement the
<literal>AuthenticationDao</literal> interface:</para>
<para><programlisting>public UserDetails loadUserByUsername(String username) throws UsernameNotFoundException, DataAccessException;</programlisting></para>
<para>The <literal>UserDetails</literal> is an interface that provides
getters that guarantee non-null provision of basic authentication
information such as the username, password, granted authorities and
whether the user is enabled or disabled. A concrete implementation,
<literal>User</literal>, is also provided. Acegi Security users will
need to decide when writing their <literal>AuthenticationDao</literal>
what type of <literal>UserDetails</literal> to return. In most cases
<literal>User</literal> will be used directly or subclassed, although
special circumstances (such as object relational mappers) may require
users to write their own <literal>UserDetails</literal> implementation
from scratch. <literal>UserDetails</literal> is often used to store
additional principal-related properties (such as their telephone
number and email address), so they can be easily used by web
views.</para>
<para>Given <literal>AuthenticationDao</literal> is so simple to
implement, it should be easy for users to retrieve authentication
information using a persistence strategy of their choice.</para>
<para>A design decision was made not to support account locking in the
<literal>DaoAuthenticationProvider</literal>, as doing so would have
increased the complexity of the <literal>AuthenticationDao</literal>
interface. For instance, a method would be required to increase the
count of unsuccessful authentication attempts. Such functionality
could be easily provided by leveraging the application event
publishing features discussed below.</para>
<para><literal>DaoAuthenticationProvider</literal> returns an
<literal>Authentication</literal> object which in turn has its
<literal>principal</literal> property set. The principal will be
either a <literal>String</literal> (which is essentially the username)
or a <literal>UserDetails</literal> object (which was looked up from
the <literal>AuthenticationDao</literal>). By default the
<literal>UserDetails</literal> is returned, as this enables
applications to add extra properties potentially of use in
applications, such as the user's full name, email address etc. If
using container adapters, or if your applications were written to
operate with <literal>String</literal>s (as was the case for releases
prior to Acegi Security 0.6), you should set the
<literal>DaoAuthenticationProvider.forcePrincipalAsString</literal>
property to <literal>true</literal> in your application
context.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-authentication-provider-in-memory">
<title>In-Memory Authentication</title>
<para>Whilst it is easy to use the
<literal>DaoAuthenticationProvider</literal> and create a custom
<literal>AuthenticationDao</literal> implementation that extracts
information from a persistence engine of choice, many applications do
not require such complexity. One alternative is to configure an
authentication repository in the application context itself using the
<literal>InMemoryDaoImpl</literal>:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;bean id="inMemoryDaoImpl" class="org.acegisecurity.providers.dao.memory.InMemoryDaoImpl"&gt;
&lt;property name="userMap"&gt;
&lt;value&gt;
marissa=koala,ROLE_TELLER,ROLE_SUPERVISOR
dianne=emu,ROLE_TELLER
scott=wombat,ROLE_TELLER
peter=opal,disabled,ROLE_TELLER
&lt;/value&gt;
&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>The <literal>userMap</literal> property contains each of the
usernames, passwords, a list of granted authorities and an optional
enabled/disabled keyword. Commas delimit each token. The username must
appear to the left of the equals sign, and the password must be the
first token to the right of the equals sign. The
<literal>enabled</literal> and <literal>disabled</literal> keywords
(case insensitive) may appear in the second or any subsequent token.
Any remaining tokens are treated as granted authorities, which are
created as <literal>GrantedAuthorityImpl</literal> objects (refer to
the Authorization section for further discussion on granted
authorities). Note that if a user has no password and/or no granted
authorities, the user will not be created in the in-memory
authentication repository.</para>
<para><literal>InMemoryDaoImpl</literal> also offers a
<literal>setUserProperties(Properties)</literal> method, which allows
you to externalise the <literal>java.util.Properties</literal> in
another Spring configured bean or an external properties file. This
might prove useful for simple applications that have a larger number
of users, or deployment-time configuration changes, but do not wish to
use a full database for authentication details.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-authentication-provider-jdbc">
<title>JDBC Authentication</title>
<para>The Acegi Security System for Spring also includes an
authentication provider that can obtain authentication information
from a JDBC data source. The typical configuration for the
<literal>JdbcDaoImpl</literal> is shown below:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;bean id="dataSource" class="org.springframework.jdbc.datasource.DriverManagerDataSource"&gt;
&lt;property name="driverClassName"&gt;&lt;value&gt;org.hsqldb.jdbcDriver&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="url"&gt;&lt;value&gt;jdbc:hsqldb:hsql://localhost:9001&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="username"&gt;&lt;value&gt;sa&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="password"&gt;&lt;value&gt;&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;bean id="jdbcDaoImpl" class="org.acegisecurity.providers.dao.jdbc.JdbcDaoImpl"&gt;
&lt;property name="dataSource"&gt;&lt;ref bean="dataSource"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>You can use different relational database management systems by
modifying the <literal>DriverManagerDataSource</literal> shown above.
Irrespective of the database used, a standard schema must be used as
indicated in <literal>dbinit.txt</literal>.</para>
<para>If you default schema is unsuitable for your needs,
<literal>JdbcDaoImpl</literal> provides two properties that allow
customisation of the SQL statements. You may also subclass the
<literal>JdbcDaoImpl</literal> if further customisation is necessary.
Please refer to the JavaDocs for details.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-authentication-provider-jaas">
<title>JAAS Authentication</title>
<para>Acegi Security provides a package able to delegate
authentication requests to the Java Authentication and Authorization
Service (JAAS). This package is discussed in detail below.</para>
<para>Central to JAAS operation are login configuration files. To
learn more about JAAS login configuration files, consult the JAAS
reference documentation available from Sun Microsystems. We expect you
to have a basic understanding of JAAS and its login configuration file
syntax in order to understand this section.</para>
<sect3>
<title>JaasAuthenticationProvider</title>
<para>The <literal>JaasAuthenticationProvider</literal> attempts to
authenticate a users principal and credentials through JAAS.</para>
<para>Lets assume we have a JAAS login configuration file,
<literal>/WEB-INF/login.conf</literal>, with the following
contents:</para>
<para><programlisting>JAASTest {
sample.SampleLoginModule required;
};</programlisting></para>
<para>Like all Acegi Security beans, the
<literal>JaasAuthenticationProvider</literal> is configured via the
application context. The following definitions would correspond to
the above JAAS login configuration file:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;bean id="jaasAuthenticationProvider" class="org.acegisecurity.providers.jaas.JaasAuthenticationProvider"&gt;
&lt;property name="loginConfig"&gt;
&lt;value&gt;/WEB-INF/login.conf&lt;/value&gt;
&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="loginContextName"&gt;
&lt;value&gt;JAASTest&lt;/value&gt;
&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="callbackHandlers"&gt;
&lt;list&gt;
&lt;bean class="org.acegisecurity.providers.jaas.JaasNameCallbackHandler"/&gt;
&lt;bean class="org.acegisecurity.providers.jaas.JaasPasswordCallbackHandler"/&gt;
&lt;/list&gt;
&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="authorityGranters"&gt;
&lt;list&gt;
&lt;bean class="org.acegisecurity.providers.jaas.TestAuthorityGranter"/&gt;
&lt;/list&gt;
&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>The <literal>CallbackHandler</literal>s and
<literal>AuthorityGranter</literal>s are discussed below.</para>
</sect3>
<sect3>
<title>Callbacks</title>
<para>Most JAAS <literal>LoginModule</literal>s require a callback
of some sort. These callbacks are usually used to obtain the
username and password from the user. In an Acegi Security
deployment, Acegi Security is responsible for this user interaction
(typically via a reference to a
<literal>ContextHolder</literal>-managed
<literal>Authentication</literal> object). The JAAS package for
Acegi Security provides two default callback handlers,
<literal>JaasNameCallbackHandler</literal> and
<literal>JaasPasswordCallbackHandler</literal>. Each of these
callback handlers implement
<literal>JaasAuthenticationCallbackHandler</literal>. In most cases
these callback handlers can simply be used without understanding the
internal mechanics. For those needing full control over the callback
behavior, internally <literal>JaasAutheticationProvider</literal>
wraps these <literal>JaasAuthenticationCallbackHandler</literal>s
with an <literal>InternalCallbackHandler</literal>. The
<literal>InternalCallbackHandler</literal> is the class that
actually implements JAAS normal <literal>CallbackHandler</literal>
interface. Any time that the JAAS <literal>LoginModule</literal> is
used, it is passed a list of application context configured
<literal>InternalCallbackHandler</literal>s. If the
<literal>LoginModule</literal> requests a callback against the
<literal>InternalCallbackHandler</literal>s, the callback is in-turn
passed to the <literal>JaasAuthenticationCallbackHandler</literal>s
being wrapped.</para>
</sect3>
<sect3>
<title>AuthorityGranters</title>
<para>JAAS works with principals. Even “roles” are represented as
principals in JAAS. Acegi Security, on the other hand, works with
<literal>Authentication</literal> objects. Each
<literal>Authentication</literal> object contains a single
principal, and multiple <literal>GrantedAuthority</literal>[]s. To
facilitate mapping between these different concepts, the Acegi
Security JAAS package includes an
<literal>AuthorityGranter</literal> interface. An
<literal>AuthorityGranter</literal> is responsible for inspecting a
JAAS principal and returning a <literal>String</literal>. The
<literal>JaasAuthenticationProvider</literal> then creates a
<literal>JaasGrantedAuthority</literal> (which implements Acegi
Securitys <literal>GrantedAuthority</literal> interface) containing
both the <literal>AuthorityGranter</literal>-returned
<literal>String</literal> and the JAAS principal that the
<literal>AuthorityGranter</literal> was passed. The
<literal>JaasAuthenticationProvider</literal> obtains the JAAS
principals by firstly successfully authenticating the users
credentials using the JAAS <literal>LoginModule</literal>, and then
accessing the <literal>LoginContext</literal> it returns. A call to
<literal>LoginContext.getSubject().getPrincipals()</literal> is
made, with each resulting principal passed to each
<literal>AuthorityGranter</literal> defined against the
<literal>JaasAuthenticationProvider.setAuthorityGranters(List)</literal>
property. Acegi Security does not include any production
<literal>AuthorityGranter</literal>s given every JAAS principal has
an implementation-specific meaning. However, there is a
<literal>TestAuthorityGranter</literal> in the unit tests that
demonstrates a simple <literal>AuthorityGranter</literal>
implementation.</para>
</sect3>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-authentication-provider-siteminder">
<title>Siteminder Authentication</title>
<para>Acegi Security provides a web filter
<literal>(org.acegisecurity.ui.webapp.SiteminderAuthenticationProcessingFilter</literal>)
that can be used to process requests that have been pre-authenticated
by Computer Associates' Siteminder. This filter assumes that you're
using Siteminder for <emphasis>authentication</emphasis>, and your
application (or backing datasource) is used for
<emphasis>authorization</emphasis>. The use of Siteminder for
<emphasis>authorization</emphasis> is not yet directly supported by
Acegi.</para>
<para>Recall that a Siteminder agent is set up on your web server to
intercept a user's first call to your application. This agent
redirects the initial request to a login page, and only after
successful authentication does your application receive the request.
Authenticated requests contain one or more HTTP headers populated by
the Siteminder agent. Below we'll assume that the request header key
containing the user's identity is "SM_USER", but of course your header
values may be different based on Siteminder policy server
configuration. Please refer to your company's "single sign-on" group
for header details.</para>
<sect3>
<title>SiteminderAuthenticationProcessingFilter</title>
<para>The first step in setting up Acegi's Siteminder support is to
define an <literal>authenticationProcessingFilter</literal> bean and
give it an <literal>authenticationManager</literal> to use, as well
as to tell it where to send users upon success and failure and where
to find the Siteminder username and password values. Most people
won't need the password value since Siteminder has already
authenticated the user, so it's typical to use the same header for
both.</para>
<para><programlisting> &lt;!-- ======================== SITEMINDER AUTHENTICATION PROCESSING FILTER ======================= --&gt;
&lt;bean id="authenticationProcessingFilter" class="org.acegisecurity.ui.webapp.SiteminderAuthenticationProcessingFilter"&gt;
&lt;property name="authenticationManager"&gt;&lt;ref bean="authenticationManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="authenticationFailureUrl"&gt;&lt;value&gt;/login.jsp?login_error=1&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="defaultTargetUrl"&gt;&lt;value&gt;/security.do?method=getMainMenu&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="filterProcessesUrl"&gt;&lt;value&gt;/j_acegi_security_check&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="siteminderUsernameHeaderKey"&gt;&lt;value&gt;SM_USER&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="siteminderPasswordHeaderKey"&gt;&lt;value&gt;SM_USER&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>Since this <literal>authenticationProcessingFilter</literal>
depends on an <literal>authenticationManager</literal>, we'll need
to define one:</para>
<para><programlisting> &lt;!-- ======================== AUTHENTICATION ======================= --&gt;
&lt;!--
- The top-level Authentication Manager is responsible for all application AUTHENTICATION
- operations. Note that it must reference one or more provider(s) defined below.
--&gt;
&lt;bean id="authenticationManager" class="org.acegisecurity.providers.ProviderManager"&gt;
&lt;property name="providers"&gt;
&lt;list&gt;
&lt;ref local="daoAuthenticationProvider"/&gt;
&lt;/list&gt;
&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>Note that your <literal>daoAuthenticationProvider</literal>
above will expect the password property to match what it expects. In
this case, authentication has already been handled by Siteminder and
you've specified the same HTTP header for both username and
password, so you can code
<literal>daoAuthenticationProvider</literal> to simply make sure the
username and password values match. This may sound like a security
weakness, but remember that users have to authenticate with
Siteminder before your application ever receives the requests, so
the purpose of your <literal>daoAuthenticationProvider</literal>
should simply be to assign roles and other properties needed by
subsequent method interceptors, etc.</para>
<para>Finally we need to tell the
<literal>filterChainProxy</literal> to include the
<literal>authenticationProcessingFilter</literal> in its
operations.</para>
<para><programlisting> &lt;!-- ======================== FILTER CHAIN ======================= --&gt;
&lt;!--
- The web.xml file has a single filter reference to this top-level bean, which
- invokes the chain of sub-filters specified below.
--&gt;
&lt;bean id="filterChainProxy" class="org.acegisecurity.util.FilterChainProxy"&gt;
&lt;property name="filterInvocationDefinitionSource"&gt;
&lt;value&gt;
CONVERT_URL_TO_LOWERCASE_BEFORE_COMPARISON
PATTERN_TYPE_APACHE_ANT
/**=httpSessionContextIntegrationFilter,authenticationProcessingFilter,securityEnforcementFilter
&lt;/value&gt;
&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>In summary, once the user has authenticated through
Siteminder, their header-loaded request will be brokered by
<literal>filterChainProxy</literal> to
<literal>authenticationProcessingFilter</literal>, which in turn
will grab the user's identity from the SM_USER request header. The
user's identity will then be passed to the
<literal>authenticationManager</literal> and finally
<literal>daoAuthenticationProvider</literal> will do the work of
authorizing the user against back-end databases, etc. and loading
the <literal>UserDetails</literal> implementation with roles,
username and any other property you deem relevant.</para>
</sect3>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-authentication-recommendations">
<title>Authentication Recommendations</title>
<para>With the heavy use of interfaces throughout the authentication
system (<literal>Authentication</literal>,
<literal>AuthenticationManager</literal>,
<literal>AuthenticationProvider</literal> and
<literal>AuthenticationDao</literal>) it might be confusing to a new
user to know which part of the authentication system to customize. In
general, the following is recommended:</para>
<itemizedlist>
<listitem>
<para>Use the
<literal>UsernamePasswordAuthenticationToken</literal>
implementation where possible.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>If you simply need to implement a new authentication
repository (eg to obtain user details from your applications
existing database), use the
<literal>DaoAuthenticationProvider</literal> along with the
<literal>AuthenticationDao</literal>. It is the fastest and safest
way to integrate an external database.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>If you're using Container Adapters or a
<literal>RunAsManager</literal> that replaces the
<literal>Authentication</literal> object, ensure you have
registered the <literal>AuthByAdapterProvider</literal> and
<literal>RunAsManagerImplProvider</literal> respectively with your
<literal>ProviderManager</literal>.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>Never enable the
<literal>TestingAuthenticationProvider</literal> on a production
system. Doing so will allow any client to simply present a
<literal>TestingAuthenticationToken</literal> and obtain whatever
access they request.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>Adding a new <literal>AuthenticationProvider</literal> is
sufficient to support most custom authentication requirements.
Only unusual requirements would require the
<literal>ProviderManager</literal> to be replaced with a different
<literal>AuthenticationManager</literal>.</para>
</listitem>
</itemizedlist>
</sect2>
</sect1>
<sect1 id="security-authorization">
<title>Authorization</title>
<sect2 id="security-authorization-granted-authorities">
<title>Granted Authorities</title>
<para>As briefly mentioned in the Authentication section, all
<literal>Authentication</literal> implementations are required to
store an array of <literal>GrantedAuthority</literal> objects. These
represent the authorities that have been granted to the principal. The
<literal>GrantedAuthority</literal> objects are inserted into the
<literal>Authentication</literal> object by the
<literal>AuthenticationManager</literal> and are later read by
<literal>AccessDecisionManager</literal>s when making authorization
decisions.</para>
<para><literal>GrantedAuthority</literal> is an interface with only
one method:</para>
<para><programlisting>public String getAuthority();</programlisting></para>
<para>This method allows <literal>AccessDecisionManager</literal>s to
obtain a precise <literal>String</literal> representation of the
<literal>GrantedAuthority</literal>. By returning a representation as
a <literal>String</literal>, a <literal>GrantedAuthority</literal> can
be easily "read" by most <literal>AccessDecisionManager</literal>s. If
a <literal>GrantedAuthority</literal> cannot be precisely represented
as a <literal>String</literal>, the
<literal>GrantedAuthority</literal> is considered "complex" and
<literal>getAuthority()</literal> must return
<literal>null</literal>.</para>
<para>An example of a "complex" <literal>GrantedAuthority</literal>
would be an implementation that stores a list of operations and
authority thresholds that apply to different customer account numbers.
Representing this complex <literal>GrantedAuthority</literal> as a
<literal>String</literal> would be quite complex, and as a result the
<literal>getAuthority()</literal> method should return
<literal>null</literal>. This will indicate to any
<literal>AccessDecisionManager</literal> that it will need to
specifically support the <literal>GrantedAuthority</literal>
implementation in order to understand its contents.</para>
<para>The Acegi Security System for Spring includes one concrete
<literal>GrantedAuthority</literal> implementation,
<literal>GrantedAuthorityImpl</literal>. This allows any
user-specified <literal>String</literal> to be converted into a
<literal>GrantedAuthority</literal>. All
<literal>AuthenticationProvider</literal>s included with the security
architecture use <literal>GrantedAuthorityImpl</literal> to populate
the <literal>Authentication</literal> object.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-authorization-access-decision-managers">
<title>Access Decision Managers</title>
<para>The <literal>AccessDecisionManager</literal> is called by the
<literal>AbstractSecurityInterceptor</literal> and is responsible for
making final access control decisions. The
<literal>AccessDecisionManager</literal> interface contains three
methods:</para>
<para><programlisting>public void decide(Authentication authentication, Object object, ConfigAttributeDefinition config) throws AccessDeniedException;
public boolean supports(ConfigAttribute attribute);
public boolean supports(Class clazz);</programlisting></para>
<para>As can be seen from the first method, the
<literal>AccessDecisionManager</literal> is passed via method
parameters all information that is likely to be of value in assessing
an authorization decision. In particular, passing the secure
<literal>Object</literal> enables those arguments contained in the
actual secure object invocation to be inspected. For example, let's
assume the secure object was a <literal>MethodInvocation</literal>. It
would be easy to query the <literal>MethodInvocation</literal> for any
<literal>Customer</literal> argument, and then implement some sort of
security logic in the <literal>AccessDecisionManager</literal> to
ensure the principal is permitted to operate on that customer.
Implementations are expected to throw an
<literal>AccessDeniedException</literal> if access is denied.</para>
<para>The <literal>supports(ConfigAttribute)</literal> method is
called by the <literal>AbstractSecurityInterceptor</literal> at
startup time to determine if the
<literal>AccessDecisionManager</literal> can process the passed
<literal>ConfigAttribute</literal>. The
<literal>supports(Class)</literal> method is called by a security
interceptor implementation to ensure the configured
<literal>AccessDecisionManager</literal> supports the type of secure
object that the security interceptor will present.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-authorization-voting-decision-manager">
<title>Voting Decision Manager</title>
<para>Whilst users can implement their own
<literal>AccessDecisionManager</literal> to control all aspects of
authorization, the Acegi Security System for Spring includes several
<literal>AccessDecisionManager</literal> implementations that are
based on voting. Figure 4 illustrates the relevant classes.</para>
<para><mediaobject>
<imageobject role="html">
<imagedata align="center"
fileref="images/AccessDecisionVoting.gif"
format="GIF" />
</imageobject>
<caption>
<para>Figure 4: Voting Decision Manager</para>
</caption>
</mediaobject></para>
<para>Using this approach, a series of
<literal>AccessDecisionVoter</literal> implementations are polled on
an authorization decision. The
<literal>AccessDecisionManager</literal> then decides whether or not
to throw an <literal>AccessDeniedException</literal> based on its
assessment of the votes.</para>
<para>The <literal>AccessDecisionVoter</literal> interface has three
methods:</para>
<para><programlisting>public int vote(Authentication authentication, Object object, ConfigAttributeDefinition config);
public boolean supports(ConfigAttribute attribute);
public boolean supports(Class clazz);</programlisting></para>
<para>Concrete implementations return an <literal>int</literal>, with
possible values being reflected in the
<literal>AccessDecisionVoter</literal> static fields
<literal>ACCESS_ABSTAIN</literal>, <literal>ACCESS_DENIED</literal>
and <literal>ACCESS_GRANTED</literal>. A voting implementation will
return <literal>ACCESS_ABSTAIN</literal> if it has no opinion on an
authorization decision. If it does have an opinion, it must return
either <literal>ACCESS_DENIED</literal> or
<literal>ACCESS_GRANTED</literal>.</para>
<para>There are three concrete
<literal>AccessDecisionManager</literal>s provided with the Acegi
Security System for Spring that tally the votes. The
<literal>ConsensusBased</literal> implementation will grant or deny
access based on the consensus of non-abstain votes. Properties are
provided to control behavior in the event of an equality of votes or
if all votes are abstain. The <literal>AffirmativeBased</literal>
implementation will grant access if one or more
<literal>ACCESS_GRANTED</literal> votes were received (ie a deny vote
will be ignored, provided there was at least one grant vote). Like the
<literal>ConsensusBased</literal> implementation, there is a parameter
that controls the behavior if all voters abstain. The
<literal>UnanimousBased</literal> provider expects unanimous
<literal>ACCESS_GRANTED</literal> votes in order to grant access,
ignoring abstains. It will deny access if there is any
<literal>ACCESS_DENIED</literal> vote. Like the other implementations,
there is a parameter that controls the behaviour if all voters
abstain.</para>
<para>It is possible to implement a custom
<literal>AccessDecisionManager</literal> that tallies votes
differently. For example, votes from a particular
<literal>AccessDecisionVoter</literal> might receive additional
weighting, whilst a deny vote from a particular voter may have a veto
effect.</para>
<para>There are two concrete <literal>AccessDecisionVoter</literal>
implementations provided with the Acegi Security System for Spring.
The <literal>RoleVoter</literal> class will vote if any
ConfigAttribute begins with <literal>ROLE_</literal>. It will vote to
grant access if there is a <literal>GrantedAuthority</literal> which
returns a <literal>String</literal> representation (via the
<literal>getAuthority()</literal> method) exactly equal to one or more
<literal>ConfigAttributes</literal> starting with
<literal>ROLE_</literal>. If there is no exact match of any
<literal>ConfigAttribute</literal> starting with
<literal>ROLE_</literal>, the <literal>RoleVoter</literal> will vote
to deny access. If no <literal>ConfigAttribute</literal> begins with
<literal>ROLE_</literal>, the voter will abstain.
<literal>RoleVoter</literal> is case sensitive on comparisons as well
as the <literal>ROLE_</literal> prefix.</para>
<para>BasicAclEntryVoter is the other concrete voter included with
Acegi Security. It integrates with Acegi Security's
<literal>AclManager</literal> (discussed later). This voter is
designed to have multiple instances in the same application context,
such as:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;bean id="aclContactReadVoter" class="org.acegisecurity.vote.BasicAclEntryVoter"&gt;
&lt;property name="processConfigAttribute"&gt;&lt;value&gt;ACL_CONTACT_READ&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="processDomainObjectClass"&gt;&lt;value&gt;sample.contact.Contact&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="aclManager"&gt;&lt;ref local="aclManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="requirePermission"&gt;
&lt;list&gt;
&lt;ref local="org.acegisecurity.acl.basic.SimpleAclEntry.ADMINISTRATION"/&gt;
&lt;ref local="org.acegisecurity.acl.basic.SimpleAclEntry.READ"/&gt;
&lt;/list&gt;
&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;bean id="aclContactDeleteVoter" class="org.acegisecurity.vote.BasicAclEntryVoter"&gt;
&lt;property name="processConfigAttribute"&gt;&lt;value&gt;ACL_CONTACT_DELETE&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="processDomainObjectClass"&gt;&lt;value&gt;sample.contact.Contact&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="aclManager"&gt;&lt;ref local="aclManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="requirePermission"&gt;
&lt;list&gt;
&lt;ref local="org.acegisecurity.acl.basic.SimpleAclEntry.ADMINISTRATION"/&gt;
&lt;ref local="org.acegisecurity.acl.basic.SimpleAclEntry.DELETE"/&gt;
&lt;/list&gt;
&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>In the above example, you'd define
<literal>ACL_CONTACT_READ</literal> or
<literal>ACL_CONTACT_DELETE</literal> against some methods on a
<literal>MethodSecurityInterceptor</literal> or
<literal>AspectJSecurityInterceptor</literal>. When those methods are
invoked, the above applicable voter defined above would vote to grant
or deny access. The voter would look at the method invocation to
locate the first argument of type
<literal>sample.contact.Contact</literal>, and then pass that
<literal>Contact</literal> to the <literal>AclManager</literal>. The
<literal>AclManager</literal> will then return an access control list
(ACL) that applies to the current <literal>Authentication</literal>.
Assuming that ACL contains one of the listed
<literal>requirePermission</literal>s, the voter will vote to grant
access. If the ACL does not contain one of the permissions defined
against the voter, the voter will vote to deny access.
<literal>BasicAclEntryVoter</literal> is an important class as it
allows you to build truly complex applications with domain object
security entirely defined in the application context. If you're
interested in learning more about Acegi Security's ACL capabilities
and how best to apply them, please see the ACL and "After Invocation"
sections of this reference guide, and the Contacts sample
application.</para>
<para>It is also possible to implement a custom
<literal>AccessDecisionVoter</literal>. Several examples are provided
in the Acegi Security System for Spring unit tests, including
<literal>ContactSecurityVoter</literal> and
<literal>DenyVoter</literal>. The
<literal>ContactSecurityVoter</literal> abstains from voting decisions
where a <literal>CONTACT_OWNED_BY_CURRENT_USER</literal>
<literal>ConfigAttribute</literal> is not found. If voting, it queries
the <literal>MethodInvocation</literal> to extract the owner of the
<literal>Contact</literal> object that is subject of the method call.
It votes to grant access if the <literal>Contact</literal> owner
matches the principal presented in the
<literal>Authentication</literal> object. It could have just as easily
compared the <literal>Contact</literal> owner with some
<literal>GrantedAuthority</literal> the
<literal>Authentication</literal> object presented. All of this is
achieved with relatively few lines of code and demonstrates the
flexibility of the authorization model.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-authorization-taglib">
<title>Authorization-Related Tag Libraries</title>
<para>The Acegi Security System for Spring comes bundled with several
JSP tag libraries that eases JSP writing. The tag libraries are known
as <literal>authz</literal> and provide a range of different
services.</para>
<para>All taglib classes are included in the core
<literal>acegi-security-xx.jar</literal> file, with the
<literal>authz.tld</literal> located in the JAR's
<literal>META-INF</literal> directory. This means for JSP 1.2+ web
containers you can simply include the JAR in the WAR's
<literal>WEB-INF/lib</literal> directory and it will be available. If
you're using a JSP 1.1 container, you'll need to declare the JSP
taglib in your <literal>web.xml file</literal>, and include
<literal>authz.tld</literal> in the <literal>WEB-INF/lib</literal>
directory. The following fragment is added to
<literal>web.xml</literal>:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;taglib&gt;
&lt;taglib-uri&gt;http://acegisecurity.sf.net/authz&lt;/taglib-uri&gt;
&lt;taglib-location&gt;/WEB-INF/authz.tld&lt;/taglib-location&gt;
&lt;/taglib&gt;</programlisting></para>
<sect3>
<title>AuthorizeTag</title>
<para><literal>AuthorizeTag</literal> is used to include content if
the current principal holds certain
<literal>GrantedAuthority</literal>s.</para>
<para>The following JSP fragment illustrates how to use the
<literal>AuthorizeTag</literal>:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;authz:authorize ifAllGranted="ROLE_SUPERVISOR"&gt;
&lt;td&gt;
&lt;A HREF="del.htm?id=&lt;c:out value="${contact.id}"/&gt;"&gt;Del&lt;/A&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/authz:authorize&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>This tag would cause the tag's body to be output if the
principal has been granted ROLE_SUPERVISOR.</para>
<para>The <literal>authz:authorize</literal> tag declares the
following attributes:</para>
<para><itemizedlist spacing="compact">
<listitem>
<para><literal>ifAllGranted</literal>: All the listed roles
must be granted for the tag to output its body.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>ifAnyGranted</literal>: Any of the listed roles
must be granted for the tag to output its body.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>ifNotGranted</literal>: None of the listed
roles must be granted for the tag to output its body.</para>
</listitem>
</itemizedlist></para>
<para>You'll note that in each attribute you can list multiple
roles. Simply separate the roles using a comma. The
<literal>authorize</literal> tag ignores whitespace in
attributes.</para>
<para>The tag library logically ANDs all of it's parameters
together. This means that if you combine two or more attributes, all
attributes must be true for the tag to output it's body. Don't add
an <literal>ifAllGranted="ROLE_SUPERVISOR"</literal>, followed by an
<literal>ifNotGranted="ROLE_SUPERVISOR"</literal>, or you'll be
surprised to never see the tag's body.</para>
<para>By requiring all attributes to return true, the authorize tag
allows you to create more complex authorization scenarios. For
example, you could declare an
<literal>ifAllGranted="ROLE_SUPERVISOR"</literal> and an
<literal>ifNotGranted="ROLE_NEWBIE_SUPERVISOR"</literal> in the same
tag, in order to prevent new supervisors from seeing the tag body.
However it would no doubt be simpler to use
<literal>ifAllGranted="ROLE_EXPERIENCED_SUPERVISOR"</literal> rather
than inserting NOT conditions into your design.</para>
<para>One last item: the tag verifies the authorizations in a
specific order: first <literal>ifNotGranted</literal>, then
<literal>ifAllGranted</literal>, and finally,
<literal>ifAnyGranted</literal>.</para>
</sect3>
<sect3>
<title>AuthenticationTag</title>
<para><literal>AuthenticationTag</literal> is used to simply output
a property of the current principal's
<literal>Authentication.getPrincipal()</literal> object to the web
page.</para>
<para>The following JSP fragment illustrates how to use the
<literal>AuthenticationTag</literal>:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;authz:authentication operation="username"/&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>This tag would cause the principal's name to be output. Here
we are assuming the <literal>Authentication.getPrincipal()</literal>
is a <literal>UserDetails</literal> object, which is generally the
case when using the typical
<literal>DaoAuthenticationProvider</literal>.</para>
</sect3>
<sect3>
<title>AclTag</title>
<para><literal>AclTag</literal> is used to include content if the
current principal has a ACL to the indicated domain object.</para>
<para>The following JSP fragment illustrates how to use the
<literal>AclTag</literal>:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;authz:acl domainObject="${contact}" hasPermission="16,1"&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;A HREF="&lt;c:url value="del.htm"&gt;&lt;c:param name="contactId" value="${contact.id}"/&gt;&lt;/c:url&gt;"&gt;Del&lt;/A&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/authz:acl&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>This tag would cause the tag's body to be output if the
principal holds either permission 16 or permission 1 for the
"contact" domain object. The numbers are actually integers that are
used with <literal>AbstractBasicAclEntry</literal> bit masking.
Please refer tro the ACL section of this reference guide to
understand more about the ACL capabilities of Acegi Security.</para>
</sect3>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-authorization-recommendations">
<title>Authorization Recommendations</title>
<para>Given there are several ways to achieve similar authorization
outcomes in the Acegi Security System for Spring, the following
general recommendations are made:</para>
<itemizedlist>
<listitem>
<para>Grant authorities using
<literal>GrantedAuthorityImpl</literal> where possible. Because it
is already supported by the Acegi Security System for Spring, you
avoid the need to create custom
<literal>AuthenticationManager</literal> or
<literal>AuthenticationProvider</literal> implementations simply
to populate the <literal>Authentication</literal> object with a
custom <literal>GrantedAuthority</literal>.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>Writing an <literal>AccessDecisionVoter</literal>
implementation and using either <literal>ConsensusBased</literal>,
<literal>AffirmativeBased</literal> or
<literal>UnanimousBased</literal> as the
<literal>AccessDecisionManager</literal> may be the best approach
to implementing your custom access decision rules.</para>
</listitem>
</itemizedlist>
</sect2>
</sect1>
<sect1 id="afterinvocation">
<title>After Invocation Handling</title>
<sect2 id="afterinvocation-overview">
<title>Overview</title>
<para>Whilst the <literal>AccessDecisionManager</literal> is called by
the <literal>AbstractSecurityInterceptor</literal> before proceeding
with the secure object invocation, some applications need a way of
modifying the object actually returned by the secure object
invocation. Whilst you could easily implement your own AOP concern to
achieve this, Acegi Security provides a convenient hook that has
several concrete implementations that integrate with its ACL
capabilities.</para>
<para>Figure 5 illustrates Acegi Security's
<literal>AfterInvocationManager</literal> and its concrete
implementations.</para>
<para><mediaobject>
<imageobject role="html">
<imagedata align="center" fileref="images/AfterInvocation.gif"
format="GIF" />
</imageobject>
<caption>
<para>Figure 5: After Invocation Implementation</para>
</caption>
</mediaobject></para>
<para>Like many other parts of Acegi Security,
<literal>AfterInvocationManager</literal> has a single concrete
implementation, <literal>AfterInvocationProvider</literal>, which
polls a list of <literal>AfterInvocationProvider</literal>s. Each
<literal>AfterInvocationProvider</literal> is allowed to modify the
return object or throw an <literal>AccessDeniedException</literal>.
Indeed multiple providers can modify the object, as the result of the
previous provider is passed to the next in the list. Let's now
consider our ACL-aware implementations of
<literal>AfterInvocationProvider</literal>.</para>
<para>Please be aware that if you're using
<literal>AfterInvocationManager</literal>, you will still need
configuration attributes that allow the
<literal>MethodSecurityInterceptor</literal>'s
<literal>AccessDecisionManager</literal> to allow an operation. If
you're using the typical Acegi Security included
<literal>AccessDecisionManager</literal> implementations, having no
configuration attributes defined for a particular secure method
invocation will cause each <literal>AccessDecisionVoter</literal> to
abstain from voting. In turn, if the
<literal>AccessDecisionManager</literal> property
"<literal>allowIfAllAbstainDecisions</literal>" is
<literal>false</literal>, an <literal>AccessDeniedException</literal>
will be thrown. You may avoid this potential issue by either (i)
setting "<literal>allowIfAllAbstainDecisions</literal>" to
<literal>true</literal> (although this is generally not recommended)
or (ii) simply ensure that there is at least one configuration
attribute that an <literal>AccessDecisionVoter</literal> will vote to
grant access for. This latter (recommended) approach is usually
achieved through a <literal>ROLE_USER</literal> or
<literal>ROLE_AUTHENTICATED</literal> configuration attribute.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="afterinvocation-acl-aware">
<title>ACL-Aware AfterInvocationProviders</title>
<para>A common services layer method we've all written at one stage or
another looks like this:</para>
<para><programlisting>public Contact getById(Integer id);</programlisting></para>
<para>Quite often, only principals with permission to read the
<literal>Contact</literal> should be allowed to obtain it. In this
situation the <literal>AccessDecisionManager</literal> approach
provided by the <literal>AbstractSecurityInterceptor</literal> will
not suffice. This is because the identity of the
<literal>Contact</literal> is all that is available before the secure
object is invoked. The
<literal>BasicAclAfterInvocationProvider</literal> delivers a
solution, and is configured as follows:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;bean id="afterAclRead" class="org.acegisecurity.afterinvocation.BasicAclEntryAfterInvocationProvider"&gt;
&lt;property name="aclManager"&gt;&lt;ref local="aclManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="requirePermission"&gt;
&lt;list&gt;
&lt;ref local="org.acegisecurity.acl.basic.SimpleAclEntry.ADMINISTRATION"/&gt;
&lt;ref local="org.acegisecurity.acl.basic.SimpleAclEntry.READ"/&gt;
&lt;/list&gt;
&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>In the above example, the <literal>Contact</literal> will be
retrieved and passed to the
<literal>BasicAclEntryAfterInvocationProvider</literal>. The provider
will thrown an <literal>AccessDeniedException</literal> if one of the
listed <literal>requirePermission</literal>s is not held by the
<literal>Authentication</literal>. The
<literal>BasicAclEntryAfterInvocationProvider</literal> queries the
<literal>AclManager</literal> to determine the ACL that applies for
this domain object to this <literal>Authentication</literal>.</para>
<para>Similar to the
<literal>BasicAclEntryAfterInvocationProvider</literal> is
<literal>BasicAclEntryAfterInvocationCollectionFilteringProvider</literal>.
It is designed to remove <literal>Collection</literal> or array
elements for which a principal does not have access. It never thrown
an <literal>AccessDeniedException</literal> - simply silently removes
the offending elements. The provider is configured as follows:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;bean id="afterAclCollectionRead" class="org.acegisecurity.afterinvocation.BasicAclEntryAfterInvocationCollectionFilteringProvider"&gt;
&lt;property name="aclManager"&gt;&lt;ref local="aclManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="requirePermission"&gt;
&lt;list&gt;
&lt;ref local="org.acegisecurity.acl.basic.SimpleAclEntry.ADMINISTRATION"/&gt;
&lt;ref local="org.acegisecurity.acl.basic.SimpleAclEntry.READ"/&gt;
&lt;/list&gt;
&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>As you can imagine, the returned <literal>Object</literal> must
be a <literal>Collection</literal> or array for this provider to
operate. It will remove any element if the
<literal>AclManager</literal> indicates the
<literal>Authentication</literal> does not hold one of the listed
<literal>requirePermission</literal>s.</para>
<para>The Contacts sample application demonstrates these two
<literal>AfterInvocationProvider</literal>s.</para>
</sect2>
</sect1>
<sect1 id="security-run-as">
<title>Run-As Authentication Replacement</title>
<sect2 id="security-run-as-purpose">
<title>Purpose</title>
<para>The <literal>AbstractSecurityInterceptor</literal> is able to
temporarily replace the <literal>Authentication</literal> object in
the <literal>SecurityContext</literal> and
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal> during the
<literal>SecurityInterceptorCallback</literal>. This only occurs if
the original <literal>Authentication</literal> object was successfully
processed by the <literal>AuthenticationManager</literal> and
<literal>AccessDecisionManager</literal>. The
<literal>RunAsManager</literal> will indicate the replacement
<literal>Authentication</literal> object, if any, that should be used
during the <literal>SecurityInterceptorCallback</literal>.</para>
<para>By temporarily replacing the <literal>Authentication</literal>
object during a <literal>SecurityInterceptorCallback</literal>, the
secured invocation will be able to call other objects which require
different authentication and authorization credentials. It will also
be able to perform any internal security checks for specific
<literal>GrantedAuthority</literal> objects. Because Acegi Security
provides a number of helper classes that automatically configure
remoting protocols based on the contents of the
<literal>ContextHolder</literal>, these run-as replacements are
particularly useful when calling remote web services.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-run-as-usage">
<title>Usage</title>
<para>A <literal>RunAsManager</literal> interface is provided by the
Acegi Security System for Spring:</para>
<para><programlisting>public Authentication buildRunAs(Authentication authentication, Object object, ConfigAttributeDefinition config);
public boolean supports(ConfigAttribute attribute);
public boolean supports(Class clazz);</programlisting></para>
<para>The first method returns the <literal>Authentication</literal>
object that should replace the existing
<literal>Authentication</literal> object for the duration of the
method invocation. If the method returns <literal>null</literal>, it
indicates no replacement should be made. The second method is used by
the <literal>AbstractSecurityInterceptor</literal> as part of its
startup validation of configuration attributes. The
<literal>supports(Class)</literal> method is called by a security
interceptor implementation to ensure the configured
<literal>RunAsManager</literal> supports the type of secure object
that the security interceptor will present.</para>
<para>One concrete implementation of a <literal>RunAsManager</literal>
is provided with the Acegi Security System for Spring. The
<literal>RunAsManagerImpl</literal> class returns a replacement
<literal>RunAsUserToken</literal> if any
<literal>ConfigAttribute</literal> starts with
<literal>RUN_AS_</literal>. If any such
<literal>ConfigAttribute</literal> is found, the replacement
<literal>RunAsUserToken</literal> will contain the same principal,
credentials and granted authorities as the original
<literal>Authentication</literal> object, along with a new
<literal>GrantedAuthorityImpl</literal> for each
<literal>RUN_AS_</literal> <literal>ConfigAttribute</literal>. Each
new <literal>GrantedAuthorityImpl</literal> will be prefixed with
<literal>ROLE_</literal>, followed by the <literal>RUN_AS</literal>
<literal>ConfigAttribute</literal>. For example, a
<literal>RUN_AS_SERVER</literal> will result in the replacement
<literal>RunAsUserToken</literal> containing a
<literal>ROLE_RUN_AS_SERVER</literal> granted authority.</para>
<para>The replacement <literal>RunAsUserToken</literal> is just like
any other <literal>Authentication</literal> object. It needs to be
authenticated by the <literal>AuthenticationManager</literal>,
probably via delegation to a suitable
<literal>AuthenticationProvider</literal>. The
<literal>RunAsImplAuthenticationProvider</literal> performs such
authentication. It simply accepts as valid any
<literal>RunAsUserToken</literal> presented.</para>
<para>To ensure malicious code does not create a
<literal>RunAsUserToken</literal> and present it for guaranteed
acceptance by the <literal>RunAsImplAuthenticationProvider</literal>,
the hash of a key is stored in all generated tokens. The
<literal>RunAsManagerImpl</literal> and
<literal>RunAsImplAuthenticationProvider</literal> is created in the
bean context with the same key:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;bean id="runAsManager" class="org.acegisecurity.runas.RunAsManagerImpl"&gt;
&lt;property name="key"&gt;&lt;value&gt;my_run_as_password&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting><programlisting>&lt;bean id="runAsAuthenticationProvider" class="org.acegisecurity.runas.RunAsImplAuthenticationProvider"&gt;
&lt;property name="key"&gt;&lt;value&gt;my_run_as_password&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>By using the same key, each <literal>RunAsUserToken</literal>
can be validated it was created by an approved
<literal>RunAsManagerImpl</literal>. The
<literal>RunAsUserToken</literal> is immutable after creation for
security reasons.</para>
</sect2>
</sect1>
<sect1 id="security-ui">
<title>User Interfacing with the SecurityContextHolder</title>
<sect2 id="security-ui-purpose">
<title>Purpose</title>
<para>Everything presented so far assumes one thing: the
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal> is populated with a valid
<literal>SecurityContext</literal>, which in turn contains a valid
<literal>Authentication</literal> object. Developers are free to do
this in whichever way they like, such as directly calling the relevant
objects at runtime. However, several classes have been provided to
make this process transparent in many situations. We call these
classes "authentication mechanisms".</para>
<para>The <literal>org.acegisecurity.ui</literal> package provides
what we call "authentication processing mechanisms". An authentication
processing mechanism is solely concerned with received an
authentication request from the principal, testing if it seems valid,
and if so, placing the authentication request token onto the
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal>. Of course, if the
authentication request is invalid, the authentication processing
mechanism is responsible for informing the principal in whatever way
is appropriate to the protocol.</para>
<para>Recall the
<literal>HttpSessionContextIntegrationFilter</literal> (discussed in
the context section) is responsible for storing the
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal> contents between invocations.
This means no authentication processing mechanism need ever interact
directly with <literal>HttpSession</literal>. Indeed
<literal>HttpSessionContextIntegrationFilter</literal> has been
designed to minimise the unnecessary creation of
<literal>HttpSession</literal>s, as might occur when using Basic
authentication for example.</para>
<para>There are several authentication processing mechanisms included
with Acegi Security, which will be briefly discussed in this chapter.
The most popular (and almost always recommended) approach is HTTP Form
Authentication, which uses a login form to authenticate the user.
Another approach (commonly use with web services) is HTTP Basic
Authentication, which allows clients to use HTTP headers to present
authentication information to the Acegi Security System for Spring.
Alternatively, you can also use Yale Central Authentication Service
(CAS) for enterprise-wide single sign on. The final (and generally
unrecommended) approach is via Container Adapters, which allow
supported web containers to perform the authentication themselves.
HTTP Form Authentication and Basic Authentication is discussed below,
whilst CAS and Container Adapters are discussed in separate sections
of this document.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-ui-http-form">
<title>HTTP Form Authentication</title>
<para>HTTP Form Authentication involves using the
<literal>AuthenticationProcessingFilter</literal> to process a login
form. The login form simply contains <literal>j_username</literal> and
<literal>j_password</literal> input fields, and posts to a URL that is
monitored by the filter (by default
<literal>j_acegi_security_check</literal>). The filter is defined in
<literal>web.xml</literal> behind a
<literal>FilterToBeanProxy</literal> as follows:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;filter&gt;
&lt;filter-name&gt;Acegi Authentication Processing Filter&lt;/filter-name&gt;
&lt;filter-class&gt;org.acegisecurity.util.FilterToBeanProxy&lt;/filter-class&gt;
&lt;init-param&gt;
&lt;param-name&gt;targetClass&lt;/param-name&gt;
&lt;param-value&gt;org.acegisecurity.ui.webapp.AuthenticationProcessingFilter&lt;/param-value&gt;
&lt;/init-param&gt;
&lt;/filter&gt;
&lt;filter-mapping&gt;
&lt;filter-name&gt;Acegi Authentication Processing Filter&lt;/filter-name&gt;
&lt;url-pattern&gt;/*&lt;/url-pattern&gt;
&lt;/filter-mapping&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>For a discussion of <literal>FilterToBeanProxy</literal>, please
refer to the Filters section. The application context will need to
define the <literal>AuthenticationProcessingFilter</literal>:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;bean id="authenticationProcessingFilter" class="org.acegisecurity.ui.webapp.AuthenticationProcessingFilter"&gt;
&lt;property name="authenticationManager"&gt;&lt;ref bean="authenticationManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="authenticationFailureUrl"&gt;&lt;value&gt;/acegilogin.jsp?login_error=1&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="defaultTargetUrl"&gt;&lt;value&gt;/&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="filterProcessesUrl"&gt;&lt;value&gt;/j_acegi_security_check&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>The configured <literal>AuthenticationManager</literal>
processes each authentication request. If authentication fails, the
browser will be redirected to the
<literal>authenticationFailureUrl</literal>. The
<literal>AuthenticationException</literal> will be placed into the
<literal>HttpSession</literal> attribute indicated by
<literal>AbstractProcessingFilter.ACEGI_SECURITY_LAST_EXCEPTION_KEY</literal>,
enabling a reason to be provided to the user on the error page.</para>
<para>If authentication is successful, the resulting
<literal>Authentication</literal> object will be placed into the
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal>.</para>
<para>Once the <literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal> has been
updated, the browser will need to be redirected to the target URL. The
target URL is usually indicated by the <literal>HttpSession</literal>
attribute specified by
<literal>AbstractProcessingFilter.ACEGI_SECURITY_TARGET_URL_KEY</literal>.
This attribute is automatically set by the
<literal>SecurityEnforcementFilter</literal> when an
<literal>AuthenticationException</literal> occurs, so that after login
is completed the user can return to what they were trying to access.
If for some reason the <literal>HttpSession</literal> does not
indicate the target URL, the browser will be redirected to the
<literal>defaultTargetUrl</literal> property.</para>
<para>Because this authentication approach is fully contained within a
single web application, HTTP Form Authentication is recommended to be
used instead of Container Adapters.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-ui-http-basic">
<title>HTTP Basic Authentication</title>
<para>The Acegi Security System for Spring provides a
<literal>BasicProcessingFilter</literal> which is capable of
processing basic authentication credentials presented in HTTP headers.
This can be used for authenticating calls made by Spring remoting
protocols (such as Hessian and Burlap), as well as normal user agents
(such as Internet Explorer and Navigator). The standard governing HTTP
Basic Authentication is defined by RFC 1945, Section 11, and the
<literal>BasicProcessingFilter</literal> conforms with this RFC. Basic
Authentication is an attractive approach to authentication, because it
is very widely deployed in user agents and implementation is extremely
simple (it's just a Base64 encoding of the username:password,
specified in a HTTP header).</para>
<para>To implement HTTP Basic Authentication, it is necessary to
define <literal>BasicProcessingFilter</literal> in the fitler chain.
The application context will need to define the
<literal>BasicProcessingFilter</literal> and its required
collaborator:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;bean id="basicProcessingFilter" class="org.acegisecurity.ui.basicauth.BasicProcessingFilter"&gt;
&lt;property name="authenticationManager"&gt;&lt;ref bean="authenticationManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="authenticationEntryPoint"&gt;&lt;ref bean="authenticationEntryPoint"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;bean id="authenticationEntryPoint" class="org.acegisecurity.ui.basicauth.BasicProcessingFilterEntryPoint"&gt;
&lt;property name="realmName"&gt;&lt;value&gt;Name Of Your Realm&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>The configured <literal>AuthenticationManager</literal>
processes each authentication request. If authentication fails, the
configured <literal>AuthenticationEntryPoint</literal> will be used to
retry the authentication process. Usually you will use the
<literal>BasicProcessingFilterEntryPoint</literal>, which returns a
401 response with a suitable header to retry HTTP Basic
authentication. If authentication is successful, the resulting
<literal>Authentication</literal> object will be placed into the
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal>.</para>
<para>If the authentication event was successful, or authentication
was not attempted because the HTTP header did not contain a supported
authentication request, the filter chain will continue as normal. The
only time the filter chain will be interrupted is if authentication
fails and the <literal>AuthenticationEntryPoint</literal> is called,
as discussed in the previous paragraph.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-ui-http-digest">
<title>HTTP Digest Authentication</title>
<para>The Acegi Security System for Spring provides a
<literal>DigestProcessingFilter</literal> which is capable of
processing digest authentication credentials presented in HTTP
headers. Digest Authentication attempts to solve many of the
weakenesses of Basic authentication, specifically by ensuring
credentials are never sent in clear text across the wire. Many user
agents support Digest Authentication, including FireFox and Internet
Explorer. The standard governing HTTP Digest Authentication is defined
by RFC 2617, which updates an earlier version of the Digest
Authentication standard prescribed by RFC 2069. Most user agents
implement RFC 2617. The Acegi Security
<literal>DigestProcessingFilter</literal> is compatible with the
"<literal>auth</literal>" quality of protection
(<literal>qop</literal>) prescribed by RFC 2617, which also provides
backward compatibility with RFC 2069. Digest Authentication is a
highly attractive option if you need to use unencrypted HTTP (ie no
TLS/HTTPS) and wish to maximise security of the authentication
process. Indeed Digest Authentication is a mandatory requirement for
the WebDAV protocol, as noted by RFC 2518 Section 17.1, so we should
expect to see it increasingly deployed and replacing Basic
Authentication.</para>
<para>Digest Authentication is definitely the most secure choice
between Form Authentication, Basic Authentication and Digest
Authentication, although extra security also means more complex user
agent implementations. Central to Digest Authentication is a "nonce".
This is a value the server generates. Acegi Security's nonce adopts
the following format:</para>
<para><programlisting>base64(expirationTime + ":" + md5Hex(expirationTime + ":" + key))
expirationTime: The date and time when the nonce expires, expressed in milliseconds
key: A private key to prevent modification of the nonce token
</programlisting></para>
<para>The <literal>DigestProcessingFilterEntryPoint</literal> has a
property specifying the <literal>key</literal> used for generating the
nonce tokens, along with a <literal>nonceValiditySeconds</literal>
property for determining the expiration time (default 300, which
equals five minutes). Whilstever the nonce is valid, the digest is
computed by concatenating various strings including the username,
password, nonce, URI being requested, a client-generated nonce (merely
a random value which the user agent generates each request), the realm
name etc, then performing an MD5 hash. Both the server and user agent
perform this digest computation, resulting in different hash codes if
they disagree on an included value (eg password). In the Acegi
Security implementation, if the server-generated nonce has merely
expired (but the digest was otherwise valid), the
<literal>DigestProcessingFilterEntryPoint</literal> will send a
<literal>"stale=true"</literal> header. This tells the user agent
there is no need to disturb the user (as the password and username etc
is correct), but simply to try again using a new nonce.</para>
<para>An appropriate value for
<literal>DigestProcessingFilterEntryPoint</literal>'s
<literal>nonceValiditySeconds</literal> parameter will depend on your
application. Extremely secure applications should note that an
intercepted authentication header can be used to impersonate the
principal until the <literal>expirationTime</literal> contained in the
nonce is reached. This is the key principle when selecting an
appropriate setting, but it would be unusual for immensly secure
applications to not be running over TLS/HTTPS in the first
instance.</para>
<para>Because of the more complex implementation of Digest
Authentication, there are often user agent issues. For example,
Internet Explorer fails to present an "<literal>opaque</literal>"
token on subsequent requests in the same session. The Acegi Security
filters therefore encapsulate all state information into the
"<literal>nonce</literal>" token instead. In our testing, the Acegi
Security implementation works reliably with FireFox and Internet
Explorer, correctly handling nonce timeouts etc.</para>
<para>Now that we've reviewed the theory, let's see how to use it. To
implement HTTP Digest Authentication, it is necessary to define
<literal>DigestProcessingFilter</literal> in the fitler chain. The
application context will need to define the
<literal>DigestProcessingFilter</literal> and its required
collaborators:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;bean id="digestProcessingFilter" class="org.acegisecurity.ui.digestauth.DigestProcessingFilter"&gt;
&lt;property name="authenticationDao"&gt;&lt;ref local="jdbcDaoImpl"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="authenticationEntryPoint"&gt;&lt;ref local="digestProcessingFilterEntryPoint"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="userCache"&gt;&lt;ref local="userCache"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;bean id="digestProcessingFilterEntryPoint" class="org.acegisecurity.ui.digestauth.DigestProcessingFilterEntryPoint"&gt;
&lt;property name="realmName"&gt;&lt;value&gt;Contacts Realm via Digest Authentication&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="key"&gt;&lt;value&gt;acegi&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="nonceValiditySeconds"&gt;&lt;value&gt;10&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>The configured <literal>AuthenticationDao</literal> is needed
because <literal>DigestProcessingFilter</literal> must have direct
access to the clear text password of a user. Digest Authentication
will NOT work if you are using encoded passwords in your DAO. The DAO
collaborator, along with the <literal>UserCache</literal>, are
typically shared directly with a
<literal>DaoAuthenticationProvider</literal>. The
<literal>authenticationEntryPoint</literal> property must be
<literal>DigestProcessingFilterEntryPoint</literal>, so that
<literal>DigestProcessingFilter</literal> can obtain the correct
<literal>realmName</literal> and <literal>key</literal> for digest
calculations.</para>
<para>Like <literal>BasicAuthenticationFilter</literal>, if
authentication is successful an <literal>Authentication</literal>
request token will be placed into the
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal>. If the authentication event
was successful, or authentication was not attempted because the HTTP
header did not contain a Digest Authentication request, the filter
chain will continue as normal. The only time the filter chain will be
interrupted is if authentication fails and the
<literal>AuthenticationEntryPoint</literal> is called, as discussed in
the previous paragraph.</para>
<para>Digest Authentication's RFC offers a range of additional
features to further increase security. For example, the nonce can be
changed on every request. Despite this, the Acegi Security
implementation was designed to minimise the complexity of the
implementation (and the doubtless user agent incompatibilities that
would emerge), and avoid needing to store server-side state. You are
invited to review RFC 2617 if you wish to explore these features in
more detail. As far as we are aware, the Acegi Security implementation
does comply with the minimum standards of this RFC.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-ui-anonymous">
<title>Anonymous Authentication</title>
<para>Particularly in the case of web request URI security, sometimes
it is more convenient to assign configuration attributes against every
possible secure object invocation. Put differently, sometimes it is
nice to say <literal>ROLE_SOMETHING</literal> is required by default
and only allow certain exceptions to this rule, such as for login,
logout and home pages of an application. There are also other
situations where anonymous authentication would be desired, such as
when an auditing interceptor queries the
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal> to identify which principal
was responsible for a given operation. Such classes can be authored
with more robustness if they know the
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal> always contains an
<literal>Authentication</literal> object, and never
<literal>null</literal>.</para>
<para>Acegi Security provides three classes that together provide an
anoymous authentication feature.
<literal>AnonymousAuthenticationToken</literal> is an implementation
of <literal>Authentication</literal>, and stores the
<literal>GrantedAuthority</literal>[]s which apply to the anonymous
principal. There is a corresponding
<literal>AnonymousAuthenticationProvider</literal>, which is chained
into the <literal>ProviderManager</literal> so that
<literal>AnonymousAuthenticationTokens</literal> are accepted.
Finally, there is an AnonymousProcessingFilter, which is chained after
the normal authentication mechanisms and automatically add an
<literal>AnonymousAuthenticationToken</literal> to the
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal> if there is no existing
<literal>Authentication</literal> held there. The definition of the
filter and authentication provider appears as follows:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;bean id="anonymousProcessingFilter" class="org.acegisecurity.providers.anonymous.AnonymousProcessingFilter"&gt;
&lt;property name="key"&gt;&lt;value&gt;foobar&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="userAttribute"&gt;&lt;value&gt;anonymousUser,ROLE_ANONYMOUS&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;bean id="anonymousAuthenticationProvider" class="org.acegisecurity.providers.anonymous.AnonymousAuthenticationProvider"&gt;
&lt;property name="key"&gt;&lt;value&gt;foobar&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>The <literal>key</literal> is shared between the filter and
authentication provider, so that tokens created by the former are
accepted by the latter. The <literal>userAttribute</literal> is
expressed in the form of
<literal>usernameInTheAuthenticationToken,grantedAuthority[,grantedAuthority]</literal>.
This is the same syntax as used after the equals sign for
<literal>InMemoryDaoImpl</literal>'s <literal>userMap</literal>
property.</para>
<para>As explained earlier, the benefit of anonymous authentication is
that all URI patterns can have security applied to them. For
example:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;bean id="filterInvocationInterceptor" class="org.acegisecurity.intercept.web.FilterSecurityInterceptor"&gt;
&lt;property name="authenticationManager"&gt;&lt;ref bean="authenticationManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="accessDecisionManager"&gt;&lt;ref local="httpRequestAccessDecisionManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="objectDefinitionSource"&gt;
&lt;value&gt;
CONVERT_URL_TO_LOWERCASE_BEFORE_COMPARISON
PATTERN_TYPE_APACHE_ANT
/index.jsp=ROLE_ANONYMOUS,ROLE_USER
/hello.htm=ROLE_ANONYMOUS,ROLE_USER
/logoff.jsp=ROLE_ANONYMOUS,ROLE_USER
/acegilogin.jsp*=ROLE_ANONYMOUS,ROLE_USER
/**=ROLE_USER
&lt;/value&gt;
&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting>Rounding out the anonymous authentication
discussion is the <literal>AuthenticationTrustResolver</literal>
interface, with its corresponding
<literal>AuthenticationTrustResolverImpl</literal> implementation.
This interface provides an
<literal>isAnonymous(Authentication)</literal> method, which allows
interested classes to take into account this special type of
authentication status. The
<literal>SecurityEnforcementFilter</literal> uses this interface in
processing <literal>AccessDeniedException</literal>s. If an
<literal>AccessDeniedException</literal> is thrown, and the
authentication is of an anonymous type, instead of throwing a 403
(forbidden) response, the filter will instead commence the
<literal>AuthenticationEntryPoint</literal> so the principal can
authenticate properly. This is a necessary distinction, otherwise
principals would always be deemed "authenticated" and never be given
an opportunity to login via form, basic, digest or some other normal
authentication mechanism.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-ui-remember-me">
<title>Remember-Me Authentication</title>
<para>Remember-me authentication refers to web sites being able to
remember the identity of a principal between sessions. This is
typically accomplished by sending a cookie to the browser, with the
cookie being detected during future sessions and causing automated
login to take place. Acegi Security provides the necessary hooks so
that such operations can take place, along with providing a concrete
implementation that uses hashing to preserve the security of
cookie-based tokens.</para>
<para>Remember-me authentication is not used with digest or basic
authentication, given they are often not used with
<literal>HttpSession</literal>s. Remember-me is used with
<literal>AuthenticationProcessingFilter</literal>, and is implemented
via hooks in the <literal>AbstractProcessingFilter</literal>
superclass. The hooks will invoke a concrete
<literal>RememberMeServices</literal> at the appropriate times. The
interface looks like this:</para>
<para><programlisting>public Authentication autoLogin(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response);
public void loginFail(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response);
public void loginSuccess(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response, Authentication successfulAuthentication);</programlisting></para>
<para>Please refer to JavaDocs for a fuller discussion on what the
methods do, although note at this stage
<literal>AbstractProcessingFilter</literal> only calls the
<literal>loginFail()</literal> and <literal>loginSuccess()</literal>
methods. The <literal>autoLogin()</literal> method is called by
<literal>RememberMeProcessingFilter</literal> whenever the
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal> does not contain an
<literal>Authentication</literal>. This interface therefore provides
the underlaying remember-me implementation with sufficient
notification of authentication-related events, and delegates to the
implementation whenever a candidate web request might contain a cookie
and wish to be remembered.</para>
<para>This design allows any number of remember-me implementation
strategies. In the interests of simplicity and avoiding the need for
DAO implementations that specify write and create methods, Acegi
Security's only concrete implementation,
<literal>TokenBasedRememberMeServices</literal>, uses hashing to
achieve a useful remember-me strategy. In essence a cookie is sent to
the browser upon successful interactive authentication, with that
cookie being composed as follows:</para>
<para><programlisting>base64(username + ":" + expirationTime + ":" + md5Hex(username + ":" + expirationTime + ":" password + ":" + key))
username: As identifiable to TokenBasedRememberMeServices.getAuthenticationDao()
password: That matches the relevant UserDetails retrieved from TokenBasedRememberMeServices.getAuthenticationDao()
expirationTime: The date and time when the remember-me token expires, expressed in milliseconds
key: A private key to prevent modification of the remember-me token
</programlisting></para>
<para>As such the remember-me token is valid only for the period
specified, and provided that the username, password and key does not
change. Notably, this has a potential security issue issue in that a
captured remember-me token will be usable from any user agent until
such time as the token expires. This is the same issue as with digest
authentication. If a principal is aware a token has been captured,
they can easily change their password and immediately invalidate all
remember-me tokens on issue. However, if more significant security is
needed a rolling token approach should be used (this would require a
database) or remember-me services should simply not be used.</para>
<para><literal>TokenBasedRememberMeServices</literal> generates a
<literal>RememberMeAuthenticationToken</literal>, which is processed
by <literal>RememberMeAuthenticationProvider</literal>. A
<literal>key</literal> is shared between this authentication provider
and the <literal>TokenBasedRememberMeServices</literal>. In addition,
<literal>TokenBasedRememberMeServices</literal> requires an
<literal>AuthenticationDao</literal> from which it can retrieve the
username and password for signature comparison purposes, and generate
the <literal>RememberMeAuthenticationToken</literal> to contain the
correct <literal>GrantedAuthority</literal>[]s. Some sort of logout
command should be provided by the application (typically via a JSP)
that invalidates the cookie upon user request. See the Contacts Sample
application's <literal>logout.jsp</literal> for an example.</para>
<para>The beans required in an application context to enable
remember-me services are as follows:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;bean id="rememberMeProcessingFilter" class="org.acegisecurity.ui.rememberme.RememberMeProcessingFilter"&gt;
&lt;property name="rememberMeServices"&gt;&lt;ref local="rememberMeServices"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;bean id="rememberMeServices" class="org.acegisecurity.ui.rememberme.TokenBasedRememberMeServices"&gt;
&lt;property name="authenticationDao"&gt;&lt;ref local="jdbcDaoImpl"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="key"&gt;&lt;value&gt;springRocks&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;bean id="rememberMeAuthenticationProvider" class="org.acegisecurity.providers.rememberme.RememberMeAuthenticationProvider"&gt;
&lt;property name="key"&gt;&lt;value&gt;springRocks&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting>Don't forget to add your
<literal>RememberMeServices</literal> implementation to your
<literal>AuthenticationProcessingFilter.setRememberMeServices()</literal>
property, include the
<literal>RememberMeAuthenticationProvider</literal> in your
<literal>AuthenticationManager.setProviders()</literal> list, and add
a call to <literal>RememberMeProcessingFilter</literal> into your
<literal>FilterChainProxy</literal> (typically immediately after your
<literal>AuthenticationProcessingFilter</literal>).</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-ui-well-known">
<title>Well-Known Locations</title>
<para>Prior to release 0.8.0, Acegi Security referred to "well-known
locations" in discussions about storing the
<literal>Authentication</literal>. This approach did not explicitly
separate the function of <literal>HttpSession</literal> storage of
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal> contents from the processing
of authentication requests received through various protocols. In
addition, the previous approach did not facilitate storage of
non-<literal>Authentication</literal> objects between requests, which
was limiting usefulness of the
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal> system to member of the
community. For these reasons, the notion of well-known locations was
abandoned, the <literal>HttpSessionContextIntegrationFilter</literal>
was established, and the purpose of authentication processing
mechanisms was explicitly defined and limited to interaction with the
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal> only. There is no need to
refer to well-known locations any more and we hope this clearer
separation of responsibilities enhances understanding of the
design.</para>
</sect2>
</sect1>
<sect1 id="security-container-adapters">
<title>Container Adapters</title>
<sect2 id="security-container-adapters-overview">
<title>Overview</title>
<para>Very early versions of the Acegi Security System for Spring
exclusively used Container Adapters for interfacing authentication
with end users. Whilst this worked well, it required considerable time
to support multiple container versions and the configuration itself
was relatively time-consuming for developers. For this reason the HTTP
Form Authentication and HTTP Basic Authentication approaches were
developed, and are today recommended for almost all
applications.</para>
<para>Container Adapters enable the Acegi Security System for Spring
to integrate directly with the containers used to host end user
applications. This integration means that applications can continue to
leverage the authentication and authorization capabilities built into
containers (such as <literal>isUserInRole()</literal> and form-based
or basic authentication), whilst benefiting from the enhanced security
interception capabilities provided by the Acegi Security System for
Spring (it should be noted that Acegi Security also offers
<literal>ContextHolderAwareRequestWrapper</literal> to deliver
<literal>isUserInRole()</literal> and similar Servlet Specification
compatibility methods).</para>
<para>The integration between a container and the Acegi Security
System for Spring is achieved through an adapter. The adapter provides
a container-compatible user authentication provider, and needs to
return a container-compatible user object.</para>
<para>The adapter is instantiated by the container and is defined in a
container-specific configuration file. The adapter then loads a Spring
application context which defines the normal authentication manager
settings, such as the authentication providers that can be used to
authenticate the request. The application context is usually named
<literal>acegisecurity.xml</literal> and is placed in a
container-specific location.</para>
<para>The Acegi Security System for Spring currently supports Jetty,
Catalina (Tomcat), JBoss and Resin. Additional container adapters can
easily be written.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-container-adapters-adapter-provider">
<title>Adapter Authentication Provider</title>
<para>As is always the case, the container adapter generated
<literal>Authentication</literal> object still needs to be
authenticated by an <literal>AuthenticationManager</literal> when
requested to do so by the
<literal>AbstractSecurityInterceptor</literal>. The
<literal>AuthenticationManager</literal> needs to be certain the
adapter-provided <literal>Authentication</literal> object is valid and
was actually authenticated by a trusted adapter.</para>
<para>Adapters create <literal>Authentication</literal> objects which
are immutable and implement the <literal>AuthByAdapter</literal>
interface. These objects store the hash of a key that is defined by
the adapter. This allows the <literal>Authentication</literal> object
to be validated by the <literal>AuthByAdapterProvider</literal>. This
authentication provider is defined as follows:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;bean id="authByAdapterProvider" class="org.acegisecurity.adapters.AuthByAdapterProvider"&gt;
&lt;property name="key"&gt;&lt;value&gt;my_password&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>The key must match the key that is defined in the
container-specific configuration file that starts the adapter. The
<literal>AuthByAdapterProvider</literal> automatically accepts as
valid any <literal>AuthByAdapter</literal> implementation that returns
the expected hash of the key.</para>
<para>To reiterate, this means the adapter will perform the initial
authentication using providers such as
<literal>DaoAuthenticationProvider</literal>, returning an
<literal>AuthByAdapter</literal> instance that contains a hash code of
the key. Later, when an application calls a security interceptor
managed resource, the <literal>AuthByAdapter</literal> instance in the
<literal>SecurityContext</literal> in the
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal> will be tested by the
application's <literal>AuthByAdapterProvider</literal>. There is no
requirement for additional authentication providers such as
<literal>DaoAuthenticationProvider</literal> within the
application-specific application context, as the only type of
<literal>Authentication</literal> instance that will be presented by
the application is from the container adapter.</para>
<para>Classloader issues are frequent with containers and the use of
container adapters illustrates this further. Each container requires a
very specific configuration. The installation instructions are
provided below. Once installed, please take the time to try the sample
application to ensure your container adapter is properly
configured.</para>
<para>When using container adapters with the
<literal>DaoAuthenticationProvider</literal>, ensure you set its
<literal>forcePrincipalAsString</literal> property to
<literal>true</literal>.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-container-adapters-catalina">
<title>Catalina (Tomcat) Installation</title>
<para>The following was tested with Jakarta Tomcat 4.1.30 and
5.0.19.</para>
<para><literal>$CATALINA_HOME</literal> refers to the root of your
Catalina (Tomcat) installation.</para>
<para>Edit your <literal>$CATALINA_HOME/conf/server.xml</literal> file
so the <literal>&lt;Engine&gt;</literal> section contains only one
active <literal>&lt;Realm&gt;</literal> entry. An example realm
entry:</para>
<para><programlisting> &lt;Realm className="org.acegisecurity.adapters.catalina.CatalinaAcegiUserRealm"
appContextLocation="conf/acegisecurity.xml"
key="my_password" /&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>Be sure to remove any other <literal>&lt;Realm&gt;</literal>
entry from your <literal>&lt;Engine&gt;</literal> section.</para>
<para>Copy <literal>acegisecurity.xml</literal> into
<literal>$CATALINA_HOME/conf</literal>.</para>
<para>Copy <literal>acegi-security-catalina-XX.jar</literal> into
<literal>$CATALINA_HOME/server/lib</literal>.</para>
<para>Copy the following files into
<literal>$CATALINA_HOME/common/lib</literal>:</para>
<itemizedlist>
<listitem>
<para><literal>aopalliance.jar</literal></para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>spring.jar</literal></para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>commons-codec.jar</literal></para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>burlap.jar</literal></para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>hessian.jar</literal></para>
</listitem>
</itemizedlist>
<para>None of the above JAR files (or
<literal>acegi-security-XX.jar</literal>) should be in your
application's <literal>WEB-INF/lib</literal>. The realm name indicated
in your <literal>web.xml</literal> does not matter with
Catalina.</para>
<para>We have received reports of problems using this Container
Adapter with Mac OS X. A work-around is to use a script such as
follows:</para>
<para><programlisting>#!/bin/sh
export CATALINA_HOME="/Library/Tomcat"
export JAVA_HOME="/Library/Java/Home"
cd /
$CATALINA_HOME/bin/startup.sh</programlisting></para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-container-adapters-jetty">
<title>Jetty Installation</title>
<para>The following was tested with Jetty 4.2.18.</para>
<para><literal>$JETTY_HOME</literal> refers to the root of your Jetty
installation.</para>
<para>Edit your <literal>$JETTY_HOME/etc/jetty.xml</literal> file so
the <literal>&lt;Configure class&gt;</literal> section has a new
addRealm call:</para>
<para><programlisting> &lt;Call name="addRealm"&gt;
&lt;Arg&gt;
&lt;New class="org.acegisecurity.adapters.jetty.JettyAcegiUserRealm"&gt;
&lt;Arg&gt;Spring Powered Realm&lt;/Arg&gt;
&lt;Arg&gt;my_password&lt;/Arg&gt;
&lt;Arg&gt;etc/acegisecurity.xml&lt;/Arg&gt;
&lt;/New&gt;
&lt;/Arg&gt;
&lt;/Call&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>Copy <literal>acegisecurity.xml</literal> into
<literal>$JETTY_HOME/etc</literal>.</para>
<para>Copy the following files into
<literal>$JETTY_HOME/ext</literal>:<itemizedlist>
<listitem>
<para><literal>aopalliance.jar</literal></para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>commons-logging.jar</literal></para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>spring.jar</literal></para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>acegi-security-jetty-XX.jar</literal></para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>commons-codec.jar</literal></para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>burlap.jar</literal></para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>hessian.jar</literal></para>
</listitem>
</itemizedlist></para>
<para>None of the above JAR files (or
<literal>acegi-security-XX.jar</literal>) should be in your
application's <literal>WEB-INF/lib</literal>. The realm name indicated
in your <literal>web.xml</literal> does matter with Jetty. The
<literal>web.xml</literal> must express the same
<literal>&lt;realm-name&gt;</literal> as your
<literal>jetty.xml</literal> (in the example above, "Spring Powered
Realm").</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-container-adapters-joss">
<title>JBoss Installation</title>
<para>The following was tested with JBoss 3.2.6.</para>
<para><literal>$JBOSS_HOME</literal> refers to the root of your JBoss
installation.</para>
<para>There are two different ways of making spring context available
to the Jboss integration classes.</para>
<para>The first approach is by editing your
<literal>$JBOSS_HOME/server/your_config/conf/login-config.xml</literal>
file so that it contains a new entry under the
<literal>&lt;Policy&gt;</literal> section:</para>
<para><programlisting> &lt;application-policy name = "SpringPoweredRealm"&gt;
&lt;authentication&gt;
&lt;login-module code = "org.acegisecurity.adapters.jboss.JbossSpringLoginModule"
flag = "required"&gt;
&lt;module-option name = "appContextLocation"&gt;acegisecurity.xml&lt;/module-option&gt;
&lt;module-option name = "key"&gt;my_password&lt;/module-option&gt;
&lt;/login-module&gt;
&lt;/authentication&gt;
&lt;/application-policy&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>Copy <literal>acegisecurity.xml</literal> into
<literal>$JBOSS_HOME/server/your_config/conf</literal>.</para>
<para>In this configuration <literal>acegisecurity.xml</literal>
contains the spring context definition including all the
authentication manager beans. You have to bear in mind though, that
<literal>SecurityContext</literal> is created and destroyed on each
login request, so the login operation might become costly.
Alternatively, the second approach is to use Spring singleton
capabilities through
<literal>org.springframework.beans.factory.access.SingletonBeanFactoryLocator</literal>.
The required configuration for this approach is:</para>
<para><programlisting> &lt;application-policy name = "SpringPoweredRealm"&gt;
&lt;authentication&gt;
&lt;login-module code = "org.acegisecurity.adapters.jboss.JbossSpringLoginModule"
flag = "required"&gt;
&lt;module-option name = "singletonId"&gt;springRealm&lt;/module-option&gt;
&lt;module-option name = "key"&gt;my_password&lt;/module-option&gt;
&lt;module-option name = "authenticationManager"&gt;authenticationManager&lt;/module-option&gt;
&lt;/login-module&gt;
&lt;/authentication&gt;
&lt;/application-policy&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>In the above code fragment,
<literal>authenticationManager</literal> is a helper property that
defines the expected name of the
<literal>AuthenticationManager</literal> in case you have several
defined in the IoC container. The <literal>singletonId</literal>
property references a bean defined in a
<literal>beanRefFactory.xml</literal> file. This file needs to be
available from anywhere on the JBoss classpath, including
<literal>$JBOSS_HOME/server/your_config/conf</literal>. The
<literal>beanRefFactory.xml</literal> contains the following
declaration:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;beans&gt;
&lt;bean id="springRealm" singleton="true" lazy-init="true" class="org.springframework.context.support.ClassPathXmlApplicationContext"&gt;
&lt;constructor-arg&gt;
&lt;list&gt;
&lt;value&gt;acegisecurity.xml&lt;/value&gt;
&lt;/list&gt;
&lt;/constructor-arg&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;/beans&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>Finally, irrespective of the configuration approach you need to
copy the following files into
<literal>$JBOSS_HOME/server/your_config/lib</literal>:<itemizedlist>
<listitem>
<para><literal>aopalliance.jar</literal></para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>spring.jar</literal></para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>acegi-security-jboss-XX.jar</literal></para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>commons-codec.jar</literal></para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>burlap.jar</literal></para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>hessian.jar</literal></para>
</listitem>
</itemizedlist></para>
<para>None of the above JAR files (or
<literal>acegi-security-XX.jar</literal>) should be in your
application's <literal>WEB-INF/lib</literal>. The realm name indicated
in your <literal>web.xml</literal> does not matter with JBoss.
However, your web application's
<literal>WEB-INF/jboss-web.xml</literal> must express the same
<literal>&lt;security-domain&gt;</literal> as your
<literal>login-config.xml</literal>. For example, to match the above
example, your <literal>jboss-web.xml</literal> would look like
this:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;jboss-web&gt;
&lt;security-domain&gt;java:/jaas/SpringPoweredRealm&lt;/security-domain&gt;
&lt;/jboss-web&gt;</programlisting></para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-container-adapters-resin">
<title>Resin Installation</title>
<para>The following was tested with Resin 3.0.6.</para>
<para><literal>$RESIN_HOME</literal> refers to the root of your Resin
installation.</para>
<para>Resin provides several ways to support the container adapter. In
the instructions below we have elected to maximise consistency with
other container adapter configurations. This will allow Resin users to
simply deploy the sample application and confirm correct
configuration. Developers comfortable with Resin are naturally able to
use its capabilities to package the JARs with the web application
itself, and/or support single sign-on.</para>
<para>Copy the following files into
<literal>$RESIN_HOME/lib</literal>:<itemizedlist>
<listitem>
<para><literal>aopalliance.jar</literal></para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>commons-logging.jar</literal></para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>spring.jar</literal></para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>acegi-security-resin-XX.jar</literal></para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>commons-codec.jar</literal></para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>burlap.jar</literal></para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>hessian.jar</literal></para>
</listitem>
</itemizedlist></para>
<para>Unlike the container-wide <literal>acegisecurity.xml</literal>
files used by other container adapters, each Resin web application
will contain its own
<literal>WEB-INF/resin-acegisecurity.xml</literal> file. Each web
application will also contain a <literal>resin-web.xml</literal> file
which Resin uses to start the container adapter:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;web-app&gt;
&lt;authenticator&gt;
&lt;type&gt;org.acegisecurity.adapters.resin.ResinAcegiAuthenticator&lt;/type&gt;
&lt;init&gt;
&lt;app-context-location&gt;WEB-INF/resin-acegisecurity.xml&lt;/app-context-location&gt;
&lt;key&gt;my_password&lt;/key&gt;
&lt;/init&gt;
&lt;/authenticator&gt;
&lt;/web-app&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>With the basic configuration provided above, none of the JAR
files listed (or <literal>acegi-security-XX.jar</literal>) should be
in your application's <literal>WEB-INF/lib</literal>. The realm name
indicated in your <literal>web.xml</literal> does not matter with
Resin, as the relevant authentication class is indicated by the
<literal>&lt;authenticator&gt;</literal> setting.</para>
</sect2>
</sect1>
<sect1 id="security-cas">
<title>Yale Central Authentication Service (CAS) Single Sign On</title>
<sect2 id="security-cas-overview">
<title>Overview</title>
<para>Yale University produces an enterprise-wide single sign on
system known as CAS. Unlike other initiatives, Yale's Central
Authentication Service is open source, widely used, simple to
understand, platform independent, and supports proxy capabilities. The
Acegi Security System for Spring fully supports CAS, and provides an
easy migration path from single-application deployments of Acegi
Security through to multiple-application deployments secured by an
enterprise-wide CAS server.</para>
<para>You can learn more about CAS at
<literal>http://www.yale.edu/tp/auth/</literal>. You will need to
visit this URL to download the CAS Server files. Whilst the Acegi
Security System for Spring includes two CAS libraries in the
"-with-dependencies" ZIP file, you will still need the CAS Java Server
Pages and <literal>web.xml</literal> to customise and deploy your CAS
server.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-cas-how-cas-works">
<title>How CAS Works</title>
<para>Whilst the CAS web site above contains two documents that detail
the architecture of CAS, we present the general overview again here
within the context of the Acegi Security System for Spring. The
following refers to CAS 2.0, being the version of CAS that Acegi
Security System for Spring supports.</para>
<para>Somewhere in your enterprise you will need to setup a CAS
server. The CAS server is simply a standard WAR file, so there isn't
anything difficult about setting up your server. Inside the WAR file
you will customise the login and other single sign on pages displayed
to users. You will also need to specify in the web.xml a
<literal>PasswordHandler</literal>. The
<literal>PasswordHandler</literal> has a simple method that returns a
boolean as to whether a given username and password is valid. Your
<literal>PasswordHandler</literal> implementation will need to link
into some type of backend authentication repository, such as an LDAP
server or database.</para>
<para>If you are already running an existing CAS server instance, you
will have already established a <literal>PasswordHandler</literal>. If
you do not already have a <literal>PasswordHandler</literal>, you
might prefer to use the Acegi Security System for Spring
<literal>CasPasswordHandler</literal> class. This class delegates
through to the standard Acegi Security
<literal>AuthenticationManager</literal>, enabling you to use a
security configuration you might already have in place. You do not
need to use the <literal>CasPasswordHandler</literal> class on your
CAS server if you do not wish. The Acegi Security System for Spring
will function as a CAS client successfully irrespective of the
<literal>PasswordHandler</literal> you've chosen for your CAS
server.</para>
<para>Apart from the CAS server itself, the other key player is of
course the secure web applications deployed throughout your
enterprise. These web applications are known as "services". There are
two types of services: standard services and proxy services. A proxy
service is able to request resources from other services on behalf of
the user. This will be explained more fully later.</para>
<para>Services can be developed in a large variety of languages, due
to CAS 2.0's very light XML-based protocol. The Yale CAS home page
contains a clients archive which demonstrates CAS clients in Java,
Active Server Pages, Perl, Python and others. Naturally, Java support
is very strong given the CAS server is written in Java. You do not
need to use any of CAS' client classes in applications secured by the
Acegi Security System for Spring. This is handled transparently for
you.</para>
<para>The basic interaction between a web browser, CAS server and an
Acegi Security for System Spring secured service is as follows:</para>
<orderedlist>
<listitem>
<para>The web user is browsing the service's public pages. CAS or
Acegi Security is not involved.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>The user eventually requests a page that is either secure or
one of the beans it uses is secure. Acegi Security's
<literal>SecurityEnforcementFilter</literal> will detect the
<literal>AuthenticationException</literal>.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>Because the user's <literal>Authentication</literal> object
(or lack thereof) caused an
<literal>AuthenticationException</literal>, the
<literal>SecurityEnforcementFilter</literal> will call the
configured <literal>AuthenticationEntryPoint</literal>. If using
CAS, this will be the
<literal>CasProcessingFilterEntryPoint</literal> class.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>The <literal>CasProcessingFilterEntry</literal> point will
redirect the user's browser to the CAS server. It will also
indicate a <literal>service</literal> parameter, which is the
callback URL for the Acegi Security service. For example, the URL
to which the browser is redirected might be
<literal>https://my.company.com/cas/login?service=https%3A%2F%2Fserver3.company.com%2Fwebapp%2Fj_acegi_cas_security_check</literal>.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>After the user's browser redirects to CAS, they will be
prompted for their username and password. If the user presents a
session cookie which indicates they've previously logged on, they
will not be prompted to login again (there is an exception to this
procedure, which we'll cover later). CAS will use the
<literal>PasswordHandler</literal> discussed above to decide
whether the username and password is valid.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>Upon successful login, CAS will redirect the user's browser
back to the original service. It will also include a
<literal>ticket</literal> parameter, which is an opaque string
representing the "service ticket". Continuing our earlier example,
the URL the browser is redirected to might be
<literal>https://server3.company.com/webapp/j_acegi_cas_security_check?ticket=ST-0-ER94xMJmn6pha35CQRoZ</literal>.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>Back in the service web application, the
<literal>CasProcessingFilter</literal> is always listening for
requests to <literal>/j_acegi_cas_security_check</literal> (this
is configurable, but we'll use the defaults in this introduction).
The processing filter will construct a
<literal>UsernamePasswordAuthenticationToken</literal>
representing the service ticket. The principal will be equal to
<literal>CasProcessingFilter.CAS_STATEFUL_IDENTIFIER</literal>,
whilst the credentials will be the service ticket opaque value.
This authentication request will then be handed to the configured
<literal>AuthenticationManager</literal>.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>The <literal>AuthenticationManager</literal> implementation
will be the <literal>ProviderManager</literal>, which is in turn
configured with the <literal>CasAuthenticationProvider</literal>.
The <literal>CasAuthenticationProvider</literal> only responds to
<literal>UsernamePasswordAuthenticationToken</literal>s containing
the CAS-specific principal (such as
<literal>CasProcessingFilter.CAS_STATEFUL_IDENTIFIER</literal>)
and <literal>CasAuthenticationToken</literal>s (discussed
later).</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>CasAuthenticationProvider</literal> will validate
the service ticket using a <literal>TicketValidator</literal>
implementation. Acegi Security includes one implementation, the
<literal>CasProxyTicketValidator</literal>. This implementation a
ticket validation class included in the CAS client library. The
<literal>CasProxyTicketValidator</literal> makes a HTTPS request
to the CAS server in order to validate the service ticket. The
<literal>CasProxyTicketValidator</literal> may also include a
proxy callback URL, which is included in this example:
<literal>https://my.company.com/cas/proxyValidate?service=https%3A%2F%2Fserver3.company.com%2Fwebapp%2Fj_acegi_cas_security_check&amp;ticket=ST-0-ER94xMJmn6pha35CQRoZ&amp;pgtUrl=https://server3.company.com/webapp/casProxy/receptor</literal>.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>Back on the CAS server, the proxy validation request will be
received. If the presented service ticket matches the service URL
the ticket was issued to, CAS will provide an affirmative response
in XML indicating the username. If any proxy was involved in the
authentication (discussed below), the list of proxies is also
included in the XML response.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>[OPTIONAL] If the request to the CAS validation service
included the proxy callback URL (in the <literal>pgtUrl</literal>
parameter), CAS will include a <literal>pgtIou</literal> string in
the XML response. This <literal>pgtIou</literal> represents a
proxy-granting ticket IOU. The CAS server will then create its own
HTTPS connection back to the <literal>pgtUrl</literal>. This is to
mutually authenticate the CAS server and the claimed service URL.
The HTTPS connection will be used to send a proxy granting ticket
to the original web application. For example,
<literal>https://server3.company.com/webapp/casProxy/receptor?pgtIou=PGTIOU-0-R0zlgrl4pdAQwBvJWO3vnNpevwqStbSGcq3vKB2SqSFFRnjPHt&amp;pgtId=PGT-1-si9YkkHLrtACBo64rmsi3v2nf7cpCResXg5MpESZFArbaZiOKH</literal>.
We suggest you use CAS' <literal>ProxyTicketReceptor</literal>
servlet to receive these proxy-granting tickets, if they are
required.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>The <literal>CasProxyTicketValidator</literal> will parse
the XML received from the CAS server. It will return to the
<literal>CasAuthenticationProvider</literal> a
<literal>TicketResponse</literal>, which includes the username
(mandatory), proxy list (if any were involved), and proxy-granting
ticket IOU (if the proxy callback was requested).</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>Next <literal>CasAuthenticationProvider</literal> will call
a configured <literal>CasProxyDecider</literal>. The
<literal>CasProxyDecider</literal> indicates whether the proxy
list in the <literal>TicketResponse</literal> is acceptable to the
service. Several implementations are provided with the Acegi
Security System: <literal>RejectProxyTickets</literal>,
<literal>AcceptAnyCasProxy</literal> and
<literal>NamedCasProxyDecider</literal>. These names are largely
self-explanatory, except <literal>NamedCasProxyDecider</literal>
which allows a <literal>List</literal> of trusted proxies to be
provided.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>CasAuthenticationProvider</literal> will next
request a <literal>CasAuthoritiesPopulator</literal> to advise the
<literal>GrantedAuthority</literal> objects that apply to the user
contained in the <literal>TicketResponse</literal>. Acegi Security
includes a <literal>DaoCasAuthoritiesPopulator</literal> which
simply uses the <literal>AuthenticationDao</literal>
infrastructure to find the <literal>UserDetails</literal> and
their associated <literal>GrantedAuthority</literal>s. Note that
the password and enabled/disabled status of
<literal>UserDetails</literal> returned by the
<literal>AuthenticationDao</literal> are ignored, as the CAS
server is responsible for authentication decisions.
<literal>DaoCasAuthoritiesPopulator</literal> is only concerned
with retrieving the <literal>GrantedAuthority</literal>s.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>If there were no problems,
<literal>CasAuthenticationProvider</literal> constructs a
<literal>CasAuthenticationToken</literal> including the details
contained in the <literal>TicketResponse</literal> and the
<literal>GrantedAuthority</literal>s. The
<literal>CasAuthenticationToken</literal> contains the hash of a
key, so that the <literal>CasAuthenticationProvider</literal>
knows it created it.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>Control then returns to
<literal>CasProcessingFilter</literal>, which places the created
<literal>CasAuthenticationToken</literal> into the
<literal>HttpSession</literal> attribute named
<literal>HttpSessionIntegrationFilter.ACEGI_SECURITY_AUTHENTICATION_KEY</literal>.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>The user's browser is redirected to the original page that
caused the <literal>AuthenticationException</literal>.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>As the <literal>Authentication</literal> object is now in
the well-known location, it is handled like any other
authentication approach. Usually the
<literal>HttpSessionIntegrationFilter</literal> will be used to
associate the <literal>Authentication</literal> object with the
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal> for the duration of each
request.</para>
</listitem>
</orderedlist>
<para>It's good that you're still here! It might sound involved, but
you can relax as the Acegi Security System for Spring classes hide
much of the complexity. Let's now look at how this is
configured.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-cas-install-server">
<title>CAS Server Installation (Optional)</title>
<para>As mentioned above, the Acegi Security System for Spring
includes a <literal>PasswordHandler</literal> that bridges your
existing <literal>AuthenticationManager</literal> into CAS. You do not
need to use this <literal>PasswordHandler</literal> to use Acegi
Security on the client side (any CAS
<literal>PasswordHandler</literal> will do).</para>
<para>To install, you will need to download and extract the CAS server
archive. We used version 2.0.12. There will be a
<literal>/web</literal> directory in the root of the deployment. Copy
an <literal>applicationContext.xml</literal> containing your
<literal>AuthenticationManager</literal> as well as the
<literal>CasPasswordHandler</literal> into the
<literal>/web/WEB-INF</literal> directory. A sample
<literal>applicationContext.xml</literal> is included below:</para>
<programlisting>&lt;bean id="inMemoryDaoImpl" class="org.acegisecurity.providers.dao.memory.InMemoryDaoImpl"&gt;
&lt;property name="userMap"&gt;
&lt;value&gt;
marissa=koala,ROLES_IGNORED_BY_CAS
dianne=emu,ROLES_IGNORED_BY_CAS
scott=wombat,ROLES_IGNORED_BY_CAS
peter=opal,disabled,ROLES_IGNORED_BY_CAS
&lt;/value&gt;
&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;bean id="daoAuthenticationProvider" class="org.acegisecurity.providers.dao.DaoAuthenticationProvider"&gt;
&lt;property name="authenticationDao"&gt;&lt;ref bean="inMemoryDaoImpl"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;bean id="authenticationManager" class="org.acegisecurity.providers.ProviderManager"&gt;
&lt;property name="providers"&gt;
&lt;list&gt;
&lt;ref bean="daoAuthenticationProvider"/&gt;
&lt;/list&gt;
&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;bean id="casPasswordHandler" class="org.acegisecurity.adapters.cas.CasPasswordHandler"&gt;
&lt;property name="authenticationManager"&gt;&lt;ref bean="authenticationManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting>
<para>Note the granted authorities are ignored by CAS because it has
no way of communicating the granted authorities to calling
applications. CAS is only concerned with username and passwords (and
the enabled/disabled status).</para>
<para>Next you will need to edit the existing
<literal>/web/WEB-INF/web.xml</literal> file. Add (or edit in the case
of the <literal>authHandler</literal> property) the following
lines:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;context-param&gt;
&lt;param-name&gt;edu.yale.its.tp.cas.authHandler&lt;/param-name&gt;
&lt;param-value&gt;org.acegisecurity.adapters.cas.CasPasswordHandlerProxy&lt;/param-value&gt;
&lt;/context-param&gt;
&lt;context-param&gt;
&lt;param-name&gt;contextConfigLocation&lt;/param-name&gt;
&lt;param-value&gt;/WEB-INF/applicationContext.xml&lt;/param-value&gt;
&lt;/context-param&gt;
&lt;listener&gt;
&lt;listener-class&gt;org.springframework.web.context.ContextLoaderListener&lt;/listener-class&gt;
&lt;/listener&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>Copy the <literal>spring.jar</literal> and
<literal>acegi-security.jar</literal> files into
<literal>/web/WEB-INF/lib</literal>. Now use the <literal>ant
dist</literal> task in the <literal>build.xml</literal> in the root of
the directory structure. This will create
<literal>/lib/cas.war</literal>, which is ready for deployment to your
servlet container.</para>
<para>Note CAS heavily relies on HTTPS. You can't even test the system
without a HTTPS certificate. Whilst you should refer to your web
container's documentation on setting up HTTPS, if you need some
additional help or a test certificate you might like to check the
<literal>samples/contacts/etc/ssl</literal> directory.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-cas-install-client">
<title>CAS Acegi Security System Client Installation</title>
<para>The web application side of CAS is made easy due to the Acegi
Security System for Spring. It is assumed you already know the basics
of using the Acegi Security System for Spring, so these are not
covered again below. Only the CAS-specific beans are mentioned.</para>
<para>You will need to add a <literal>ServiceProperties</literal> bean
to your application context. This represents your service:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;bean id="serviceProperties" class="org.acegisecurity.ui.cas.ServiceProperties"&gt;
&lt;property name="service"&gt;&lt;value&gt;https://localhost:8443/contacts-cas/j_acegi_cas_security_check&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="sendRenew"&gt;&lt;value&gt;false&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>The <literal>service</literal> must equal a URL that will be
monitored by the <literal>CasProcessingFilter</literal>. The
<literal>sendRenew</literal> defaults to false, but should be set to
true if your application is particularly sensitive. What this
parameter does is tell the CAS login service that a single sign on
login is unacceptable. Instead, the user will need to re-enter their
username and password in order to gain access to the service.</para>
<para>The following beans should be configured to commence the CAS
authentication process:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;bean id="casProcessingFilter" class="org.acegisecurity.ui.cas.CasProcessingFilter"&gt;
&lt;property name="authenticationManager"&gt;&lt;ref bean="authenticationManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="authenticationFailureUrl"&gt;&lt;value&gt;/casfailed.jsp&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="defaultTargetUrl"&gt;&lt;value&gt;/&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="filterProcessesUrl"&gt;&lt;value&gt;/j_acegi_cas_security_check&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;bean id="securityEnforcementFilter" class="org.acegisecurity.intercept.web.SecurityEnforcementFilter"&gt;
&lt;property name="filterSecurityInterceptor"&gt;&lt;ref bean="filterInvocationInterceptor"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="authenticationEntryPoint"&gt;&lt;ref bean="casProcessingFilterEntryPoint"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;bean id="casProcessingFilterEntryPoint" class="org.acegisecurity.ui.cas.CasProcessingFilterEntryPoint"&gt;
&lt;property name="loginUrl"&gt;&lt;value&gt;https://localhost:8443/cas/login&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="serviceProperties"&gt;&lt;ref bean="serviceProperties"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>You will also need to add the
<literal>CasProcessingFilter</literal> to web.xml:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;filter&gt;
&lt;filter-name&gt;Acegi CAS Processing Filter&lt;/filter-name&gt;
&lt;filter-class&gt;org.acegisecurity.util.FilterToBeanProxy&lt;/filter-class&gt;
&lt;init-param&gt;
&lt;param-name&gt;targetClass&lt;/param-name&gt;
&lt;param-value&gt;org.acegisecurity.ui.cas.CasProcessingFilter&lt;/param-value&gt;
&lt;/init-param&gt;
&lt;/filter&gt;
&lt;filter-mapping&gt;
&lt;filter-name&gt;Acegi CAS Processing Filter&lt;/filter-name&gt;
&lt;url-pattern&gt;/*&lt;/url-pattern&gt;
&lt;/filter-mapping&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>The <literal>CasProcessingFilter</literal> has very similar
properties to the <literal>AuthenticationProcessingFilter</literal>
(used for form-based logins). Each property is
self-explanatory.</para>
<para>For CAS to operate, the
<literal>SecurityEnforcementFilter</literal> must have its
<literal>authenticationEntryPoint</literal> property set to the
<literal>CasProcessingFilterEntryPoint</literal> bean.</para>
<para>The <literal>CasProcessingFilterEntryPoint</literal> must refer
to the <literal>ServiceProperties</literal> bean (discussed above),
which provides the URL to the enterprise's CAS login server. This is
where the user's browser will be redirected.</para>
<para>Next you need to add an <literal>AuthenticationManager</literal>
that uses <literal>CasAuthenticationProvider</literal> and its
collaborators:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;bean id="authenticationManager" class="org.acegisecurity.providers.ProviderManager"&gt;
&lt;property name="providers"&gt;
&lt;list&gt;
&lt;ref bean="casAuthenticationProvider"/&gt;
&lt;/list&gt;
&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;bean id="casAuthenticationProvider" class="org.acegisecurity.providers.cas.CasAuthenticationProvider"&gt;
&lt;property name="casAuthoritiesPopulator"&gt;&lt;ref bean="casAuthoritiesPopulator"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="casProxyDecider"&gt;&lt;ref bean="casProxyDecider"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="ticketValidator"&gt;&lt;ref bean="casProxyTicketValidator"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="statelessTicketCache"&gt;&lt;ref bean="statelessTicketCache"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="key"&gt;&lt;value&gt;my_password_for_this_auth_provider_only&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;bean id="casProxyTicketValidator" class="org.acegisecurity.providers.cas.ticketvalidator.CasProxyTicketValidator"&gt;
&lt;property name="casValidate"&gt;&lt;value&gt;https://localhost:8443/cas/proxyValidate&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="proxyCallbackUrl"&gt;&lt;value&gt;https://localhost:8443/contacts-cas/casProxy/receptor&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="serviceProperties"&gt;&lt;ref bean="serviceProperties"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;!-- &lt;property name="trustStore"&gt;&lt;value&gt;/some/path/to/your/lib/security/cacerts&lt;/value&gt;&lt;/property&gt; --&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;bean id="cacheManager" class="org.springframework.cache.ehcache.EhCacheManagerFactoryBean"&gt;
&lt;property name="configLocation"&gt;
&lt;value&gt;classpath:/ehcache-failsafe.xml&lt;/value&gt;
&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;bean id="ticketCacheBackend" class="org.springframework.cache.ehcache.EhCacheFactoryBean"&gt;
&lt;property name="cacheManager"&gt;
&lt;ref local="cacheManager"/&gt;
&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="cacheName"&gt;
&lt;value&gt;ticketCache&lt;/value&gt;
&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;bean id="statelessTicketCache" class="org.acegisecurity.providers.cas.cache.EhCacheBasedTicketCache"&gt;
&lt;property name="cache"&gt;&lt;ref local="ticketCacheBackend"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;bean id="casAuthoritiesPopulator" class="org.acegisecurity.providers.cas.populator.DaoCasAuthoritiesPopulator"&gt;
&lt;property name="authenticationDao"&gt;&lt;ref bean="inMemoryDaoImpl"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;bean id="casProxyDecider" class="org.acegisecurity.providers.cas.proxy.RejectProxyTickets"/&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>The beans are all reasonable self-explanatory if you refer back
to the "How CAS Works" section. Careful readers might notice one
surprise: the <literal>statelessTicketCache</literal> property of the
<literal>CasAuthenticationProvider</literal>. This is discussed in
detail in the "Advanced CAS Usage" section.</para>
<para>Note the <literal>CasProxyTicketValidator</literal> has a
remarked out <literal>trustStore</literal> property. This property
might be helpful if you experience HTTPS certificate issues. Also note
the <literal>proxyCallbackUrl</literal> is set so the service can
receive a proxy-granting ticket. As mentioned above, this is optional
and unnecessary if you do not require proxy-granting tickets. If you
do use this feature, you will need to configure a suitable servlet to
receive the proxy-granting tickets. We suggest you use CAS'
<literal>ProxyTicketReceptor</literal> by adding the following to your
web application's <literal>web.xml</literal>:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;servlet&gt;
&lt;servlet-name&gt;casproxy&lt;/servlet-name&gt;
&lt;servlet-class&gt;edu.yale.its.tp.cas.proxy.ProxyTicketReceptor&lt;/servlet-class&gt;
&lt;/servlet&gt;
&lt;servlet-mapping&gt;
&lt;servlet-name&gt;casproxy&lt;/servlet-name&gt;
&lt;url-pattern&gt;/casProxy/*&lt;/url-pattern&gt;
&lt;/servlet-mapping&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>This completes the configuration of CAS. If you haven't made any
mistakes, your web application should happily work within the
framework of CAS single sign on. No other parts of the Acegi Security
System for Spring need to be concerned about the fact CAS handled
authentication.</para>
<para>There is also a <literal>contacts-cas.war</literal> file in the
sample applications directory. This sample application uses the above
settings and can be deployed to see CAS in operation.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-cas-advanced-usage">
<title>Advanced CAS Usage</title>
<para>The <literal>CasAuthenticationProvider</literal> distinguishes
between stateful and stateless clients. A stateful client is
considered any that originates via the
<literal>CasProcessingFilter</literal>. A stateless client is any that
presents an authentication request via the
<literal>UsernamePasswordAuthenticationToken</literal> with a
principal equal to
<literal>CasProcessingFilter.CAS_STATELESS_IDENTIFIER</literal>.</para>
<para>Stateless clients are likely to be via remoting protocols such
as Hessian and Burlap. The <literal>BasicProcessingFilter</literal> is
still used in this case, but the remoting protocol client is expected
to present a username equal to the static string above, and a password
equal to a CAS service ticket. Clients should acquire a CAS service
ticket directly from the CAS server.</para>
<para>Because remoting protocols have no way of presenting themselves
within the context of a <literal>HttpSession</literal>, it isn't
possible to rely on the <literal>HttpSession</literal>'s
<literal>HttpSessionIntegrationFilter.ACEGI_SECURITY_AUTHENTICATION_KEY</literal>
attribute to locate the <literal>CasAuthenticationToken</literal>.
Furthermore, because the CAS server invalidates a service ticket after
it has been validated by the <literal>TicketValidator</literal>,
presenting the same service ticket on subsequent requests will not
work. It is similarly very difficult to obtain a proxy-granting ticket
for a remoting protocol client, as they are often deployed on client
machines which rarely have HTTPS URLs that would be accessible to the
CAS server.</para>
<para>One obvious option is to not use CAS at all for remoting
protocol clients. However, this would eliminate many of the desirable
features of CAS.</para>
<para>As a middle-ground, the
<literal>CasAuthenticationProvider</literal> uses a
<literal>StatelessTicketCache</literal>. This is used solely for
requests with a principal equal to
<literal>CasProcessingFilter.CAS_STATELESS_IDENTIFIER</literal>. What
happens is the <literal>CasAuthenticationProvider</literal> will store
the resulting <literal>CasAuthenticationToken</literal> in the
<literal>StatelessTicketCache</literal>, keyed on the service ticket.
Accordingly, remoting protocol clients can present the same service
ticket and the <literal>CasAuthenticationProvider</literal> will not
need to contact the CAS server for validation (aside from the first
request).</para>
<para>The other aspect of advanced CAS usage involves creating proxy
tickets from the proxy-granting ticket. As indicated above, we
recommend you use CAS' <literal>ProxyTicketReceptor</literal> to
receive these tickets. The <literal>ProxyTicketReceptor</literal>
provides a static method that enables you to obtain a proxy ticket by
presenting the proxy-granting IOU ticket. You can obtain the
proxy-granting IOU ticket by calling
<literal>CasAuthenticationToken.getProxyGrantingTicketIou()</literal>.</para>
<para>It is hoped you find CAS integration easy and useful with the
Acegi Security System for Spring classes. Welcome to enterprise-wide
single sign on!</para>
</sect2>
</sect1>
<sect1 id="security-x509">
<title>X509 Authentication</title>
<sect2 id="security-x509-overview">
<title>Overview</title>
<para>The most common use of X509 certificate authentication is in
verifying the identity of a server when using SSL, most commonly when
using HTTPS from a browser. The browser will automatically check that
the certificate presented by a server has been issued (ie digitally
signed) by one of a list of trusted certificate authorities which it
maintains.</para>
<para>You can also use SSL with <quote>mutual authentication</quote>;
the server will then request a valid certificate from the client as
part of the SSL handshake. The server will authenticate the client by
checking that it's certificate is signed by an acceptable authority.
If a valid certificate has been provided, it can be obtained through
the servlet API in an application. The Acegi Security X509 module
extracts the certificate using a filter and passes it to the
configured X509 authentication provider to allow any additional
application-specific checks to be applied. It also maps the
certificate to an application user and loads that user's set of
granted authorities for use with the standard Acegi Security
infrastructure.</para>
<para>You should be familiar with using certificates and setting up
client authentication for your servlet container before attempting to
use it with Acegi Security. Most of the work is in creating and
installing suitable certificates and keys. For example, if you're
using Tomcat then read the instructions here <ulink
url="http://jakarta.apache.org/tomcat/tomcat-5.0-doc/ssl-howto.html"></ulink>.
It's important that you get this working before trying it out with
Acegi Security.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-x509-details">
<title>X509 with Acegi Security</title>
<para>With X509 authentication, there is no explicit login procedure
so the implementation is relatively simple; there is no need to
redirect requests in order to interact with the user. As a result,
some of the classes behave slightly differently from their equivalents
in other packages. For example, the default <quote>entry point</quote>
class, which is normally responsible for starting the authentication
process, is only invoked if the certificate is rejected and it always
returns an error to the user. With a suitable bean configuration, the
normal sequence of events is as follows <orderedlist>
<listitem>
<para>The <classname>X509ProcessingFilter</classname> extracts
the certificate from the request and uses it as the credentials
for an authentication request. The generated authentication
request is an <classname>X509AuthenticationToken</classname>.
The request is passed to the authentication manager.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>The <classname>X509AuthenticationProvider</classname>
receives the token. Its main concern is to obtain the user
information (in particular the user's granted authorities) that
matches the certificate. It delegates this responsibility to an
<interfacename>X509AuthoritiesPopulator</interfacename>.</para>
</listitem>
.
<listitem>
<para>The populator's single method,
<methodname>getUserDetails(X509Certificate
userCertificate)</methodname> is invoked. Implementations should
return a <classname>UserDetails</classname> instance containing
the array of <classname>GrantedAuthority</classname> objects for
the user. This method can also choose to reject the certificate
(for example if it doesn't contain a matching user name). In
such cases it should throw a
<exceptionname>BadCredentialsException</exceptionname>. A
DAO-based implementation,
<classname>DaoX509AuthoritiesPopulator</classname>, is provided
which extracts the user's name from the subject <quote>common
name</quote> (CN) in the certificate. It also allows you to set
your own regular expression to match a different part of the
subject's distinguished name. An
<classname>AuthenticationDao</classname> is used to load the
user information.<!-- TODO: Give email matching as an example --></para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>If everything has gone smoothly then there should be a
valid <classname>Authentication</classname> object in the secure
context and the invocation will procede as normal. If no
certificate was found, or the certificate was rejected, then the
<classname>SecurityEnforcementFilter</classname> will invoke the
<classname>X509ProcessingFilterEntryPoint</classname> which
returns a 403 error (forbidden) to the user.</para>
</listitem>
</orderedlist></para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-x509-config">
<title>Configuring the X509 Provider</title>
<para>There is a version of the <link
linkend="security-sample">Contacts Sample Application</link> which
uses X509. Copy the beans and filter setup from this as a starting
point for configuring your own application. A set of example
certificates is also included which you can use to configure your
server. These are <itemizedlist>
<listitem>
<para><filename>marissa.p12</filename>: A PKCS12 format file
containing the client key and certificate. These should be
installed in your browser. It maps to the user
<quote>marissa</quote> in the application.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><filename>server.p12</filename>: The server certificate
and key for HTTPS connections.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><filename>ca.jks</filename>: A Java keystore containing
the certificate for the authority which issued marissa's
certificate. This will be used by the container to validate
client certificates.</para>
</listitem>
</itemizedlist> For JBoss 3.2.7 (with Tomcat 5.0), the SSL
configuration in the <filename>server.xml</filename> file looks like
this <programlisting>&lt;!-- SSL/TLS Connector configuration --&gt;
&lt;Connector port="8443" address="${jboss.bind.address}"
maxThreads="100" minSpareThreads="5" maxSpareThreads="15"
scheme="https" secure="true"
sslProtocol = "TLS"
clientAuth="true" keystoreFile="${jboss.server.home.dir}/conf/server.p12"
keystoreType="PKCS12" keystorePass="password"
truststoreFile="${jboss.server.home.dir}/conf/ca.jks"
truststoreType="JKS" truststorePass="password"
/&gt;</programlisting><parameter>clientAuth</parameter> can also be set to
<parameter>want</parameter> if you still want SSL connections to
succeed even if the client doesn't provide a certificate. Obviously
these clients won't be able to access any objects secured by Acegi
Security (unless you use a non-X509 authentication mechanism, such as
BASIC authentication, to authenticate the user).</para>
</sect2>
</sect1>
<sect1 id="security-channels">
<title>Channel Security</title>
<sect2 id="security-channels-overview">
<title>Overview</title>
<para>In addition to coordinating the authentication and authorization
requirements of your application, the Acegi Security System for Spring
is also able to ensure unauthenticated web requests have certain
properties. These properties may include being of a particular
transport type, having a particular <literal>HttpSession</literal>
attribute set and so on. The most common requirement is for your web
requests to be received using a particular transport protocol, such as
HTTPS.</para>
<para>An important issue in considering transport security is that of
session hijacking. Your web container manages a
<literal>HttpSession</literal> by reference to a
<literal>jsessionid</literal> that is sent to user agents either via a
cookie or URL rewriting. If the <literal>jsessionid</literal> is ever
sent over HTTP, there is a possibility that session identifier can be
intercepted and used to impersonate the user after they complete the
authentication process. This is because most web containers maintain
the same session identifier for a given user, even after they switch
from HTTP to HTTPS pages.</para>
<para>If session hijacking is considered too significant a risk for
your particular application, the only option is to use HTTPS for every
request. This means the <literal>jsessionid</literal> is never sent
across an insecure channel. You will need to ensure your
<literal>web.xml</literal>-defined
<literal>&lt;welcome-file&gt;</literal> points to a HTTPS location,
and the application never directs the user to a HTTP location. The
Acegi Security System for Spring provides a solution to assist with
the latter.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-channels-installation">
<title>Configuration</title>
<para>To utilise Acegi Security's channel security services, add the
following lines to <literal>web.xml</literal>:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;filter&gt;
&lt;filter-name&gt;Acegi Channel Processing Filter&lt;/filter-name&gt;
&lt;filter-class&gt;org.acegisecurity.util.FilterToBeanProxy&lt;/filter-class&gt;
&lt;init-param&gt;
&lt;param-name&gt;targetClass&lt;/param-name&gt;
&lt;param-value&gt;org.acegisecurity.securechannel.ChannelProcessingFilter&lt;/param-value&gt;
&lt;/init-param&gt;
&lt;/filter&gt;
&lt;filter-mapping&gt;
&lt;filter-name&gt;Acegi Channel Processing Filter&lt;/filter-name&gt;
&lt;url-pattern&gt;/*&lt;/url-pattern&gt;
&lt;/filter-mapping&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>As usual when running <literal>FilterToBeanProxy</literal>, you
will also need to configure the filter in your application
context:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;bean id="channelProcessingFilter" class="org.acegisecurity.securechannel.ChannelProcessingFilter"&gt;
&lt;property name="channelDecisionManager"&gt;&lt;ref bean="channelDecisionManager"/&gt;&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;property name="filterInvocationDefinitionSource"&gt;
&lt;value&gt;
CONVERT_URL_TO_LOWERCASE_BEFORE_COMPARISON
\A/secure/.*\Z=REQUIRES_SECURE_CHANNEL
\A/acegilogin.jsp.*\Z=REQUIRES_SECURE_CHANNEL
\A/j_acegi_security_check.*\Z=REQUIRES_SECURE_CHANNEL
\A.*\Z=REQUIRES_INSECURE_CHANNEL
&lt;/value&gt;
&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;bean id="channelDecisionManager" class="org.acegisecurity.securechannel.ChannelDecisionManagerImpl"&gt;
&lt;property name="channelProcessors"&gt;
&lt;list&gt;
&lt;ref bean="secureChannelProcessor"/&gt;
&lt;ref bean="insecureChannelProcessor"/&gt;
&lt;/list&gt;
&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;
&lt;bean id="secureChannelProcessor" class="org.acegisecurity.securechannel.SecureChannelProcessor"/&gt;
&lt;bean id="insecureChannelProcessor" class="org.acegisecurity.securechannel.InsecureChannelProcessor"/&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>Like <literal>FilterSecurityInterceptor</literal>, Apache Ant
style paths are also supported by the
<literal>ChannelProcessingFilter</literal>.</para>
<para>The <literal>ChannelProcessingFilter</literal> operates by
filtering all web requests and determining the configuration
attributes that apply. It then delegates to the
<literal>ChannelDecisionManager</literal>. The default implementation,
<literal>ChannelDecisionManagerImpl</literal>, should suffice in most
cases. It simply delegates through the list of configured
<literal>ChannelProcessor</literal> instances. A
<literal>ChannelProcessor</literal> will review the request, and if it
is unhappy with the request (eg it was received across the incorrect
transport protocol), it will perform a redirect, throw an exception or
take whatever other action is appropriate.</para>
<para>Included with the Acegi Security System for Spring are two
concrete <literal>ChannelProcessor</literal> implementations:
<literal>SecureChannelProcessor</literal> ensures requests with a
configuration attribute of <literal>REQUIRES_SECURE_CHANNEL</literal>
are received over HTTPS, whilst
<literal>InsecureChannelProcessor</literal> ensures requests with a
configuration attribute of
<literal>REQUIRES_INSECURE_CHANNEL</literal> are received over HTTP.
Both implementations delegate to a
<literal>ChannelEntryPoint</literal> if the required transport
protocol is not used. The two <literal>ChannelEntryPoint</literal>
implementations included with Acegi Security simply redirect the
request to HTTP and HTTPS as appropriate. Appropriate defaults are
assigned to the <literal>ChannelProcessor</literal> implementations
for the configuration attribute keywords they respond to and the
<literal>ChannelEntryPoint</literal> they delegate to, although you
have the ability to override these using the application
context.</para>
<para>Note that the redirections are absolute (eg
<literal>http://www.company.com:8080/app/page</literal>), not relative
(eg <literal>/app/page</literal>). During testing it was discovered
that Internet Explorer 6 Service Pack 1 has a bug whereby it does not
respond correctly to a redirection instruction which also changes the
port to use. Accordingly, absolute URLs are used in conjunction with
bug detection logic in the <literal>PortResolverImpl</literal> that is
wired up by default to many Acegi Security beans. Please refer to the
JavaDocs for <literal>PortResolverImpl</literal> for further
details.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-channels-usage">
<title>Usage</title>
<para>Once configured, using the channel security filter is very easy.
Simply request pages without regard to the protocol (ie HTTP or HTTPS)
or port (eg 80, 8080, 443, 8443 etc). Obviously you'll still need a
way of making the initial request (probably via the
<literal>web.xml</literal> <literal>&lt;welcome-file&gt;</literal> or
a well-known home page URL), but once this is done the filter will
perform redirects as defined by your application context.</para>
<para>You can also add your own <literal>ChannelProcessor</literal>
implementations to the <literal>ChannelDecisionManagerImpl</literal>.
For example, you might set a <literal>HttpSession</literal> attribute
when a human user is detected via a "enter the contents of this
graphic" procedure. Your <literal>ChannelProcessor</literal> would
respond to say <literal>REQUIRES_HUMAN_USER</literal> configuration
attributes and redirect to an appropriate entry point to start the
human user validation process if the <literal>HttpSession</literal>
attribute is not currently set.</para>
<para>To decide whether a security check belongs in a
<literal>ChannelProcessor</literal> or an
<literal>AccessDecisionVoter</literal>, remember that the former is
designed to handle unauthenticated requests, whilst the latter is
designed to handle authenticated requests. The latter therefore has
access to the granted authorities of the authenticated principal. In
addition, problems detected by a <literal>ChannelProcessor</literal>
will generally cause a HTTP/HTTPS redirection so its requirements can
be met, whilst problems detected by an
<literal>AccessDecisionVoter</literal> will ultimately result in an
<literal>AccessDeniedException</literal> (depending on the governing
<literal>AccessDecisionManager</literal>).</para>
</sect2>
</sect1>
<sect1 id="acls">
<title>Instance-Based Access Control List (ACL) Security</title>
<sect2 id="acls-overview">
<title>Overview</title>
<para>Complex applications often will find the need to define access
permissions not simply at a web request or method invocation level.
Instead, security decisions need to comprise both who
(<literal>Authentication</literal>), where
(<literal>MethodInvocation</literal>) and what
(<literal>SomeDomainObject</literal>). In other words, authorization
decisions also need to consider the actual domain object instance
subject of a method invocation.</para>
<para>Imagine you're designing an application for a pet clinic. There
will be two main groups of users of your Spring-based application:
staff of the pet clinic, as well as the pet clinic's customers. The
staff will have access to all of the data, whilst your customers will
only be able to see their own customer records. To make it a little
more interesting, your customers can allow other users to see their
customer records, such as their "puppy preschool "mentor or president
of their local "Pony Club". Using Acegi Security System for Spring as
the foundation, you have several approaches that can be
used:<orderedlist>
<listitem>
<para>Write your business methods to enforce the security. You
could consult a collection within the
<literal>Customer</literal> domain object instance to determine
which users have access. By using the
<literal>SecurityContextHolder.getContext().getAuthentication()</literal>,
you'll be able to access the <literal>Authentication</literal>
object.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>Write an <literal>AccessDecisionVoter</literal> to enforce
the security from the <literal>GrantedAuthority[]</literal>s
stored in the <literal>Authentication</literal> object. This
would mean your <literal>AuthenticationManager</literal> would
need to populate the <literal>Authentication</literal> with
custom <literal>GrantedAuthority</literal>[]s representing each
of the <literal>Customer</literal> domain object instances the
principal has access to.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>Write an <literal>AccessDecisionVoter</literal> to enforce
the security and open the target <literal>Customer</literal>
domain object directly. This would mean your voter needs access
to a DAO that allows it to retrieve the
<literal>Customer</literal> object. It would then access the
<literal>Customer</literal> object's collection of approved
users and make the appropriate decision.</para>
</listitem>
</orderedlist></para>
<para>Each one of these approaches is perfectly legitimate. However,
the first couples your authorization checking to your business code.
The main problems with this include the enhanced difficulty of unit
testing and the fact it would be more difficult to reuse the
<literal>Customer</literal> authorization logic elsewhere. Obtaining
the <literal>GrantedAuthority[]</literal>s from the
<literal>Authentication</literal> object is also fine, but will not
scale to large numbers of <literal>Customer</literal>s. If a user
might be able to access 5,000 <literal>Customer</literal>s (unlikely
in this case, but imagine if it were a popular vet for a large Pony
Club!) the amount of memory consumed and time required to construct
the <literal>Authentication</literal> object would be undesirable. The
final method, opening the <literal>Customer</literal> directly from
external code, is probably the best of the three. It achieves
separation of concerns, and doesn't misuse memory or CPU cycles, but
it is still inefficient in that both the
<literal>AccessDecisionVoter</literal> and the eventual business
method itself will perform a call to the DAO responsible for
retrieving the <literal>Customer</literal> object. Two accesses per
method invocation is clearly undesirable. In addition, with every
approach listed you'll need to write your own access control list
(ACL) persistence and business logic from scratch.</para>
<para>Fortunately, there is another alternative, which we'll talk
about below.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="acls-acl-package">
<title>The org.acegisecurity.acl Package</title>
<para>The <literal>org.acegisecurity.acl</literal> package is very
simple, comprising only a handful of interfaces and a single class, as
shown in Figure 6. It provides the basic foundation for access control
list (ACL) lookups.</para>
<para><mediaobject>
<imageobject role="html">
<imagedata align="center" fileref="images/ACLSecurity.gif"
format="GIF" />
</imageobject>
<caption>
<para>Figure 6: Access Control List Manager</para>
</caption>
</mediaobject></para>
<para>The central interface is <literal>AclManager</literal>, which is
defined by two methods:</para>
<para><programlisting>public AclEntry[] getAcls(java.lang.Object domainInstance);
public AclEntry[] getAcls(java.lang.Object domainInstance, Authentication authentication);</programlisting></para>
<para><literal>AclManager</literal> is intended to be used as a
collaborator against your business objects, or, more desirably,
<literal>AccessDecisionVoter</literal>s. This means you use Spring's
normal <literal>ApplicationContext</literal> features to wire up your
<literal>AccessDecisionVoter</literal> (or business method) with an
<literal>AclManager</literal>. Consideration was given to placing the
ACL information in the <literal>ContextHolder</literal>, but it was
felt this would be inefficient both in terms of memory usage as well
as the time spent loading potentially unused ACL information. The
trade-off of needing to wire up a collaborator for those objects
requiring ACL information is rather minor, particularly in a
Spring-managed application.</para>
<para>The first method of the <literal>AclManager</literal> will
return all ACLs applying to the domain object instance passed to it.
The second method does the same, but only returns those ACLs which
apply to the passed <literal>Authentication</literal> object.</para>
<para>The <literal>AclEntry</literal> interface returned by
<literal>AclManager</literal> is merely a marker interface. You will
need to provide an implementation that reflects that ACL permissions
for your application.</para>
<para>Rounding out the <literal>org.acegisecurity.acl</literal>
package is an <literal>AclProviderManager</literal> class, with a
corresponding <literal>AclProvider</literal> interface.
<literal>AclProviderManager</literal> is a concrete implementation of
<literal>AclManager</literal>, which iterates through registered
<literal>AclProvider</literal>s. The first
<literal>AclProvider</literal> that indicates it can authoritatively
provide ACL information for the presented domain object instance will
be used. This is very similar to the
<literal>AuthenticationProvider</literal> interface used for
authentication.</para>
<para>With this background, let's now look at a usable ACL
implementation.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="acls-masking">
<title>Integer Masked ACLs</title>
<para>Acegi Security System for Spring includes a production-quality
ACL provider implementation, which is shown in Figure 7.</para>
<para><mediaobject>
<imageobject role="html">
<imagedata align="center" fileref="images/BasicAclProvider.gif"
format="GIF" />
</imageobject>
<caption>
<para>Figure 7: Basic ACL Manager</para>
</caption>
</mediaobject></para>
<para>The implementation is based on integer masking, which is
commonly used for ACL permissions given its flexibility and speed.
Anyone who has used Unix's <literal>chmod</literal> command will know
all about this type of permission masking (eg <literal>chmod
777</literal>). You'll find the classes and interfaces for the integer
masking ACL package under
<literal>org.acegisecurity.acl.basic</literal>.</para>
<para>Extending the <literal>AclEntry</literal> interface is a
<literal>BasicAclEntry</literal> interface, with the main methods
shown below:</para>
<para><programlisting>public AclObjectIdentity getAclObjectIdentity();
public AclObjectIdentity getAclObjectParentIdentity();
public int getMask();
public java.lang.Object getRecipient();</programlisting></para>
<para>As shown, each <literal>BasicAclEntry</literal> has four main
properties. The <literal>mask</literal> is the integer that represents
the permissions granted to the <literal>recipient</literal>. The
<literal>aclObjectIdentity</literal> is able to identify the domain
object instance for which the ACL applies, and the
<literal>aclObjectParentIdentity</literal> optionally specifies the
parent of the domain object instance. Multiple
<literal>BasicAclEntry</literal>s usually exist against a single
domain object instance, and as suggested by the parent identity
property, permissions granted higher in the object hierarchy will
trickle down and be inherited (unless blocked by integer zero).</para>
<para><literal>BasicAclEntry</literal> implementations typically
provide convenience methods, such as
<literal>isReadAllowed()</literal>, to avoid application classes
needing to perform bit masking themselves. The
<literal>SimpleAclEntry</literal> and
<literal>AbstractBasicAclEntry</literal> demonstrate and provide much
of this bit masking logic.</para>
<para>The <literal>AclObjectIdentity</literal> itself is merely a
marker interface, so you need to provide implementations for your
domain objects. However, the package does include a
<literal>NamedEntityObjectIdentity</literal> implementation which will
suit many needs. The <literal>NamedEntityObjectIdentity</literal>
identifies a given domain object instance by the classname of the
instance and the identity of the instance. A
<literal>NamedEntityObjectIdentity</literal> can be constructed
manually (by calling the constructor and providing the classname and
identity <literal>String</literal>s), or by passing in any domain
object that contains a <literal>getId()</literal> method.</para>
<para>The actual <literal>AclProvider</literal> implementation is
named <literal>BasicAclProvider</literal>. It has adopted a similar
design to that used by the authentication-related
<literal>DaoAuthenticationProvder</literal>. Specifically, you define
a <literal>BasicAclDao</literal> against the provider, so different
ACL repository types can be accessed in a pluggable manner. The
<literal>BasicAclProvider</literal> also supports pluggable cache
providers (with Acegi Security System for Spring including an
implementation that fronts EH-CACHE).</para>
<para>The <literal>BasicAclDao</literal> interface is very simple to
implement:</para>
<para><programlisting>public BasicAclEntry[] getAcls(AclObjectIdentity aclObjectIdentity);</programlisting></para>
<para>A <literal>BasicAclDao</literal> implementation needs to
understand the presented <literal>AclObjectIdentity</literal> and how
it maps to a storage repository, find the relevant records, and create
appropriate <literal>BasicAclEntry</literal> objects and return
them.</para>
<para>Acegi Security includes a single <literal>BasicAclDao</literal>
implementation called <literal>JdbcDaoImpl</literal>. As implied by
the name, <literal>JdbcDaoImpl</literal> accesses ACL information from
a JDBC database. There is also an extended version of this DAO,
<literal>JdbcExtendedDaoImpl</literal>, which provides CRUD operations
on the JDBC database, although we won't discuss these features here.
The default database schema and some sample data will aid in
understanding its function:</para>
<para><programlisting>CREATE TABLE acl_object_identity (
id IDENTITY NOT NULL,
object_identity VARCHAR_IGNORECASE(250) NOT NULL,
parent_object INTEGER,
acl_class VARCHAR_IGNORECASE(250) NOT NULL,
CONSTRAINT unique_object_identity UNIQUE(object_identity),
FOREIGN KEY (parent_object) REFERENCES acl_object_identity(id)
);
CREATE TABLE acl_permission (
id IDENTITY NOT NULL,
acl_object_identity INTEGER NOT NULL,
recipient VARCHAR_IGNORECASE(100) NOT NULL,
mask INTEGER NOT NULL,
CONSTRAINT unique_recipient UNIQUE(acl_object_identity, recipient),
FOREIGN KEY (acl_object_identity) REFERENCES acl_object_identity(id)
);
INSERT INTO acl_object_identity VALUES (1, 'corp.DomainObject:1', null, 'org.acegisecurity.acl.basic.SimpleAclEntry');
INSERT INTO acl_object_identity VALUES (2, 'corp.DomainObject:2', 1, 'org.acegisecurity.acl.basic.SimpleAclEntry');
INSERT INTO acl_object_identity VALUES (3, 'corp.DomainObject:3', 1, 'org.acegisecurity.acl.basic.SimpleAclEntry');
INSERT INTO acl_object_identity VALUES (4, 'corp.DomainObject:4', 1, 'org.acegisecurity.acl.basic.SimpleAclEntry');
INSERT INTO acl_object_identity VALUES (5, 'corp.DomainObject:5', 3, 'org.acegisecurity.acl.basic.SimpleAclEntry');
INSERT INTO acl_object_identity VALUES (6, 'corp.DomainObject:6', 3, 'org.acegisecurity.acl.basic.SimpleAclEntry');
INSERT INTO acl_permission VALUES (null, 1, 'ROLE_SUPERVISOR', 1);
INSERT INTO acl_permission VALUES (null, 2, 'ROLE_SUPERVISOR', 0);
INSERT INTO acl_permission VALUES (null, 2, 'marissa', 2);
INSERT INTO acl_permission VALUES (null, 3, 'scott', 14);
INSERT INTO acl_permission VALUES (null, 6, 'scott', 1);</programlisting></para>
<para>As can be seen, database-specific constraints are used
extensively to ensure the integrity of the ACL information. If you
need to use a different database (Hypersonic SQL statements are shown
above), you should try to implement equivalent constraints.</para>
<para>The <literal>JdbcDaoImpl</literal> will only respond to requests
for <literal>NamedEntityObjectIdentity</literal>s. It converts such
identities into a single <literal>String</literal>, comprising
the<literal> NamedEntityObjectIdentity.getClassname()</literal> +
<literal>":"</literal> +
<literal>NamedEntityObjectIdentity.getId()</literal>. This yields the
type of <literal>object_identity</literal> values shown above. As
indicated by the sample data, each database row corresponds to a
single <literal>BasicAclEntry</literal>. As stated earlier and
demonstrated by <literal>corp.DomainObject:2</literal> in the above
sample data, each domain object instance will often have multiple
<literal>BasicAclEntry</literal>[]s.</para>
<para>As <literal>JdbcDaoImpl</literal> is required to return concrete
<literal>BasicAclEntry</literal> classes, it needs to know which
<literal>BasicAclEntry</literal> implementation it is to create and
populate. This is the role of the <literal>acl_class</literal> column.
<literal>JdbcDaoImpl</literal> will create the indicated class and set
its <literal>mask</literal>, <literal>recipient</literal>,
<literal>aclObjectIdentity</literal> and
<literal>aclObjectParentIdentity</literal> properties.</para>
<para>As you can probably tell from the sample data, the
<literal>parent_object_identity</literal> value can either be null or
in the same format as the <literal>object_identity</literal>. If
non-null, <literal>JdbcDaoImpl</literal> will create a
<literal>NamedEntityObjectIdentity</literal> to place inside the
returned <literal>BasicAclEntry</literal> class.</para>
<para>Returning to the <literal>BasicAclProvider</literal>, before it
can poll the <literal>BasicAclDao</literal> implementation it needs to
convert the domain object instance it was passed into an
<literal>AclObjectIdentity</literal>.
<literal>BasicAclProvider</literal> has a <literal>protected
AclObjectIdentity obtainIdentity(Object domainInstance)</literal>
method that is responsible for this. As a protected method, it enables
subclasses to easily override. The normal implementation checks
whether the passed domain object instance implements the
<literal>AclObjectIdentityAware</literal> interface, which is merely a
getter for an <literal>AclObjectIdentity</literal>. If the domain
object does implement this interface, that is the identity returned.
If the domain object does not implement this interface, the method
will attempt to create an <literal>AclObjectIdentity</literal> by
passing the domain object instance to the constructor of a class
defined by the
<literal>BasicAclProvider.getDefaultAclObjectIdentity()</literal>
method. By default the defined class is
<literal>NamedEntityObjectIdentity</literal>, which was described in
more detail above. Therefore, you will need to either (i) provide a
<literal>getId()</literal> method on your domain objects, (ii)
implement <literal>AclObjectIdentityAware</literal> on your domain
objects, (iii) provide an alternative
<literal>AclObjectIdentity</literal> implementation that will accept
your domain object in its constructor, or (iv) override the
<literal>obtainIdentity(Object)</literal> method.</para>
<para>Once the <literal>AclObjectIdentity</literal> of the domain
object instance is determined, the <literal>BasicAclProvider</literal>
will poll the DAO to obtain its <literal>BasicAclEntry</literal>[]s.
If any of the entries returned by the DAO indicate there is a parent,
that parent will be polled, and the process will repeat until there is
no further parent. The permissions assigned to a
<literal>recipient</literal> closest to the domain object instance
will always take priority and override any inherited permissions. From
the sample data above, the following inherited permissions would
apply:</para>
<para><programlisting>--- Mask integer 0 = no permissions
--- Mask integer 1 = administer
--- Mask integer 2 = read
--- Mask integer 6 = read and write permissions
--- Mask integer 14 = read and write and create permissions
---------------------------------------------------------------------
--- *** INHERITED RIGHTS FOR DIFFERENT INSTANCES AND RECIPIENTS ***
--- INSTANCE RECIPIENT PERMISSION(S) (COMMENT #INSTANCE)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
--- 1 ROLE_SUPERVISOR Administer
--- 2 ROLE_SUPERVISOR None (overrides parent #1)
--- marissa Read
--- 3 ROLE_SUPERVISOR Administer (from parent #1)
--- scott Read, Write, Create
--- 4 ROLE_SUPERVISOR Administer (from parent #1)
--- 5 ROLE_SUPERVISOR Administer (from parent #3)
--- scott Read, Write, Create (from parent #3)
--- 6 ROLE_SUPERVISOR Administer (from parent #3)
--- scott Administer (overrides parent #3)</programlisting></para>
<para>So the above explains how a domain object instance has its
<literal>AclObjectIdentity</literal> discovered, and the
<literal>BasicAclDao</literal> will be polled successively until an
array of inherited permissions is constructed for the domain object
instance. The final step is to determine the
<literal>BasicAclEntry</literal>[]s that are actually applicable to a
given <literal>Authentication</literal> object.</para>
<para>As you would recall, the <literal>AclManager</literal> (and all
delegates, up to and including <literal>BasicAclProvider</literal>)
provides a method which returns only those
<literal>BasicAclEntry</literal>[]s applying to a passed
<literal>Authentication</literal> object.
<literal>BasicAclProvider</literal> delivers this functionality by
delegating the filtering operation to an
<literal>EffectiveAclsResolver</literal> implementation. The default
implementation,
<literal>GrantedAuthorityEffectiveAclsResolver</literal>, will iterate
through the <literal>BasicAclEntry</literal>[]s and include only those
where the <literal>recipient</literal> is equal to either the
<literal>Authentication</literal>'s <literal>principal</literal> or
any of the <literal>Authentication</literal>'s
<literal>GrantedAuthority</literal>[]s. Please refer to the JavaDocs
for more information.</para>
<mediaobject>
<imageobject role="html">
<imagedata align="center" fileref="images/Permissions.gif"
format="GIF" />
</imageobject>
<caption>
<para>Figure 8: ACL Instantiation Approach</para>
</caption>
</mediaobject>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="acls-conclusion">
<title>Conclusion</title>
<para>Acegi Security's instance-specific ACL packages shield you from
much of the complexity of developing your own ACL approach. The
interfaces and classes detailed above provide a scalable, customisable
ACL solution that is decoupled from your application code. Whilst the
reference documentation may suggest complexity, the basic
implementation is able to support most typical applications
out-of-the-box.</para>
</sect2>
</sect1>
<sect1 id="security-filters">
<title>Filters</title>
<sect2 id="security-filters-overview">
<title>Overview</title>
<para>The Acegi Security System for Spring uses filters extensively.
Each filter is covered in detail in a respective section of this
document. This section includes information that applies to all
filters.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-filters-filtertobeanproxy">
<title>FilterToBeanProxy</title>
<para>Most filters are configured using the
<literal>FilterToBeanProxy</literal>. An example configuration from
<literal>web.xml</literal> follows:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;filter&gt;
&lt;filter-name&gt;Acegi HTTP Request Security Filter&lt;/filter-name&gt;
&lt;filter-class&gt;org.acegisecurity.util.FilterToBeanProxy&lt;/filter-class&gt;
&lt;init-param&gt;
&lt;param-name&gt;targetClass&lt;/param-name&gt;
&lt;param-value&gt;org.acegisecurity.ClassThatImplementsFilter&lt;/param-value&gt;
&lt;/init-param&gt;
&lt;/filter&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>Notice that the filter in <literal>web.xml</literal> is actually
a <literal>FilterToBeanProxy</literal>, and not the filter that will
actually implements the logic of the filter. What
<literal>FilterToBeanProxy</literal> does is delegate the
<literal>Filter</literal>'s methods through to a bean which is
obtained from the Spring application context. This enables the bean to
benefit from the Spring application context lifecycle support and
configuration flexibility. The bean must implement
<literal>javax.servlet.Filter</literal>.</para>
<para>The <literal>FilterToBeanProxy</literal> only requires a single
initialization parameter, <literal>targetClass</literal> or
<literal>targetBean</literal>. The <literal>targetClass</literal>
parameter locates the first object in the application context of the
specified class, whilst <literal>targetBean</literal> locates the
object by bean name. Like standard Spring web applications, the
<literal>FilterToBeanProxy</literal> accesses the application context
via<literal>
WebApplicationContextUtils.getWebApplicationContext(ServletContext)</literal>,
so you should configure a <literal>ContextLoaderListener</literal> in
<literal>web.xml</literal>.</para>
<para>There is a lifecycle issue to consider when hosting
<literal>Filter</literal>s in an IoC container instead of a servlet
container. Specifically, which container should be responsible for
calling the <literal>Filter</literal>'s "startup" and "shutdown"
methods? It is noted that the order of initialization and destruction
of a <literal>Filter</literal> can vary by servlet container, and this
can cause problems if one <literal>Filter</literal> depends on
configuration settings established by an earlier initialized
<literal>Filter</literal>. The Spring IoC container on the other hand
has more comprehensive lifecycle/IoC interfaces (such as
<literal>InitializingBean</literal>,
<literal>DisposableBean</literal>, <literal>BeanNameAware</literal>,
<literal>ApplicationContextAware</literal> and many others) as well as
a well-understood interface contract, predictable method invocation
ordering, autowiring support, and even options to avoid implementing
Spring interfaces (eg the <literal>destroy-method</literal> attribute
in Spring XML). For this reason we recommend the use of Spring
lifecycle services instead of servlet container lifecycle services
wherever possible. By default <literal>FilterToBeanProxy</literal>
will not delegate <literal>init(FilterConfig)</literal> and
<literal>destroy()</literal> methods through to the proxied bean. If
you do require such invocations to be delegated, set the
<literal>lifecycle</literal> initialization parameter to
<literal>servlet-container-managed</literal>.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-filters-filterchainproxy">
<title>FilterChainProxy</title>
<para>We strongly recommend to use <literal>FilterChainProxy</literal>
instead of adding multiple filters to
<literal>web.xml</literal>.</para>
<para>Whilst <literal>FilterToBeanProxy</literal> is a very useful
class, the problem is that the lines of code required for
<literal>&lt;filter&gt;</literal> and
<literal>&lt;filter-mapping&gt;</literal> entries in
<literal>web.xml</literal> explodes when using more than a few
filters. To overcome this issue, Acegi Security provides a
<literal>FilterChainProxy</literal> class. It is wired using a
<literal>FilterToBeanProxy</literal> (just like in the example above),
but the target class is
<literal>org.acegisecurity.util.FilterChainProxy</literal>. The filter
chain is then declared in the application context, using code such as
this:</para>
<para><programlisting>&lt;bean id="filterChainProxy" class="org.acegisecurity.util.FilterChainProxy"&gt;
&lt;property name="filterInvocationDefinitionSource"&gt;
&lt;value&gt;
CONVERT_URL_TO_LOWERCASE_BEFORE_COMPARISON
PATTERN_TYPE_APACHE_ANT
/webServices/**=httpSessionContextIntegrationFilterWithASCFalse,basicProcessingFilter,securityEnforcementFilter
/**=httpSessionContextIntegrationFilterWithASCTrue,authenticationProcessingFilter,securityEnforcementFilter
&lt;/value&gt;
&lt;/property&gt;
&lt;/bean&gt;</programlisting></para>
<para>You may notice similarities with the way
<literal>SecurityEnforcementFilter</literal> is declared. Both regular
expressions and Ant Paths are supported, and the most specific URIs
appear first. At runtime the <literal>FilterChainProxy</literal> will
locate the first URI pattern that matches the current web request.
Each of the corresponding configuration attributes represent the name
of a bean defined in the application context. The filters will then be
invoked in the order they are specified, with standard
<literal>FilterChain</literal> behaviour being respected (a
<literal>Filter</literal> can elect not to proceed with the chain if
it wishes to end processing).</para>
<para>As you can see, <literal>FitlerChainProxy</literal> requires the
duplication of filter names for different request patterns (in the
above example, <literal>httpSessionContextIntegrationFilter</literal>
and <literal>securityEnforcementFilter</literal> are duplicated). This
design decision was made to enable <literal>FilterChainProxy</literal>
to specify different <literal>Filter</literal> invocation orders for
different URI patterns, and also to improve both the expressiveness
(in terms of regular expressions, Ant Paths, and any custom
<literal>FilterInvocationDefinitionSource</literal> implementations)
and clarity of which <literal>Filter</literal>s should be
invoked.</para>
<para>You may have noticed we have declared two
<literal>HttpSessionContextIntegrationFilter</literal>s in the filter
chain (<literal>ASC</literal> is short for
<literal>allowSessionCreation</literal>, a property of
<literal>HttpSessionContextIntegrationFilter</literal>). As web
services will never present a <literal>jsessionid</literal> on future
requests, creating <literal>HttpSession</literal>s for such user
agents would be wasteful. If you had a high-volume application which
required maximum scalability, we recommend you use the approach shown
above. For smaller applications, using a single
<literal>HttpSessionContextIntegrationFilter</literal> (with its
default <literal>allowSessionCreation</literal> as
<literal>true</literal>) would likely be sufficient.</para>
<para>In relation to lifecycle issues, the
<literal>FilterChainProxy</literal> will always delegate
<literal>init(FilterConfig)</literal> and <literal>destroy()</literal>
methods through to the underlaying <literal>Filter</literal>s if such
methods are called against <literal>FilterChainProxy</literal> itself.
In this case, <literal>FilterChainProxy</literal> guarantees to only
initialize and destroy each <literal>Filter</literal> once,
irrespective of how many times it is declared by the
<literal>FilterInvocationDefinitionSource</literal>. You control the
overall choice as to whether these methods are called or not via the
<literal>lifecycle</literal> initialization parameter of the
<literal>FilterToBeanProxy</literal> that proxies
<literal>FilterChainProxy</literal>. As discussed above, by default
any servlet container lifecycle invocations are not delegated through
to <literal>FilterChainProxy</literal>.</para>
</sect2>
<sect2 id="security-filters-order">
<title>Filter Ordering</title>
<para>The order that filters are defined in <literal>web.xml</literal>
is important. NB: THE FILTER ORDER CHANGED FROM VERSION 0.8.0.</para>
<para>Irrespective of which filters you are actually using, the order
of the <literal>&lt;filter-mapping&gt;</literal>s should be as
follows:</para>
<orderedlist>
<listitem>
<para><literal>ChannelProcessingFilter</literal>, because it might
need to redirect to a different protocol</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>ConcurrentSessionFilter</literal>, because it
doesn't use any <literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal>
functionality but needs to update the
<literal>SessionRegistry</literal> to reflect ongoing requests
from the principal</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>HttpSessionContextIntegrationFilter</literal>, so a
<literal>Context</literal> can be setup in the
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal> at the beginning of a web
request, and any changes to the Context can be copied to the
<literal>HttpSession</literal> when the web request ends (ready
for use with the next web request)</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>Authentication processing mechanisms -
<literal>AuthenticationProcessingFilter</literal>,
<literal>CasProcessingFilter</literal>,
<literal>BasicProcessingFilter, HttpRequestIntegrationFilter,
JbossIntegrationFilter</literal> etc - so that the
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal> can be modified to
contain a valid <literal>Authentication</literal> request
token</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>The <literal>ContextHolderAwareRequestFilter</literal>, if
you are using it to install an Acegi Security aware
<literal>HttpServletRequestWrapper</literal> into your servlet
container</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>RememberMeProcessingFilter</literal>, so that if no
earlier authentication processing mechanism updated the
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal>, and the request presents
a cookie that enables remember-me services to take place, a
suitable remembered
<literal><literal>Authentication</literal></literal> object will
be put there</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>AnonymousProcessingFilter</literal>, so that if no
earlier authentication processing mechanism updated the
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal>, an anonymous
<literal>Authentication</literal> object will be put there</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para><literal>SecurityEnforcementFilter</literal>, to protect web
URIs and catch any Acegi Security exceptions so that an
appropriate <literal>AuthenticationEntryPoint</literal> can be
launched</para>
</listitem>
</orderedlist>
<para>All of the above filters use
<literal>FilterToBeanProxy</literal> or
<literal>FilterChainProxy</literal>, which is discussed in the
previous sections. It is recommended that a single
<literal>FilterToBeanProxy</literal> proxy through to a single
<literal>FilterChainProxy</literal> for each application, with that
<literal>FilterChainProxy</literal> defining all of the Acegi Security
<literal>Filter</literal>s.</para>
<para>If you're using SiteMesh, ensure the Acegi Security filters
execute before the SiteMesh filters are called. This enables the
<literal>SecurityContextHolder</literal> to be populated in time for
use by SiteMesh decorators.</para>
</sect2>
</sect1>
<sect1 id="security-sample">
<title>Contacts Sample Application</title>
<para>Included with the Acegi Security System for Spring is a very
simple application that can demonstrate the basic security facilities
provided by the system (and confirm your Container Adapter is properly
configured if you're using one).</para>
<para>If you build from CVS, the Contacts sample application includes
three deployable versions:
<literal>acegi-security-sample-contacts-filter.war</literal> is
configured with the HTTP Session Authentication approach. The
<literal><literal>acegi-security-sample-contacts-ca.war</literal></literal>
is configured to use a Container Adapter. Finally,
<literal>acegi-security-sample-contacts-cas.war</literal> is designed to
work with a Yale CAS server. If you're just wanting to see how the
sample application works, please use
<literal><literal>acegi-security-sample-contacts-filter.war</literal></literal>
as it does not require special configuration of your container. This is
also the artifact included in ofiical release ZIPs.</para>
<para>To deploy, simply copy the relevant WAR file from the Acegi
Security System for Spring distribution into your containers
<literal>webapps</literal> directory.</para>
<para>After starting your container, check the application can load.
Visit
<literal>http://localhost:</literal><literal><literal>8080/</literal>acegi-security-sample-contacts-filter</literal>
(or whichever URL is appropriate for your web container and the WAR you
deployed). A random contact should be displayed. Click "Refresh" several
times and you will see different contacts. The business method that
provides this random contact is not secured.</para>
<para>Next, click "Debug". You will be prompted to authenticate, and a
series of usernames and passwords are suggested on that page. Simply
authenticate with any of these and view the resulting page. It should
contain a success message similar to the following:</para>
<blockquote>
<para>Context on SecurityContextHolder is of type:
org.acegisecurity.context.SecurityContextImpl</para>
<para>The Context implements SecurityContext.</para>
<para>Authentication object is of type:
org.acegisecurity.adapters.PrincipalAcegiUserToken</para>
<para>Authentication object as a String:
org.acegisecurity.adapters.PrincipalAcegiUserToken@e9a7c2: Username:
marissa; Password: [PROTECTED]; Authenticated: true; Granted
Authorities: ROLE_TELLER, ROLE_SUPERVISOR</para>
<para>Authentication object holds the following granted
authorities:</para>
<para>ROLE_TELLER (getAuthority(): ROLE_TELLER)</para>
<para>ROLE_SUPERVISOR (getAuthority(): ROLE_SUPERVISOR)</para>
<para>SUCCESS! Your [container adapter|web filter] appears to be
properly configured!</para>
</blockquote>
<para>If you receive a different message, and deployed
<literal>acegi-security-sample-contacts-ca.war</literal>, check you have
properly configured your Container Adapter as described elsewhere in
this reference guide.</para>
<para>Once you successfully receive the above message, return to the
sample application's home page and click "Manage". You can then try out
the application. Notice that only the contacts available to the
currently logged on user are displayed, and only users with
<literal>ROLE_SUPERVISOR</literal> are granted access to delete their
contacts. Behind the scenes, the
<literal>MethodSecurityInterceptor</literal> is securing the business
objects. If you're using
<literal><literal>acegi-security-sample-contacts-filter.war</literal></literal>
or <literal>acegi-security-sample-contacts-cas.war</literal>, the
<literal>FilterSecurityInterceptor</literal> is also securing the HTTP
requests. If using either of these WARs, be sure to try visiting
<literal>http://localhost:8080/contacts/secure/super</literal>, which
will demonstrate access being denied by the
<literal>SecurityEnforcementFilter</literal>. Note the sample
application enables you to modify the access control lists associated
with different contacts. Be sure to give this a try and understand how
it works by reviewing the sample application's application context XML
files.</para>
<para>The Contacts sample application also include a
<literal>client</literal> directory. Inside you will find a small
application that queries the backend business objects using several web
services protocols. This demonstrates how to use the Acegi Security
System for Spring for authentication with Spring remoting protocols. To
try this client, ensure your servlet container is still running the
Contacts sample application, and then execute <literal>client marissa
koala</literal>. The command-line parameters respectively represent the
username to use, and the password to use. Note that you may need to edit
<literal>client.properties</literal> to use a different target
URL.</para>
<para>Please note the sample application's <literal>client</literal>
does not currently support CAS. You can still give it a try, though, if
you're ambitious: try <literal>client _cas_stateless_
YOUR-SERVICE-TICKET-ID</literal>.</para>
</sect1>
<sect1 id="security-become-involved">
<title>Become Involved</title>
<para>We welcome you to become involved in the Acegi Security System for
Spring project. There are many ways of contributing, including reading
the mailing list and responding to questions from other people, writing
new code, improving existing code, assisting with documentation, or
simply making suggestions. Please read our project policies web page
that is available on the Acegi Security home page. This explains the
path to become a committer, and the administration approaches we use
with the project.</para>
<para>SourceForge provides CVS services for the project, allowing
anybody to access the latest code. If you wish to contribute new code,
please observe the following requirements. These exist to maintain the
quality and consistency of the project:</para>
<itemizedlist>
<listitem>
<para>Use a suitable IDE Jalopy plug-in to convert your code into
the project's consistent style</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>Ensure your code does not break any unit tests (run the Maven
<literal>test:test</literal> goal)</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>If you have added new code, please provide suitable unit tests
(use the Maven <literal>clover:html-report</literal> to view
coverage)</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>Join the acegisecurity-developer and acegisecurity-cvs mailing
lists so you're in the loop</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>Use CamelCase</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>Add code contributions to JIRA</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>Add a CVS <literal>$Id: index.xml,v 1.3 2004/04/02 21:12:25
fbos Exp $</literal> tag to the JavaDocs for any new class you
create</para>
</listitem>
</itemizedlist>
</sect1>
<sect1 id="security-further">
<title>Further Information</title>
<para>Questions and comments on the Acegi Security System for Spring are
welcome. Please use the Spring Community Forum web site at
<literal>http://forum.springframework.org</literal>. You're also welcome
to join the acegisecurity-developer mailing list. Our project home page
(where you can obtain the latest release of the project and access to
CVS, mailing lists, forums etc) is at
<literal>http://acegisecurity.sourceforge.net</literal>.</para>
</sect1>
</chapter>
</book>