discourse/app/controllers/uploads_controller.rb

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# frozen_string_literal: true
require "mini_mime"
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class UploadsController < ApplicationController
requires_login except: [:show, :show_short, :show_secure]
skip_before_action :preload_json, :check_xhr, :redirect_to_login_if_required, only: [:show, :show_short, :show_secure]
protect_from_forgery except: :show
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before_action :is_asset_path, :apply_cdn_headers, only: [:show, :show_short, :show_secure]
SECURE_REDIRECT_GRACE_SECONDS = 5
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def create
# capture current user for block later on
me = current_user
# 50 characters ought to be enough for the upload type
type = params.require(:type).parameterize(separator: "_")[0..50]
FEATURE: Rename 'Discourse SSO' to DiscourseConnect (#11978) The 'Discourse SSO' protocol is being rebranded to DiscourseConnect. This should help to reduce confusion when 'SSO' is used in the generic sense. This commit aims to: - Rename `sso_` site settings. DiscourseConnect specific ones are prefixed `discourse_connect_`. Generic settings are prefixed `auth_` - Add (server-side-only) backwards compatibility for the old setting names, with deprecation notices - Copy `site_settings` database records to the new names - Rename relevant translation keys - Update relevant translations This commit does **not** aim to: - Rename any Ruby classes or methods. This might be done in a future commit - Change any URLs. This would break existing integrations - Make any changes to the protocol. This would break existing integrations - Change any functionality. Further normalization across DiscourseConnect and other auth methods will be done separately The risks are: - There is no backwards compatibility for site settings on the client-side. Accessing auth-related site settings in Javascript is fairly rare, and an error on the client side would not be security-critical. - If a plugin is monkey-patching parts of the auth process, changes to locale keys could cause broken error messages. This should also be unlikely. The old site setting names remain functional, so security-related overrides will remain working. A follow-up commit will be made with a post-deploy migration to delete the old `site_settings` rows.
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if type == "avatar" && !me.admin? && (SiteSetting.discourse_connect_overrides_avatar || !SiteSetting.allow_uploaded_avatars)
return render json: failed_json, status: 422
end
url = params[:url]
file = params[:file] || params[:files]&.first
pasted = params[:pasted] == "true"
for_private_message = params[:for_private_message] == "true"
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for_site_setting = params[:for_site_setting] == "true"
is_api = is_api?
retain_hours = params[:retain_hours].to_i
# note, atm hijack is processed in its own context and has not access to controller
# longer term we may change this
hijack do
begin
info = UploadsController.create_upload(
current_user: me,
file: file,
url: url,
type: type,
for_private_message: for_private_message,
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for_site_setting: for_site_setting,
pasted: pasted,
is_api: is_api,
retain_hours: retain_hours
)
rescue => e
render json: failed_json.merge(message: e.message&.split("\n")&.first), status: 422
else
render json: UploadsController.serialize_upload(info), status: Upload === info ? 200 : 422
end
end
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end
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def lookup_urls
params.permit(short_urls: [])
uploads = []
if (params[:short_urls] && params[:short_urls].length > 0)
PrettyText::Helpers.lookup_upload_urls(params[:short_urls]).each do |short_url, paths|
uploads << {
short_url: short_url,
url: paths[:url],
short_path: paths[:short_path]
}
end
end
render json: uploads.to_json
end
def show
# do not serve uploads requested via XHR to prevent XSS
return xhr_not_allowed if request.xhr?
return render_404 if !RailsMultisite::ConnectionManagement.has_db?(params[:site])
RailsMultisite::ConnectionManagement.with_connection(params[:site]) do |db|
return render_404 if SiteSetting.prevent_anons_from_downloading_files && current_user.nil?
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if upload = Upload.find_by(sha1: params[:sha]) || Upload.find_by(id: params[:id], url: request.env["PATH_INFO"])
unless Discourse.store.internal?
local_store = FileStore::LocalStore.new
return render_404 unless local_store.has_been_uploaded?(upload.url)
end
send_file_local_upload(upload)
else
render_404
end
end
end
def show_short
# do not serve uploads requested via XHR to prevent XSS
return xhr_not_allowed if request.xhr?
if SiteSetting.prevent_anons_from_downloading_files && current_user.nil?
return render_404
end
sha1 = Upload.sha1_from_base62_encoded(params[:base62])
if upload = Upload.find_by(sha1: sha1)
if upload.secure? && SiteSetting.secure_media?
return handle_secure_upload_request(upload)
end
FEATURE: Secure media allowing duplicated uploads with category-level privacy and post-based access rules (#8664) ### General Changes and Duplication * We now consider a post `with_secure_media?` if it is in a read-restricted category. * When uploading we now set an upload's secure status straight away. * When uploading if `SiteSetting.secure_media` is enabled, we do not check to see if the upload already exists using the `sha1` digest of the upload. The `sha1` column of the upload is filled with a `SecureRandom.hex(20)` value which is the same length as `Upload::SHA1_LENGTH`. The `original_sha1` column is filled with the _real_ sha1 digest of the file. * Whether an upload `should_be_secure?` is now determined by whether the `access_control_post` is `with_secure_media?` (if there is no access control post then we leave the secure status as is). * When serializing the upload, we now cook the URL if the upload is secure. This is so it shows up correctly in the composer preview, because we set secure status on upload. ### Viewing Secure Media * The secure-media-upload URL will take the post that the upload is attached to into account via `Guardian.can_see?` for access permissions * If there is no `access_control_post` then we just deliver the media. This should be a rare occurrance and shouldn't cause issues as the `access_control_post` is set when `link_post_uploads` is called via `CookedPostProcessor` ### Removed We no longer do any of these because we do not reuse uploads by sha1 if secure media is enabled. * We no longer have a way to prevent cross-posting of a secure upload from a private context to a public context. * We no longer have to set `secure: false` for uploads when uploading for a theme component.
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if Discourse.store.internal?
send_file_local_upload(upload)
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else
redirect_to Discourse.store.url_for(upload, force_download: force_download?)
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end
else
render_404
end
end
def show_secure
# do not serve uploads requested via XHR to prevent XSS
return xhr_not_allowed if request.xhr?
return render_404 if !Discourse.store.external?
path_with_ext = "#{params[:path]}.#{params[:extension]}"
sha1 = File.basename(path_with_ext, File.extname(path_with_ext))
# this takes care of optimized image requests
sha1 = sha1.partition("_").first if sha1.include?("_")
upload = Upload.find_by(sha1: sha1)
return render_404 if upload.blank?
return render_404 if SiteSetting.prevent_anons_from_downloading_files && current_user.nil?
FEATURE: Secure media allowing duplicated uploads with category-level privacy and post-based access rules (#8664) ### General Changes and Duplication * We now consider a post `with_secure_media?` if it is in a read-restricted category. * When uploading we now set an upload's secure status straight away. * When uploading if `SiteSetting.secure_media` is enabled, we do not check to see if the upload already exists using the `sha1` digest of the upload. The `sha1` column of the upload is filled with a `SecureRandom.hex(20)` value which is the same length as `Upload::SHA1_LENGTH`. The `original_sha1` column is filled with the _real_ sha1 digest of the file. * Whether an upload `should_be_secure?` is now determined by whether the `access_control_post` is `with_secure_media?` (if there is no access control post then we leave the secure status as is). * When serializing the upload, we now cook the URL if the upload is secure. This is so it shows up correctly in the composer preview, because we set secure status on upload. ### Viewing Secure Media * The secure-media-upload URL will take the post that the upload is attached to into account via `Guardian.can_see?` for access permissions * If there is no `access_control_post` then we just deliver the media. This should be a rare occurrance and shouldn't cause issues as the `access_control_post` is set when `link_post_uploads` is called via `CookedPostProcessor` ### Removed We no longer do any of these because we do not reuse uploads by sha1 if secure media is enabled. * We no longer have a way to prevent cross-posting of a secure upload from a private context to a public context. * We no longer have to set `secure: false` for uploads when uploading for a theme component.
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return handle_secure_upload_request(upload, path_with_ext) if SiteSetting.secure_media?
# we don't want to 404 here if secure media gets disabled
# because all posts with secure uploads will show broken media
# until rebaked, which could take some time
#
# if the upload is still secure, that means the ACL is probably still
# private, so we don't want to go to the CDN url just yet otherwise we
# will get a 403. if the upload is not secure we assume the ACL is public
signed_secure_url = Discourse.store.signed_url_for_path(path_with_ext)
redirect_to upload.secure? ? signed_secure_url : Discourse.store.cdn_url(upload.url)
end
def handle_secure_upload_request(upload, path_with_ext = nil)
FEATURE: Secure media allowing duplicated uploads with category-level privacy and post-based access rules (#8664) ### General Changes and Duplication * We now consider a post `with_secure_media?` if it is in a read-restricted category. * When uploading we now set an upload's secure status straight away. * When uploading if `SiteSetting.secure_media` is enabled, we do not check to see if the upload already exists using the `sha1` digest of the upload. The `sha1` column of the upload is filled with a `SecureRandom.hex(20)` value which is the same length as `Upload::SHA1_LENGTH`. The `original_sha1` column is filled with the _real_ sha1 digest of the file. * Whether an upload `should_be_secure?` is now determined by whether the `access_control_post` is `with_secure_media?` (if there is no access control post then we leave the secure status as is). * When serializing the upload, we now cook the URL if the upload is secure. This is so it shows up correctly in the composer preview, because we set secure status on upload. ### Viewing Secure Media * The secure-media-upload URL will take the post that the upload is attached to into account via `Guardian.can_see?` for access permissions * If there is no `access_control_post` then we just deliver the media. This should be a rare occurrance and shouldn't cause issues as the `access_control_post` is set when `link_post_uploads` is called via `CookedPostProcessor` ### Removed We no longer do any of these because we do not reuse uploads by sha1 if secure media is enabled. * We no longer have a way to prevent cross-posting of a secure upload from a private context to a public context. * We no longer have to set `secure: false` for uploads when uploading for a theme component.
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if upload.access_control_post_id.present?
raise Discourse::InvalidAccess if !guardian.can_see?(upload.access_control_post)
else
return render_404 if current_user.nil?
FEATURE: Secure media allowing duplicated uploads with category-level privacy and post-based access rules (#8664) ### General Changes and Duplication * We now consider a post `with_secure_media?` if it is in a read-restricted category. * When uploading we now set an upload's secure status straight away. * When uploading if `SiteSetting.secure_media` is enabled, we do not check to see if the upload already exists using the `sha1` digest of the upload. The `sha1` column of the upload is filled with a `SecureRandom.hex(20)` value which is the same length as `Upload::SHA1_LENGTH`. The `original_sha1` column is filled with the _real_ sha1 digest of the file. * Whether an upload `should_be_secure?` is now determined by whether the `access_control_post` is `with_secure_media?` (if there is no access control post then we leave the secure status as is). * When serializing the upload, we now cook the URL if the upload is secure. This is so it shows up correctly in the composer preview, because we set secure status on upload. ### Viewing Secure Media * The secure-media-upload URL will take the post that the upload is attached to into account via `Guardian.can_see?` for access permissions * If there is no `access_control_post` then we just deliver the media. This should be a rare occurrance and shouldn't cause issues as the `access_control_post` is set when `link_post_uploads` is called via `CookedPostProcessor` ### Removed We no longer do any of these because we do not reuse uploads by sha1 if secure media is enabled. * We no longer have a way to prevent cross-posting of a secure upload from a private context to a public context. * We no longer have to set `secure: false` for uploads when uploading for a theme component.
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end
# defaults to public: false, so only cached by the client browser
cache_seconds = S3Helper::DOWNLOAD_URL_EXPIRES_AFTER_SECONDS - SECURE_REDIRECT_GRACE_SECONDS
expires_in cache_seconds.seconds
# url_for figures out the full URL, handling multisite DBs,
# and will return a presigned URL for the upload
if path_with_ext.blank?
return redirect_to Discourse.store.url_for(upload, force_download: force_download?)
end
redirect_to Discourse.store.signed_url_for_path(
path_with_ext,
expires_in: S3Helper::DOWNLOAD_URL_EXPIRES_AFTER_SECONDS,
force_download: force_download?
)
FEATURE: Secure media allowing duplicated uploads with category-level privacy and post-based access rules (#8664) ### General Changes and Duplication * We now consider a post `with_secure_media?` if it is in a read-restricted category. * When uploading we now set an upload's secure status straight away. * When uploading if `SiteSetting.secure_media` is enabled, we do not check to see if the upload already exists using the `sha1` digest of the upload. The `sha1` column of the upload is filled with a `SecureRandom.hex(20)` value which is the same length as `Upload::SHA1_LENGTH`. The `original_sha1` column is filled with the _real_ sha1 digest of the file. * Whether an upload `should_be_secure?` is now determined by whether the `access_control_post` is `with_secure_media?` (if there is no access control post then we leave the secure status as is). * When serializing the upload, we now cook the URL if the upload is secure. This is so it shows up correctly in the composer preview, because we set secure status on upload. ### Viewing Secure Media * The secure-media-upload URL will take the post that the upload is attached to into account via `Guardian.can_see?` for access permissions * If there is no `access_control_post` then we just deliver the media. This should be a rare occurrance and shouldn't cause issues as the `access_control_post` is set when `link_post_uploads` is called via `CookedPostProcessor` ### Removed We no longer do any of these because we do not reuse uploads by sha1 if secure media is enabled. * We no longer have a way to prevent cross-posting of a secure upload from a private context to a public context. * We no longer have to set `secure: false` for uploads when uploading for a theme component.
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end
def metadata
params.require(:url)
upload = Upload.get_from_url(params[:url])
raise Discourse::NotFound unless upload
render json: {
original_filename: upload.original_filename,
width: upload.width,
height: upload.height,
human_filesize: upload.human_filesize
}
end
protected
def force_download?
params[:dl] == "1"
end
def xhr_not_allowed
raise Discourse::InvalidParameters.new("XHR not allowed")
end
def render_404
raise Discourse::NotFound
end
def self.serialize_upload(data)
# as_json.as_json is not a typo... as_json in AM serializer returns keys as symbols, we need them
# as strings here
serialized = UploadSerializer.new(data, root: nil).as_json.as_json if Upload === data
serialized ||= (data || {}).as_json
end
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def self.create_upload(current_user:,
file:,
url:,
type:,
for_private_message:,
for_site_setting:,
pasted:,
is_api:,
retain_hours:)
if file.nil?
if url.present? && is_api
maximum_upload_size = [SiteSetting.max_image_size_kb, SiteSetting.max_attachment_size_kb].max.kilobytes
tempfile = FileHelper.download(
url,
follow_redirect: true,
max_file_size: maximum_upload_size,
tmp_file_name: "discourse-upload-#{type}"
) rescue nil
filename = File.basename(URI.parse(url).path)
end
else
tempfile = file.tempfile
filename = file.original_filename
end
return { errors: [I18n.t("upload.file_missing")] } if tempfile.nil?
opts = {
type: type,
for_private_message: for_private_message,
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for_site_setting: for_site_setting,
pasted: pasted,
}
upload = UploadCreator.new(tempfile, filename, opts).create_for(current_user.id)
if upload.errors.empty? && current_user.admin?
upload.update_columns(retain_hours: retain_hours) if retain_hours > 0
end
upload.errors.empty? ? upload : { errors: upload.errors.to_hash.values.flatten }
ensure
tempfile&.close!
end
private
def send_file_local_upload(upload)
opts = {
filename: upload.original_filename,
content_type: MiniMime.lookup_by_filename(upload.original_filename)&.content_type
}
if !FileHelper.is_inline_image?(upload.original_filename)
opts[:disposition] = "attachment"
elsif params[:inline]
opts[:disposition] = "inline"
end
file_path = Discourse.store.path_for(upload)
return render_404 unless file_path
send_file(file_path, opts)
end
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end