2017-01-31 17:21:37 -05:00
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# frozen_string_literal: true
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require "digest/sha1"
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class UserAuthToken < ActiveRecord::Base
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belongs_to :user
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FEATURE: Apply rate limits per user instead of IP for trusted users (#14706)
Currently, Discourse rate limits all incoming requests by the IP address they
originate from regardless of the user making the request. This can be
frustrating if there are multiple users using Discourse simultaneously while
sharing the same IP address (e.g. employees in an office).
This commit implements a new feature to make Discourse apply rate limits by
user id rather than IP address for users at or higher than the configured trust
level (1 is the default).
For example, let's say a Discourse instance is configured to allow 200 requests
per minute per IP address, and we have 10 users at trust level 4 using
Discourse simultaneously from the same IP address. Before this feature, the 10
users could only make a total of 200 requests per minute before they got rate
limited. But with the new feature, each user is allowed to make 200 requests
per minute because the rate limits are applied on user id rather than the IP
address.
The minimum trust level for applying user-id-based rate limits can be
configured by the `skip_per_ip_rate_limit_trust_level` global setting. The
default is 1, but it can be changed by either adding the
`DISCOURSE_SKIP_PER_IP_RATE_LIMIT_TRUST_LEVEL` environment variable with the
desired value to your `app.yml`, or changing the setting's value in the
`discourse.conf` file.
Requests made with API keys are still rate limited by IP address and the
relevant global settings that control API keys rate limits.
Before this commit, Discourse's auth cookie (`_t`) was simply a 32 characters
string that Discourse used to lookup the current user from the database and the
cookie contained no additional information about the user. However, we had to
change the cookie content in this commit so we could identify the user from the
cookie without making a database query before the rate limits logic and avoid
introducing a bottleneck on busy sites.
Besides the 32 characters auth token, the cookie now includes the user id,
trust level and the cookie's generation date, and we encrypt/sign the cookie to
prevent tampering.
Internal ticket number: t54739.
2021-11-17 15:27:30 -05:00
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ROTATE_TIME_MINS = 10
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ROTATE_TIME = ROTATE_TIME_MINS.minutes
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2017-01-31 17:21:37 -05:00
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# used when token did not arrive at client
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URGENT_ROTATE_TIME = 1.minute
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2019-11-27 07:39:31 -05:00
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MAX_SESSION_COUNT = 60
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2018-08-31 04:18:06 -04:00
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USER_ACTIONS = ["generate"]
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2017-01-31 17:21:37 -05:00
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attr_accessor :unhashed_auth_token
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2018-08-31 04:18:06 -04:00
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before_destroy do
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2021-10-20 10:20:39 -04:00
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UserAuthToken.log_verbose(
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action: "destroy",
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user_auth_token_id: self.id,
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user_id: self.user_id,
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user_agent: self.user_agent,
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client_ip: self.client_ip,
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auth_token: self.auth_token,
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)
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2018-08-31 04:18:06 -04:00
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end
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2017-03-07 10:57:48 -05:00
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def self.log(info)
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2021-10-20 10:20:39 -04:00
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UserAuthTokenLog.create!(info)
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end
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def self.log_verbose(info)
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2017-03-07 10:57:48 -05:00
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log(info) if SiteSetting.verbose_auth_token_logging
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end
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2018-11-14 07:26:47 -05:00
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RAD_PER_DEG = Math::PI / 180
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EARTH_RADIUS_KM = 6371 # kilometers
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2018-10-25 05:45:31 -04:00
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def self.login_location(ip)
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2018-11-14 07:26:47 -05:00
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ipinfo = DiscourseIpInfo.get(ip)
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2018-12-14 11:30:34 -05:00
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ipinfo[:latitude] && ipinfo[:longitude] ? [ipinfo[:latitude], ipinfo[:longitude]] : nil
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2018-11-14 07:26:47 -05:00
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end
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def self.distance(loc1, loc2)
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lat1_rad, lon1_rad = loc1[0] * RAD_PER_DEG, loc1[1] * RAD_PER_DEG
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lat2_rad, lon2_rad = loc2[0] * RAD_PER_DEG, loc2[1] * RAD_PER_DEG
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a =
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Math.sin((lat2_rad - lat1_rad) / 2)**2 +
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Math.cos(lat1_rad) * Math.cos(lat2_rad) * Math.sin((lon2_rad - lon1_rad) / 2)**2
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c = 2 * Math.atan2(Math.sqrt(a), Math.sqrt(1 - a))
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c * EARTH_RADIUS_KM
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2018-10-25 05:45:31 -04:00
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end
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def self.is_suspicious(user_id, user_ip)
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2018-10-25 18:29:28 -04:00
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return false unless User.find_by(id: user_id)&.staff?
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2018-10-25 05:45:31 -04:00
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ips = UserAuthTokenLog.where(user_id: user_id).pluck(:client_ip)
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2021-05-20 21:43:47 -04:00
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ips.delete_at(ips.index(user_ip) || ips.length) # delete one occurrence (current)
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2018-10-25 05:45:31 -04:00
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ips.uniq!
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return false if ips.empty? # first login is never suspicious
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2018-11-14 07:26:47 -05:00
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if user_location = login_location(user_ip)
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ips.none? do |ip|
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if location = login_location(ip)
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distance(user_location, location) < SiteSetting.max_suspicious_distance_km
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end
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end
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end
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2018-10-25 05:45:31 -04:00
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end
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2018-11-12 09:34:12 -05:00
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def self.generate!(
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user_id:,
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user_agent: nil,
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client_ip: nil,
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path: nil,
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staff: nil,
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2024-07-24 03:19:58 -04:00
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impersonate: false,
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authenticated_with_oauth: false
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2018-11-12 09:34:12 -05:00
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)
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2017-01-31 17:21:37 -05:00
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token = SecureRandom.hex(16)
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hashed_token = hash_token(token)
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user_auth_token =
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UserAuthToken.create!(
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2018-10-25 18:29:28 -04:00
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user_id: user_id,
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user_agent: user_agent,
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client_ip: client_ip,
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2017-01-31 17:21:37 -05:00
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auth_token: hashed_token,
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prev_auth_token: hashed_token,
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rotated_at: Time.zone.now,
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authenticated_with_oauth: !!authenticated_with_oauth,
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2017-01-31 17:21:37 -05:00
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)
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user_auth_token.unhashed_auth_token = token
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2017-02-13 14:01:01 -05:00
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2021-10-20 10:20:39 -04:00
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log(
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action: "generate",
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user_auth_token_id: user_auth_token.id,
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user_id: user_id,
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user_agent: user_agent,
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client_ip: client_ip,
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path: path,
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auth_token: hashed_token,
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)
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2017-02-13 14:01:01 -05:00
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2018-11-12 09:34:12 -05:00
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if staff && !impersonate
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2018-10-25 18:29:28 -04:00
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Jobs.enqueue(
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:suspicious_login,
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user_id: user_id,
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client_ip: client_ip,
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user_agent: user_agent,
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)
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end
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2018-10-25 05:45:31 -04:00
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2017-01-31 17:21:37 -05:00
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user_auth_token
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end
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def self.lookup(unhashed_token, opts = nil)
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mark_seen = opts && opts[:seen]
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token = hash_token(unhashed_token)
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expire_before = SiteSetting.maximum_session_age.hours.ago
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user_token =
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2024-01-12 00:06:29 -05:00
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where(
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2017-01-31 17:21:37 -05:00
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"(auth_token = :token OR
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2018-05-03 20:11:58 -04:00
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prev_auth_token = :token) AND rotated_at > :expire_before",
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token: token,
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expire_before: expire_before,
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)
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2017-01-31 17:21:37 -05:00
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2024-01-12 00:06:29 -05:00
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if SiteSetting.verbose_auth_token_logging && path = opts.dig(:path)
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user_token = user_token.annotate("path:#{path}")
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end
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user_token = user_token.first
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2017-02-26 17:09:57 -05:00
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if !user_token
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2021-10-20 10:20:39 -04:00
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log_verbose(
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action: "miss token",
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user_id: nil,
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auth_token: token,
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user_agent: opts && opts[:user_agent],
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path: opts && opts[:path],
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client_ip: opts && opts[:client_ip],
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)
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2017-02-13 14:01:01 -05:00
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2017-01-31 17:21:37 -05:00
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return nil
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end
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2017-02-26 17:09:57 -05:00
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2017-02-28 10:38:22 -05:00
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if user_token.auth_token != token && user_token.prev_auth_token == token &&
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user_token.auth_token_seen
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2017-02-26 17:09:57 -05:00
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changed_rows =
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UserAuthToken
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2017-03-07 13:27:34 -05:00
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.where("rotated_at < ?", 1.minute.ago)
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2017-02-26 17:09:57 -05:00
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.where(id: user_token.id, prev_auth_token: token)
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.update_all(auth_token_seen: false)
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# not updating AR model cause we want to give it one more req
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# with wrong cookie
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2021-10-20 10:20:39 -04:00
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UserAuthToken.log_verbose(
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2017-02-26 17:09:57 -05:00
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action: changed_rows == 0 ? "prev seen token unchanged" : "prev seen token",
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user_auth_token_id: user_token.id,
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user_id: user_token.user_id,
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auth_token: user_token.auth_token,
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user_agent: opts && opts[:user_agent],
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2017-03-07 13:27:34 -05:00
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path: opts && opts[:path],
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2017-02-26 17:09:57 -05:00
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client_ip: opts && opts[:client_ip],
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)
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end
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2017-01-31 17:21:37 -05:00
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if mark_seen && user_token && !user_token.auth_token_seen && user_token.auth_token == token
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2017-02-14 09:34:09 -05:00
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# we must protect against concurrency issues here
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2017-02-15 10:58:18 -05:00
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changed_rows =
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UserAuthToken.where(id: user_token.id, auth_token: token).update_all(
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auth_token_seen: true,
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seen_at: Time.zone.now,
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)
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2017-02-14 09:34:39 -05:00
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if changed_rows == 1
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2017-02-14 09:34:09 -05:00
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# not doing a reload so we don't risk loading a rotated token
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user_token.auth_token_seen = true
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2017-02-15 10:58:18 -05:00
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user_token.seen_at = Time.zone.now
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2017-02-14 09:34:09 -05:00
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end
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2017-02-13 14:01:01 -05:00
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2021-10-20 10:20:39 -04:00
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log_verbose(
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action: changed_rows == 0 ? "seen wrong token" : "seen token",
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user_auth_token_id: user_token.id,
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user_id: user_token.user_id,
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auth_token: user_token.auth_token,
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user_agent: opts && opts[:user_agent],
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path: opts && opts[:path],
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client_ip: opts && opts[:client_ip],
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)
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2017-01-31 17:21:37 -05:00
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end
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user_token
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end
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def self.hash_token(token)
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Digest::SHA1.base64digest("#{token}#{GlobalSetting.safe_secret_key_base}")
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end
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def self.cleanup!
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2017-02-13 14:01:01 -05:00
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if SiteSetting.verbose_auth_token_logging
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UserAuthTokenLog.where(
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"created_at < :time",
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time: SiteSetting.maximum_session_age.hours.ago - ROTATE_TIME,
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).delete_all
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end
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2017-01-31 17:21:37 -05:00
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where(
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"rotated_at < :time",
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time: SiteSetting.maximum_session_age.hours.ago - ROTATE_TIME,
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).delete_all
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end
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def rotate!(info = nil)
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user_agent = (info && info[:user_agent] || self.user_agent)
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client_ip = (info && info[:client_ip] || self.client_ip)
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token = SecureRandom.hex(16)
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2018-06-19 02:13:14 -04:00
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result =
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DB.exec(
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"
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2017-01-31 17:21:37 -05:00
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UPDATE user_auth_tokens
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SET
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auth_token_seen = false,
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2017-02-15 10:58:18 -05:00
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seen_at = null,
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2017-01-31 17:21:37 -05:00
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user_agent = :user_agent,
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client_ip = :client_ip,
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prev_auth_token = case when auth_token_seen then auth_token else prev_auth_token end,
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auth_token = :new_token,
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rotated_at = :now
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WHERE id = :id AND (auth_token_seen or rotated_at < :safeguard_time)
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",
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id: self.id,
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user_agent: user_agent,
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client_ip: client_ip&.to_s,
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now: Time.zone.now,
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new_token: UserAuthToken.hash_token(token),
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safeguard_time: 30.seconds.ago,
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)
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2018-06-19 02:13:14 -04:00
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if result > 0
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2017-01-31 17:21:37 -05:00
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reload
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self.unhashed_auth_token = token
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2017-02-13 14:01:01 -05:00
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2017-03-07 10:57:48 -05:00
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UserAuthToken.log(
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action: "rotate",
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user_auth_token_id: id,
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user_id: user_id,
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auth_token: auth_token,
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user_agent: user_agent,
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2017-03-07 13:27:34 -05:00
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client_ip: client_ip,
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path: info && info[:path],
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2017-03-07 10:57:48 -05:00
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)
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2017-02-13 14:01:01 -05:00
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2017-01-31 17:21:37 -05:00
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true
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else
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false
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end
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end
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2019-11-27 07:39:31 -05:00
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def self.enforce_session_count_limit!(user_id)
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tokens_to_destroy =
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where(user_id: user_id)
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.where("rotated_at > ?", SiteSetting.maximum_session_age.hours.ago)
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.order("rotated_at DESC")
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.offset(MAX_SESSION_COUNT)
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tokens_to_destroy.delete_all # Returns the number of deleted rows
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end
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2017-01-31 17:21:37 -05:00
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end
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# == Schema Information
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#
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# Table name: user_auth_tokens
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#
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2024-07-24 03:19:58 -04:00
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# id :integer not null, primary key
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# user_id :integer not null
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# auth_token :string not null
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# prev_auth_token :string not null
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# user_agent :string
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# auth_token_seen :boolean default(FALSE), not null
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# client_ip :inet
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# rotated_at :datetime not null
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# created_at :datetime not null
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# updated_at :datetime not null
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# seen_at :datetime
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# authenticated_with_oauth :boolean default(FALSE)
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2017-03-22 02:26:53 -04:00
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#
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# Indexes
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#
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# index_user_auth_tokens_on_auth_token (auth_token) UNIQUE
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# index_user_auth_tokens_on_prev_auth_token (prev_auth_token) UNIQUE
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2019-04-26 08:38:54 -04:00
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# index_user_auth_tokens_on_user_id (user_id)
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2017-01-31 17:21:37 -05:00
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#
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