discourse/lib/file_helper.rb

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# frozen_string_literal: true
require "final_destination"
require "mini_mime"
require "open-uri"
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class FileHelper
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def self.log(log_level, message)
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Rails.logger.public_send(
log_level,
"#{RailsMultisite::ConnectionManagement.current_db}: #{message}"
)
end
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def self.is_supported_image?(filename)
FEATURE: Secure media allowing duplicated uploads with category-level privacy and post-based access rules (#8664) ### General Changes and Duplication * We now consider a post `with_secure_media?` if it is in a read-restricted category. * When uploading we now set an upload's secure status straight away. * When uploading if `SiteSetting.secure_media` is enabled, we do not check to see if the upload already exists using the `sha1` digest of the upload. The `sha1` column of the upload is filled with a `SecureRandom.hex(20)` value which is the same length as `Upload::SHA1_LENGTH`. The `original_sha1` column is filled with the _real_ sha1 digest of the file. * Whether an upload `should_be_secure?` is now determined by whether the `access_control_post` is `with_secure_media?` (if there is no access control post then we leave the secure status as is). * When serializing the upload, we now cook the URL if the upload is secure. This is so it shows up correctly in the composer preview, because we set secure status on upload. ### Viewing Secure Media * The secure-media-upload URL will take the post that the upload is attached to into account via `Guardian.can_see?` for access permissions * If there is no `access_control_post` then we just deliver the media. This should be a rare occurrance and shouldn't cause issues as the `access_control_post` is set when `link_post_uploads` is called via `CookedPostProcessor` ### Removed We no longer do any of these because we do not reuse uploads by sha1 if secure media is enabled. * We no longer have a way to prevent cross-posting of a secure upload from a private context to a public context. * We no longer have to set `secure: false` for uploads when uploading for a theme component.
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(filename =~ supported_images_regexp).present?
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end
def self.is_inline_image?(filename)
(filename =~ inline_images_regexp).present?
end
def self.is_supported_media?(filename)
FEATURE: Secure media allowing duplicated uploads with category-level privacy and post-based access rules (#8664) ### General Changes and Duplication * We now consider a post `with_secure_media?` if it is in a read-restricted category. * When uploading we now set an upload's secure status straight away. * When uploading if `SiteSetting.secure_media` is enabled, we do not check to see if the upload already exists using the `sha1` digest of the upload. The `sha1` column of the upload is filled with a `SecureRandom.hex(20)` value which is the same length as `Upload::SHA1_LENGTH`. The `original_sha1` column is filled with the _real_ sha1 digest of the file. * Whether an upload `should_be_secure?` is now determined by whether the `access_control_post` is `with_secure_media?` (if there is no access control post then we leave the secure status as is). * When serializing the upload, we now cook the URL if the upload is secure. This is so it shows up correctly in the composer preview, because we set secure status on upload. ### Viewing Secure Media * The secure-media-upload URL will take the post that the upload is attached to into account via `Guardian.can_see?` for access permissions * If there is no `access_control_post` then we just deliver the media. This should be a rare occurrance and shouldn't cause issues as the `access_control_post` is set when `link_post_uploads` is called via `CookedPostProcessor` ### Removed We no longer do any of these because we do not reuse uploads by sha1 if secure media is enabled. * We no longer have a way to prevent cross-posting of a secure upload from a private context to a public context. * We no longer have to set `secure: false` for uploads when uploading for a theme component.
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(filename =~ supported_media_regexp).present?
end
class FakeIO
attr_accessor :status
end
def self.download(url,
max_file_size:,
tmp_file_name:,
follow_redirect: false,
read_timeout: 5,
skip_rate_limit: false,
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verbose: false,
validate_uri: true,
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retain_on_max_file_size_exceeded: false)
url = "https:" + url if url.start_with?("//")
raise Discourse::InvalidParameters.new(:url) unless url =~ /^https?:\/\//
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tmp = nil
fd = FinalDestination.new(
url,
max_redirects: follow_redirect ? 5 : 0,
skip_rate_limit: skip_rate_limit,
verbose: verbose,
validate_uri: validate_uri
)
fd.get do |response, chunk, uri|
if tmp.nil?
# error handling
if uri.blank?
if response.code.to_i >= 400
# attempt error API compatibility
io = FakeIO.new
io.status = [response.code, ""]
raise OpenURI::HTTPError.new("#{response.code} Error: #{response.body}", io)
else
log(:error, "FinalDestination did not work for: #{url}") if verbose
throw :done
end
end
if response.content_type.present?
ext = MiniMime.lookup_by_content_type(response.content_type)&.extension
ext = "jpg" if ext == "jpe"
tmp_file_ext = "." + ext if ext.present?
end
tmp_file_ext ||= File.extname(uri.path)
tmp = Tempfile.new([tmp_file_name, tmp_file_ext])
tmp.binmode
end
tmp.write(chunk)
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if tmp.size > max_file_size
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unless retain_on_max_file_size_exceeded
tmp.close
tmp = nil
end
throw :done
end
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end
tmp&.rewind
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tmp
end
def self.optimize_image!(filename, allow_pngquant: false)
image_optim(
allow_pngquant: allow_pngquant,
strip_image_metadata: SiteSetting.strip_image_metadata
).optimize_image!(filename)
end
def self.image_optim(allow_pngquant: false, strip_image_metadata: true)
# memoization is critical, initializing an ImageOptim object is very expensive
# sometimes up to 200ms searching for binaries and looking at versions
memoize("image_optim", allow_pngquant, strip_image_metadata) do
pngquant_options = false
if allow_pngquant
pngquant_options = { allow_lossy: true }
end
ImageOptim.new(
# GLOBAL
timeout: 15,
skip_missing_workers: true,
# PNG
optipng: { level: 2, strip: strip_image_metadata },
advpng: false,
pngcrush: false,
pngout: false,
pngquant: pngquant_options,
# JPG
jpegoptim: { strip: strip_image_metadata ? "all" : "none" },
jpegtran: false,
jpegrecompress: false,
)
end
end
def self.memoize(*args)
(@memoized ||= {})[args] ||= yield
end
def self.supported_gravatar_extensions
@@supported_gravatar_images ||= Set.new(%w{jpg jpeg png gif})
end
def self.supported_images
@@supported_images ||= Set.new %w{jpg jpeg png gif svg ico webp}
end
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def self.inline_images
# SVG cannot safely be shown as a document
@@inline_images ||= supported_images - %w{svg}
end
def self.supported_audio
@@supported_audio ||= Set.new %w{mp3 ogg wav m4a}
end
def self.supported_video
@@supported_video ||= Set.new %w{mov mp4 webm ogv}
end
def self.supported_images_regexp
@@supported_images_regexp ||= /\.(#{supported_images.to_a.join("|")})$/i
end
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def self.inline_images_regexp
@@inline_images_regexp ||= /\.(#{inline_images.to_a.join("|")})$/i
end
def self.supported_media_regexp
media = supported_images | supported_audio | supported_video
@@supported_media_regexp ||= /\.(#{media.to_a.join("|")})$/i
end
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end