Commit Graph

6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Martin Brennan 9174716737
DEV: Remove Discourse.redis.delete_prefixed (#22103)
This method is a huge footgun in production, since it calls
the Redis KEYS command. From the Redis documentation at
https://redis.io/commands/keys/:

> Warning: consider KEYS as a command that should only be used in
production environments with extreme care. It may ruin performance when
it is executed against large databases. This command is intended for
debugging and special operations, such as changing your keyspace layout.
Don't use KEYS in your regular application code.

Since we were only using `delete_prefixed` in specs (now that we
removed the usage in production in 24ec06ff85)
we can remove this and instead rely on `use_redis_snapshotting` on the
particular tests that need this kind of clearing functionality.
2023-06-16 12:44:35 +10:00
David Taylor cb932d6ee1
DEV: Apply syntax_tree formatting to `spec/*` 2023-01-09 11:49:28 +00:00
Loïc Guitaut 3eaac56797 DEV: Use proper wording for contexts in specs 2022-08-04 11:05:02 +02:00
Phil Pirozhkov 493d437e79
Add RSpec 4 compatibility (#17652)
* Remove outdated option

04078317ba

* Use the non-globally exposed RSpec syntax

https://github.com/rspec/rspec-core/pull/2803

* Use the non-globally exposed RSpec syntax, cont

https://github.com/rspec/rspec-core/pull/2803

* Comply to strict predicate matchers

See:
 - https://github.com/rspec/rspec-expectations/pull/1195
 - https://github.com/rspec/rspec-expectations/pull/1196
 - https://github.com/rspec/rspec-expectations/pull/1277
2022-07-28 10:27:38 +08:00
David Taylor c9dab6fd08
DEV: Automatically require 'rails_helper' in all specs (#16077)
It's very easy to forget to add `require 'rails_helper'` at the top of every core/plugin spec file, and omissions can cause some very confusing/sporadic errors.

By setting this flag in `.rspec`, we can remove the need for `require 'rails_helper'` entirely.
2022-03-01 17:50:50 +00:00
Osama Sayegh b86127ad12
FEATURE: Apply rate limits per user instead of IP for trusted users (#14706)
Currently, Discourse rate limits all incoming requests by the IP address they
originate from regardless of the user making the request. This can be
frustrating if there are multiple users using Discourse simultaneously while
sharing the same IP address (e.g. employees in an office).

This commit implements a new feature to make Discourse apply rate limits by
user id rather than IP address for users at or higher than the configured trust
level (1 is the default).

For example, let's say a Discourse instance is configured to allow 200 requests
per minute per IP address, and we have 10 users at trust level 4 using
Discourse simultaneously from the same IP address. Before this feature, the 10
users could only make a total of 200 requests per minute before they got rate
limited. But with the new feature, each user is allowed to make 200 requests
per minute because the rate limits are applied on user id rather than the IP
address.

The minimum trust level for applying user-id-based rate limits can be
configured by the `skip_per_ip_rate_limit_trust_level` global setting. The
default is 1, but it can be changed by either adding the
`DISCOURSE_SKIP_PER_IP_RATE_LIMIT_TRUST_LEVEL` environment variable with the
desired value to your `app.yml`, or changing the setting's value in the
`discourse.conf` file.

Requests made with API keys are still rate limited by IP address and the
relevant global settings that control API keys rate limits.

Before this commit, Discourse's auth cookie (`_t`) was simply a 32 characters
string that Discourse used to lookup the current user from the database and the
cookie contained no additional information about the user. However, we had to
change the cookie content in this commit so we could identify the user from the
cookie without making a database query before the rate limits logic and avoid
introducing a bottleneck on busy sites.

Besides the 32 characters auth token, the cookie now includes the user id,
trust level and the cookie's generation date, and we encrypt/sign the cookie to
prevent tampering.

Internal ticket number: t54739.
2021-11-17 23:27:30 +03:00