This is part 1 of 3, split up of PR #23529. This PR refactors the
webauthn code to support passkey authentication/registration.
Passkeys aren't used yet, that is coming in PRs 2 and 3.
Co-authored-by: Alan Guo Xiang Tan <gxtan1990@gmail.com>
They're both constant per-instance values, there is no need to store them
in the session. This also makes the code a bit more readable by moving
the `session_challenge_key` method up to the `DiscourseWebauthn` module.
Previously, Discourse's password hashing was hard-coded to a specific algorithm and parameters. Any changes to the algorithm or parameters would essentially invalidate all existing user passwords.
This commit introduces a new `password_algorithm` column on the `users` table. This persists the algorithm/parameters which were use to generate the hash for a given user. All existing rows in the users table are assumed to be using Discourse's current algorithm/parameters. With this data stored per-user in the database, we'll be able to keep existing passwords working while adjusting the algorithm/parameters for newly hashed passwords.
Passwords which were hashed with an old algorithm will be automatically re-hashed with the new algorithm when the user next logs in.
Values in the `password_algorithm` column are based on the PHC string format (https://github.com/P-H-C/phc-string-format/blob/master/phc-sf-spec.md). Discourse's existing algorithm is described by the string `$pbkdf2-sha256$i=64000,l=32$`
To introduce a new algorithm and start using it, make sure it's implemented in the `PasswordHasher` library, then update `User::TARGET_PASSWORD_ALGORITHM`.
In this PR, we introduced an option, that when all authenticators are disabled, but backup codes still exists, user can authenticate with those backup codes. This was reverted as this is not expected behavior.
https://github.com/discourse/discourse/pull/18982
Instead, when the last authenticator is deleted, backup codes should be deleted as well. Because this disables 2fa, user is asked to confirm that action by typing text.
In addition, UI for 2fa preferences was refreshed.
Currently, we have available three 2fa methods:
- Token-Based Authenticators
- Physical Security Keys
- Two-Factor Backup Codes
If the first two are deleted, user lose visibility of their backup codes, which suggests that 2fa is disabled.
However, when they try to authenticate, the account is locked, and they have to ask admin to fix that problem.
This PR is fixing the issue. User still sees backup codes in their panel and can use them to authenticate.
In next PR, I will improve UI to clearly notify the user when 2fa is fully disabled and when it is still active.
Discourse has the Discourse Connect Provider protocol that makes it possible to
use a Discourse instance as an identity provider for external sites. As a
natural extension to this protocol, this PR adds a new feature that makes it
possible to use Discourse as a 2FA provider as well as an identity provider.
The rationale for this change is that it's very difficult to implement 2FA
support in a website and if you have multiple websites that need to have 2FA,
it's unrealistic to build and maintain a separate 2FA implementation for each
one. But with this change, you can piggyback on Discourse to take care of all
the 2FA details for you for as many sites as you wish.
To use Discourse as a 2FA provider, you'll need to follow this guide:
https://meta.discourse.org/t/-/32974. It walks you through what you need to
implement on your end/site and how to configure your Discourse instance. Once
you're done, there is only one additional thing you need to do which is to
include `require_2fa=true` in the payload that you send to Discourse.
When Discourse sees `require_2fa=true`, it'll prompt the user to confirm their
2FA using whatever methods they've enabled (TOTP or security keys), and once
they confirm they'll be redirected back to the return URL you've configured and
the payload will contain `confirmed_2fa=true`. If the user has no 2FA methods
enabled however, the payload will not contain `confirmed_2fa`, but it will
contain `no_2fa_methods=true`.
You'll need to be careful to re-run all the security checks and ensure the user
can still access the resource on your site after they return from Discourse.
This is very important because there's nothing that guarantees the user that
will come back from Discourse after they confirm 2FA is the same user that
you've redirected to Discourse.
Internal ticket: t62183.
The 'Discourse SSO' protocol is being rebranded to DiscourseConnect. This should help to reduce confusion when 'SSO' is used in the generic sense.
This commit aims to:
- Rename `sso_` site settings. DiscourseConnect specific ones are prefixed `discourse_connect_`. Generic settings are prefixed `auth_`
- Add (server-side-only) backwards compatibility for the old setting names, with deprecation notices
- Copy `site_settings` database records to the new names
- Rename relevant translation keys
- Update relevant translations
This commit does **not** aim to:
- Rename any Ruby classes or methods. This might be done in a future commit
- Change any URLs. This would break existing integrations
- Make any changes to the protocol. This would break existing integrations
- Change any functionality. Further normalization across DiscourseConnect and other auth methods will be done separately
The risks are:
- There is no backwards compatibility for site settings on the client-side. Accessing auth-related site settings in Javascript is fairly rare, and an error on the client side would not be security-critical.
- If a plugin is monkey-patching parts of the auth process, changes to locale keys could cause broken error messages. This should also be unlikely. The old site setting names remain functional, so security-related overrides will remain working.
A follow-up commit will be made with a post-deploy migration to delete the old `site_settings` rows.
This is because the TOTP gem identifies as a colon as an addressable
protocol. The solution for now is to remove the colon in the issuer
name.
Changing the issuer changes the token values, but now it was completely
broken for colons so this should not be breaking anyone new.
The ROTP gem is only used in a very small amount of places in the app, we don't need to globally require it.
Also set the Addressable gem to not have a specific version range, as it has not been a problem yet.
Some slight refactoring of UserSecondFactor here too to use SecondFactorManager to avoid code repetition
Adds 2 factor authentication method via second factor security keys over [web authn](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API).
Allows a user to authenticate a second factor on login, login-via-email, admin-login, and change password routes. Adds registration area within existing user second factor preferences to register multiple security keys. Supports both external (yubikey) and built-in (macOS/android fingerprint readers).
Adds a second factor landing page that centralizes a user's second factor configuration.
This contains both TOTP and Backup, and also allows multiple TOTP tokens to be registered and organized by a name. Access to this page is authenticated via password, and cached for 30 minutes via a secure session.
This reduces chances of errors where consumers of strings mutate inputs
and reduces memory usage of the app.
Test suite passes now, but there may be some stuff left, so we will run
a few sites on a branch prior to merging
Jarek Radosz
Penar Musaraj
David Taylor
Krzysztof Kotlarek
Osama Sayegh
Robin Ward
Sam Saffron
Martin Brennan
Martin Brennan
dependabot-preview[bot]
Martin Brennan
Jeff Wong
Guo Xiang Tan
Maja Komel