Until now, changing a user's role involved deleting a user's role then re-adding. This change creates a new `update_role` function and associated method in `WP_Roles` to consolidate this process.
This commit also introduces new unit tests around `update_role` and adds additional "unhappy path" tests for roles and capabilities in general.
Props maksimkuzmin, peterwilsoncc, NomNom99, costdev, SergeyBiryukov.
Fixes#54572.
Built from https://develop.svn.wordpress.org/trunk@54213
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This avoids an `Undefined array key 0` PHP warning for `current_user_can()` capability checks that require a specific object to check against but an object ID was not passed.
A `_doing_it_wrong()` notice is also added, so that developers and site administrators are aware that the capability mapping is failing in the absence of the required object ID.
The list of mapped capabilities that require an object ID:
* `delete_post` / `delete_page`
* `edit_post` / `edit_page`
* `read_post` / `read_page`
* `publish_post`
* `edit_(post|comment|term|user)_meta` / `delete_*_meta` / `add_*_meta`
* `edit_comment`
* `edit_term` / `delete_term` / `assign_term`
Follow-up to [34091], [34113], [47178].
Props jeherve, peterwilsoncc, henry.wright, johnbillion, mattheweppelsheimer, hellofromTonya, JeffPaul, azouamauriac, Ninos Ego, TobiasBg, wpsmith, GaryJ, nacin, johnstonphilip, azaozz, SergeyBiryukov.
Fixes#44591.
Built from https://develop.svn.wordpress.org/trunk@53408
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On multisite, when checking if a user has a certain capability WordPress makes an additional check to see if the user is a super admin. The `is_super_admin()` function contained a call to `wp_get_current_user()` so as the global current user object could be used if it matched the queried user id.
This would cause an infinite loop if a hook attached to the `determine_current_user` filter was itself making a permission check. For example when limiting who can use the Application Passwords feature based on their capabilities.
Since [50790] the `WP_User` instance for the current user is shared between `wp_get_current_user()` and `get_userdata()`. This means we can remove the `wp_get_current_user` call from `is_super_admin()` while still retaining the same behavior.
Props chrisvanpatten, peterwilsoncc.
Fixes#53386.
Built from https://develop.svn.wordpress.org/trunk@52157
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Ensure `current_user_can()` and `user_can()` return the same results for logged out users. For core capabilities this changes `user_can( 0, 'exist' )` to return `true` rather than `false` in line with `current_user_can( 'exist' )` for logged out users.
Convert `current_user_can()` and `current_user_can_for_blog()` to wrapper functions ultimately calling `user_can()`.
Add anonymous user to primitive capability checks as appropriate. Convert `Tests_User_Capabilities::test_other_caps_for_all_roles()` to use a data provider and add tests to check whether user exists in the database (`WP_User::exists()`) as that intentionally differs from the `exist` capability.
Props jjj, johnbillion, peterwilsoncc, SergeyBiryukov, TimothyBlynJacobs.
Fixes#52076.
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Add check to `redirect_canonical()` to ensure private posts only redirect for logged in users.
Modifies the `read_post` mata capability to user `get_post_status()` rather than the post's `post_status` property to allow attachments to redirect based on the inherited post status.
Introduces `wp_force_ugly_post_permalink()` to unify the check to determine if an ugly link should be displayed in each of the functions used for determining permalinks: `get_permalink()`, `get_post_permalink()`, `_get_page_link()` and `get_attachment_link()`.
Improves logic of `get_attachment_link()` to validate parent post and resolution of inherited post status. This is an incomplete fix of #52373 to prevent the function returning links resulting in a file not found error. Required to unblock this ticket.
Props peterwilsoncc, TimothyBlynJacobs.
See #52373.
Fixes#5272.
Built from https://develop.svn.wordpress.org/trunk@50132
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Switching a WordPress site from HTTP to HTTPS has historically been a tedious task. While on the surface the Site Address and WordPress Address have to be updated, existing content still remains using HTTP URLs where hard-coded in the database. Furthermore, updating _two_ URLs to migrate to HTTPS is still a fairly unintuitive step which is not clearly explained.
This changeset simplifies migration from HTTP to HTTPS and, where possible, makes it a one-click interaction.
* Automatically replace insecure versions of the Site Address (`home_url()`) with its HTTPS counterpart on the fly if the site has been migrated from HTTP to HTTPS. This is accomplished by introducing a `https_migration_required` option and enabling it when the `home_url()` is accordingly changed.
* A new `wp_replace_insecure_home_url()` function is hooked into various pieces of content to replace URLs accordingly.
* The migration only kicks in when the Site Address (`home_url()`) and WordPress Address (`site_url()`) match, which is the widely common case. Configurations where these differ are often maintained by more advanced users, where this migration routine would be less essential - something to potentially iterate on in the future though.
* The migration does not actually update content in the database. More savvy users that prefer to do that can prevent the migration logic from running by either deleting the `https_migration_required` option or using the new `wp_should_replace_insecure_home_url` filter.
* For fresh sites that do not have any content yet at the point of changing the URLs to HTTPS, the migration will also be skipped since it would not be relevant.
* Expose a primary action in the Site Health recommendation, if HTTPS is already supported by the environment, built on top of the HTTPS detection mechanism from [49904]. When clicked, the default behavior is to update `home_url()` and `site_url()` in one go to their HTTPS counterpart.
* A new `wp_update_urls_to_https()` function takes care of the update routine.
* A new `update_https` meta capability is introduced to control access.
* If the site's URLs are controlled by constants, this update is not automatically possible, so in these scenarios the user is informed about that in the HTTPS status check in Site Health.
* Allow hosting providers to modify the URLs linked to in the HTTPS status check in Site Health, similar to how that is possible for the URLs around updating the PHP version.
* A `WP_UPDATE_HTTPS_URL` environment variable or `wp_update_https_url` filter can be used to provide a custom URL with guidance about updating the site to use HTTPS.
* A `WP_DIRECT_UPDATE_HTTPS_URL` environment variable or `wp_direct_update_https_url` filter can be used to provide a custom URL for the primary CTA to update the site to use HTTPS.
Props flixos90, timothyblynjacobs.
Fixes#51437.
Built from https://develop.svn.wordpress.org/trunk@50131
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Previously, all permission checks for using app passwords were implemented using `edit_user`. This commit introduces a series of more fine grained meta capabilities that should be used instead: `create_app_password`, `list_app_passwords`, `read_app_password`, `edit_app_password`, `delete_app_password` and `delete_app_passwords`. These capabilities all map to `edit_user` by default, but may now be customized by developers.
Props johnbillion, TimothyBlynJacobs.
Fixes#51703.
Built from https://develop.svn.wordpress.org/trunk@50114
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The new default_term argument is added to `register_taxonomy()` allowing a user to define the default term `name` and optionally `slug` and `description`.
Fixes#43517.
Props enrico.sorcinelli, SergeyBiryukov, desrosj, davidbaumwald, whyisjake.
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This is a final pass to fix PHP compatibiilty issues in the codebase with code changes or adding `phpcs:ignore` comments.
With this change, all PHP compatibility warnings and errors without specific tickets have been addressed (see #49810 and #41750).
Props desrosj, johnbillion, jrf.
See #49922.
Built from https://develop.svn.wordpress.org/trunk@47902
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* `erase_others_personal_data`
* `export_others_personal_data`
* `manage_privacy_options`
Previously mapped to `manage_options` or `manage_network` (on Multisite), these are now added to the Administrator role separately.
Additionally, `manage_privacy_options` is added to the Editor role.
Props garrett-eclipse, xkon, pbiron, desrosj, johnbillion, flixos90, juliobox, lakenh, Ov3rfly, ianatkins.
Fixes#44176.
Built from https://develop.svn.wordpress.org/trunk@47269
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With `map_meta_cap` enabled for a post type, the `read_post` capability for posts with a public status is supposed to be mapped to the post type's `read` capability.
When a post is left in the database after the post status is no longer present, and WP does a `read_post` check against it, a PHP notice was thrown, and the cap check always failed.
As a more graceful fallback, the cap is now mapped onto `edit_others_posts`, which allows highly privileged users to be able to access orphaned content.
A `_doing_it_wrong()` notice is also added, so that developers and site administrators are aware that the cap mapping is failing in the absence of the registered post status.
Follow-up to [34091], which introduced a similar approach to checking mapped caps against an unregistered post type.
Props roytanck, SergeyBiryukov.
Fixes#48653.
Built from https://develop.svn.wordpress.org/trunk@47178
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Allowing the client to delete revisions breaks the "audit trail" functionality. This is not allowed in WordPress and shouldn't be allowed through the API.
While not recommended, a plugin may opt-in to the previous behavior by setting a custom 'delete_post' capability for the revisions post type.
Props dlh, danielbachhuber, TimothyBlynJacobs, azaozz, kadamwhite.
Fixes#43709.
Built from https://develop.svn.wordpress.org/trunk@45812
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Introduces the faux primitive capability `view_site_health_checks` available to single site admins and multisite super-admin to view the site health page within the admin.
The capability is mapped to the `install_plugins` capability without being dependent on the file system being writable. This fixes a bug where the feature couldn't be used by sites unable to write to the file system or managed through version control.
The capability is granted on the `user_has_cap` filter.
Props birgire, Clorith, palmiak, peterwilsoncc, spacedmonkey.
Fixes#46957.
Built from https://develop.svn.wordpress.org/trunk@45507
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Using the new fatal handler introduced in [44962], an email is sent to the admin when a fatal error occurs. This email includes a secret link to enter recovery mode. When clicked, the link will be validated and on success a cookie will be placed on the client, enabling recovery mode for that user. This functionality is executed early before plugins and themes are loaded, in order to be unaffected by potential fatal errors these might be causing.
When in recovery mode, broken plugins and themes will be paused for that client, so that they are able to access the admin backend despite of these errors. They are notified about the broken extensions and the errors caused, and can then decide whether they would like to temporarily deactivate the extension or fix the problem and resume the extension.
A link in the admin bar allows the client to exit recovery mode.
Props timothyblynjacobs, afragen, flixos90, nerrad, miss_jwo, schlessera, spacedmonkey, swissspidy.
Fixes#46130, #44458.
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Due to the high number of follow-up tickets and associated security concerns, it was decided to reschedule the fatal error recovery feature for WordPress 5.2, in order to address these issues properly. The feature will continue to be developed, with iterations being merged into trunk early in the 5.2 release cycle.
Fixes#46141. See #44458, #45932, #45940, #46038, #46047, #46068.
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This changeset introduces a `WP_Shutdown_Handler` class that detects fatal errors and which extension (plugin or theme) causes them. Such an error is then recorded, and an error message is displayed. Subsequently, in certain protected areas, for example the admin, the broken extension will be paused, ensuring that the website is still usable in the respective area. The major benefit is that this mechanism allows site owners to still log in to their website, to fix the problem by either disabling the extension or solving the bug and then resuming the extension.
Extensions are only paused in certain designated areas. The frontend for example stays unaffected, as it is impossible to know what pausing the extension would cause to be missing, so it might be preferrable to clearly see that the website is temporarily not accessible instead.
The fatal error recovery is especially important in scope of encouraging the switch to a maintained PHP version, as not necessarily every WordPress extension is compatible with all PHP versions. If problems occur now, non-technical site owners that do not have immediate access to the codebase are not locked out of their site and can at least temporarily solve the problem quickly.
Websites that have custom requirements in that regard can implement their own shutdown handler by adding a `shutdown-handler.php` drop-in that returns the handler instance to use, which must be based on a class that inherits `WP_Shutdown_Handler`. That handler will then be used in place of the default one.
Websites that would like to modify specifically the error template displayed in the frontend can add a `php-error.php` drop-in that works similarly to the existing `db-error.php` drop-in.
Props afragen, bradleyt, flixos90, ocean90, schlessera, SergeyBiryukov, spacedmonkey.
Fixes#44458.
Built from https://develop.svn.wordpress.org/trunk@44524
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This brings the name in line with user-facing language and similar names of existing related capabilities. Since the capability has not been part of any WordPress release, it can be renamed without any backward-compatibility implications.
Also missing props benhuberman for [43006].
Fixes#44457.
Built from https://develop.svn.wordpress.org/trunk@43381
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Introduce an `object_subtype` argument to the args array for `register_meta()` which can be used to limit meta registration to a single subtype (e.g. a custom post type or taxonomy, vs all posts or taxonomies).
Introduce `register_post_meta()` and `register_term_meta()` wrapper methods for `register_meta` to provide a convenient interface for the common case of registering meta for a specific taxonomy or post type. These methods work the way plugin developers have often expected `register_meta` to function, and should be used in place of direct `register_meta` where possible.
Props flixos90, tharsheblows, spacedmonkey.
Fixes#38323.
Built from https://develop.svn.wordpress.org/trunk@43378
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A user is required to have the `manage_privacy_options` capability in order to determine which page is set as the privacy policy (the `wp_page_for_privacy_policy`). Given that, it doesn't make sense to allow users without that capability to edit or delete the page.
A similar situation exists with the `page_for_posts` and `page_on_front` options, but Editors are allowed to edit those pages. The reason that this situation is different is because it is more likely that an administrator will want to restrict modifications to the privacy policy, than it is that they will want to allow modifications. Modifications to the policy often require specialized knowledge of local laws, and can have implications for compliance with those laws.
Props dlh, desrosj.
Fixes#44079.
Built from https://develop.svn.wordpress.org/trunk@43286
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In many common Multisite use cases, the network administrator will want to set a network-wide privacy policy -- via the `privacy_policy_url` filter -- for consistency and convenience. When that's done, the Privacy Settings screen on individual sites becomes unnecessary, and may confuse administrators of those sites when they see that their changes don't have any effect on the policy link in the footer.
Since we can't programatically determine which behavior the network admins would like, the safest default setting is to restrict the ability to super admins, and let them delegate it to individual site owners via a plugin, if they'd like to.
Fixes#43935.
Built from https://develop.svn.wordpress.org/trunk@43147
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Multisite networks have a variety of use cases, and in many of them single-site administrators are not trusted to take actions that affect the whole network, require making decisions about legal compliance, etc. By default, those actions should require super admin capabilities. Plugins can be used to override that behavior if a particular site's use case calls for it.
Props allendav, jeremyfelt, iandunn.
Fixes#43919.
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davidbaumwald
Sergey Biryukov
audrasjb
TimothyBlynJacobs
Peter Wilson
Felix Arntz
John Blackbourn
whyisjake
desrosj
K. Adam White
Gary Pendergast
Jeremy Felt
iandunn
Andrew Ozz