When a term query using `fields=all_with_object_id` hits the cache, the
cached `stdClass` objects must be converted to `WP_Term` objects. This
was overlooked when `WP_Term_Query` was refactored to support object
queries in [38667].
Props dlh.
Fixes#44221.
Built from https://develop.svn.wordpress.org/trunk@43313
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Update the test infrastructure so that third party plugins, themes, and projects that use the core testing framework continue to operate from the `src` directory and do not require a build step.
Props mboynes, danielbachhuber, schlessera
See #43055
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And delete some left over cruft, only then shall we prevail.
There are some things easily missed, when using Git, which does not persist—
Empty directories, though that didn't derail—
Our Travis-based tests, which now must prevail.
Quoth Travis CI, “Build did fail.”
See #43055.
Built from https://develop.svn.wordpress.org/trunk@43310
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In many a strange and curious file of forgotten lore—
While I pondered, blaming Nacin, my notifications suddenly awakened,
As of someone quietly DMing;—DMing me, I can’t ignore.
“’Tis some contributor,” I muttered, “DMing me an idea or four—
Only this and nothing more.”
Ah, distinctly I remember, at WordCamp US, last December;
A mad proposal nearly laid me—down out cold—upon the floor.
Curious, I listened closely;—to a plan I agreed with, mostly—
A way to make our JavaScript—JavaScript which was a chore—
Maintainable, extendable, for the future, is what I saw.
Guten-ready for evermore.
Open here I switch to Slack, when, with many a patch and hack,
In there stepped Omar, a JavaScript developer hardcore;
Pronouncing all the changes fit; ready now to be commit;
“There’s nothing else for us to do,” DMing me, “It’s done!” he swore—
“No longer random guessing at which file need next be explored—
Let’s move on, we’re all aboard.”
Moved all together, grouped and managed, in folders all is packaged,
The code had all been cleaned and tidied, important parts moved to the fore,
“Though this change be useful here,” I said, “it is too large, I fear,
We couldn’t manage such a patch, we’ve done nothing like this before—
Tell me where doth go this change, change to make our codebase soar!”
Quoth Omar, “In WordPress Core.”
Props omarreis for shepherding this significant change.
Props adamsilverstein, aduth, atimmer, dingo_bastard, frank-klein, gziolo, herregroen, jaswrks, jeremyfelt, jipmoors, jorbin, netweb, ocean90, pento, tjnowell, and youknowriad for testing, feedback, discussion, encouragement, commiserations, etc.
I make no apologies for this commit message.
Fixes#43055.
Built from https://develop.svn.wordpress.org/trunk@43309
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There doesn't appear to be any way for an attacker to introduce malicious input into the URL, unless a plugin is filtering the URL to add it, but it's better to be safe than sorry.
Props 1naveengiri, joyously.
Fixes#44115.
Built from https://develop.svn.wordpress.org/trunk@43290
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A user is required to have the `manage_privacy_options` capability in order to determine which page is set as the privacy policy (the `wp_page_for_privacy_policy`). Given that, it doesn't make sense to allow users without that capability to edit or delete the page.
A similar situation exists with the `page_for_posts` and `page_on_front` options, but Editors are allowed to edit those pages. The reason that this situation is different is because it is more likely that an administrator will want to restrict modifications to the privacy policy, than it is that they will want to allow modifications. Modifications to the policy often require specialized knowledge of local laws, and can have implications for compliance with those laws.
Props dlh, desrosj.
Fixes#44079.
Built from https://develop.svn.wordpress.org/trunk@43286
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Previously, personal data exports were stored in `wp-content/uploads/exports`, which is generic enough that it's likely there are existing folders with that name, either created by plugins or manually by administrators. If that folder were reused by Core, then `wp_privacy_delete_old_export_files()` would delete all of the existing files inside it, which is almost certainly not what the site owner wants or expects.
To avoid that, the folder is being renamed to include a specific reference to Core, and a more verbose description of its purpose. With those factored in, it's very unlikely that there will be any conflicts with existing folders.
The `wp_privacy_exports_dir()` and `wp_privacy_exports_url()` functions were introduced to provide a canonical source for the location, and the `wp_privacy_exports_dir` and `wp_privacy_exports_url` filters were introduced to allow plugins to customize it.
Props johnjamesjacoby, allendav.
Fixes#44091.
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Previously, the link used absolute positioning, in order to stick it at the bottom of the page. That was done in order to create visual separation between it and the "action" links, like "Lost Your Password?"
The absolute positioning can cause conflicts in some situations, though. For example, if extra text or error notices are added above the form, then the login link would be positioned on top of other elements.
Switching to relative positioning with extra margins avoids those issues, while maintaining the visual separation between the "action" links and the privacy policy link.
Props imath, melchoyce, desrosj, xkon, iandunn.
Fixes#44046.
Built from https://develop.svn.wordpress.org/trunk@43274
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r43158 introduced a new admin pointer for the privacy tools added in 4.9.6. With the previous positioning, though, sometimes the `Dismiss` link would be fixed off screen, making it impossible for the user to dismiss the pointer. This happened when there were enough extra menu items, or when the viewport height was short enough.
This commit repositions the pointer to work around that problem. One down side of this workaround is that the arrow will not always be positioned next to the `Tools` menu, where it should be. That's an acceptable compromise given the current time constraints, though. A long term solution would be to make `WP_Pointer` robust enough to handle this use case.
Props imath, audrasjb, desrosj.
Fixes#44045.
Built from https://develop.svn.wordpress.org/trunk@43246
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The previous `user_email` value was redundant, because it always matched `$request_data->email`. That value might be different from where the message is sent, though, if the `user_erasure_fulfillment_email_to` filter is used. If they are different, then callbacks for the `user_confirmed_action_email_content` filter may want to distinguish between the email address of the user making the request, and the email address that the confirmation notification is being sent to.
Props desrosj, iandunn.
See #43973.
Built from https://develop.svn.wordpress.org/trunk@43236
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Jeremy Felt
Andrew Ozz
Sergey Biryukov
John Blackbourn
Boone Gorges
Gary Pendergast
laurelfulford
iandunn
Felix Arntz
Dominik Schilling
Weston Ruter