Merge branch 'master' into feature/search-request-refactoring

This commit is contained in:
Colin Goodheart-Smithe 2015-10-15 13:51:00 +01:00
commit cf3e92ae92
7 changed files with 126 additions and 21 deletions

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@ -253,7 +253,9 @@ public class Version {
public static final int V_1_7_2_ID = 1070299;
public static final Version V_1_7_2 = new Version(V_1_7_2_ID, false, org.apache.lucene.util.Version.LUCENE_4_10_4);
public static final int V_1_7_3_ID = 1070399;
public static final Version V_1_7_3 = new Version(V_1_7_3_ID, true, org.apache.lucene.util.Version.LUCENE_4_10_4);
public static final Version V_1_7_3 = new Version(V_1_7_3_ID, false, org.apache.lucene.util.Version.LUCENE_4_10_4);
public static final int V_1_7_4_ID = 1070499;
public static final Version V_1_7_4 = new Version(V_1_7_4_ID, true, org.apache.lucene.util.Version.LUCENE_4_10_4);
public static final int V_2_0_0_beta1_ID = 2000001;
public static final Version V_2_0_0_beta1 = new Version(V_2_0_0_beta1_ID, false, org.apache.lucene.util.Version.LUCENE_5_2_1);
@ -295,6 +297,8 @@ public class Version {
return V_2_0_0_beta2;
case V_2_0_0_beta1_ID:
return V_2_0_0_beta1;
case V_1_7_4_ID:
return V_1_7_4;
case V_1_7_3_ID:
return V_1_7_3;
case V_1_7_2_ID:

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@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ class JNANatives {
static boolean LOCAL_MLOCKALL = false;
// Set to true, in case native seccomp call was successful
static boolean LOCAL_SECCOMP = false;
// Set to true, in case policy can be applied to all threads of the process (even existing ones)
// otherwise they are only inherited for new threads (ES app threads)
static boolean LOCAL_SECCOMP_ALL = false;
static void tryMlockall() {
int errno = Integer.MIN_VALUE;
@ -177,8 +180,11 @@ class JNANatives {
static void trySeccomp(Path tmpFile) {
try {
Seccomp.init(tmpFile);
int ret = Seccomp.init(tmpFile);
LOCAL_SECCOMP = true;
if (ret == 1) {
LOCAL_SECCOMP_ALL = true;
}
} catch (Throwable t) {
// this is likely to happen unless the kernel is newish, its a best effort at the moment
// so we log stacktrace at debug for now...

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@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ final class Seccomp {
static final int PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS = 38; // since Linux 3.5
static final int PR_GET_SECCOMP = 21; // since Linux 2.6.23
static final int PR_SET_SECCOMP = 22; // since Linux 2.6.23
static final int SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER = 2; // since Linux Linux 3.5
static final long SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER = 2; // since Linux Linux 3.5
/** corresponds to struct sock_filter */
static final class SockFilter {
@ -209,9 +209,10 @@ final class Seccomp {
static final int NR_SYSCALL_FORK = 57;
static final int NR_SYSCALL_EXECVE = 59;
static final int NR_SYSCALL_EXECVEAT = 322; // since Linux 3.19
static final int NR_SYSCALL_TUXCALL = 184; // should return ENOSYS
/** try to install our BPF filters via seccomp() or prctl() to block execution */
private static void linuxImpl() {
private static int linuxImpl() {
// first be defensive: we can give nice errors this way, at the very least.
// also, some of these security features get backported to old versions, checking kernel version here is a big no-no!
boolean supported = Constants.LINUX && "amd64".equals(Constants.OS_ARCH);
@ -224,24 +225,85 @@ final class Seccomp {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("seccomp unavailable: could not link methods. requires kernel 3.5+ with CONFIG_SECCOMP and CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER compiled in");
}
// check for kernel version
if (linux_libc.prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, 0, 0, 0) < 0) {
// pure paranoia:
// check that unimplemented syscalls actually return ENOSYS
// you never know (e.g. https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=439795)
if (linux_libc.syscall(NR_SYSCALL_TUXCALL) >= 0 || Native.getLastError() != ENOSYS) {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("seccomp unavailable: your kernel is buggy and you should upgrade");
}
// try to check system calls really are who they claim
// you never know (e.g. https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src.git/+/master/sandbox/linux/seccomp-bpf/sandbox_bpf.cc#57)
final int bogusArg = 0xf7a46a5c;
// test seccomp(BOGUS)
long ret = linux_libc.syscall(SECCOMP_SYSCALL_NR, bogusArg);
if (ret != -1) {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("seccomp unavailable: seccomp(BOGUS_OPERATION) returned " + ret);
} else {
int errno = Native.getLastError();
switch (errno) {
case ENOSYS: throw new UnsupportedOperationException("seccomp unavailable: requires kernel 3.5+ with CONFIG_SECCOMP and CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER compiled in");
default: throw new UnsupportedOperationException("prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS): " + JNACLibrary.strerror(errno));
case ENOSYS: break; // ok
case EINVAL: break; // ok
default: throw new UnsupportedOperationException("seccomp(BOGUS_OPERATION): " + JNACLibrary.strerror(errno));
}
}
// test seccomp(VALID, BOGUS)
ret = linux_libc.syscall(SECCOMP_SYSCALL_NR, SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, bogusArg);
if (ret != -1) {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("seccomp unavailable: seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, BOGUS_FLAG) returned " + ret);
} else {
int errno = Native.getLastError();
switch (errno) {
case ENOSYS: break; // ok
case EINVAL: break; // ok
default: throw new UnsupportedOperationException("seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, BOGUS_FLAG): " + JNACLibrary.strerror(errno));
}
}
// test prctl(BOGUS)
ret = linux_libc.prctl(bogusArg, 0, 0, 0, 0);
if (ret != -1) {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("seccomp unavailable: prctl(BOGUS_OPTION) returned " + ret);
} else {
int errno = Native.getLastError();
switch (errno) {
case ENOSYS: break; // ok
case EINVAL: break; // ok
default: throw new UnsupportedOperationException("prctl(BOGUS_OPTION): " + JNACLibrary.strerror(errno));
}
}
// now just normal defensive checks
// check for GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
switch (linux_libc.prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, 0, 0, 0)) {
case 0: break; // not yet set
case 1: break; // already set by caller
default:
int errno = Native.getLastError();
if (errno == ENOSYS) {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("seccomp unavailable: requires kernel 3.5+ with CONFIG_SECCOMP and CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER compiled in");
} else {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS): " + JNACLibrary.strerror(errno));
}
}
// check for SECCOMP
if (linux_libc.prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP, 0, 0, 0, 0) < 0) {
int errno = Native.getLastError();
switch (errno) {
case EINVAL: throw new UnsupportedOperationException("seccomp unavailable: CONFIG_SECCOMP not compiled into kernel, CONFIG_SECCOMP and CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER are needed");
default: throw new UnsupportedOperationException("prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP): " + JNACLibrary.strerror(errno));
}
switch (linux_libc.prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP, 0, 0, 0, 0)) {
case 0: break; // not yet set
case 2: break; // already in filter mode by caller
default:
int errno = Native.getLastError();
if (errno == EINVAL) {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("seccomp unavailable: CONFIG_SECCOMP not compiled into kernel, CONFIG_SECCOMP and CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER are needed");
} else {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP): " + JNACLibrary.strerror(errno));
}
}
// check for SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
if (linux_libc.prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, 0, 0, 0) < 0) {
if (linux_libc.prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, 0, 0, 0) != 0) {
int errno = Native.getLastError();
switch (errno) {
case EFAULT: break; // available
@ -251,10 +313,15 @@ final class Seccomp {
}
// ok, now set PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, needed to be able to set a seccomp filter as ordinary user
if (linux_libc.prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) < 0) {
if (linux_libc.prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) != 0) {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS): " + JNACLibrary.strerror(Native.getLastError()));
}
// check it worked
if (linux_libc.prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, 0, 0, 0) != 1) {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("seccomp filter did not really succeed: prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS): " + JNACLibrary.strerror(Native.getLastError()));
}
// BPF installed to check arch, then syscall range. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt for details.
SockFilter insns[] = {
/* 1 */ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD + BPF_W + BPF_ABS, SECCOMP_DATA_ARCH_OFFSET), //
@ -272,14 +339,16 @@ final class Seccomp {
prog.write();
long pointer = Pointer.nativeValue(prog.getPointer());
int method = 1;
// install filter, if this works, after this there is no going back!
// first try it with seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER), falling back to prctl()
if (linux_libc.syscall(SECCOMP_SYSCALL_NR, SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC, pointer) != 0) {
method = 0;
int errno1 = Native.getLastError();
if (logger.isDebugEnabled()) {
logger.debug("seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER): " + JNACLibrary.strerror(errno1) + ", falling back to prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP)...");
}
if (linux_libc.prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, pointer, 0, 0) < 0) {
if (linux_libc.prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, pointer, 0, 0) != 0) {
int errno2 = Native.getLastError();
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER): " + JNACLibrary.strerror(errno1) +
", prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP): " + JNACLibrary.strerror(errno2));
@ -291,7 +360,8 @@ final class Seccomp {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("seccomp filter installation did not really succeed. seccomp(PR_GET_SECCOMP): " + JNACLibrary.strerror(Native.getLastError()));
}
logger.debug("Linux seccomp filter installation successful");
logger.debug("Linux seccomp filter installation successful, threads: [{}]", method == 1 ? "all" : "app" );
return method;
}
// OS X implementation via sandbox(7)
@ -334,7 +404,7 @@ final class Seccomp {
// first be defensive: we can give nice errors this way, at the very least.
boolean supported = Constants.MAC_OS_X;
if (supported == false) {
throw new IllegalStateException("bug: should not be trying to initialize seccomp for an unsupported OS");
throw new IllegalStateException("bug: should not be trying to initialize seatbelt for an unsupported OS");
}
// we couldn't link methods, could be some really ancient OS X (< Leopard) or some bug
@ -372,12 +442,14 @@ final class Seccomp {
* Attempt to drop the capability to execute for the process.
* <p>
* This is best effort and OS and architecture dependent. It may throw any Throwable.
* @return 0 if we can do this for application threads, 1 for the entire process
*/
static void init(Path tmpFile) throws Throwable {
static int init(Path tmpFile) throws Throwable {
if (Constants.LINUX) {
linuxImpl();
return linuxImpl();
} else if (Constants.MAC_OS_X) {
macImpl(tmpFile);
return 1;
} else {
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("syscall filtering not supported for OS: '" + Constants.OS_NAME + "'");
}

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@ -30,6 +30,16 @@ public class SeccompTests extends ESTestCase {
assumeTrue("requires seccomp filter installation", Natives.isSeccompInstalled());
// otherwise security manager will block the execution, no fun
assumeTrue("cannot test with security manager enabled", System.getSecurityManager() == null);
// otherwise, since we don't have TSYNC support, rules are not applied to the test thread
// (randomizedrunner class initialization happens in its own thread, after the test thread is created)
// instead we just forcefully run it for the test thread here.
if (!JNANatives.LOCAL_SECCOMP_ALL) {
try {
Seccomp.init(createTempDir());
} catch (Throwable e) {
throw new RuntimeException("unable to forcefully apply seccomp to test thread", e);
}
}
}
public void testNoExecution() throws Exception {

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@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ import org.apache.lucene.search.IndexSearcher;
import org.apache.lucene.search.MatchAllDocsQuery;
import org.apache.lucene.search.TermQuery;
import org.apache.lucene.store.Directory;
import org.apache.lucene.store.MMapDirectory;
import org.apache.lucene.store.MockDirectoryWrapper;
import org.apache.lucene.util.Version;
import org.elasticsearch.test.ESTestCase;
@ -359,4 +360,16 @@ public class LuceneTests extends ESTestCase {
w.close();
dir.close();
}
/**
* Test that the "unmap hack" is detected as supported by lucene.
* This works around the following bug: https://bugs.openjdk.java.net/browse/JDK-4724038
* <p>
* While not guaranteed, current status is "Critical Internal API": http://openjdk.java.net/jeps/260
* Additionally this checks we did not screw up the security logic around the hack.
*/
public void testMMapHackSupported() throws Exception {
// add assume's here if needed for certain platforms, but we should know if it does not work.
assertTrue(MMapDirectory.UNMAP_SUPPORTED);
}
}