We have a Kerberos setting to remove realm part from the user
principal name (remove_realm_name). If this is true then
the realm name is removed to form username but in the process,
the realm name is lost. For scenarios like Kerberos cross-realm
authentication, one could make use of the realm name to determine
role mapping for users coming from different realms.
This commit adds user metadata for kerberos_realm and
kerberos_user_principal_name.
This change removes the wrapping of the created field in the put user
response. The created field was added as a top level field in #32332,
while also still being wrapped within the `user` object of the
response. Since the value is available in both formats in 6.x, we can
remove the wrapped version for 7.0.
With features like CCR building on the CCS infrastructure, the settings
prefix search.remote makes less sense as the namespace for these remote
cluster settings than does a more general namespace like
cluster.remote. This commit replaces these settings with cluster.remote
with a fallback to the deprecated settings search.remote.
This commit adds a security client to the high level rest client, which
includes an implementation for the put user api. As part of these
changes, a new request and response class have been added that are
specific to the high level rest client. One change here is that the response
was previously wrapped inside a user object. The plan is to remove this
wrapping and this PR adds an unwrapped response outside of the user
object so we can remove the user object later on.
See #29827
Authorization Realms allow an authenticating realm to delegate the task
of constructing a User object (with name, roles, etc) to one or more
other realms.
E.g. A client could authenticate using PKI, but then delegate to an LDAP
realm. The LDAP realm performs a "lookup" by principal, and then does
regular role-mapping from the discovered user.
This commit includes:
- authorization_realm support in the pki, ldap, saml & kerberos realms
- docs for authorization_realms
- checks that there are no "authorization chains"
(whereby "realm-a" delegates to "realm-b", but "realm-b" delegates to "realm-c")
Authorization realms is a platinum feature.
We need to limit the search request aggregations to whole multiples
of the configured interval for both histogram and date_histogram.
Otherwise, agg buckets won't overlap with the rolled up buckets
and the results will be incorrect.
For histogram, the validation is very simple: request must be >= the config,
and modulo evenly.
Dates are more tricky.
- If both request and config are fixed dates, we can convert to millis
and treat them just like the histo
- If both are calendar, we make sure the request is >= the config with
a static lookup map that ranks the calendar values relatively. All
calendar units are "singles", so they are evenly divisible already
- We disallow any other combination (one fixed, one calendar, etc)
This change adds support for the client credentials grant type to the
token api. The client credentials grant allows for a client to
authenticate with the authorization server and obtain a token to access
as itself. Per RFC 6749, a refresh token should not be included with
the access token and as such a refresh token is not issued when the
client credentials grant is used.
The addition of the client credentials grant will allow users
authenticated with mechanisms such as kerberos or PKI to obtain a token
that can be used for subsequent access.
* Adding new MonitoredSystem for APM server
* Teaching Monitoring template utils about APM server monitoring indices
* Documenting new monitoring index for APM server
* Adding monitoring index template for APM server
* Copy pasta typo
* Removing metrics.libbeat.config section from mapping
* Adding built-in user and role for APM server user
* Actually define the role :)
* Adding missing import
* Removing index template and system ID for apm server
* Shortening line lengths
* Updating expected number of built-in users in integration test
* Removing "system" from role and user names
* Rearranging users to make tests pass
If a search request doesn't contain aggs (or an empty agg object),
we should just retun an empty response. This is how the normal search
API works if you specify zero hits and empty aggs.
The existing behavior throws an exception because it tries to send
an empty msearch.
Closes#32256
Add documentation for #31238
- Add documentation for the req_authn_context_class_ref setting
- Add a section in SAML Guide regarding the use of SAML
Authentication Context.
* Add relevant documentation for FIPS 140-2 compliance.
* Introduce `fips_mode` setting.
* Discuss necessary configuration for FIPS 140-2
* Discuss introduced limitations by FIPS 140-2
* [DOCS] Add configurable password hashing docs
Adds documentation about the newly introduced configuration option
for setting the password hashing algorithm to be used for the users
cache and for storing credentials for the native and file realm.
This commit adds troubleshooting section for Kerberos.
Most of the times the problems seen are caused due to invalid
configurations like keytab missing principals or credentials
not up to date. Time synchronization is an important part for
Kerberos infrastructure and the time skew can cause problems.
To debug further documentation explains how to enable JAAS
Kerberos login module debugging and Kerberos/SPNEGO debugging
by setting JVM system properties.
This commit adds documentation for configuring Kerberos realm.
Configuring Kerberos realm documentation highlights important
terminology and requirements before creating Kerberos realm.
Most of the documentation is centered around configuration from
Elasticsearch rather than go deep into Kerberos implementation.
Kerberos realm settings are mentioned in the security settings
for Kerberos realm.
- Missing links to new IndexCaps API
- Incorrect security permissions on IndexCaps API
- GetJobs API must supply a job (or `_all`), omitting throws error
- Link to search/agg limitations from RollupSearch API
- Tweak URLs in quick reference
- Formatting of overview page
Previously, we were using a simple CRC32 for the IDs of rollup documents.
This is a very poor choice however, since 32bit IDs leads to collisions
between documents very quickly.
This commit moves Rollups over to a 128bit ID. The ID is a concatenation
of all the keys in the document (similar to the rolling CRC before),
hashed with 128bit Murmur3, then base64 encoded. Finally, the job
ID and a delimiter (`$`) are prepended to the ID.
This gurantees that there are 128bits per-job. 128bits should
essentially remove all chances of collisions, and the prepended
job ID means that _if_ there is a collision, it stays "within"
the job.
BWC notes:
We can only upgrade the ID scheme after we know there has been a good
checkpoint during indexing. We don't rely on a STARTED/STOPPED
status since we can't guarantee that resulted from a real checkpoint,
or other state. So we only upgrade the ID after we have reached
a checkpoint state during an active index run, and only after the
checkpoint has been confirmed.
Once a job has been upgraded and checkpointed, the version increments
and the new ID is used in the future. All new jobs use the
new ID from the start
This commit introduces "Application Privileges" to the X-Pack security
model.
Application Privileges are managed within Elasticsearch, and can be
tested with the _has_privileges API, but do not grant access to any
actions or resources within Elasticsearch. Their purpose is to allow
applications outside of Elasticsearch to represent and store their own
privileges model within Elasticsearch roles.
Access to manage application privileges is handled in a new way that
grants permission to specific application names only. This lays the
foundation for more OLS on cluster privileges, which is implemented by
allowing a cluster permission to inspect not just the action being
executed, but also the request to which the action is applied.
To support this, a "conditional cluster privilege" is introduced, which
is like the existing cluster privilege, except that it has a Predicate
over the request as well as over the action name.
Specifically, this adds
- GET/PUT/DELETE actions for defining application level privileges
- application privileges in role definitions
- application privileges in the has_privileges API
- changes to the cluster permission class to support checking of request
objects
- a new "global" element on role definition to provide cluster object
level security (only for manage application privileges)
- changes to `kibana_user`, `kibana_dashboard_only_user` and
`kibana_system` roles to use and manage application privileges
Closes#29820Closes#31559
Lisa Cawley
Shivaank121
horacimacias
Or Bin
Yogesh Gaikwad
Jay Modi
Tanguy Leroux
Jason Tedor
Tim Vernum
Ioannis Kakavas
Zachary Tong
Shaunak Kashyap
Zachary Tong
debadair
Dimitris Athanasiou