While refactoring has_child and has_parent query we lost an important detail around types. The types that the inner query gets executed against shouldn't be the main types of the search request but the parent or child type set to the parent query. We used to use QueryParseContext#setTypesWithPrevious as part of XContentStructure class which has been deleted, without taking care though of setting the types and restoring them as part of the innerQuery#toQuery call.
Meanwhile also we make sure that the original context types are restored in PercolatorQueriesRegistry
Closes#13863
Closes#13854
Squashed commit of the following:
commit 42c1166efc55adda0d13fed77de583c0973e44b3
Author: Robert Muir <rmuir@apache.org>
Date: Tue Sep 29 11:59:43 2015 -0400
Add paranoia
Groovy holds on to a classloader, so check it before compilation too.
I have not reviewed yet what Rhino is doing, but just be safe.
commit b58668a81428e964dd5ffa712872c0a34897fc91
Author: Robert Muir <rmuir@apache.org>
Date: Tue Sep 29 11:46:06 2015 -0400
Add SpecialPermission to guard exceptions to security policy.
In some cases (e.g. buggy cloud libraries, scripting engines), we must
grant dangerous permissions to contained cases. Those AccessController blocks
are dangerous, since they truncate the stack, and can allow privilege escalation.
This PR adds a simple permission to check before each one, so that unprivileged code
like groovy scripts, can't do anything they shouldn't be allowed to do otherwise.
Now that groovy is factored out, we contain this dangerous stuff there.
TODO: look into those test hacks inspecting class protection domains, maybe we can
clean that one up too.
TODO: generalize the GroovyCodeSourcePermission to something all script engines check,
before entering accesscontrollerblocks. this way e.g. groovy script cannot coerce
python engine into creating something with more privs if it gets ahold of it... we
should probably protect the aws/gce hacks in the same way.
Martijn van Groningen
javanna
Robert Muir
Colin Goodheart-Smithe
Lee Hinman