This change makes the process of verifying the signature of
official plugins FIPS 140 compliant by defaulting to use the
BouncyCastle FIPS provider and adding a dependency to bcpg-fips
that implement parts of openPGP in a FIPS compliant manner.
In already FIPS 140 enabled environments that use the
BouncyCastle FIPS provider, the bcfips dependency is redundant
but doesn't cause an issue as it will be added only in the classpath
of the cli-tools
This is a backport of #44224
We sign our official plugins yet this is not well-advertised and not at
all consumed during plugin installation. For plugins that are installed
over the intertubes, verifying that the downloaded artifact is signed by
our signing key would establish both integrity and validity of the
downloaded artifact. The chain of trust here is simple: our installable
artifacts (archive and package distributions) so that if a user trusts
our packages via their signatures, and our plugin installer (which would
be executing trusted code) verifies the downloaded plugin, then the user
can trust the downloaded plugin too. This commit adds verification of
official plugins downloaded during installation. We do not add
verification for offline plugin installs; a user can download our
signatures and verify the artifacts themselves.
This commit also needs to solve a few interesting challenges. One of
these is that we want the bouncy castle JARs on the classpath only for
the plugin installer, but not for the runtime
Elasticsearch. Additionally, we want these JARs to not be present for
the JAR hell checks. To address this, we shift these JARs into a
sub-directory of lib (lib/tools/plugin-cli) that is only loaded for the
plugin installer, and in the plugin installer we filter any JARs in this
directory from the JAR hell check.
Ioannis Kakavas
Jason Tedor