This commit moves the source file in x-pack-core to a org.elasticsearch.xpack.core package. This is to prevent issues where we have compile-time success reaching through packages that will cross module boundaries at runtime (due to being in different classloaders). By moving these to a separate package, we have compile-time safety. Follow-ups can consider build time checking that only this package is defined in x-pack-core, or sealing x-pack-core until modules arrive for us.
Original commit: elastic/x-pack-elasticsearch@232e156e0e
This is related to elastic/x-pack-elasticsearch#1217. This PR removes the default password of
"changeme" from the reserved users.
This PR adds special behavior for authenticating the reserved users. No
ReservedRealm user can be authenticated until its password is set. The
one exception to this is the elastic user. The elastic user can be
authenticated with an empty password if the action is a rest request
originating from localhost. In this scenario where an elastic user is
authenticated with a default password, it will have metadata indicating
that it is in setup mode. An elastic user in setup mode is only
authorized to execute a change password request.
Original commit: elastic/x-pack-elasticsearch@e1e101a237
This commit removes the SecuredString class that was previously used throughout the security code
and replaces it with the SecureString class from core that was added as part of the new secure
settings infrastructure.
relates elastic/x-pack-elasticsearch#421
Original commit: elastic/x-pack-elasticsearch@e9cd117ca1
This is a followup from elastic/elasticsearchelastic/elasticsearch#21590 and needs to be
committed first or at the same time since netty_3 is removed
Original commit: elastic/x-pack-elasticsearch@131d74dd6b
Eagerly authorizing CompositeIndicesRequests allowed the security plugin to fail fast up until now, but it makes it very hard to reason about each specific item in a multi items request. Either all items fail, or none do. We would rather want to adopt a similar behaviour to es core, where individual items fail without affecting other items that are part of the same request. We can rely on the fact that es core always authorizes both main action and every subaction too, and skip authorization for the main action. By subaction we mean either all sub search requests in msearch, as well as each shard level get in mget or shard level bulk request for bulk.
BulkRequestInterceptor was converted to intercept BulkShardRequests rather than BulkRequest as that is where bulk is authorized after this change.
Split IndicesAndAliasesResolverIntegrationTests into ReadActionsTests and WriteActionsTests as they require different set of permissions, lots of tests added.
Explicitly listing the composite actions makes sure that the actions that can bypass security are known, somebody adding a similar action must to add it to the list, so we know it doesn't happen by mistake. At this point the CompositeIndicesRequest can be used as a marker interface only (it is not really needed but can be used to verify that composite actions use a request that implements such interface).
Given that we don't authorize composite actions based on their indices anymore, but only their sub-requests which implement IndicesRequest, printing out the indices names in the audit log for requests like bulk and msearch is confusing. Removed support for that.
Authorize composite indices actions based on their name only, their indices will be authorized at the sub-request/shard level
Rather than simply granting bulk, mget, msearch etc. and relying on authorization at the sub-request/shard level, we check that the current user can at least execute the action. This justifies the grant line that gets written in the audit log, the action is potentially possible without looking at the indices. Each specific item will fail or succeed later and will yield its own specific audit log entry.
Original commit: elastic/x-pack-elasticsearch@4570caf019