89 lines
4.0 KiB
Plaintext
89 lines
4.0 KiB
Plaintext
[[security-limitations]]
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== Security Limitations
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[float]
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=== Plugins
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Elasticsearch's plugin infrastructure is extremely flexible in terms of what can
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be extended. While it opens up Elasticsearch to a wide variety of (often custom)
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additional functionality, when it comes to security, this high extensibility level
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comes at a cost. We have no control over the third-party plugins' code (open
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source or not) and therefore we cannot guarantee their compliance with {security}.
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For this reason, third-party plugins are not officially supported on clusters
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with {security} enabled.
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[float]
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=== Changes in Index Wildcard Behavior
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Elasticsearch clusters with {security} enabled apply the `/_all` wildcard, and
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all other wildcards, to the indices that the current user has privileges for, not
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the set of all indices on the cluster.
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While creating or retrieving aliases by providing wildcard expressions for alias names, if there are no existing authorized aliases
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that match the wildcard expression provided an IndexNotFoundException is returned.
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[float]
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=== Multi Document APIs
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Multi get and multi term vectors API throw IndexNotFoundException when trying to access non existing indices that the user is
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not authorized for. By doing that they leak information regarding the fact that the index doesn't exist, while the user is not
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authorized to know anything about those indices.
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[float]
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=== Filtered Index Aliases
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Aliases containing filters are not a secure way to restrict access to individual
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documents, due to the limitations described in <<alias-limitations, Index and Field Names Can Be Leaked When Using Aliases>>.
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{security} provides a secure way to restrict access to documents through the
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<<field-and-document-access-control, document-level security>> feature.
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[float]
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=== Field and Document Level Security Limitations
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When a user's role enables document or field level security for an index:
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* The user cannot perform write operations:
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** The update API isn't supported.
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** Update requests included in bulk requests aren't supported.
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* The request cache is disabled for search requests.
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When a user's role enables document level security for an index:
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* Document level security isn't applied for APIs that aren't document based.
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An example is the field stats API.
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* Document level security doesn't affect global index statistics that relevancy
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scoring uses. So this means that scores are computed without taking the role
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query into account. Note that documents not matching with the role query are
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never returned.
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* The `has_child` and `has_parent` queries aren't supported as query in the
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role definition. The `has_child` and `has_parent` queries can be used in the
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search API with document level security enabled.
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* Any query that makes remote calls to fetch data to query by isn't supported.
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The following queries aren't supported:
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** The `terms` query with terms lookup isn't supported.
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** The `geo_shape` query with indexed shapes isn't supported.
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** The `percolate` query isn't supported.
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* If suggesters are specified and document level security is enabled then
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the specified suggesters are ignored.
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* A search request cannot be profiled if document level security is enabled.
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[float]
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[[alias-limitations]]
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=== Index and Field Names Can Be Leaked When Using Aliases
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Calling certain Elasticsearch APIs on an alias can potentially leak information
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about indices that the user isn't authorized to access. For example, when you get
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the mappings for an alias with the `_mapping` API, the response includes the
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index name and mappings for each index that the alias applies to.
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Until this limitation is addressed, avoid index and field names that contain
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confidential or sensitive information.
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[float]
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=== LDAP Realm
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The <<ldap-realm, LDAP Realm>> does not currently support the discovery of nested
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LDAP Groups. For example, if a user is a member of `group_1` and `group_1` is a
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member of `group_2`, only `group_1` will be discovered. However, the
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<<active-directory-realm, Active Directory Realm>> *does* support transitive
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group membership.
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