block includes
  include ../_util-fns
:marked
  Web application security has many aspects. This documentation describes Angular's built in
  protections against common web application vulnerabilities and attacks, such as Cross Site
  Scripting Attacks. It does not cover application level security, such as authentication (_Who is
  this user?_) or authorization (_What can this user do?_).

  Web应用程序的安全涉及到很多方面。针对常见的漏洞和攻击，比如跨站脚本攻击，Angular提供了一些内建的保护措施。本章将讨论这些内建保护措施，但不会涉及应用级安全，比如用户认证（_这个用户是谁？_）和授权(_这个用户能做什么？_)。

  The [Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Guide_Project)
  has further information on the attacks and mitigations described below.

  [开放式Web应用程序安全项目(OWASP)](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Guide_Project)有关于攻防的更多信息。

.l-main-section
:marked
  # Table Of Contents
  # 目录

  * [Reporting Vulnerabilities](#report-issues)

  * [举报漏洞](#report-issues)

  * [Best Practices](#best-practices)

  * [最佳实践](#best-practices)

  * [Preventing Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)](#xss)

  * [防范跨站脚本(XSS)攻击](#xss)

  * [Trusting Safe Values](#bypass-security-apis)

  * [信任安全值](#bypass-security-apis)

  * [HTTP-level Vulnerabilities](#http)

  * [HTTP级别的漏洞](#http)

  * [Auditing Angular Applications](#code-review)

  * [审计Angular应用程序](#code-review)

p Try the #[+liveExampleLink2()] of the code shown in this chapter.

p 运行#[+liveExampleLink2('在线例子')]

.l-main-section
h2#report-issues Reporting Vulnerabilities

h2#report-issues 举报漏洞

:marked
  Email us at [security@angular.io](mailto:security@angular.io) to report vulnerabilities in
  Angular itself.

  给我们（[security@angular.io](mailto:security@angular.io)）发邮件，报告Angular本身的漏洞。

  For further details on how Google handles security issues please refer to [Google's security
  philosophy](https://www.google.com/about/appsecurity/).

  请到[谷歌的安全哲学](https://www.google.com/about/appsecurity/)了解关于“谷歌如何处理安全问题”的更多信息。

.l-main-section
h2#best-practices Best Practices

h2#best-practices 最佳实践

:marked
  * **Keep current with the latest Angular library releases.**
  We regularly update our Angular libraries and these updates may fix security defects discovered in
  previous version. Check the Angular [change
  log](https://github.com/angular/angular/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md) for security-related updates.

  * **及时把Angular包更新到最新版本。**

    我们会频繁的更新Angular库，这些更新可能会修复之前版本中发现的安全漏洞。查看Angular的[更新记录](https://github.com/angular/angular/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md)，了解与安全有关的更新。

  * **Don't modify your copy of Angular.**  
  Private, customized versions of Angular tend to fall behind the current version and may neglect
  important security fixes and enhancements. Instead, share your Angular improvements with the
  community and make a pull request.

  * **不要修改你的Angular副本。**

    私有的、定制版的Angular往往跟不上最新版本，这可能导致你忽略重要的安全修复与增强。反之，应该在社区共享你对Angular所做的改进并创建Pull Request。

  * **Avoid Angular APIs marked in the documentation as “[_Security Risk_](#bypass-security-apis)”.**

  * **避免使用本文档中带“[_安全风险_](#bypass-security-apis)”标记的Angular API。**

.l-main-section
h2#xss Preventing Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

h2#xss 防范跨站脚本(XSS)攻击

:marked
  [Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_scripting) enables attackers
  to inject malicious code into web pages. Such code can then for example steal user's data (in
  particular their login data), or perform actions impersonating the user. This is one of the most
  common attacks on the web.

  [跨站脚本(XSS)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_scripting)允许攻击者将恶意代码注入到页面中。这些代码可以偷取用户数据
  （特别是他们的登录数据），还可以冒充用户执行操作。它是Web上最常见的攻击方式之一。

  To block XSS attacks, we must prevent malicious code from entering the DOM. For example, if an
  attacker can trick us into inserting a `<script>` tag in the DOM, they can run arbitrary code on
  our website. The attack is not limited to `<script>` tags - many elements and properties in the
  DOM allow code execution, for example `<img onerror="...">`, `<a href="javascript:...">`. If
  attacker controlled data enters the DOM, we have to expect security vulnerabilities.

  为了防范XSS攻击，我们必须阻止恶意代码进入DOM。比如，如果某个攻击者能骗我们把`<script>`标签插入到DOM，就可以在我们的网站上运行任何代码。
  除了`<script>`，攻击者还可以使用很多DOM元素和属性来执行代码，比如`<img onerror="...">`、`<a href="javascript:...">`。
  如果攻击者所控制的数据混进了DOM，就会导致安全漏洞。

  ### Angular’s Cross-site Scripting Security Model
  ### Angular的“跨站脚本安全模型”

  To systematically block XSS bugs, Angular treats all values as untrusted by default. When a value
  is inserted into the DOM from a template, via property, attribute, style, or class binding, or via
  interpolation, Angular will sanitize and escape untrusted values.

  为了系统性的防范XSS问题，Angular默认把所有值都当做不可信任的。
  当值从模板中以属性（Property）、DOM元素属性（Attribte)、CSS类绑定或插值表达式等途径插入到DOM中的时候，
  Angular将对这些值进行无害化处理（Sanitize），对不可信的值进行编码。

  **Angular templates are the same as executable code**: HTML, attributes, and binding expressions
  (but not the values bound!) in templates are trusted to be safe. That means applications must
  prevent potentially attacker controlled values from ever making it into the source code of a
  template. Never generate template source code by concatenating user input and templates! Using
  the [offline template compiler](#offline-template-compiler) is an effective way to prevent these
  vulnerabilities, also known as template injection.

  **Angular的模板同样是可执行的**：模板中的HTML、Attribute和绑定表达式（还没有绑定到值的时候）会被当做可信任的。
  这意味着应用必须防止把来自攻击者的值直接编入模板的源码中。永远不要根据用户的输入和原始模板动态生成模板源码！
  使用[离线模板编译器](#offline-template-compiler)是防范这类“模板注入”漏洞的有效途径。

  ### Sanitization and security contexts

  ### 无害化处理与安全环境

  Sanitization inspects an untrusted value and turns it into a value that is safe to insert into
  the DOM. In many cases, values do not get changed by this at all. Sanitization depends on context:
  a value that is harmless in CSS is potentially dangerous in a URL.

  无害化处理会审查不可信的值，并将它们转换成可以安全插入到DOM的形式。多数情况下，这些值并不会在处理过程中发生任何变化。
  无害化处理的方式取决于所在的环境：一个在CSS里面无害的值，可能在URL里很危险。

  Angular defines four security contexts: HTML, style, URL, and resource URL.

  Angular定义了四个安全环境：HTML，样式，URL，和资源URL。

  * HTML is used when interpreting a value as HTML, e.g. when binding to `innerHtml`

  * HTML：值需要被解释为HTML时使用，比如当绑定到`innerHTML`时。

  * Style is used when binding CSS into the `style` property

  * 样式：值需要作为CSS绑定到`style`属性时使用。

  * URL is used for URL properties such as `<a href>`

  * URL：值需要被用作URL属性时使用，比如`<a href>`。

  * Resource URLs are URLs that will be loaded and executed as code, e.g. in `<script src>`

  * 资源URL：值需要被当做代码而加载并执行时使用，比如`<script src>`中的URL。

  Angular sanitizes untrusted values for the first three items; sanitizing resource URLs is not
  possible as they contain arbitrary code. In development mode, Angular prints a console warning
  when it has to change a value during sanitization.

  Angular会对前三项中种不可信的值进行无害化处理。但Angular无法对第四种资源URL进行无害化，因为它们可能包含任何代码。在开发模式下，
  如果Angular在进行无害化处理时需要被迫改变一个值，它就会在控制台上输出一个警告。

  ### Sanitization example

  ### 无害化示例

  The template below binds the value of `htmlSnippet`, once by interpolating it into an element's
  content, and once by binding it to the `innerHTML` property of an element.

  下面的例子绑定了`htmlSnippet`的值，一次把它放进插值表达式里，另一次把它绑定到元素的`innerHTML`属性上。

+makeExample('security/ts/app/inner-html-binding.component.html')(format=".")

:marked
  Interpolated content is always escaped - the HTML is not interpreted, and the browser displays
  angle brackets in the elements text content.

  插值表达式的内容总会被编码 - 其中的HTML不会被解释，所以浏览器会在元素的文本内容中显示尖括号。

  For the HTML to be interpreted, we must bind to an HTML property, such as `innerHTML`. But binding
  a potentially attacker controlled value into `innerHTML` would normally cause an XSS
  vulnerability. For example, code contained in a `<script>` tag would be executed.

  如果希望这段HTML被正常解释，就必须绑定到一个HTML属性上，比如`innerHTML`。但是如果把一个可能被攻击者控制的值绑定到`innerHTML`就会导致XSS漏洞。
  比如，包含在`<script>`标签的代码就会被执行。

+makeExample('security/ts/app/inner-html-binding.component.ts', 'inner-html-controller')(format=".")

:marked
  Angular recognizes the value as unsafe, and automatically sanitizes it. It removes the `<script>`
  tag but keeps safe content, such as the text content of the `<script>` tag, or the `<b>` element.

  Angular认为这些值是不安全的，并自动进行无害化处理。它会移除`<script>`标签，但保留安全的内容，比如该片段中的文本内容或`<b>`元素。

figure.image-display
    img(src='/resources/images/devguide/security/binding-inner-html.png'
        alt='A screenshot showing interpolated and bound HTML values')

:marked
  ### Avoid direct use of the DOM APIs

  ### 避免直接使用DOM API

  The built-in browser DOM APIs do not automatically protect you from security vulnerabilities.
  For example, `document`, the node available through `ElementRef`, and many third party APIs
  contain unsafe methods. Avoid directly interacting with the DOM, and instead use Angular
  templates where possible.

  浏览器内置的DOM API不会自动针对安全漏洞进行防护。比如，`document`（它可以通过`ElementRef`访问）以及其它第三方API都可能包含不安全的方法。
  要避免直接与DOM交互，只要可能，就尽量使用Angular模板。

  ### Content Security Policy

  ### 内容安全策略

  A [Content Security Policy (CSP)]
  (http://www.html5rocks.com/en/tutorials/security/content-security-policy/) is a defense-in-depth
  technique to prevent XSS. To enable CSP, configure your web server to return an appropriate
  `Content-Security-Policy` HTTP header.

  [内容安全策略(CSP)](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-
  US/docs/Web/Security/CSP/Introducing_Content_Security_Policy)是用来防范XSS的纵深防御技术。
  要打开CSP，请配置你的Web服务器，让它返回合适的HTTP头`Content_Security_Policy`。

  <a id="offline-template-compiler"></a>
  ### Use the Offline Template Compiler

  ### 使用离线模板编译器

  The offline template compiler prevents a whole class of vulnerabilities called template injection,
  and also greatly improves application performance. Use the offline template compiler in production
  deployments. Do not dynamically generate templates. Angular trusts template code, so generating
  templates, in particular containing user data, circumvents Angular's built-in protections. See the
  [Dynamic Forms Cookbook](../cookbook/dynamic-form.html) on how to dynamically construct forms in a
  safe way.

  离线模板编译器阻止了一整套被称为“模板注入”的漏洞，并能显著增强应用程序的性能。尽量在产品发布时使用离线模板编译器，
  而不要动态生成模板（比如在代码中拼接字符串生成模板）。由于Angular会信任模板本身的代码，所以，动态生成的模板 —— 特别是包含用户数据的模板 —— 会绕过Angular自带的保护机制。
  要了解如何用安全的方式动态创建表单，请参见[动态表单烹饪宝典](../cookbook/dynamic-form.html)一章。

  ### Server side XSS protection
  
  ### 服务器端XSS保护

  HTML constructed on the server is vulnerable to injection attacks. Injecting template code into an
  Angular application is the same as injecting executable code (e.g. JavaScript) into the
  application; it gives the attacker full control over the application. To prevent this, make sure
  to use a templating language that automatically escapes values to prevent XSS vulnerabilities on
  the server. Do not generate Angular templates on the server side using a templating language, this
  carries a high risk of introducing template injection vulnerabilities.

  服务器端构造的HTML很容易受到注入攻击。当需要在服务器端生成HTML时（比如Angular应用的初始页面），
  务必使用一个能够自动进行无害化处理以防范XSS漏洞的后端模板语言。不要在服务器端使用模板语言生成Angular模板，
  这样会带来很高的“模板注入”风险。

.l-main-section
h2#bypass-security-apis Trusting Safe Values

h2#bypass-security-apis 信任安全的值

:marked
  Sometimes applications genuinely need to include executable code, display an `<iframe>` from some
  URL, or construct potentially dangerous URLs. To prevent automatic sanitization in this situation,
  you can tell Angular that you inspected a value, checked how it is generated, and made sure it is
  always secure. But **be careful**! If you trust a value that can be malicious, you will likely
  introduce a security vulnerability into your application. If in doubt, find a professional
  security reviewer.

  有时候，应用程序确实需要包含可执行的代码，比如使用URL显示`<iframe>`，或者构造出有潜在危险的URL。
  为了防止在这种情况下被自动无害化，你可以告诉Angular：我已经审查了这个值，检查了它是怎么生成的，并确信它总是安全的。
  但是**千万要小心**！如果你信任了一个可能是恶意的值，就会在应用中引入一个安全漏洞。如果你有疑问，请找一个安全专家复查下。

  You can mark a value as trusted by injecting `DomSanitizationService`, and calling one of the
  following methods.

  注入`DomSanitizationService`服务，然后调用下面的方法之一，你就可以把一个值标记为可信任的。

  * `bypassSecurityTrustHtml`
  * `bypassSecurityTrustScript`
  * `bypassSecurityTrustStyle`
  * `bypassSecurityTrustUrl`
  * `bypassSecurityTrustResourceUrl`

  Remember, whether a value is safe depends on context, so you need to choose the right context for
  your intended use of the value. Imagine the following template needs to bind a URL to a
  `javascript:alert(...)` call.

  记住，一个值是否安全取决于它所在的环境，所以你要为这个值按预定的用法选择正确的环境。假设下面的模板需要把`javascript.alert(...)`方法绑定到URL。

+makeExample('security/ts/app/bypass-security.component.html', 'dangerous-url')(format=".")

:marked
  Normally, Angular would automatically sanitize the URL and disable the dangerous code. To prevent
  this, we can mark the URL value as a trusted URL using the `bypassSecurityTrustUrl` call:

  通常，Angular会自动无害化这个URL并禁止危险的代码。为了防止这种行为，我们可以调用`bypassSecurityTrustUrl`把这个URL值标记为一个可信任的URL：

+makeExample('security/ts/app/bypass-security.component.ts', 'trust-url')(format=".")

figure.image-display
    img(src='/resources/images/devguide/security/bypass-security-component.png'
        alt='A screenshot showing an alert box created from a trusted URL')

:marked
  If we need to convert user input into a trusted value, it can be convenient to do so in a
  controller method. The template below allows users to enter a YouTube video ID, and load the
  corresponding video in an `<iframe>`. The `<iframe src>` attribute is a resource URL security
  context, because an untrusted source can e.g. smuggle in file downloads that unsuspecting users
  would execute. So we call a method on the controller to construct a trusted video URL, which
  Angular then allows binding into `<iframe src>`.

  如果需要把用户输入转换为一个可信任的值，我们可以很方便的在控制器方法中处理。下面的模板允许用户输入一个YouTube视频的ID，
  然后把相应的视频加载到`<iframe>`中。`<iframe src>`是一个“资源URL”的安全环境，因为不可信的源码可能作为文件下载到本地，被毫无防备的用户执行。
  所以我们要调用一个控制器方法来构造一个新的、可信任的视频URL，然后把它绑定到`<iframe src>`。

+makeExample('security/ts/app/bypass-security.component.html', 'iframe-videoid')(format=".")

+makeExample('security/ts/app/bypass-security.component.ts', 'trust-video-url')(format=".")

.l-main-section
h2#http HTTP-level Vulnerabilities

h2#http HTTP级别的漏洞

:marked
  Angular has built in support to help prevent two common HTTP vulnerabilities, Cross-site Request
  Forgery (XSRF) and Cross-site Script Inclusion (XSSI). Both of these must be primarily mitigated
  on the server side, but Angular ships helpers to make integration on the client side easier.

  Angular内建了一些支持来防范两个常见的HTTP漏洞：跨站请求伪造（XSRF）和跨站脚本包含（XSSI）。
  这两个漏洞主要在服务器端防范，但是Angular也自带了一些辅助特性，可以让客户端的集成变得更容易。

h3#xsrf Cross-site Request Forgery (XSRF)

h3#xsrf 跨站请求伪造（XSRF）

:marked
  In a Cross-site Request Forgery (XSRF or CSRF), an attacker tricks the user into visiting a
  _different_ page, and has them e.g. submit a form that sends a request to your application's
  web server. If the user is logged into your application, the browser will send authentication
  cookies, and the attacker could - for example - cause a bank transfer in the user's name with
  the right request.

  在跨站请求伪造（XSRF或CSFR）中，一个攻击者会欺骗用户，让他们访问_另一个_页面，并提交一个表单，
  向你应用程序的Web服务器发送一个请求。如果用户已经登录到你的应用程序，浏览器就会发送该用户的认证Cookie，
  这样攻击者就可以发送一个正确的请求，以该用户的名义发起一次银行转账。

  To prevent this, your application must make sure that user requests originate in your own
  application, not on a different site. A common technique is that the server sends a randomly
  generated authentication token in a cookie, often with the name `XSRF-TOKEN`. Cookies can only
  be read by the website on which they are set, so only your own application can read this token. On
  each API request, the server then validates the client by checking that the token is sent back,
  usually in an HTTP header called `X-XSRF-TOKEN`.

  为了防止这种情况，你必须确保每个用户的请求都是从你自己的应用中发出的，而不是从另一个网站发出的。
  一个常见的技术是服务器随机生成一个用户认证令牌到cookie中，它的名字通常是`XSRF-TOKEN`。
  由于Cookie只能被创建它的网站访问，所以你自己的程序能读取这个令牌，但攻击者不行。每收到一个API请求，
  服务器就会通过检查这个发回来的令牌对客户端进行验证，这个令牌通常放在HTTP头里，叫做`X-XSRF-TOKEN`。

  The Angular `http` client has built-in support for this technique. The default
  `CookieXSRFStrategy` looks for a cookie called `XSRF-TOKEN` and sets an HTTP request header named
  `X-XSRF-TOKEN` with the value of that cookie on every request. The server must set the
  `XSRF-TOKEN` cookie, and validate the response header for each state modifying request.

  Angular的`http`客户端具有对这项技术的内建支持。默认的`CookieXSRFStrategy`会寻找一个名叫`XSFR-TOKEN`的cookie。
  在每个请求中，设置一个名为`X-XSRF-TOKEN`的HTTP请求头，并把该cookie的值赋给它。
  服务器必须设置`XSRF-TOKEN` cookie，并为每个会修改状态的请求验证请求头。

  XSRF tokens should be unique per user and session, have a large random value generated by a
  cryptographically secure random number generator, and expire.

  XSRF令牌应该对每个用户和session是唯一的，它包含一大串由安全的随机数字生成器生成的随机值，并且会过期。

  Angular applications can customize cookie and header names by binding their own
  `CookieXSRFStrategy` value, or implement an entirely custom `XSRFStrategy` by providing a custom
  binding for that type, by adding
  `provide(XSRFStrategy, {useValue: new CookieXSRFStrategy('myCookieName', 'My-Header-Name')})` or
  `provide(XSRFStrategy, {useClass: MyXSRFStrategy})` to your providers list.

  Angular应用程序可以通过绑定它们自己的`CookieXSRFStrategy`值来自定义cookie和HTTP头的名字，
  也可以通过提供一个自定义类型绑定来完全制定`XSRFStrategy`，只要把`provide(XSRFStrategy, {useValue: new CookieXSRFStrategy('myCookieName', 'My-Header-Name')})`或`provide(XSRFStrategy, {useClass: MyXSRFStrategy})`加到你的供应商列表里就可以了。

  Learn about Cross Site Request Forgery (XSRF) at the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)
  [here](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_%28CSRF%29) and
  [here](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/CSRF_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet). This [Stanford University
  paper](https://seclab.stanford.edu/websec/csrf/csrf.pdf) is a rich source of detail.

  到开放式Web应用程序安全项目(OWASP)的[这里](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_%28CSRF%29)
  和[这里](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/CSRF_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet)学习更多关于跨站请求伪造（XSRF）的知识。
  这个[斯坦福大学论文](https://seclab.stanford.edu/websec/csrf/csrf.pdf)有详尽的细节。

h3#xssi Cross-site Script Inclusion (XSSI)

h3#xssi 跨站脚本包含(XSSI)

:marked
  Cross-site Script Inclusion, also known as JSON vulnerability, can allow an attacker's website to
  read data from a JSON API. The attack works on older browser by overriding native JavaScript
  object constructors, and then including an API URL using a `<script>` tag.

  跨站脚本包含，也被称为Json漏洞，它可以允许一个攻击者的网站从JSON API读取数据。这种攻击发生在老的浏览器上，
  它重写原生JavaScript对象的构造函数，然后使用`<script>`标签包含一个API的URL。

  This attack is only successful if the returned JSON is executable as JavaScript. Servers can
  prevent it by prefixing all JSON responses to make them non-executable, by convention using the
  well-known string `")]}',\n"`.

  只有在返回的JSON能像JavaScript一样可以被执行时，这种攻击才会生效。所以服务端会约定给所有JSON响应体加上前缀`")]}',\n"`，来把它们标记为不可执行的，
  以防范这种攻击，

  Angular's `Http` library recognizes this convention and automatically strips the string
  `")]}',\n"` from all responses before further parsing.

  Angular的`Http`库会识别这种约定，并在进一步解析之前，自动把字符串`")]}',\n"`从所有响应中去掉。

  Learn more in the XSSI section of this [Google web security blog
  post](https://security.googleblog.com/2011/05/website-security-for-webmasters.html)
  
  要学习更多这方面的知识，请参见[谷歌Web安全博客文章](https://security.googleblog.com/2011/05/website-security-for-webmasters.html)的XSSI小节。

.l-main-section
h2#code-review Auditing Angular Applications

h2#code-review 审计Angular应用程序

:marked
  Angular applications should follow the same security principles as regular web applications, and
  should be audited as such. Angular specific APIs that should be audited in a security review,
  such as the [_bypassSecurityTrust_](#bypass-security-apis) APIs, are marked in the documentation
  as security sensitive.

  Angular应用应该遵循和常规Web应用一样的安全原则并按照这些原则进行审计。Angular中某些应该在安全评审中被审计的API（
  比如[_bypassSecurityTrust_](#bypass-security-apis) API）都在文档中被明确标记为安全性敏感的。
