docs(docs-infra): update preview server docs to account for recent changes (#25671)
Mostly (but not exclusively) a follow-up to #23576. PR Close #25671
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@ -5,4 +5,5 @@ TODO (gkalpak): Add docs. Mention:
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- Testing on CI.
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Relevant files: `scripts/ci/test-aio.sh`, `aio/aio-builds-setup/scripts/test.sh`
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- Deploying from CI.
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Relevant files: `scripts/ci/deploy.sh`, `aio/scripts/deploy-to-firebase.sh`
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Relevant files: `.circleci/config.yml`, `scripts/ci/deploy.sh`, `aio/scripts/build-artifacts.sh`,
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`aio/scripts/deploy-to-firebase.sh`
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@ -34,34 +34,31 @@ container:
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### On CI (CircleCI)
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- Build job completes successfully.
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- The CI script checks whether the build job was initiated by a PR against the angular/angular
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master branch.
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- The CI script checks whether the PR has touched any files that might affect the angular.io app
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(currently the `aio/` or `packages/` directories, ignoring spec files).
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- The CI script builds the angular.io project.
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- The CI script gzips and stores the build artifacts in the CI infrastructure.
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- When the build completes CircleCI triggers a webhook on the preview-server.
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- When the build completes, CircleCI triggers a webhook on the preview-server.
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More info on how to set things up on CI can be found [here](misc--integrate-with-ci.md).
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### Hosting build artifacts
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- nginx receives the webhook trigger and passes it through to the preview server.
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- The preview-server runs several preliminary checks to determine whether the request is valid and
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whether the corresponding PR can have a (public or non-public) preview (more details can be found
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[here](overview--security-model.md)).
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- The preview-server makes a request to CircleCI for the URL of the AIO build artifacts.
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- The preview-server makes a request to this URL to receive the artifact - failing if the size
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exceeds the specified max file size - and stores it in a temporary location.
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- The preview-server runs several checks to determine whether the request should be accepted and
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whether it should be publicly accessible or stored for later verification (more details can be
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found [here](overview--security-model.md)).
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- The preview-server runs more checks to determine whether the preview should be publicly accessible
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or stored for later verification (more details can be found [here](overview--security-model.md)).
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- The preview-server changes the "visibility" of the associated PR, if necessary. For example, if
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builds for the same PR had been previously deployed as non-public and the current build has been
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automatically verified, all previous builds are made public as well.
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If the PR transitions from "non-public" to "public", the preview-server posts a comment on the
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corresponding PR on GitHub mentioning the SHAs and the links where the previews can be found.
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- The preview-server verifies that it is not trying to overwrite an existing build.
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- The preview-server deploys the artifacts to a sub-directory named after the PR number and the first
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few characters of the SHA: `<PR>/<SHA>/`
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- The preview-server deploys the artifacts to a sub-directory named after the PR number and the
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first few characters of the SHA: `<PR>/<SHA>/`
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(Non-publicly accessible PRs will be stored in a different location, but again derived from the PR
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number and SHA.)
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- If the PR is publicly accessible, the preview-server posts a comment on the corresponding PR on
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@ -101,8 +98,8 @@ More info on the possible HTTP status codes and their meaning can be found
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### Removing obsolete artifacts
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In order to avoid flooding the disk with unnecessary build artifacts, there is a cronjob that runs a
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clean-up tasks once a day. The task retrieves all open PRs from GitHub and removes all directories
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that do not correspond with an open PR.
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clean-up task once a day. The task retrieves all open PRs from GitHub and removes all directories
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that do not correspond to an open PR.
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### Health-check
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@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
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# Overview - HTTP Status Codes
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This is a list of all the possible HTTP status codes returned by the nginx and preview servers, along
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with a brief explanation of what they mean:
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This is a list of all the possible HTTP status codes returned by the nginx and preview servers,
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along with a brief explanation of what they mean:
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## `http://*.ngbuilds.io/*`
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@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ part of the CI process and serving them publicly.
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## Security objectives
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- **Prevent hosting arbitrary content to on servers.**
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Since there is no restriction on who can submit a PR, we cannot allow arbitrary untrusted PRs'
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- **Prevent hosting arbitrary content on our servers.**
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Since there is no restriction on who can submit a PR, we cannot allow arbitrary, untrusted PRs'
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build artifacts to be hosted.
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- **Prevent overwriting other people's hosted build artifacts.**
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@ -40,40 +40,49 @@ part of the CI process and serving them publicly.
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### In a nutshell
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The implemented approach can be broken up to the following sub-tasks:
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0. Receive notification from CircleCI of a completed build.
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1. Verify that the build is valid and download the artifact.
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2. Fetch the PR's metadata, including author and labels.
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3. Check whether the PR can be automatically verified as "trusted" (based on its author or labels).
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4. If necessary, update the corresponding PR's verification status.
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5. Deploy the artifacts to the corresponding PR's directory.
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6. Prevent overwriting previously deployed artifacts (which ensures that the guarantees established
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1. Receive notification from CircleCI of a completed build.
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2. Verify that the build is valid and can have a preview.
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3. Download the build artifact.
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4. Fetch the PR's metadata, including author and labels.
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5. Check whether the PR can be automatically verified as "trusted" (based on its author or labels).
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6. If necessary, update the corresponding PR's verification status.
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7. Deploy the artifacts to the corresponding PR's directory.
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8. Prevent overwriting previously deployed artifacts (which ensures that the guarantees established
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during deployment will remain valid until the artifacts are removed).
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7. Prevent hosted preview files from accessing anything outside their directory.
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9. Prevent hosted preview files from accessing anything outside their directory.
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### Implementation details
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This section describes how each of the aforementioned sub-tasks is accomplished:
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0. **Receive notification from CircleCI of a completed build**
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1. **Receive notification from CircleCI of a completed build**
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CircleCI is configured to trigger a webhook on our preview-server whenever a build completes.
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The payload contains the number of the build that completed.
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1. **Verify that the build is valid and download the artifact.**
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2. **Verify that the build is valid and can have a preview.**
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We cannot trust that the data in the webhook trigger is authentic, so we only extract the build
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number and then run a direct query against the CircleCI API to get hold of the real data for
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the given build number.
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If the build was not successful then we ignore this trigger. Otherwise we check that the
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associated github organisation and repository are what we expect (e.g. angular/angular).
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We perform a number of preliminary checks:
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- Was the webhook triggered by the designated CircleCI job (currently `aio_preview`)?
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- Was the build successful?
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- Are the associated GitHub organisation and repository what we expect (e.g. `angular/angular`)?
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- Has the PR touched any files that might affect the angular.io app (currently the `aio/` or
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`packages/` directories, ignoring spec files)?
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Next we make another call to the CircleCI API to get a list of the URLS for artifacts of that
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If any of the preliminary checks fails, the process is aborted and not preview is generated.
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3. **Download the build artifact.**
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Next we make another call to the CircleCI API to get a list of the URLs for artifacts of that
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build. If there is one that matches the configured artifact path, we download the contents of the
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build artifact and store it in a local folder. This download has a maximum size limit to prevent
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PRs from producing artifacts that are so large they would cause the preview server to crash.
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2. **Fetch the PR's metadata, including author and labels**.
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4. **Fetch the PR's metadata, including author and labels**.
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Once we have securely downloaded the artifact for a build, we retrieve the PR's metadata -
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including the author's username and the labels - using the
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@ -81,7 +90,7 @@ This section describes how each of the aforementioned sub-tasks is accomplished:
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To avoid rate-limit restrictions, we use a Personal Access Token (issued by
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[@mary-poppins](https://github.com/mary-poppins)).
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3. **Check whether the PR can be automatically verified as "trusted"**.
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5. **Check whether the PR can be automatically verified as "trusted"**.
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"Trusted" means that we are confident that the build artifacts are suitable for being deployed
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and publicly accessible on the preview server. There are two ways to check that:
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@ -93,31 +102,32 @@ This section describes how each of the aforementioned sub-tasks is accomplished:
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`read:org` scope issued by a user that can "see" the specified GitHub organization.
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Here too, we use the token by @mary-poppins.
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4. **If necessary update the corresponding PR's verification status**.
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6. **If necessary update the corresponding PR's verification status**.
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Once we have determined whether the PR is considered "trusted", we update its "visibility" (i.e.
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whether it is publicly accessible or not), based on the new verification status. For example, if
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a PR was initially considered "not trusted" but the check triggered by a new build determined
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otherwise, the PR (and all the previously hosted previews) are made public. It works the same
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otherwise, the PR (and all the previously downloaded previews) are made public. It works the same
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way if a PR has gone from "trusted" to "not trusted".
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5. **Deploy the artifacts to the corresponding PR's directory.**
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7. **Deploy the artifacts to the corresponding PR's directory.**
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With the preceding steps, we have verified that the build artifacts are valid.
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Additionally, we have determined whether the PR can be trusted to have its previews
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publicly accessible or whether further verification is necessary. The artifacts will be stored to
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the PR's directory, but will not be publicly accessible unless the PR has been verified.
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Essentially, as long as sub-tasks 1, 2 and 3 can be securely accomplished, it is possible to
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"project" the trust we have in a team's members through the PR to the build artifacts.
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With the preceding steps, we have verified that the build artifacts are valid. Additionally, we
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have determined whether the PR can be trusted to have its previews publicly accessible or whether
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further verification is necessary.
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6. **Prevent overwriting previously deployed artifacts**.
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The artifacts will be stored to the PR's directory, but will not be publicly accessible unless
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the PR has been verified. Essentially, as long as sub-tasks 2, 3, 4 and 5 can be securely
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accomplished, it is possible to "project" the trust we have in a team's members through the PR to
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the build artifacts.
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8. **Prevent overwriting previously deployed artifacts**.
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In order to enforce this restriction (and ensure that the deployed artifacts' validity is
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preserved throughout their "lifetime"), the server that handles the artifacts (currently a Node.js
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Express server) rejects builds that have already been handled.
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preserved throughout their "lifetime"), the server that handles the artifacts (currently a Node.js Express server) rejects builds that have already been handled.
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_Note: A PR can contain multiple builds; one for each SHA that was built on CircleCI._
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7. **Prevent hosted preview files from accessing anything outside their directory.**
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9. **Prevent hosted preview files from accessing anything outside their directory.**
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Nginx (which is used to serve the hosted preview) has been configured to not follow symlinks
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outside of the directory where the preview files are stored.
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@ -130,10 +140,10 @@ This section describes how each of the aforementioned sub-tasks is accomplished:
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This means that any secret access keys need only be stored on the preview-server and not on any of
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the CI build infrastructure (e.g. CircleCI).
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- Each trusted PR author has full control over the content that is hosted as a preview for their PRs.
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Part of the security model relies on the trustworthiness of these authors.
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- Each trusted PR author has full control over the content that is hosted as a preview for their
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PRs. Part of the security model relies on the trustworthiness of these authors.
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- Adding the specified label on a PR to mark it as trusted, gives the author full control over
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the content that is hosted for the specific PR preview (e.g. by pushing more commits to it).
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The user adding the label is responsible for ensuring that this control is not abused and that
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the PR is either closed (one way of another) or the access is revoked.
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- Adding the specified label on a PR to mark it as trusted, gives the author full control over the
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content that is hosted for the specific PR preview (e.g. by pushing more commits to it). The user
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adding the label is responsible for ensuring that this control is not abused and that the PR is
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either closed (one way of another) or the access is revoked.
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@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Necessary secrets:
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1. `GITHUB_TOKEN`
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- Used for:
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- Retrieving open PRs without rate-limiting.
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- Retrieving PR author.
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- Retrieving PR info, such as author, labels, changed files.
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- Retrieving members of the trusted GitHub teams.
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- Posting comments with preview links on PRs.
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- Generate new token with the `public_repo` scope.
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2. `CIRCLE_CI_TOKEN`
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- Visit https://circleci.com/gh/angular/angular/edit#api
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- Create an API token with `Build Artifacts` scope
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- Visit https://circleci.com/gh/angular/angular/edit#api.
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- Create an API token with `Build Artifacts` scope.
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## Save secrets on the VM
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