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@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
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block includes
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include ../_util-fns
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:marked
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# Security
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Web application security has many aspects. This documentation describes Angular's built in
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protections against common web application vulnerabilities and attacks, such as Cross Site
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Scripting Attacks. It does not cover application level security, such as authentication (_Who is
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this user?_) or authorization (_What can this user do?_).
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The [Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Guide_Project)
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has further information on the attacks and mitigations described below.
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.l-main-section
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:marked
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# Table Of Contents
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* [Reporting Vulnerabilities](#report-issues)
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* [Best Practices](#best-practices)
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* [Preventing Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)](#xss)
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* [Trusting Safe Values](#bypass-security-apis)
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* [HTTP-level Vulnerabilities](#http)
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* [Auditing Angular Applications](#code-review)
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p Try the #[+liveExampleLink2()] of the code shown in this chapter.
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.l-main-section
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h2#report-issues Reporting Vulnerabilities
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:marked
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Email us at [security@angular.io](mailto:security@angular.io) to report vulnerabilities in
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Angular itself.
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For further details on how Google handles security issues please refer to [Google's security
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philosophy](https://www.google.com/about/appsecurity/).
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.l-main-section
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h2#best-practices Best Practices
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:marked
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* **Keep current with the latest Angular library releases.**
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We regularly update our Angular libraries and these updates may fix security defects discovered in
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previous version. Check the Angular [change
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log](https://github.com/angular/angular/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md) for security-related updates.
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* **Don't modify your copy of Angular.**
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Private, customized versions of Angular tend to fall behind the current version and may neglect
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important security fixes and enhancements. Instead, share your Angular improvements with the
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community and make a pull request.
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* **Avoid Angular APIs marked in the documentation as “[_Security Risk_](#bypass-security-apis)”.**
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.l-main-section
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h2#xss Preventing Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
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:marked
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[Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_scripting) enables attackers
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to inject malicious code into web pages. Such code can then for example steal user's data (in
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particular their login data), or perform actions impersonating the user. This is one of the most
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common attacks on the web.
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To block XSS attacks, we must prevent malicious code from entering the DOM. For example, if an
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attacker can trick us into inserting a `<script>` tag in the DOM, they can run arbitrary code on
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our website. The attack is not limited to `<script>` tags - many elements and properties in the
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DOM allow code execution, for example `<img onerror="...">`, `<a href="javascript:...">`. If
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attacker controlled data enters the DOM, we have to expect security vulnerabilities.
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### Angular’s Cross-site Scripting Security Model
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To systematically block XSS bugs, Angular treats all values as untrusted by default. When a value
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is inserted into the DOM from a template, via property, attribute, style, or class binding, or via
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interpolation, Angular will sanitize and escape untrusted values.
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### Sanitization and security contexts
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Sanitization inspects an untrusted value and turns it into a value that is safe to insert into
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the DOM. In many cases, values do not get changed by this at all. Sanitization depends on context:
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a value that is harmless in CSS is potentially dangerous in a URL.
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Angular defines four security contexts: HTML, style, URL, and resource URL.
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* HTML is used when interpreting a value as HTML, e.g. when binding to `innerHtml`
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* Style is used when binding CSS into the `style` property
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* URL is used for URL properties such as `<a href>`
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* Resource URLs are URLs that will be loaded and executed as code, e.g. in `<script src>`
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Angular sanitizes untrusted values for the first three items; sanitizing resource URLs is not
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possible as they contain arbitrary code. In development mode, Angular prints a console warning
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when it has to change a value during sanitization.
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### Sanitization example
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The template below binds the value of `htmlSnippet`, once by interpolating it into an element's
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content, and once by binding it to the `innerHTML` property of an element.
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+makeExample('security/ts/app/inner-html-binding.component.html')(format=".")
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:marked
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Interpolated content is always escaped - the HTML is not interpreted, and the browser displays
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angle brackets in the elements text content.
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For the HTML to be interpreted, we must bind to an HTML property, such as `innerHTML`. But binding
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a potentially attacker controlled value into `innerHTML` would normally cause an XSS
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vulnerability. For example, code contained in a `<script>` tag would be executed.
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+makeExample('security/ts/app/inner-html-binding.component.ts', 'inner-html-controller')(format=".")
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:marked
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Angular recognizes the value as unsafe, and automatically sanitizes it. It removes the `<script>`
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tag but keeps safe content, such as the text content of the `<script>` tag, or the `<b>` element.
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figure.image-display
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img(src='/resources/images/devguide/security/binding-inner-html.png'
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alt='A screenshot showing interpolated and bound HTML values')
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:marked
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### Avoid direct use of the DOM APIs
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The built-in browser DOM APIs do not automatically protect you from security vulnerabilities.
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For example, `document`, the node available through `ElementRef`, and many third party APIs
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contain unsafe methods. Avoid directly interacting with the DOM, and instead use Angular
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templates where possible.
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### Content Security Policy
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A [Content Security Policy (CSP)](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-
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US/docs/Web/Security/CSP/Introducing_Content_Security_Policy) is a defense-in-depth technique to
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prevent XSS. To enable CSP, configure your web server to return an appropriate
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`Content-Security-Policy` HTTP header. Learn more at
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[OWASP](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Content_Security_Policy).
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<a id="offline-template-compiler"></a>
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### Use the Offline Template Compiler
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The offline template compiler prevents a whole class of vulnerabilities called template injection,
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and also greatly improves application performance. Use the offline template compiler in production
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deployments. Do not dynamically generate templates. Angular trusts template code, so generating
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templates, in particular containing user data, circumvents Angular's built-in protections. See the
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[Dynamic Forms Cookbook](../cookbook/dynamic-form.html) on how to dynamically construct forms in a
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safe way.
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### Server side XSS protection
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HTML constructed on the server is vulnerable to injection attacks. When generating server side
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HTML, e.g. for the initial page load of the Angular application, make sure to use a templating
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language that automatically escapes values to prevent XSS vulnerabilities on the server. Do not
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generate Angular templates on the server side using a templating language, this carries a high
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risk of introducing template injection vulnerabilities.
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.l-main-section
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h2#bypass-security-apis Trusting Safe Values
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:marked
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Sometimes applications genuinely need to include executable code, display an `<iframe>` from some
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URL, or construct potentially dangerous URLs. To prevent automatic sanitization in this situation,
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you can tell Angular that you inspected a value, checked how it is generated, and made sure it is
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always secure. But **be careful**! If you trust a value that can be malicious, you will likely
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introduce a security vulnerability into your application. If in doubt, find a professional
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security reviewer.
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You can mark a value as trusted by injecting `DomSanitizationService`, and calling one of the
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following methods.
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* `bypassSecurityTrustHtml`
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* `bypassSecurityTrustScript`
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* `bypassSecurityTrustStyle`
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* `bypassSecurityTrustUrl`
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* `bypassSecurityTrustResourceUrl`
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Remember, whether a value is safe depends on context, so you need to choose the right context for
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your intended use of the value. Imagine the following template needs to bind a URL to a
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`javascript:alert(...)` call.
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+makeExample('security/ts/app/bypass-security.component.html', 'dangerous-url')(format=".")
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:marked
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Normally, Angular would automatically sanitize the URL and disable the dangerous code. To prevent
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this, we can mark the URL value as a trusted URL using the `bypassSecurityTrustUrl` call:
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+makeExample('security/ts/app/bypass-security.component.ts', 'trust-url')(format=".")
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figure.image-display
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img(src='/resources/images/devguide/security/bypass-security-component.png'
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alt='A screenshot showing an alert box created from a trusted URL')
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:marked
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If we need to convert user input into a trusted value, it can be convenient to do so in a
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controller method. The template below allows users to enter a YouTube video ID, and load the
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corresponding video in an `<iframe>`. `<iframe src>` is a resource URL, because an untrusted
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source can e.g. smuggle in file downloads that unsuspecting users would execute. So we call a
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method on the controller to construct a new, trusted video URL, which is then bound to the
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`<iframe src>`.
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+makeExample('security/ts/app/bypass-security.component.html', 'iframe-videoid')(format=".")
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+makeExample('security/ts/app/bypass-security.component.ts', 'trust-video-url')(format=".")
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.l-main-section
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h2#http HTTP-level Vulnerabilities
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:marked
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Angular has built in support to help prevent two common HTTP vulnerabilities, Cross-site Request
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Forgery (XSRF) and Cross-site Script Inclusion (XSSI). Both of these must be primarily mitigated
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on the server side, but Angular ships helpers to make integration on the client side easier.
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h3#xsrf Cross-site Request Forgery (XSRF)
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:marked
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In a Cross-site Request Forgery (XSRF or CSRF), an attacker tricks the user into visiting a
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_different_ page, and has them e.g. submit a form that sends a request to your application's
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web server. If the user is logged into your application, the browser will send authentication
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cookies, and the attacker could - for example - cause a bank transfer in the user's name with
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the right request.
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To prevent this, your application must make sure that user requests originate in your own
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application, not on a different site. A common technique is that the server sends a randomly
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generated authentication token in a cookie, often with the name `XSRF-TOKEN`. Cookies can only
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be read by the website on which they are set, so only your own application can read this token. On
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each API request, the server then validates the client by checking that the token is sent back,
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usually in an HTTP header called `X-XSRF-TOKEN`.
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The Angular `http` client has built-in support for this technique. The default
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`CookieXSRFStrategy` looks for a cookie called `XSRF-TOKEN` and sets an HTTP request header named
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`X-XSRF-TOKEN` with the value of that cookie on every request. The server must set the
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`XSRF-TOKEN` cookie, and validate the response header for each state modifying request.
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XSRF tokens should be unique per user and session, have a large random value generated by a
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cryptographically secure random number generator, and expire.
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Angular applications can customize cookie and header names by binding their own
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`CookieXSRFStrategy` value, or implement an entirely custom `XSRFStrategy` by providing a custom
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binding for that type.
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Learn about Cross Site Request Forgery (XSRF) at the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)
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[here](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_%28CSRF%29) and
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[here](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/CSRF_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet). This [Stanford University
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paper](https://seclab.stanford.edu/websec/csrf/csrf.pdf) is a rich source of detail.
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h3#xssi Cross-site Script Inclusion (XSSI)
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:marked
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Cross-site Script Inclusion, also known as JSON vulnerability, can allow an attacker's website to
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read data from a JSON API. The attack works on older browser by overriding native JavaScript
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object constructors, and then including an API URL using a `<script>` tag.
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This attack is only successful if the returned JSON is executable as JavaScript. Servers can
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prevent it by prefixing all JSON responses to make them non-executable, by convention using the
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well-known string `")]}',\n"`.
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Angular's `Http` library recognizes this convention and automatically strips the string
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`")]}',\n"` from all responses before further parsing.
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Learn more in the XSSI section of this [Google web security blog
|
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|
|
post](https://security.googleblog.com/2011/05/website-security-for-webmasters.html)
|
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|
|
.l-main-section
|
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|
|
h2#code-review Auditing Angular Applications
|
|
|
|
|
:marked
|
|
|
|
|
Angular applications should follow the same security principles as regular web applications, and
|
|
|
|
|
should be audited as such. Angular specific APIs that should be audited in a security review,
|
|
|
|
|
such as the [_bypassSecurityTrust_](#bypass-security-apis) APIs, are marked in the documentation
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|
|
|
|
as security sensitive.
|