There is no need to expose this additional method inside of the Renderer
API. The functionality can be restored by looping and calling
`setElementStyle` instead.
Note that this change is changing code that was was introduced after
the last release therefore this fix is not a breaking change.
Closes#9000Closes#9009
Automatically recognize XSRF protection cookies, and set a corresponding XSRF
header. Allows applications to configure the cookie names, or if needed,
completely override the XSRF request configuration by binding their own
XSRFHandler implementation.
Part of #8511.
The code does not force the user to provider `RenderDebugInfo`. The
current implementation lists this as a mandatory parameter. Update
the parameter to be optional.
Fixes#8466Closes#8859
Implement the ability to provide objects as request body. The following use cases
are supported:
* raw objects: a JSON payload is created and the content type set to `application/json`
* text: the text is used as it is and no content type header is automatically added
* URLSearchParams: a form payload is created and the content type set to `application/x-www-form-urlencoded`
* FormData: the object is used as it is and no content type header is automatically added
* Blob: the object is used as it is and the content type set with the value of its `type` property if any
* ArrayBuffer: the object is used as it is and no content type header is automatically added
Closes https://github.com/angular/http/issues/69Closes#7310
allows for
```
bootstrap(App, [
...HTTP_PROVIDERS,
...ROUTER_PROVIDERS
])
.then(enableDebugTools)
```
without breaking the rule of always returning a value in a promise
Allows sanitized URLs for CSS properties. These can be abused for information
leakage, but only if the CSS rules are already set up to allow for it. That is,
an attacker cannot cause information leakage without controlling the style rules
present, or a very particular setup.
Fixes#8514.
This is based on Angular 1's implementation, parsing an HTML document
into an inert DOM Document implementation, and then serializing only
specifically whitelisted elements.
It currently does not support SVG sanitization, all SVG elements are
rejected.
If available, the sanitizer uses the `<template>` HTML element as an
inert container.
Sanitization works client and server-side.
Reviewers: rjamet, tbosch , molnarg , koto
Differential Revision: https://reviews.angular.io/D108
ScottSWu
Matias Niemelä
Victor Berchet
Igor Minar
Vikram Subramanian
Martin Probst
Alex Eagle
Matt Wheatley
Vanga Sasidhar
Misko Hevery
Alfonso Presa
gdi2290
Thierry Templier
Brendan Wyse
Vamsi V
Andrew
Joost de Vries
Marc Laval