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key byte array cleanup as necessary (#846)

This commit is contained in:
lhazlewood 2023-10-03 12:27:12 -07:00 committed by GitHub
parent e78f3f511f
commit b411b19b92
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 4AEE18F83AFDEB23
3 changed files with 86 additions and 35 deletions
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34
impl/src/main/java/io/jsonwebtoken/impl/security/ConcatKDF.java
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@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
*/
package io.jsonwebtoken.impl.security;
import io.jsonwebtoken.impl.lang.Bytes;
import io.jsonwebtoken.impl.lang.CheckedFunction;
import io.jsonwebtoken.lang.Assert;
import io.jsonwebtoken.security.SecurityException;
@ -114,12 +115,14 @@ final class ConcatKDF extends CryptoAlgorithm {
long inputBitLength = bitLength(counter) + bitLength(Z) + bitLength(OtherInfo);
Assert.state(inputBitLength <= MAX_HASH_INPUT_BIT_LENGTH, "Hash input is too large.");
byte[] derivedKeyBytes = jca().withMessageDigest(new CheckedFunction<MessageDigest, byte[]>() {
final ClearableByteArrayOutputStream stream = new ClearableByteArrayOutputStream((int) derivedKeyByteLength);
byte[] derivedKeyBytes = EMPTY;
try {
derivedKeyBytes = jca().withMessageDigest(new CheckedFunction<MessageDigest, byte[]>() {
@Override
public byte[] apply(MessageDigest md) throws Exception {
final ByteArrayOutputStream stream = new ByteArrayOutputStream((int) derivedKeyByteLength);
// Section 5.8.1.1, Process step #5. We depart from Java idioms here by starting iteration index at 1
// (instead of 0) and continue to <= reps (instead of < reps) to match the NIST publication algorithm
// notation convention (so variables like Ki and kLast below match the NIST definitions).
@ -150,7 +153,30 @@ final class ConcatKDF extends CryptoAlgorithm {
return stream.toByteArray();
}
});
return new SecretKeySpec(derivedKeyBytes, AesAlgorithm.KEY_ALG_NAME);
} finally {
// key cleanup
Bytes.clear(derivedKeyBytes); // SecretKeySpec clones this, so we can clear it out safely
Bytes.clear(counter);
stream.reset();
// we don't clear out 'Z', since that is the responsibility of the caller
}
}
/**
* Calling ByteArrayOutputStream.toByteArray returns a copy of the bytes, so this class allows us to completely
* zero-out the buffer upon reset (whereas BAOS just resets the position marker, leaving the bytes in tact)
*/
private static class ClearableByteArrayOutputStream extends ByteArrayOutputStream {
public ClearableByteArrayOutputStream(int size) {
super(size);
}
@Override
public synchronized void reset() {
super.reset();
Bytes.clear(buf); // zero out internal buffer
}
}
}

4
impl/src/main/java/io/jsonwebtoken/impl/security/EcdhKeyAlgorithm.java
View File

@ -139,7 +139,11 @@ class EcdhKeyAlgorithm extends CryptoAlgorithm implements KeyAlgorithm<PublicKey
byte[] apv = request.getHeader().getAgreementPartyVInfo();
byte[] OtherInfo = createOtherInfo(requiredCekBitLen, AlgorithmID, apu, apv);
byte[] Z = generateZ(request, publicKey, privateKey);
try {
return CONCAT_KDF.deriveKey(Z, requiredCekBitLen, OtherInfo);
} finally {
Bytes.clear(Z);
}
}
@Override

31
impl/src/main/java/io/jsonwebtoken/impl/security/HmacAesAeadAlgorithm.java
View File

@ -96,7 +96,13 @@ public class HmacAesAeadAlgorithm extends AesAlgorithm implements AeadAlgorithm
int halfCount = compositeKeyBytes.length / 2; // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7518#section-5.2
byte[] macKeyBytes = Arrays.copyOfRange(compositeKeyBytes, 0, halfCount);
byte[] encKeyBytes = Arrays.copyOfRange(compositeKeyBytes, halfCount, compositeKeyBytes.length);
final SecretKey encryptionKey = new SecretKeySpec(encKeyBytes, KEY_ALG_NAME);
final SecretKey encryptionKey;
try {
encryptionKey = new SecretKeySpec(encKeyBytes, KEY_ALG_NAME);
} finally {
Bytes.clear(encKeyBytes);
Bytes.clear(compositeKeyBytes);
}
final InputStream plaintext = Assert.notNull(req.getPayload(),
"Request content (plaintext) InputStream cannot be null.");
@ -121,9 +127,13 @@ public class HmacAesAeadAlgorithm extends AesAlgorithm implements AeadAlgorithm
byte[] aadBytes = aad == null ? Bytes.EMPTY : Streams.bytes(aad, "Unable to read AAD bytes.");
byte[] tag = sign(aadBytes, iv, Streams.of(copy.toByteArray()), macKeyBytes);
byte[] tag;
try {
tag = sign(aadBytes, iv, Streams.of(copy.toByteArray()), macKeyBytes);
res.setTag(tag).setIv(iv);
} finally {
Bytes.clear(macKeyBytes);
}
}
private byte[] sign(byte[] aad, byte[] iv, InputStream ciphertext, byte[] macKeyBytes) {
@ -162,7 +172,13 @@ public class HmacAesAeadAlgorithm extends AesAlgorithm implements AeadAlgorithm
int halfCount = compositeKeyBytes.length / 2; // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7518#section-5.2
byte[] macKeyBytes = Arrays.copyOfRange(compositeKeyBytes, 0, halfCount);
byte[] encKeyBytes = Arrays.copyOfRange(compositeKeyBytes, halfCount, compositeKeyBytes.length);
final SecretKey decryptionKey = new SecretKeySpec(encKeyBytes, KEY_ALG_NAME);
final SecretKey decryptionKey;
try {
decryptionKey = new SecretKeySpec(encKeyBytes, KEY_ALG_NAME);
} finally {
Bytes.clear(encKeyBytes);
Bytes.clear(compositeKeyBytes);
}
InputStream in = Assert.notNull(req.getPayload(),
"Decryption request content (ciphertext) InputStream cannot be null.");
@ -174,7 +190,12 @@ public class HmacAesAeadAlgorithm extends AesAlgorithm implements AeadAlgorithm
// Assert that the aad + iv + ciphertext provided, when signed, equals the tag provided,
// thereby verifying none of it has been tampered with:
byte[] aadBytes = aad == null ? Bytes.EMPTY : Streams.bytes(aad, "Unable to read AAD bytes.");
byte[] digest = sign(aadBytes, iv, in, macKeyBytes);
byte[] digest;
try {
digest = sign(aadBytes, iv, in, macKeyBytes);
} finally {
Bytes.clear(macKeyBytes);
}
if (!MessageDigest.isEqual(digest, tag)) { //constant time comparison to avoid side-channel attacks
String msg = "Ciphertext decryption failed: Authentication tag verification failed.";
throw new SignatureException(msg);