760c542a0b
* JWE support. Resolves #113 Huge feature/code change - see CHANGELOG.MD for an in-depth review of changes. Commit note log: - Added JWE AeadAlgorithm and KeyAlgorithm and supporting interfaces/implementations, and refactored SignatureAlgorithm to be an interface instead of an enum to enable custom algorithms - NoneSignatureAlgorithm cleanup. Added UnsupportedKeyExceptionTest. - Added JWK support! * Removed the previous SignatureAlgorithm implementation concepts (Provider/Signer/Validator implementations). Implementations are now interface-driven and fully pluggable. * adding tests, working towards 100% coverage. Moved api static factory class tests to impl module to avoid mocking static calls due to bridge/reflection logic. * adding tests, removed unused class * implementation checkpoint (safety save) * clean build checkpoint * continued testing w/ more coverage. Replaced PbeKey concept with PasswordKey * fixed erroneous optimize imports * Added ECDH-ES key algorithms + RFC tests * 1. Enabled targeted/limited use of BouncyCastle only when required by eliminating use of RuntimeEnvironment in favor of new Providers implementation. JJWT will no longer modify the system providers list. 2. Changed SecretKeyGenerator.generateKey() to KeyBuilderSupplier.keyBuilder() and a new SecretKeyBuilder interface. This allows users to customize the Provider and SecureRandom used during key generation if desired. 3. Added KeyLengthSupplier to allow certain algorithms the ability to determine a key bit length without forcing a key generation. 4. Ensured Pbes2 algorithms defaulted to OWASP-recommended iteration counts if not specified by the user. * 1. EcdhKeyAlgorithm: consolidated duplicate logic to a single private helper method 2. Updated RequiredTypeConverter exception message to represent the expected type as well as the found type * Minor javadoc update * 1. Javadoc cleanup. 2. Ensured CompressionException extends from io.jsonwebtoken.io.IOException 3. Deleted old POC unused JwkParser interface 4. Ensured NoneSignatureAlgorithm reflected the correct exception message for `sign` * Fixed erroneous JavaDoc, enhanced code coverage for DefaultClaims * Added jwe compression test * Added TestKeys concept for Groovy test authoring * Added tests, cleaned up state assertions for code coverage * Added tests, cleaned up state assertions for code coverage * Removed unused code * Merge branch 'master' into jwe-merge * using groovy syntax to avoid conflict with legacy SignatureAlgorithm type * JavaDoc fixes * JavaDoc fixes, test additions to work on JDK >= 15 * JavaDoc fixes, test additions to work on JDK 7 and JDK >= 15 * Test adjustment to work on Java 7 * Test adjustment to work on Java 7 * code coverage work cont'd * code coverage work cont'd * JavaDoc fix * Update impl/src/main/java/io/jsonwebtoken/impl/JwtTokenizer.java Co-authored-by: sonatype-lift[bot] <37194012+sonatype-lift[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * lift edits * lift edits * lift edits * code coverage testing cont'd * PayloadSupplier renamed to Message * Added new KeyPairBuilder/KeyPairBuilderSupplier for parity with KeyBuilder/KeyBuilderSupplier. Switched all generate* calls to use the new API methods. * - Added lots of JavaDoc - JwtMap: Ensured Groovy GString implementations that invoke Groovy's InvokerHelper on a JwtMap implementation will print redacted values instead of the actual secret values. * - JavaDoc additions cont'd * - JavaDoc additions and syntax cleanup cont'd - Minor work to fix compilation errors on a few Groovy test classes * - JavaDoc additions and syntax cleanup cont'd - Minor work to fix compilation errors on a few Groovy test classes * - JavaDoc additions and syntax cleanup cont'd - Minor work to fix compilation errors on a few Groovy test classes * - JavaDoc additions and syntax cleanup cont'd - Minor work to fix compilation errors on a few Groovy test classes * - JavaDoc cont'd * Code coverage updates cont'd * Propagating exception wrapper function enhancements * 100% code coverage! * Minor test changes to work with JDK >= 11 * Ensured all JWK secret or private values were wrapped in a RedactedSupplier instance to prevent accidental printing of secure values * - Updated JavaDoc to reflect JWK toString safety and property access - Updated README to reflect new GsonSerializer requirements for io.jsonwebtoken.lang.Supplier * Documentation enhancements * Fixed erroneous JavaDoc element * Fixed LocatorAdapter usage now that it's abstract * Minor JavaDoc fix * JavaDoc is now complete (no warnings) for api module * Ensured JWS signatures are computed first before deserializing the body if no SigningKeyResolver has been configured. * Removed EllipticCurveSignatureAlgorithm and RsaSignatureAlgorithm concepts due to some PKCS11 and HSM security providers that cannot provide keys that implement the ECKey or RSAKey interfaces. * Removed reliance on io.jsonwebtoken.security.KeyPair now that KeyPairBuilder implementations cannot guarantee RSAKey or ECKey types * Ensured RsaKeyAlgorithm used PublicKey and PrivateKey parameters due to PKCS11 and HSM key stores that may not expose the RSAKey interface on their RSA key implementations * cleaned up EC point addition/doubling logic to be more readable and match equations in literature * Deprecated JwtParserBuilder setSigningKey* methods in favor of verifyWith for name accuracy and congruence with decryptWith * Added PositiveIntegerConverter and PublicJwkConverter for JWE Header "p2c" and "jwk" fields * Ensured CompressionCodec inherited Identifiable for consistency w/ all other algorithms * Ensured CompressionCodec inherited Identifiable for consistency w/ all other algorithms * Ensured CompressionCodec inherited Identifiable for consistency w/ all other algorithms * JavaDoc enhancement * Added Jwks.parserBuilder(), JwkParserBuilder and JwkParser concepts * Ensured ProtoJwkBuilder method names were all congruent (remaining set* methods were renamed to for*) * Minor JavaDoc organization change * Changed JweBuilder to have only two encryptWith* methods for consistency with JwtBuilder signWith* methods. Also prevents incorrect configuration by forgetting to call follow-up methods. * Removed DefaultValueGetter in favor of new FieldReadable concept to leverage Field instances instead of duplicating logic. * Adding copyright headers * Deprecated CompressionCodecResolver in favor of Locator<CompressionCodec> * Deprecated CompressionCodecResolver in favor of Locator<CompressionCodec> * Folded in JweBuilder concept and implementation into the existing JwtBuilder * Cleanup to reduce duplicate logic * Changed plaintext JWT payload type from String to byte[] * Minor internal doc fixes * - Added UnprotectedHeader interface - Renamed DefaultHeader to AbstractHeader - Renamed JwtParser 'plaintext'* methods to 'payload'* methods to more accurately reflect the JWT nomenclature * Updated changelog to reflect the following changes: - Added UnprotectedHeader interface - Renamed DefaultHeader to AbstractHeader - Renamed JwtParser 'plaintext'* methods to 'payload'* methods to more accurately reflect the JWT nomenclature * Adding RFC 7520 test cases. * Changed JwtBuilder/JwtParser/JwtHandler/JwtHandlerAdapter `payload` concept to `content` concept * JavaDoc error fix * Added JwtParserBuilder#addCompressionCodecs method and supporting tests * Updated changelog to reflect recent changes * doc updates * Fixed minor types in JWE related change log * Enabled Mutator and HeaderBuilder interfaces and implementations * Fixed erroneous JavaDoc * Added additional .pem files for testing PEM parsing (TBD at a later date) * Updating documentation to prepare for JWE release * more docs * docs cont'd * Update README.md Trying to prevent table wrap * Update README.md testing table whitespace wrap * Update README.md formatting testing * Update README.md formatting testing cont'd * docs cont'd * docs cont'd * docs cont'd * documentation checkpoint * documentation checkpoint, still work in progress * added extra info about Android BouncyCastle registration * added extra info about Android BouncyCastle registration * added extra info about Android BouncyCastle registration * documentation cont'd * documentation cont'd * documentation cont'd * documentation cont'd * documentation cont'd * Upgraded Jackson to 2.12.7 due to Jackson CVE * trying to get sonatype lift working again * Removed unnecessary println statement in test * Added JDK 19 * Removing JDK 19 until we can resolve incompatible groovy version * doc formatting test * Update README.md Fixed 'JWE Encryption Algorithms' table formatting * renamed PasswordKey to just Password, removed unnecessary WrappedSecretKey class and its one usage in favor of JDK-standard SecretKeySpec * Updated PasswordKey references to Password * Renamed DefaultPassword to PasswordSpec while also implementing KeySpec per JDK conventions. * documentation cont'd * documentation cont'd * documentation cont'd * JWT expired exception is now shows difference as now - expired Instead of now + skew - expired Fixes: #660 * documentation cont'd * Fixed erroneous error message (should be '521' not '512'). * - Removed EcKeyAlgorithm and RsaKeyAlgorithm in favor of KeyAlgorithm<PublicKey, PrivateKey> due to HSM key types unable to conform to respective ECKey or RSAKey types - added Curve concept with DefaultCurve and ECCurve implementations for use across EC/EdEC SignatureAlgorithm and KeyAlgorithm implementations - disabled Zulu JDK 10 - compiler was failing, and that is a short-term-supported version anyway - added Temurin JDK 19 and Zulu JDK 19 to the build * Removed JDK 19 builds due to error with Groovy compiler version compatibility * removed unused test, created https://github.com/jwtk/jjwt/issues/765 to address later * updated test case to reflect Edwards keys algorithm name differences between BouncyCastle and JDK 11/15 * - Reordered JwtBuilder .encryptWith method arguments to match signWith conventions - Added key validation logic to DefaultRsaKeyAlgorithm * - Reordered JwtBuilder .encryptWith method arguments to match signWith conventions - Added key validation logic to DefaultRsaKeyAlgorithm - Removed mutation methods on InvalidClaimException and its subclasses, IncorrectClaimException and MissingClaimException - renamed Jwks.parserBuilder() to Jwks.parser() to reduce verbosity since we'll never likely offer a Jwts.parser() that returns a Parser instance directly. * Documentation updates * Documentation updates * Documentation updates * Adding Java-based tests for README.md code snippets (e.g. new Examples section). * Testing README code snippet in examples * Testing README code snippet in examples * Testing README code snippet in examples * Ensured README.md examples would compile/run by testing code in a JavaReadmeTest.java class * Ensured README.md examples would compile/run by testing code in a JavaReadmeTest.java class * Ensured README.md examples would compile/run by testing code in a JavaReadmeTest.java class * Ensured README.md examples would compile/run by testing code in a JavaReadmeTest.java class * Ensured README.md examples would compile/run by testing code in a JavaReadmeTest.java class * Ensured README.md examples would compile/run by testing code in a JavaReadmeTest.java class * Ensured README.md examples would compile/run by testing code in a JavaReadmeTest.java class * Ensured README.md examples would compile/run by testing code in a JavaReadmeTest.java class * Ensured README.md examples would compile/run by testing code in a JavaReadmeTest.java class * Ensured README.md examples would compile/run by testing code in a JavaReadmeTest.java class * Ensured README.md examples would compile/run by testing code in a JavaReadmeTest.java class * Ensured README.md examples would compile/run by testing code in a JavaReadmeTest.java class * Ensured README.md examples would compile/run by testing code in a JavaReadmeTest.java class * Testing coveralls failure fix for JavaReadmeTest (unnecessary for coverage) * Message* API refactoring cleanup * Refactored SignatureAlgorithm(s) concept as a new DigestAlgorithm hierarchy to support non-keyed digests, as well as to reflect correct cryptographic taxonomy. Renamed SignatureAlgorithms utility class to JwsAlgorithms. * - Added JwkThumbprint and JWK Thumbprint URI support - Fixed various copyright headers * Updated README with JWK examples * - Added logic and test to ensure Parser builder does not allow both a signature verification key and SigningKeyResolver to be configured. - Updated README code example, and added test for verification * - Added proactive checks to ensure PublicKey instances cannot be specified on JwtBuilder to create digital signatures - Added additional tests to ensure that Password instances cannot be used with Mac algorithm instances (HS256, HS384, HS512, etc) * minor edit to reflect latest # of test cases * Minor JavaDoc improvement * Disabled parsing of unsecured compressed payloads by default, with a JwtParserBuilder#enableUnsecuredDecompression method added for override if necessary. * Refactored JcaTemplate to avoid reflection * minor readme clarification * Edwards Curve keys checkpoint * Edwards Curve keys and related functionality checkpoint. Added lots of tests. * Edwards Curve keys and related functionality checkpoint. Reached 100% code coverage. * Addressed EdwardsCurve differences (and a JDK 11 PKCS8 encoding bug) between JDK versions (1.7 through 15+). * Addressed EdwardsCurve differences (and a JDK 11 PKCS8 encoding bug) between JDK versions (1.7 through 18). * Adding --add-opens lines to surefire/test config to avoid unnecessary build warnings * Improved Edwards Key encoding error checks * added some code to test errors in CI * added some code to test errors in CI * added some code to test errors in CI * added some code to test errors in CI * added some code to test errors in CI * added some code to test errors in CI * added some code to test errors in CI * added some code to test errors in CI * added some code to test errors in CI * added some code to test errors in CI * added some code to test errors in CI * added some code to test errors in CI * added some code to test errors in CI * Improved Field/FieldBuilder implementation to make it more robust and catch type errors. JwkBuilder/Factory refactoring is likely to follow on subsequent commits. * Updating CI config to use the Oracle no-fee JDK builds * Updating CI config to use the Oracle no-fee JDK builds * Updating CI config to use the Oracle no-fee JDK builds * JavaDoc fixes * JavaDoc fixes * JavaDoc fixes * Ensured license headers are updated with correct dates based on git history, as well as ensured this is enforced in CI * fixed various build warnings and javadoc errors * Maven license plugin config cleanup. Removed now-unused header_format.xml file. * fixed javadoc error causing build failures * Changed Algorithms + Bridge concept to allow nested inner classes for simpler authoring all stemming from an 'Algorithms' class (easier to find algorithms via code completion than knowing off the top of your head which *Algorithms classes to reference). * Added license headers * Moved JwsAlgorithms to an inner class of Algorithms. Will rename to `StandardSecureDigestAlgorithms` to maintain the convention used with the other Algorithms inner classes. * Extracting Algorithms inner classes up a level - cleaner/easier to maintain, document and reference as JavaDoc links. * Extracting Algorithms inner classes up a level - cleaner/easier to maintain, document and reference as JavaDoc links. Renamed JwsAlgorithms to StandardSecureDigestAlgorithms to retain the JDK 'Standard*' convention. * Removed Algorithms class in favor of direct `Standard*` `Registry` references in `Jwts` and `Jwks` helper classes to keep the references 'close' to where they are used the most. * Minor README.md documentation updates. * Copying over 6e74486 to test on the jwe branch * Ensured CI license-check build pulls full (non-shallow) git history to perform full year checks. * JavaDoc + impl + test checkpoint * JavaDoc + impl + test checkpoint. Returned to 100% code coverage * JavaDoc + impl + test checkpoint. Returned to 100% code coverage * - Ensured Edwards Curve keys (X25519 and X448) worked with ECDH-ES algorithms - Ensured JWT Header ephemeral PublicKey ('epk' field) could be any Public JWK, not just an EcPublicJwk - Updated README.md to ensure the installation instructions for uncommenting BouncyCastle were a little less confusing (having commented out stuff be at the end of the code block so it couldn't be confused with other lines) * Ensured correct message assertion on all JDKs (value was different on JDK 15 and later) * Ensured correct message assertion on all JDKs (value was different on JDK 15 and later) * - enabled more IANA algorithms in StandardHashAlgorithms - JavaDoc update * - JavaDoc fixes/enhancements - Fixed erroneous README.md method name reference - ensured DefaultJwkContext#getName() supports Octet keys as well. * - JavaDoc fixes/enhancements * - JavaDoc fixes/enhancements required to pass the build on later JDKs * Minor JavaDoc typo fix * Finished implementing all [RFC 8037](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8037) test vectors in the Appendix * Removed accidentally-committed visibility modifier * Added copyright header * Enabled PublicKey derivation from Edwards curve PrivateKey * Enabled PublicKey derivation from Edwards curve PrivateKey. Updated documentation and code example showing this. * Enabled PublicKey derivation from Edwards curve PrivateKey. Updated documentation and code example showing this. * Doc update to reference Octet JWK RFC. * Minor JavaDoc fix * Fixed OctetPrivateJwk discrepancy with generic parameter ordering (compared to other PrivateJwk interfaces) * Changed Jwts.header to Jwts.unprotectedHeader, and Jwts.headerBuilder is now Jwts.header --------- Co-authored-by: sonatype-lift[bot] <37194012+sonatype-lift[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Brian Demers <bdemers@apache.org> |
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api | ||
extensions | ||
impl | ||
src/license | ||
tdjar | ||
.gitignore | ||
CHANGELOG.md | ||
LICENSE | ||
NOTICE.md | ||
README.md | ||
SECURITY.md | ||
mvnw | ||
mvnw.cmd | ||
pom.xml |
README.md
Java JWT: JSON Web Token for Java and Android
JJWT aims to be the easiest to use and understand library for creating and verifying JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) on the JVM and Android.
JJWT is a pure Java implementation based exclusively on the JWT, JWS, JWE, JWA, JWK, Octet JWK, JWK Thumbprint, and JWK Thumbprint URI RFC specifications and open source under the terms of the Apache 2.0 License.
The library was created by Les Hazlewood and is supported and maintained by a community of contributors.
We've also added some convenience extensions that are not part of the specification, such as JWS compression and claim enforcement.
Table of Contents
- Features
- Community
- What is a JSON Web Token?
- Installation
- Quickstart
- Create a JWT
- Read a JWT
- Signed JWTs
- Encrypted JWTs
- JSON Web Keys (JWKs)
- Compression
- JSON Processor
- Base64 Support
- Examples
- JWS Signed with HMAC
- JWS Signed with RSA
- JWS Signed with ECDSA
- JWE Encrypted Directly with a SecretKey
- JWE Encrypted with RSA
- JWE Encrypted with AES Key Wrap
- JWE Encrypted with ECDH-ES
- JWE Encrypted with a Password
- SecretKey JWK
- RSA Public JWK
- RSA Private JWK
- Elliptic Curve Public JWK
- Elliptic Curve Private JWK
- Edwards Elliptic Curve Public JWK
- Edwards Elliptic Curve Private JWK
Features
-
Fully functional on all JDKs and Android
-
Automatic security best practices and assertions
-
Easy to learn and read API
-
Convenient and readable fluent interfaces, great for IDE auto-completion to write code quickly
-
Fully RFC specification compliant on all implemented functionality, tested against RFC-specified test vectors
-
Stable implementation with over 1,200+ tests and enforced 100% test code coverage. Every single method, statement and conditional branch variant in the entire codebase is tested and required to pass on every build.
-
Creating, parsing and verifying digitally signed compact JWTs (aka JWSs) with all standard JWS algorithms:
Identifier Signature Algorithm HS256
HMAC using SHA-256 HS384
HMAC using SHA-384 HS512
HMAC using SHA-512 ES256
ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256 ES384
ECDSA using P-384 and SHA-384 ES512
ECDSA using P-521 and SHA-512 RS256
RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 using SHA-256 RS384
RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 using SHA-384 RS512
RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 using SHA-512 PS256
RSASSA-PSS using SHA-256 and MGF1 with SHA-2561 PS384
RSASSA-PSS using SHA-384 and MGF1 with SHA-3841 PS512
RSASSA-PSS using SHA-512 and MGF1 with SHA-5121 EdDSA
Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm2 1. Requires Java 11 or a compatible JCA Provider (like BouncyCastle) in the runtime classpath.
2. Requires Java 15 or a compatible JCA Provider (like BouncyCastle) in the runtime classpath.
-
Creating, parsing and decrypting encrypted compact JWTs (aka JWEs) with all standard JWE encryption algorithms:
Identifier Encryption Algorithm A128CBC‑HS256
AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 authenticated encryption algorithm A192CBC-HS384
AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 authenticated encryption algorithm A256CBC-HS512
AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 authenticated encryption algorithm A128GCM
AES GCM using 128-bit key3 A192GCM
AES GCM using 192-bit key3 A256GCM
AES GCM using 256-bit key3 3. Requires Java 8 or a compatible JCA Provider (like BouncyCastle) in the runtime classpath.
-
All Key Management Algorithms for obtaining JWE encryption and decryption keys:
Identifier Key Management Algorithm RSA1_5
RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 RSA-OAEP
RSAES OAEP using default parameters RSA-OAEP-256
RSAES OAEP using SHA-256 and MGF1 with SHA-256 A128KW
AES Key Wrap with default initial value using 128-bit key A192KW
AES Key Wrap with default initial value using 192-bit key A256KW
AES Key Wrap with default initial value using 256-bit key dir
Direct use of a shared symmetric key as the CEK ECDH-ES
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static key agreement using Concat KDF ECDH-ES+A128KW
ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and CEK wrapped with "A128KW" ECDH-ES+A192KW
ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and CEK wrapped with "A192KW" ECDH-ES+A256KW
ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and CEK wrapped with "A256KW" A128GCMKW
Key wrapping with AES GCM using 128-bit key4 A192GCMKW
Key wrapping with AES GCM using 192-bit key4 A256GCMKW
Key wrapping with AES GCM using 256-bit key4 PBES2-HS256+A128KW
PBES2 with HMAC SHA-256 and "A128KW" wrapping4 PBES2-HS384+A192KW
PBES2 with HMAC SHA-384 and "A192KW" wrapping4 PBES2‑HS512+A256KW
PBES2 with HMAC SHA-512 and "A256KW" wrapping4 4. Requires Java 8 or a compatible JCA Provider (like BouncyCastle) in the runtime classpath.
-
Creating, parsing and verifying JSON Web Keys (JWKs) in all standard JWA key formats using native Java
Key
types:JWK Key Format Java Key
TypeJJWT Jwk
TypeSymmetric Key SecretKey
SecretJwk
Elliptic Curve Public Key ECPublicKey
EcPublicJwk
Elliptic Curve Private Key ECPrivateKey
EcPrivateJwk
RSA Public Key RSAPublicKey
RsaPublicJwk
RSA Private Key RSAPrivateKey
RsaPrivateJwk
XDH Private Key XECPublicKey
5OctetPublicJwk
XDH Private Key XECPrivateKey
5OctetPrivateJwk
EdDSA Public Key EdECPublicKey
6OctetPublicJwk
EdDSA Private Key EdECPublicKey
6OctetPrivateJwk
5. Requires Java 11 or a compatible JCA Provider (like BouncyCastle) in the runtime classpath.
6. Requires Java 15 or a compatible JCA Provider (like BouncyCastle) in the runtime classpath.
-
Convenience enhancements beyond the specification such as
- Payload compression for any large JWT, not just JWEs
- Claims assertions (requiring specific values)
- Claim POJO marshaling and unmarshalling when using a compatible JSON parser (e.g. Jackson)
- Secure Key generation based on desired JWA algorithms
- and more...
Currently Unsupported Features
- Non-compact serialization and parsing.
This feature may be implemented in a future release. Community contributions are welcome!
Community
Getting Help
If you have trouble using JJWT, please first read the documentation on this page before asking questions. We try very hard to ensure JJWT's documentation is robust, categorized with a table of contents, and up to date for each release.
Questions
If the documentation or the API JavaDoc isn't sufficient, and you either have usability questions or are confused about something, please ask your question here.
After asking your question, you may wish to join our Slack or Gittr chat rooms, but note that they may not always be attended. You will usually have a better chance of having your question answered by asking your question here.
If you believe you have found a bug or would like to suggest a feature enhancement, please create a new GitHub issue, however:
Please do not create a GitHub issue to ask a question.
We use GitHub Issues to track actionable work that requires changes to JJWT's design and/or codebase. If you have a usability question, instead please ask your question here, or try Slack or Gittr as described above.
If a GitHub Issue is created that does not represent actionable work for JJWT's codebase, it will be promptly closed.
Bugs and Feature Requests
If you do not have a usability question and believe you have a legitimate bug or feature request, please do create a new JJWT issue.
If you feel like you'd like to help fix a bug or implement the new feature yourself, please read the Contributing section next before starting any work.
Contributing
Pull Requests
Simple Pull Requests that fix anything other than JJWT core code (documentation, JavaDoc, typos, test cases, etc) are always appreciated and have a high likelihood of being merged quickly. Please send them!
However, if you want or feel the need to change JJWT's functionality or core code, please do not issue a pull request without creating a new JJWT issue and discussing your desired changes first, before you start working on it.
It would be a shame to reject your earnest and genuinely-appreciated pull request if it might not align with the project's goals, design expectations or planned functionality. We've sadly had to reject large PRs in the past because they were out of sync with project or design expectations - all because the PR author didn't first check in with the team first before working on a solution.
So, please create a new JJWT issue first to discuss, and then we can see if (or how) a PR is warranted. Thank you!
Help Wanted
If you would like to help, but don't know where to start, please visit the Help Wanted Issues page and pick any of the ones there, and we'll be happy to discuss and answer questions in the issue comments.
If any of those don't appeal to you, no worries! Any help you would like to offer would be appreciated based on the above caveats concerning contributing pull reqeuests. Feel free to discuss or ask questions first if you're not sure. :)
What is a JSON Web Token?
JSON Web Token (JWT) is a general-purpose text-based messaging format for transmitting information in a compact and secure way. Contrary to popular belief, JWT is not just useful for sending and receiving identity tokens on the web - even if that is the most common use case. JWTs can be used as messages for any type of data.
A JWT in its simplest form contains two parts:
- The primary data within the JWT, called the
payload
, and - A JSON
Object
with name/value pairs that represent metadata about thepayload
and the message itself, called theheader
.
A JWT payload
can be absolutely anything at all - anything that can be represented as a byte array, such as Strings,
images, documents, etc.
But because a JWT header
is a JSON Object
, it would make sense that a JWT payload
could also be a JSON
Object
as well. In many cases, developers like the payload
to be JSON that
represents data about a user or computer or similar identity concept. When used this way, the payload
is called a
JSON Claims
object, and each name/value pair within that object is called a claim
- each piece of information
within 'claims' something about an identity.
And while it is useful to 'claim' something about an identity, really anyone can do that. What's important is that you trust the claims by verifying they come from a person or computer you trust.
A nice feature of JWTs is that they can be secured in various ways. A JWT can be cryptographically signed (making it what we call a JWS) or encrypted (making it a JWE). This adds a powerful layer of verifiability to the JWT - a JWS or JWE recipient can have a high degree of confidence it comes from someone they trust by verifying a signature or decrypting it. It is this feature of verifiability that makes JWT a good choice for sending and receiving secure information, like identity claims.
Finally, JSON with whitespace for human readability is nice, but it doesn't make for a very efficient message format. Therefore, JWTs can be compacted (and even compressed) to a minimal representation - basically Base64URL-encoded strings - so they can be transmitted around the web more efficiently, such as in HTTP headers or URLs.
JWT Example
Once you have a payload
and header
, how are they compacted for web transmission, and what does the final JWT
actually look like? Let's walk through a simplified version of the process with some pseudocode:
-
Assume we have a JWT with a JSON
header
and a simple text message payload:header
{ "alg": "none" }
payload
The true sign of intelligence is not knowledge but imagination.
-
Remove all unnecessary whitespace in the JSON:
String header = '{"alg":"none"}' String payload = 'The true sign of intelligence is not knowledge but imagination.'
-
Get the UTF-8 bytes and Base64URL-encode each:
String encodedHeader = base64URLEncode( header.getBytes("UTF-8") ) String encodedPayload = base64URLEncode( payload.getBytes("UTF-8") )
-
Join the encoded header and claims with period ('.') characters:
String compact = encodedHeader + '.' + encodedPayload + '.'
The final concatenated compact
JWT String looks like this:
eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0.VGhlIHRydWUgc2lnbiBvZiBpbnRlbGxpZ2VuY2UgaXMgbm90IGtub3dsZWRnZSBidXQgaW1hZ2luYXRpb24u.
This is called an 'unprotected' JWT because no security was involved - no digital signatures or encryption to 'protect' the JWT to ensure it cannot be changed by 3rd parties.
If we wanted to digitally sign the compact form so that we could at least guarantee that no-one changes the data without us detecting it, we'd have to perform a few more steps, shown next.
JWS Example
Instead of a plain text payload, the next example will use probably the most common type of payload - a JSON claims
Object
containing information about a particular identity. We'll also digitally sign the JWT to ensure it
cannot be changed by a 3rd party without us knowing.
-
Assume we have a JSON
header
and a claimspayload
:header
{ "alg": "HS256" }
payload
{ "sub": "Joe" }
In this case, the
header
indicates that theHS256
(HMAC using SHA-256) algorithm will be used to cryptographically sign the JWT. Also, thepayload
JSON object has a single claim,sub
with valueJoe
.There are a number of standard claims, called Registered Claims, in the specification and
sub
(for 'Subject') is one of them. -
Remove all unnecessary whitespace in both JSON objects:
String header = '{"alg":"HS256"}' String claims = '{"sub":"Joe"}'
-
Get their UTF-8 bytes and Base64URL-encode each:
String encodedHeader = base64URLEncode( header.getBytes("UTF-8") ) String encodedClaims = base64URLEncode( claims.getBytes("UTF-8") )
-
Concatenate the encoded header and claims with a period character '.' delimiter:
String concatenated = encodedHeader + '.' + encodedClaims
-
Use a sufficiently-strong cryptographic secret or private key, along with a signing algorithm of your choice (we'll use HMAC-SHA-256 here), and sign the concatenated string:
SecretKey key = getMySecretKey() byte[] signature = hmacSha256( concatenated, key )
-
Because signatures are always byte arrays, Base64URL-encode the signature and join it to the
concatenated
string with a period character '.' delimiter:String compact = concatenated + '.' + base64URLEncode( signature )
And there you have it, the final compact
String looks like this:
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJKb2UifQ.1KP0SsvENi7Uz1oQc07aXTL7kpQG5jBNIybqr60AlD4
This is called a 'JWS' - short for signed JWT.
Of course, no one would want to do this manually in code, and worse, if you get anything wrong, you could introduce serious security problems and weaknesses. As a result, JJWT was created to handle all of this for you: JJWT completely automates both the creation of JWSs and the parsing and verification of JWSs for you.
JWE Example
So far we have seen an unprotected JWT and a cryptographically signed JWT (called a 'JWS'). One of the things that is inherent to both of these two is that all the information within them can be seen by anyone - all the data in both the header and the payload is publicly visible. JWS just ensures the data hasn't been changed by anyone - it doesn't prevent anyone from seeing it. Many times, this is just fine because the data within them is not sensitive information.
But what if you needed to represent information in a JWT that is considered sensitive information - maybe someone's postal address or social security number or bank account number?
In these cases, we'd want a fully-encrypted JWT, called a 'JWE' for short. A JWE uses cryptography to ensure that the payload remains fully encrypted and authenticated so unauthorized parties cannot see data within, nor change the data without being detected. Specifically, the JWE specification requires that Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data algorithms are used to fully encrypt and protect data.
A full overview of AEAD algorithms are out of scope for this documentation, but here's an example of a final compact JWE that utilizes these algorithms (line breaks are for readability only):
eyJhbGciOiJBMTI4S1ciLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4Q0JDLUhTMjU2In0.
6KB707dM9YTIgHtLvtgWQ8mKwboJW3of9locizkDTHzBC2IlrT1oOQ.
AxY8DCtDaGlsbGljb3RoZQ.
KDlTtXchhZTGufMYmOYGS4HffxPSUrfmqCHXaI9wOGY.
U0m_YmjN04DJvceFICbCVQ
Next we'll cover how to install JJWT in your project, and then we'll see how to use JJWT's nice fluent API instead of risky string manipulation to quickly and safely build JWTs, JWSs, and JWEs.
Installation
Use your favorite Maven-compatible build tool to pull the dependencies from Maven Central.
The dependencies could differ slightly if you are working with a JDK project or an Android project.
JDK Projects
If you're building a (non-Android) JDK project, you will want to define the following dependencies:
Maven
<dependency>
<groupId>io.jsonwebtoken</groupId>
<artifactId>jjwt-api</artifactId>
<version>JJWT_RELEASE_VERSION</version>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>io.jsonwebtoken</groupId>
<artifactId>jjwt-impl</artifactId>
<version>JJWT_RELEASE_VERSION</version>
<scope>runtime</scope>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>io.jsonwebtoken</groupId>
<artifactId>jjwt-jackson</artifactId> <!-- or jjwt-gson if Gson is preferred -->
<version>JJWT_RELEASE_VERSION</version>
<scope>runtime</scope>
</dependency>
<!-- Uncomment this next dependency if you are using:
- JDK 10 or earlier, and you want to use RSASSA-PSS (PS256, PS384, PS512) signature algorithms.
- JDK 10 or earlier, and you want to use EdECDH (X25519 or X448) Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman encryption.
- JDK 14 or earlier, and you want to use EdDSA (Ed25519 or Ed448) Elliptic Curve signature algorithms.
It is unnecessary for these algorithms on JDK 15 or later.
<dependency>
<groupId>org.bouncycastle</groupId>
<artifactId>bcprov-jdk15on</artifactId>
<version>1.70</version>
<scope>runtime</scope>
</dependency>
-->
Gradle
dependencies {
implementation 'io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-api:JJWT_RELEASE_VERSION'
runtimeOnly 'io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-impl:JJWT_RELEASE_VERSION'
runtimeOnly 'io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-jackson:JJWT_RELEASE_VERSION' // or 'io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-gson:JJWT_RELEASE_VERSION' for gson
/*
Uncomment this next dependency if you are using:
- JDK 10 or earlier, and you want to use RSASSA-PSS (PS256, PS384, PS512) signature algorithms.
- JDK 10 or earlier, and you want to use EdECDH (X25519 or X448) Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman encryption.
- JDK 14 or earlier, and you want to use EdDSA (Ed25519 or Ed448) Elliptic Curve signature algorithms.
It is unnecessary for these algorithms on JDK 15 or later.
*/
// runtimeOnly 'org.bouncycastle:bcprov-jdk15on:1.70'
}
Android Projects
Android projects will want to define the following dependencies and Proguard exclusions, and optional
BouncyCastle Provider
:
Dependencies
Add the dependencies to your project:
dependencies {
api('io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-api:JJWT_RELEASE_VERSION')
runtimeOnly('io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-impl:JJWT_RELEASE_VERSION')
runtimeOnly('io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-orgjson:JJWT_RELEASE_VERSION') {
exclude(group: 'org.json', module: 'json') //provided by Android natively
}
/*
Uncomment this next dependency if you want to use:
- RSASSA-PSS (PS256, PS384, PS512) signature algorithms.
- EdECDH (X25519 or X448) Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman encryption.
- EdDSA (Ed25519 or Ed448) Elliptic Curve signature algorithms.
** AND ALSO ensure you enable the BouncyCastle provider as shown below **
*/
//implementation('org.bouncycastle:bcprov-jdk15on:1.70')
}
Proguard
You can use the following Android Proguard exclusion rules:
-keepattributes InnerClasses
-keep class io.jsonwebtoken.** { *; }
-keepnames class io.jsonwebtoken.* { *; }
-keepnames interface io.jsonwebtoken.* { *; }
-keep class org.bouncycastle.** { *; }
-keepnames class org.bouncycastle.** { *; }
-dontwarn org.bouncycastle.**
Bouncy Castle
If you want to use JWT RSASSA-PSS algorithms (i.e. PS256
, PS384
, and PS512
), EdECDH (X25512
or X448
)
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman encryption, EdDSA (Ed25519
or Ed448
) signature algorithms, or you just want to
ensure your Android application is running an updated version of BouncyCastle, you will need to:
- Uncomment the BouncyCastle dependency as commented above in the dependencies section.
- Replace the legacy Android custom
BC
provider with the updated one.
Provider registration needs to be done early in the application's lifecycle, preferably in your application's
main Activity
class as a static initialization block. For example:
class MainActivity : AppCompatActivity() {
companion object {
init {
Security.removeProvider("BC") //remove old/legacy Android-provided BC provider
Security.addProvider(BouncyCastleProvider()) // add 'real'/correct BC provider
}
}
// ... etc ...
}
Understanding JJWT Dependencies
Notice the above JJWT dependency declarations all have only one compile-time dependency and the rest are declared as runtime dependencies.
This is because JJWT is designed so you only depend on the APIs that are explicitly designed for you to use in your applications and all other internal implementation details - that can change without warning - are relegated to runtime-only dependencies. This is an extremely important point if you want to ensure stable JJWT usage and upgrades over time:
Warning
JJWT guarantees semantic versioning compatibility for all of its artifacts except the
jjwt-impl
.jar. No such guarantee is made for thejjwt-impl
.jar and internal changes in that .jar can happen at any time. Never add thejjwt-impl
.jar to your project withcompile
scope - always declare it withruntime
scope.
This is done to benefit you: great care goes into curating the jjwt-api
.jar and ensuring it contains what you need
and remains backwards compatible as much as is possible so you can depend on that safely with compile scope. The
runtime jjwt-impl
.jar strategy affords the JJWT developers the flexibility to change the internal packages and
implementations whenever and however necessary. This helps us implement features, fix bugs, and ship new releases to
you more quickly and efficiently.
Quickstart
Most complexity is hidden behind a convenient and readable builder-based fluent interface, great for relying on IDE auto-completion to write code quickly. Here's an example:
import io.jsonwebtoken.Jwts;
import io.jsonwebtoken.security.Keys;
import java.security.Key;
// We need a signing key, so we'll create one just for this example. Usually
// the key would be read from your application configuration instead.
SecretKey key = Jwts.SIG.HS256.keyBuilder().build();
String jws = Jwts.builder().setSubject("Joe").signWith(key).compact();
How easy was that!?
In this case, we are:
- building a JWT that will have the
registered claim
sub
(Subject) set toJoe
. We are then - signing the JWT using a key suitable for the HMAC-SHA-256 algorithm. Finally, we are
- compacting it into its final
String
form. A signed JWT is called a 'JWS'.
The resultant jws
String looks like this:
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJKb2UifQ.1KP0SsvENi7Uz1oQc07aXTL7kpQG5jBNIybqr60AlD4
Now let's verify the JWT (you should always discard JWTs that don't match an expected signature):
assert Jwts.parserBuilder().verifyWith(key).build().parseClaimsJws(jws).getPayload().getSubject().equals("Joe");
There are two things going on here. The key
from before is being used to verify the signature of the JWT. If it
fails to verify the JWT, a SignatureException
(which extends JwtException
) is thrown. Assuming the JWT is
verified, we parse the claims and assert that that subject is set to Joe
. You have to love code one-liners
that pack a punch!
Note
Type-safe JWTs: To get a type-safe
Claims
JWT result, call theparseClaimsJws
method (since there are many similar methods available). You will get anUnsupportedJwtException
if you parse your JWT with wrong method.]()
But what if parsing or signature validation failed? You can catch JwtException
and react accordingly:
try {
Jwts.parserBuilder().verifyWith(key).build().parseClaimsJws(compactJws);
//OK, we can trust this JWT
} catch (JwtException e) {
//don't trust the JWT!
}
Now that we've had a quickstart 'taste' of how to create and parse JWTs, let's cover JJWT's API in-depth.
Creating a JWT
You create a JWT as follows:
- Use the
Jwts.builder()
method to create aJwtBuilder
instance. - Call builder methods to set the
payload
content or claims and anyheader
parameters as desired. - Optionally call
signWith
orencryptWith
methods if you want to digitally sign or encrypt the JWT, respectively. - Call the
compact()
method to produce the resulting compact JWT string.
For example:
String jwt = Jwts.builder() // (1)
.setSubject("Bob") // (2) JSON Claims, or
//.setContent(aByteArray, "text/plain") // any byte[] content, with media type
.signWith(signingKey) // (3) if signing, or
//.encryptWith(key, keyAlg, encryptionAlg) // if encrypting
.compact(); // (4)
- The JWT
payload
may be eitherbyte[]
content (viasetContent
) or JSON Claims (such assetSubject
,setClaims
, etc), but not both. - Either digital signatures (
signWith
) or encryption (encryptWith
) may be used, but not both.
Warning
Unprotected JWTs: If you do not use the
signWith
orencryptWith
builder methods, an Unprotected JWT will be created, which offers no security protection at all. If you need security protection, consider either digitally signing or encrypting the JWT before calling thecompact()
builder method.
JWT Header
A JWT header is a JSON Object
that provides metadata about the contents, format, and any cryptographic operations
relevant to the JWT payload
. JJWT provides a number of ways of setting the entire header and/or multiple individual
header parameters (name/value pairs).
Header Builder
The easiest and recommended way to set one or more JWT header parameters (name/value pairs) is to call
JwtBuilder
setHeader
with Jwts.headerBuilder()
. For example:
String jwt = Jwts.builder()
.setHeader(Jwts.headerBuilder() // <----
.setKeyId("aKeyId")
.setX509Url(aUri)
.put("someName", "anyValue")
.putAll(anotherMap)
// ... etc ...
)
// ... etc ...
.compact();
In addition to type-safe setter methods, Jwts.headerBuilder()
can also support arbitrary name/value pairs via
put
and putAll
as shown above. It can also support automatically calculating
X.509 thumbprints and other builder-style benefits that the other JwtBuilder
setHeader
* methods do not support.
For this reason, Jwts.headerBuilder()
is the recommended way to set a JWT header and is preferred over the other
approaches listed next.
Note
Automatic Headers: You do not need to set the
alg
,enc
orzip
headers - JJWT will set them automatically as needed.
Header Parameters
Another way of setting header parameters is to call JwtBuilder
setHeaderParam
one or more times as needed:
String jwt = Jwts.builder()
.setHeaderParam("kid", "myKeyId")
// ... etc ...
Each time setHeaderParam
is called, it simply appends the key-value pair to an internal Header
instance,
potentially overwriting any existing identically-named key/value pair.
The downside with this approach is that you lose any type-safe setter methods or additional builder utility methods
available on the Jwts.headerBuilder()
such as setContentType
,setKeyId
, withX509Sha256Thumbprint
, etc.
Note
Automatic Headers: You do not need to set the
alg
,enc
orzip
headers - JJWT will set them automatically as needed.
Header Map
If you want to specify the entire header at once, and you don't want to use Jwts.headerBuilder()
, you can use
JwtBuilder
setHeader(Map)
method instead:
Map<String,Object> header = getMyHeaderMap(); //implement me
String jwt = Jwts.builder()
.setHeader(header)
// ... etc ...
Warning
Per standard Java
setter
idioms,setHeader
is a full replacement operation - it will replace any and all existing header name/value pairs.
The downside with this approach is that you lose any type-safe setter methods or additional builder utility methods
available on the Jwts.headerBuilder()
such as setContentType
,setKeyId
, withX509Sha256Thumbprint
, etc.
Note
Automatic Headers: You do not need to set the
alg
,enc
orzip
headers - JJWT will set them automatically as needed.
JWT Payload
A JWT payload
can be anything at all - anything that can be represented as a byte array, such as text, images,
documents, and more. But since a JWT header
is always JSON, it makes sense that the payload
could also be JSON,
especially for representing identity claims.
As a result, the JwtBuilder
supports two distinct payload options:
setContent
if you would like thepayload
to be arbitrary byte array content, andsetClaims
(and supporting helper methods) if you would like thepayload
to be a JSON ClaimsObject
.
Either option may be used, but not both. Using both will cause build()
to throw an exception.
Arbitrary Content
You can set the JWT payload
to be any arbitrary byte array content by using the JwtBuilder
setContent
method.
For example:
byte[] content = "Hello World".getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
String jwt = Jwts.builder()
.setContent(content, "text/plain") // <---
// ... etc ...
.build();
Notice this particular example of setContent
uses the two-argument convenience variant:
- The first argument is the actual byte content to set as the JWT payload
- The second argument is a String identifier of an IANA Media Type.
The second argument will cause the JwtBuilder
to automatically set the cty
(Content Type) header according to the
JWT specification's recommended compact format.
This two-argument variant is typically recommended over the single-argument setContent(byte[])
method because it
guarantees the JWT recipient can inspect the cty
header to determine how to convert the payload
byte array into
a final form that the application can use.
Without setting the cty
header, the JWT recipient must know via out-of-band (external) information how to process
the byte array, which is usually less convenient and always requires code changes if the content format ever changes.
For these reasons, it is strongly recommended to use the two-argument setContent
method variant.
JWT Claims
Instead of a content byte array, a JWT payload
may contain assertions or claims for a JWT recipient. In
this case, the payload
is a 'claims' JSON Object
, and JJWT supports this with a type-safe Claims
instance.
Standard Claims
The JwtBuilder
provides convenient setter methods for standard registered Claim names defined in the JWT
specification. They are:
setIssuer
: sets theiss
(Issuer) ClaimsetSubject
: sets thesub
(Subject) ClaimsetAudience
: sets theaud
(Audience) ClaimsetExpiration
: sets theexp
(Expiration Time) ClaimsetNotBefore
: sets thenbf
(Not Before) ClaimsetIssuedAt
: sets theiat
(Issued At) ClaimsetId
: sets thejti
(JWT ID) Claim
For example:
String jws = Jwts.builder()
.setIssuer("me")
.setSubject("Bob")
.setAudience("you")
.setExpiration(expiration) //a java.util.Date
.setNotBefore(notBefore) //a java.util.Date
.setIssuedAt(new Date()) // for example, now
.setId(UUID.randomUUID()) //just an example id
/// ... etc ...
Custom Claims
If you need to set one or more custom claims that don't match the standard setter method claims shown above, you
can simply call the JwtBuilder
claim
method one or more times as needed:
String jws = Jwts.builder()
.claim("hello", "world")
// ... etc ...
Each time claim
is called, it simply appends the key-value pair to an internal Claims
instance, potentially
overwriting any existing identically-named key/value pair.
Obviously, you do not need to call claim
for any standard claim name, and it is
recommended instead to call the standard respective type-safe setter method as this enhances readability.
Claims Instance
If you want to specify all claims at once, you can use the Jwts.claims()
method and build up the claims
with it:
Claims claims = Jwts.claims();
populate(claims); //implement me
String jws = Jwts.builder()
.setClaims(claims)
// ... etc ...
Warning
Per standard Java
setter
idioms, callingsetClaims
will fully replace all existing claim name/value pairs with the specified values. If you want to add (append) claims in bulk, and not fully replace them, use theJwtBuilder
'saddClaims
method instead.
Claims Map
If you want to specify all claims at once, and you don't want to use Jwts.claims()
, you can use JwtBuilder
setClaims(Map)
method instead:
Map<String,Object> claims = getMyClaimsMap(); //implement me
String jws = Jwts.builder()
.setClaims(claims)
// ... etc ...
Warning
Per standard Java
setter
idioms, callingsetClaims
will fully replace all existing claim name/value pairs with the specified values. If you want to add (append) claims in bulk, and not fully replace them, use theJwtBuilder
'saddClaims
method instead.
JWT Compression
If your JWT payload is large (contains a lot of data), you might want to compress the JWT to reduce its size. Note that this is not a standard feature for all JWTs - only JWEs - and is not likely to be supported by other JWT libraries for non-JWE tokens. JJWT supports compression for both JWSs and JWEs, however.
Please see the main Compression section to see how to compress and decompress JWTs.
Reading a JWT
You read (parse) a JWT as follows:
- Use the
Jwts.parserBuilder()
method to create aJwtParserBuilder
instance. - Optionally call
setKeyLocator
,verifyWith
ordecryptWith
methods if you expect to parse signed or encrypted JWTs. - Call the
build()
method on theJwtParserBuilder
to create and return a thread-safeJwtParser
. - Call one of the various
parse*
methods with your compact JWT string, depending on the type of JWT you expect. - Wrap the
parse*
call in a try/catch block in case parsing, signature verification, or decryption fails.
For example:
Jwt<?,?> jwt;
try {
jwt = Jwts.parserBuilder() // (1)
.setKeyLocator(keyLocator) // (2) dynamically locate signing or encryption keys
//.verifyWith(key) // or a static key used to verify all signed JWTs
//.decryptWith(key) // or a static key used to decrypt all encrypted JWTs
.build() // (3)
.parse(compact); // (4) or parseClaimsJws, parseClaimsJwe, parseContentJws, etc
// we can safely trust the JWT
catch (JwtException ex) { // (5)
// we *cannot* use the JWT as intended by its creator
}
Note
Type-safe JWTs: If you are certain your parser will only ever encounter a specific kind of JWT (for example, you only ever use signed JWTs with
Claims
payloads, or encrypted JWTs withbyte[]
content payloads, etc), you can call the associated type-safeparseClaimsJws
,parseClaimsJwe
, (etc) method variant instead of the genericparse
method.These
parse*
methods will return the type-safe JWT you are expecting, for example, aJws<Claims>
orJwe<byte[]>
instead of a genericJwt<?,?>
instance.
Static Parsing Key
If the JWT parsed is a JWS or JWE, a key will be necessary to verify the signature or decrypt it. If a JWS and signature verification fails, or if a JWE and decryption fails, the JWT cannot be safely trusted and should be discarded.
So which key do we use?
-
If parsing a JWS and the JWS was signed with a
SecretKey
, the sameSecretKey
should be specified on theJwtParserBuilder
. For example:Jwts.parserBuilder() .verifyWith(secretKey) // <---- .build() .parseClaimsJws(jwsString);
-
If parsing a JWS and the JWS was signed with a
PrivateKey
, that key's correspondingPublicKey
(not thePrivateKey
) should be specified on theJwtParserBuilder
. For example:Jwts.parserBuilder() .verifyWith(publicKey) // <---- publicKey, not privateKey .build() .parseClaimsJws(jwsString);
-
If parsing a JWE and the JWE was encrypted with direct encryption using a
SecretKey
, the sameSecretKey
should be specified on theJwtParserBuilder
. For example:Jwts.parserBuilder() .decryptWith(secretKey) // <---- .build() .parseClaimsJwe(jweString);
-
If parsing a JWE and the JWE was encrypted with a key algorithm using with a
PublicKey
, that key's correspondingPrivateKey
(not thePublicKey
) should be specified on theJwtParserBuilder
. For example:Jwts.parserBuilder() .decryptWith(privateKey) // <---- privateKey, not publicKey .build() .parseClaimsJwe(jweString);
Multiple Keys?
But you might have noticed something - what if your application doesn't use just a single SecretKey
or KeyPair
? What
if JWSs and JWEs can be created with different SecretKey
s or public/private keys, or a combination of both? How do
you know which key to specify if you don't inspect the JWT first?
In these cases, you can't call the JwtParserBuilder
's verifyWith
or decryptWith
methods with a single key -
instead, you'll need to configure a parsing Key Locator, discussed next.
Dynamic Key Lookup
It is common in many applications to receive JWTs that can be encrypted or signed by different cryptographic keys. For example, maybe a JWT created to assert a specific user identity uses a Key specific to that exact user. Or perhaps JWTs specific to a particular customer all use that customer's Key. Or maybe your application creates JWTs that are encrypted with a key specific to your application for your own use (e.g. a user session token).
In all of these and similar scenarios, you won't know which key was used to sign or encrypt a JWT until the JWT is
received, at parse time, so you can't 'hard code' any verification or decryption key using the JwtParserBuilder
's
verifyWith
or decryptWith
methods. Those are only to be used when the same key is used to verify or decrypt
all JWSs or JWEs, which won't work for dynamically signed or encrypted JWTs.
Key Locator
If you need to support dynamic key lookup when encountering JWTs, you'll need to implement
the Locator<Key>
interface and specify an instance on the JwtParserBuilder
via the setKeyLocator
method. For
example:
Locator<Key> keyLocator = getMyKeyLocator();
Jwts.parserBuilder()
.setKeyLocator(keyLocator) // <----
.build()
// ... etc ...
A Locator<Key>
is used to lookup both JWS signature verification keys and JWE decryption keys. You need to
determine which key to return based on information in the JWT header
, for example:
public class MyKeyLocator extends LocatorAdapter<Key> {
@Override
public Key locate(ProtectedHeader<?> header) { // a JwsHeader or JweHeader
// implement me
}
}
The JwtParser
will invoke the locate
method after parsing the JWT header
, but before parsing the payload
,
or verifying any JWS signature or decrypting any JWE ciphertext. This allows you to inspect the header
argument
for any information that can help you look up the Key
to use for verifying that specific jwt. This is very
powerful for applications with more complex security models that might use different keys at different times or for
different users or customers.
Key Locator Strategy
What data might you inspect to determine how to lookup a signature verification or decryption key?
The JWT specifications' preferred approach is to set a kid
(Key ID) header value when the JWT is being created,
for example:
Key key = getSigningKey(); // or getEncryptionKey() for JWE
String keyId = getKeyId(key); //any mechanism you have to associate a key with an ID is fine
String jws = Jwts.builder()
.setHeader(Jwts.headerBuilder().setKeyId(keyId)) // <--- add `kid` header
.signWith(key) // for JWS
//.encryptWith(key, keyAlg, encryptionAlg) // for JWE
.compact();
Then during parsing, your Locator<Key>
implementation can inspect the header
to get the kid
value and then use it
to look up the verification or decryption key from somewhere, like a database, keystore or Hardware Security Module
(HSM). For example:
public class MyKeyLocator extends LocatorAdapter<Key> {
@Override
public Key locate(ProtectedHeader<?> header) { // both JwsHeader and JweHeader extend ProtectedHeader
//inspect the header, lookup and return the verification key
String keyId = header.getKeyId(); //or any other field that you need to inspect
Key key = lookupKey(keyId); //implement me
return key;
}
}
Note that inspecting the header.getKeyId()
is just the most common approach to look up a key - you could
inspect any number of header fields to determine how to lookup the verification or decryption key. It is all based on
how the JWT was created.
If you extend LocatorAdapter<Key>
as shown above, but for some reason have different lookup strategies for
signature verification keys versus decryption keys, you can forego overriding the locate(ProtectedHeader<?>)
method
in favor of two respective locate(JwsHeader)
and locate(JweHeader)
methods:
public class MyKeyLocator extends LocatorAdapter<Key> {
@Override
public Key locate(JwsHeader header) {
String keyId = header.getKeyId(); //or any other field that you need to inspect
return lookupSignatureVerificationKey(keyId); //implement me
}
@Override
public Key locate(JweHeader header) {
String keyId = header.getKeyId(); //or any other field that you need to inspect
return lookupDecryptionKey(keyId); //implement me
}
}
Note
Simpler Lookup: If possible, try to keep the key lookup strategy the same between JWSs and JWEs (i.e. using only
locate(ProtectedHeader<?>)
), preferably using only thekid
(Key ID) header value or perhaps a public key thumbprint. You will find the implementation is much simpler and easier to maintain over time, and also creates smaller headers for compact transmission.
Key Locator Return Values
Regardless of which implementation strategy you choose, remember to return the appropriate type of key depending on the type of JWS or JWE algorithm used. That is:
- For JWS:
- For HMAC-based signature algorithms, the returned verification key should be a
SecretKey
, and, - For asymmetric signature algorithms, the returned verification key should be a
PublicKey
(not aPrivateKey
).
- For HMAC-based signature algorithms, the returned verification key should be a
- For JWE:
- For JWE direct encryption, the returned decryption key should be a
SecretKey
. - For password-based key derivation algorithms, the returned decryption key should be a
io.jsonwebtoken.security.Password
. You can create aPassword
instance by callingKeys.forPassword(char[] passwordCharacters)
. - For asymmetric key management algorithms, the returned decryption key should be a
PrivateKey
(not aPublicKey
).
- For JWE direct encryption, the returned decryption key should be a
Claim Assertions
You can enforce that the JWT you are parsing conforms to expectations that you require and are important for your application.
For example, let's say that you require that the JWT you are parsing has a specific sub
(subject) value,
otherwise you may not trust the token. You can do that by using one of the various require
* methods on the
JwtParserBuilder
:
try {
Jwts.parserBuilder().requireSubject("jsmith")/* etc... */.build().parse(s);
} catch (InvalidClaimException ice) {
// the sub field was missing or did not have a 'jsmith' value
}
If it is important to react to a missing vs an incorrect value, instead of catching InvalidClaimException
,
you can catch either MissingClaimException
or IncorrectClaimException
:
try {
Jwts.parserBuilder().requireSubject("jsmith")/* etc... */.build().parse(s);
} catch(MissingClaimException mce) {
// the parsed JWT did not have the sub field
} catch(IncorrectClaimException ice) {
// the parsed JWT had a sub field, but its value was not equal to 'jsmith'
}
You can also require custom fields by using the require(fieldName, requiredFieldValue)
method - for example:
try {
Jwts.parserBuilder().require("myfield", "myRequiredValue")/* etc... */.build().parse(s);
} catch(InvalidClaimException ice) {
// the 'myfield' field was missing or did not have a 'myRequiredValue' value
}
(or, again, you could catch either MissingClaimException
or IncorrectClaimException
instead).
Please see the JwtParserBuilder
class and/or JavaDoc for a full list of the various require
* methods you may use
for claims assertions.
Accounting for Clock Skew
When parsing a JWT, you might find that exp
or nbf
claim assertions fail (throw exceptions) because the clock on
the parsing machine is not perfectly in sync with the clock on the machine that created the JWT. This can cause
obvious problems since exp
and nbf
are time-based assertions, and clock times need to be reliably in sync for shared
assertions.
You can account for these differences (usually no more than a few minutes) when parsing using the JwtParserBuilder
's
setAllowedClockSkewSeconds
. For example:
long seconds = 3 * 60; //3 minutes
Jwts.parserBuilder()
.setAllowedClockSkewSeconds(seconds) // <----
// ... etc ...
.build()
.parse(jwt);
This ensures that clock differences between the machines can be ignored. Two or three minutes should be more than enough; it would be fairly strange if a production machine's clock was more than 5 minutes difference from most atomic clocks around the world.
Custom Clock Support
If the above setAllowedClockSkewSeconds
isn't sufficient for your needs, the timestamps created
during parsing for timestamp comparisons can be obtained via a custom time source. Call the JwtParserBuilder
's
setClock
method with an implementation of the io.jsonwebtoken.Clock
interface. For example:
Clock clock = new MyClock();
Jwts.parserBuilder().setClock(myClock) //... etc ...
The JwtParser
's default Clock
implementation simply returns new Date()
to reflect the time when parsing occurs,
as most would expect. However, supplying your own clock could be useful, especially when writing test cases to
guarantee deterministic behavior.
JWT Decompression
If you used JJWT to compress a JWT and you used a custom compression algorithm, you will need to tell the
JwtParserBuilder
how to resolve your CompressionCodec
to decompress the JWT.
Please see the Compression section below to see how to decompress JWTs during parsing.
Signed JWTs
The JWT specification provides for the ability to cryptographically sign a JWT. Signing a JWT:
- guarantees the JWT was created by someone we know (it is authentic) as well as
- guarantees that no-one has manipulated or changed the JWT after it was created (its integrity is maintained).
These two properties - authenticity and integrity - assure us that a JWT contains information we can trust. If a JWT fails authenticity or integrity checks, we should always reject that JWT because we can't trust it.
But before we dig in to showing you how to create a JWS using JJWT, let's briefly discuss Signature Algorithms and Keys, specifically as they relate to the JWT specifications. Understanding them is critical to being able to create a JWS properly.
Standard Signature Algorithms
The JWT specifications identify 13 standard signature algorithms - 3 secret key algorithms and 10 asymmetric key algorithms:
Identifier | Signature Algorithm |
---|---|
HS256 |
HMAC using SHA-256 |
HS384 |
HMAC using SHA-384 |
HS512 |
HMAC using SHA-512 |
ES256 |
ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256 |
ES384 |
ECDSA using P-384 and SHA-384 |
ES512 |
ECDSA using P-521 and SHA-512 |
RS256 |
RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 using SHA-256 |
RS384 |
RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 using SHA-384 |
RS512 |
RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 using SHA-512 |
PS256 |
RSASSA-PSS using SHA-256 and MGF1 with SHA-2561 |
PS384 |
RSASSA-PSS using SHA-384 and MGF1 with SHA-3841 |
PS512 |
RSASSA-PSS using SHA-512 and MGF1 with SHA-5121 |
EdDSA |
Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)2 |
1. Requires Java 11 or a compatible JCA Provider (like BouncyCastle) in the runtime classpath.
2. Requires Java 15 or a compatible JCA Provider (like BouncyCastle) in the runtime classpath.
These are all represented as constants in the io.jsonwebtoken.Jwts.SIG
registry singleton.
Signature Algorithms Keys
What's really important about the above standard signature algorithms - other than their security properties - is that the JWT specification RFC 7518, Sections 3.2 through 3.5 requires (mandates) that you MUST use keys that are sufficiently strong for a chosen algorithm.
This means that JJWT - a specification-compliant library - will also enforce that you use sufficiently strong keys for the algorithms you choose. If you provide a weak key for a given algorithm, JJWT will reject it and throw an exception.
This is not because we want to make your life difficult, we promise! The reason why the JWT specification, and consequently JJWT, mandates key lengths is that the security model of a particular algorithm can completely break down if you don't adhere to the mandatory key properties of the algorithm, effectively having no security at all. No one wants completely insecure JWTs, right? Right!
So what are the key strength requirements?
HMAC-SHA
JWT HMAC-SHA signature algorithms HS256
, HS384
, and HS512
require a secret key that is at least as many bits as
the algorithm's signature (digest) length per RFC 7512 Section 3.2.
This means:
-
HS256
is HMAC-SHA-256, and that produces digests that are 256 bits (32 bytes) long, soHS256
requires that you use a secret key that is at least 32 bytes long. -
HS384
is HMAC-SHA-384, and that produces digests that are 384 bits (48 bytes) long, soHS384
requires that you use a secret key that is at least 48 bytes long. -
HS512
is HMAC-SHA-512, and that produces digests that are 512 bits (64 bytes) long, soHS512
requires that you use a secret key that is at least 64 bytes long.
RSA
JWT RSA signature algorithms RS256
, RS384
, RS512
, PS256
, PS384
and PS512
all require a minimum key length
(aka an RSA modulus bit length) of 2048
bits per RFC 7512 Sections
3.3 and 3.5.
Anything smaller than this (such as 1024 bits) will be rejected with an WeakKeyException
.
That said, in keeping with best practices and increasing key lengths for security longevity, JJWT recommends that you use:
- at least 2048 bit keys with
RS256
andPS256
- at least 3072 bit keys with
RS384
andPS384
- at least 4096 bit keys with
RS512
andPS512
These are only JJWT suggestions and not requirements. JJWT only enforces JWT specification requirements and for any RSA key, the requirement is the RSA key (modulus) length in bits MUST be >= 2048 bits.
Elliptic Curve
JWT Elliptic Curve signature algorithms ES256
, ES384
, and ES512
all require a key length
(aka an Elliptic Curve order bit length) equal to the algorithm signature's individual
R
and S
components per RFC 7512 Section 3.4. This means:
-
ES256
requires that you use a private key that is exactly 256 bits (32 bytes) long. -
ES384
requires that you use a private key that is exactly 384 bits (48 bytes) long. -
ES512
requires that you use a private key that is exactly 521 bits (65 or 66 bytes) long (depending on format).
Edwards Curve
The JWT Edwards Curve signature algorithm EdDSA
supports two sizes of private and public EdECKey
s (these types
were introduced in Java 15):
-
Ed25519
algorithm keys must be 256 bits (32 bytes) long and produce signatures 512 bits (64 bytes) long. -
Ed448
algorithm keys must be 456 bits (57 bytes) long and produce signatures 912 bits (114 bytes) long.
Creating Safe Keys
If you don't want to think about bit length requirements or just want to make your life easier, JJWT has provided convenient builder classes that can generate sufficiently secure keys for any given JWT signature algorithm you might want to use.
Secret Keys
If you want to generate a sufficiently strong SecretKey
for use with the JWT HMAC-SHA algorithms, use the respective
algorithm's keyBuilder()
method:
SecretKey key = Jwts.SIG.HS256.keyBuilder().build(); //or HS384.keyBuilder() or HS512.keyBuilder()
Under the hood, JJWT uses the JCA default provider's KeyGenerator
to create a secure-random key with the correct
minimum length for the given algorithm.
If you want to specify a specific JCA Provider
or SecureRandom
to use during key generation, you may specify those
as builder arguments. For example:
SecretKey key = Jwts.SIG.HS256.keyBuilder().setProvider(aProvider).setRandom(aSecureRandom).build();
If you need to save this new SecretKey
, you can Base64 (or Base64URL) encode it:
String secretString = Encoders.BASE64.encode(key.getEncoded());
Ensure you save the resulting secretString
somewhere safe -
Base64-encoding is not encryption, so it's still considered sensitive information. You can
further encrypt it, etc, before saving to disk (for example).
Asymmetric Keys
If you want to generate sufficiently strong Elliptic Curve or RSA asymmetric key pairs for use with JWT ECDSA or RSA
algorithms, use an algorithm's respective keyPairBuilder()
method:
KeyPair keyPair = Jwts.SIG.RS256.keyPairBuilder().build(); //or RS384, RS512, PS256, etc...
Once you've generated a KeyPair
, you can use the private key (keyPair.getPrivate()
) to create a JWS and the
public key (keyPair.getPublic()
) to parse/verify a JWS.
Note
The
PS256
,PS384
, andPS512
algorithms require JDK 11 or a compatible JCA Provider (like BouncyCastle) in the runtime classpath.
TheEdDSA
,Ed25519
andEd448
algorithms require JDK 15 or a compatible JCA Provider (like BouncyCastle) in the runtime classpath. If you want to use either set of algorithms, and you are on an earlier JDK that does not support them, see the Installation section to see how to enable BouncyCastle. All other algorithms are natively supported by the JDK.
Creating a JWS
You create a JWS as follows:
- Use the
Jwts.builder()
method to create aJwtBuilder
instance. - Call
JwtBuilder
methods to set thepayload
content or claims and any header parameters as desired. - Specify the
SecretKey
or asymmetricPrivateKey
you want to use to sign the JWT. - Finally, call the
compact()
method to compact and sign, producing the final jws.
For example:
String jws = Jwts.builder() // (1)
.setSubject("Bob") // (2)
.signWith(key) // (3) <---
.compact(); // (4)
Signing Key
It is usually recommended to specify the signing key by calling the JwtBuilder
's signWith
method and let JJWT
determine the most secure algorithm allowed for the specified key.:
String jws = Jwts.builder()
// ... etc ...
.signWith(key) // <---
.compact();
For example, if you call signWith
with a SecretKey
that is 256 bits (32 bytes) long, it is not strong enough for
HS384
or HS512
, so JJWT will automatically sign the JWT using HS256
.
When using signWith
JJWT will also automatically set the required alg
header with the associated algorithm
identifier.
Similarly, if you called signWith
with an RSA PrivateKey
that was 4096 bits long, JJWT will use the RS512
algorithm and automatically set the alg
header to RS512
.
The same selection logic applies for Elliptic Curve PrivateKey
s.
Note
You cannot sign JWTs with
PublicKey
s as this is always insecure. JJWT will reject any specifiedPublicKey
for signing with anInvalidKeyException
.
SecretKey Formats
If you want to sign a JWS using HMAC-SHA algorithms, and you have a secret key String
or
encoded byte array, you will need
to convert it into a SecretKey
instance to use as the signWith
method argument.
If your secret key is:
-
SecretKey key = Keys.hmacShaKeyFor(encodedKeyBytes);
-
A Base64-encoded string:
SecretKey key = Keys.hmacShaKeyFor(Decoders.BASE64.decode(secretString));
-
A Base64URL-encoded string:
SecretKey key = Keys.hmacShaKeyFor(Decoders.BASE64URL.decode(secretString));
-
A raw (non-encoded) string (e.g. a password String):
SecretKey key = Keys.hmacShaKeyFor(secretString.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
It is always incorrect to call
secretString.getBytes()
(without providing a charset).However, raw password strings like this, e.g.
correcthorsebatterystaple
should be avoided whenever possible because they can inevitably result in weak or susceptible keys. Secure-random keys are almost always stronger. If you are able, prefer creating a new secure-random secret key instead.
SignatureAlgorithm Override
In some specific cases, you might want to override JJWT's default selected signature algorithm for a given key.
For example, if you have an RSA PrivateKey
that is 2048 bits, JJWT would automatically choose the RS256
algorithm.
If you wanted to use RS384
or RS512
instead, you could manually specify it with the overloaded signWith
method
that accepts the SignatureAlgorithm
as an additional parameter:
.signWith(privateKey, Jwts.SIG.RS512) // <---
.compact();
This is allowed because the JWT specification allows any RSA algorithm strength for any RSA key >= 2048 bits. JJWT just
prefers RS512
for keys >= 4096 bits, followed by RS384
for keys >= 3072 bits and finally RS256
for keys >= 2048
bits.
In all cases however, regardless of your chosen algorithms, JJWT will assert that the specified key is allowed to be used for that algorithm when possible according to the JWT specification requirements.
JWS Compression
If your JWT payload is large (contains a lot of data), and you are certain that JJWT will also be the same library that reads/parses your JWS, you might want to compress the JWS to reduce its size.
Warning
Not Standard for JWS: JJWT supports compression for JWS, but it is not a standard feature for JWS. The JWT RFC specifications standardize this only for JWEs, and it is not likely to be supported by other JWT libraries for JWS. Use JWS compression only if you are certain that JJWT (or another library that supports JWS compression) will be parsing the JWS
Please see the main Compression section to see how to compress and decompress JWTs.
Reading a JWS
You read (parse) a JWS as follows:
- Use the
Jwts.parserBuilder()
method to create aJwtParserBuilder
instance. - Call either setKeyLocator or
verifyWith
methods to determine the key used to verify the JWS signature. - Call the
build()
method on theJwtParserBuilder
to return a thread-safeJwtParser
. - Finally, call the
parseClaimsJws(String)
method with your jwsString
, producing the original JWS. - The entire call is wrapped in a try/catch block in case parsing or signature validation fails. We'll cover exceptions and causes for failure later.
For example:
Jws<Claims> jws;
try {
jws = Jwts.parserBuilder() // (1)
.setKeyLocator(keyLocator) // (2) dynamically lookup verification keys based on each JWS
//.verifyWith(key) // or a static key used to verify all encountered JWSs
.build() // (3)
.parseClaimsJws(jwsString); // (4) or parseContentJws(jwsString)
// we can safely trust the JWT
catch (JwtException ex) { // (5)
// we *cannot* use the JWT as intended by its creator
}
Note
Type-safe JWSs:
- If you are expecting a JWS with a Claims
payload
, call theJwtParser
'sparseClaimsJws
method.- If you are expecting a JWS with a content
payload
, call theJwtParser
'sparseContentJws
method.
Verification Key
The most important thing to do when reading a JWS is to specify the key used to verify the JWS's cryptographic signature. If signature verification fails, the JWT cannot be safely trusted and should be discarded.
So which key do we use for verification?
-
If the jws was signed with a
SecretKey
, the sameSecretKey
should be specified on theJwtParserBuilder
.
For example:Jwts.parserBuilder() .verifyWith(secretKey) // <---- .build() .parseClaimsJws(jwsString);
-
If the jws was signed with a
PrivateKey
, that key's correspondingPublicKey
(not thePrivateKey
) should be specified on theJwtParserBuilder
. For example:Jwts.parserBuilder() .verifyWith(publicKey) // <---- publicKey, not privateKey .build() .parseClaimsJws(jwsString);
Verification Key Locator
But you might have noticed something - what if your application doesn't use just a single SecretKey
or KeyPair
? What
if JWSs can be created with different SecretKey
s or public/private keys, or a combination of both? How do you
know which key to specify if you can't inspect the JWT first?
In these cases, you can't call the JwtParserBuilder
's verifyWith
method with a single key - instead, you'll need a
Key Locator. Please see the Key Lookup section to see how to dynamically obtain different keys when
parsing JWSs or JWEs.
JWS Decompression
If you used JJWT to compress a JWS and you used a custom compression algorithm, you will need to tell the
JwtParserBuilder
how to resolve your CompressionCodec
to decompress the JWT.
Please see the Compression section below to see how to decompress JWTs during parsing.
Encrypted JWTs
The JWT specification also provides for the ability to encrypt and decrypt a JWT. Encrypting a JWT:
- guarantees that no-one other than the intended JWT recipient can see the JWT
payload
(it is confidential), and - guarantees that no-one has manipulated or changed the JWT after it was created (its integrity is maintained).
These two properties - confidentiality and integrity - assure us that an encrypted JWT contains a paylaod
that
no-one else can see, nor has anyone changed or altered the data in transit.
Encryption and confidentiality seem somewhat obvious: if you encrypt a message, it is confidential by the notion that random 3rd parties cannot make sense of the encrypted message. But some might be surprised to know that general encryption does not guarantee that someone hasn't tampered/altered an encrypted message in transit. Most of us assume that if a message can be decrypted, then the message would be authentic and unchanged - after all, if you can decrypt it, it must not have been tampered with, right? Because if it was changed, decryption would surely fail, right?
Unfortunately, this is not actually guaranteed in all cryptographic ciphers. There are certain attack vectors where it is possible to change an encrypted payload (called 'ciphertext'), and the message recipient is still able to successfully decrypt the (modified) payload. In these cases, the ciphertext integrity was not maintained - a malicious 3rd party could intercept a message and change the payload content, even if they don't understand what is inside the payload, and the message recipient could never know.
To combat this, there is a category of encryption algorithms that ensures both confidentiality and integrity of the ciphertext data. These types of algorithms are called Authenticated Encryption algorithms.
As a result, to ensure JWTs do not suffer from this problem, the JWE RFC specifications require that any encryption algorithm used to encrypt a JWT MUST be an Authenticated Encryption algorithm. JWT users can be sufficiently confident their encrypted JWTs maintain the properties of both confidentiality and integrity.
JWE Encryption Algorithms
The JWT specification defines 6 standard Authenticated Encryption algorithms used to encrypt a JWT payload
:
Identifier | Required Key Bit Length | Encryption Algorithm |
---|---|---|
A128CBC‑HS256 |
256 | AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 authenticated encryption algorithm |
A192CBC-HS384 |
384 | AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 authenticated encryption algorithm |
A256CBC-HS512 |
512 | AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 authenticated encryption algorithm |
A128GCM |
128 | AES GCM using 128-bit key1 |
A192GCM |
192 | AES GCM using 192-bit key1 |
A256GCM |
256 | AES GCM using 256-bit key1 |
1. Requires Java 8+ or a compatible JCA Provider (like BouncyCastle) in the runtime classpath.
These are all represented as constants in the io.jsonwebtoken.Jwts.ENC
registry singleton as
implementations of the io.jsonwebtoken.security.AeadAlgorithm
interface.
As shown in the table above, each algorithm requires a key of sufficient length. The JWT specification RFC 7518, Sections 5.2.3 through 5.3 requires (mandates) that you MUST use keys that are sufficiently strong for a chosen algorithm. This means that JJWT - a specification-compliant library - will also enforce that you use sufficiently strong keys for the algorithms you choose. If you provide a weak key for a given algorithm, JJWT will reject it and throw an exception.
The reason why the JWT specification, and consequently JJWT, mandates key lengths is that the security model of a particular algorithm can completely break down if you don't adhere to the mandatory key properties of the algorithm, effectively having no security at all.
Symmetric Ciphers
You might have noticed something about the above Authenticated Encryption algorithms: they're all variants of the AES algorithm, and AES always uses a symmetric (secret) key to perform encryption and decryption. That's kind of strange, isn't it?
What about RSA and Elliptic Curve asymmetric key cryptography? And Diffie-Hellman key exchange? What about password-based key derivation algorithms? Surely any of those could be desirable depending on the use case, no?
Yes, they definitely can, and the JWT specifications do support them, albeit indirectly: those other
algorithms are indeed supported and used, but they aren't used to encrypt the JWT payload
directly. They are
used to produce the actual key used to encrypt the JWT
payload.
This is all done via the JWT specification's concept of a Key Management Algorithm, covered next. After we cover that,
we'll show you how to encrypt and parse your own JWTs with the JwtBuilder
and JwtParserBuilder
.
JWE Key Management Algorithms
As stated above, all standard JWA Encryption Algorithms are AES-based authenticated encryption algorithms. So what about RSA and Elliptic Curve cryptography? And password-based key derivation, or Diffie-Hellman exchange?
All of those are supported as well, but they are not used directly for encryption. They are used to produce the
key that will be used to directly encrypt the JWT payload
.
That is, JWT encryption can be thought of as a two-step process, shown in the following pseudocode:
Key algorithmKey = getKeyManagementAlgorithmKey(); // PublicKey, SecretKey, or Password
SecretKey contentEncryptionKey = keyManagementAlgorithm.produceEncryptionKey(algorithmKey); // 1
byte[] ciphertext = encryptionAlgorithm.encrypt(payload, contentEncryptionKey); // 2
Steps:
- Use the
algorithmKey
to produce the actual key that will be used to encrypt the payload. The JWT specifications call this result the 'Content Encryption Key'. - Take the resulting Content Encryption Key and use it directly with the Authenticated Encryption algorithm to
actually encrypt the JWT
payload
.
So why the indirection? Why not just use any PublicKey
, SecretKey
or Password
to encrypt the payload
directly ?
There are quite a few reasons for this.
- Asymmetric key encryption (like RSA and Elliptic Curve) tends to be slow. Like really slow. Symmetric key cipher algorithms in contrast are really fast. This matters a lot in production applications that could be handling a JWT on every HTTP request, which could be thousands per second.
- RSA encryption (for example) can only encrypt a relatively small amount of data. A 2048-bit RSA key can only encrypt up to a maximum of 245 bytes. A 4096-bit RSA key can only encrypt up to a maximum of 501 bytes. There are plenty of JWTs that can exceed 245 bytes, and that would make RSA unusable.
- Passwords usually make for very poor encryption keys - they often have poor entropy, or they themselves are often too short to be used directly with algorithms that mandate minimum key lengths to help ensure safety.
For these reasons and more, using one secure algorithm to generate or encrypt a key used for another (very fast) secure algorithm has been proven to be a great way to increase security through many more secure algorithms while also still resulting in very fast and secure output. This is after all how TLS (for https encryption) works - two parties can use more complex cryptography (like RSA or Elliptic Curve) to negotiate a small, fast encryption key. This fast encryption key is produced during the 'TLS handshake' and is called the TLS 'session key'.
So the JWT specifications work much in the same way: one key from any number of various algorithm types can be used
to produce a final symmetric key, and that symmetric key is used to encrypt the JWT payload
.
JWE Standard Key Management Algorithms
The JWT specification defines 17 standard Key Management Algorithms used to produce the JWE Content Encryption Key (CEK):
Identifier | Key Management Algorithm |
---|---|
RSA1_5 |
RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 |
RSA-OAEP |
RSAES OAEP using default parameters |
RSA-OAEP-256 |
RSAES OAEP using SHA-256 and MGF1 with SHA-256 |
A128KW |
AES Key Wrap with default initial value using 128-bit key |
A192KW |
AES Key Wrap with default initial value using 192-bit key |
A256KW |
AES Key Wrap with default initial value using 256-bit key |
dir |
Direct use of a shared symmetric key as the Content Encryption Key |
ECDH-ES |
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static key agreement using Concat KDF |
ECDH-ES+A128KW |
ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and CEK wrapped with "A128KW" |
ECDH-ES+A192KW |
ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and CEK wrapped with "A192KW" |
ECDH-ES+A256KW |
ECDH-ES using Concat KDF and CEK wrapped with "A256KW" |
A128GCMKW |
Key wrapping with AES GCM using 128-bit key3 |
A192GCMKW |
Key wrapping with AES GCM using 192-bit key3 |
A256GCMKW |
Key wrapping with AES GCM using 256-bit key3 |
PBES2-HS256+A128KW |
PBES2 with HMAC SHA-256 and "A128KW" wrapping3 |
PBES2-HS384+A192KW |
PBES2 with HMAC SHA-384 and "A192KW" wrapping3 |
PBES2‑HS512+A256KW |
PBES2 with HMAC SHA-512 and "A256KW" wrapping3 |
3. Requires Java 8 or a compatible JCA Provider (like BouncyCastle) in the runtime classpath.
These are all represented as constants in the io.jsonwebtoken.Jwts.KEY
registry singleton as
implementations of the io.jsonwebtoken.security.KeyAlgorithm
interface.
But 17 algorithms are a lot to choose from. When would you use them? The sections below describe when you might choose each category of algorithms and how they behave.
RSA Key Encryption
The JWT RSA key management algorithms RSA1_5
, RSA-OAEP
, and RSA-OAEP-256
are used when you want to use the
JWE recipient's RSA public key during encryption. This ensures that only the JWE recipient can decrypt
and read the JWE (using their RSA private
key).
During JWE creation, these algorithms:
- Generate a new secure-random Content Encryption Key (CEK) suitable for the desired encryption algorithm.
- Encrypt the JWE payload with the desired encryption algorithm using the new CEK, producing the JWE payload ciphertext.
- Encrypt the CEK itself with the specified RSA key wrap algorithm using the JWE recipient's RSA public key.
- Embed the payload ciphertext and encrypted CEK in the resulting JWE.
During JWE decryption, these algorithms:
- Retrieve the encrypted Content Encryption Key (CEK) embedded in the JWE.
- Decrypt the encrypted CEK with the discovered RSA key unwrap algorithm using the JWE recipient's RSA private key, producing the decrypted Content Encryption Key (CEK).
- Decrypt the JWE ciphertext payload with the JWE's identified encryption algorithm using the decrypted CEK.
Warning
RFC 7518 Sections 4.2 and 4.3 require (mandate) that RSA keys >= 2048 bits MUST be used with these algorithms. JJWT will throw an exception if it detects weaker keys being used.
AES Key Encryption
The JWT AES key management algorithms A128KW
, A192KW
, A256KW
, A128GCMKW
, A192GCMKW
, and A256GCMKW
are
used when you have a symmetric secret key, but you don't want to use that secret key to directly
encrypt/decrypt the JWT.
Instead, a new secure-random key is generated each time a JWE is created, and that new/random key is used to directly encrypt/decrypt the JWT payload. The secure-random key is itself encrypted with your symmetric secret key using the AES Wrap algorithm, and the encrypted key is embedded in the resulting JWE.
This allows the JWE to be encrypted with a random short-lived key, reducing material exposure of the potentially longer-lived symmetric secret key.
Because these particular algorithms use a symmetric secret key, they are best suited when the JWE creator and receiver are the same, ensuring the secret key does not need to be shared with multiple parties.
During JWE creation, these algorithms:
- Generate a new secure-random Content Encryption Key (CEK) suitable for the desired encryption algorithm.
- Encrypt the JWE payload with the desired encryption algorithm using the new CEK, producing the JWE payload ciphertext.
- Encrypt the CEK itself with the specified AES key algorithm (either AES Key Wrap or AES with GCM encryption), producing the encrypted CEK.
- Embed the payload ciphertext and encrypted CEK in the resulting JWE.
During JWE decryption, these algorithms:
- Retrieve the encrypted Content Encryption Key (CEK) embedded in the JWE.
- Decrypt the encrypted CEK with the discovered AES key algorithm using the symmetric secret key.
- Decrypt the JWE ciphertext payload with the JWE's identified encryption algorithm using the decrypted CEK.
Warning
The symmetric key used for the AES key algorithms MUST be 128, 192 or 256 bits as required by the specific AES key algorithm. JJWT will throw an exception if it detects weaker keys than what is required.
Direct Key Encryption
The JWT dir
(direct) key management algorithm is used when you have a symmetric secret key, and you want to use it
to directly encrypt the JWT payload.
Because this algorithm uses a symmetric secret key, it is best suited when the JWE creator and receiver are the same, ensuring the secret key does not need to be shared with multiple parties.
This is the simplest key algorithm for direct encryption that does not perform any key encryption. It is essentially a 'no op' key algorithm, allowing the shared key to be used to directly encrypt the JWT payload.
During JWE creation, this algorithm:
- Encrypts the JWE payload with the desired encryption algorithm directly using the symmetric secret key, producing the JWE payload ciphertext.
- Embeds the payload ciphertext in the resulting JWE.
Note that because this algorithm does not produce an encrypted key value, an encrypted CEK is not embedded in the resulting JWE.
During JWE decryption, this algorithm decrypts the JWE ciphertext payload with the JWE's identified encryption algorithm directly using the symmetric secret key. No encrypted CEK is used.
Warning
The symmetric secret key MUST be 128, 192 or 256 bits as required by the associated AEAD encryption algorithm used to encrypt the payload. JJWT will throw an exception if it detects weaker keys than what is required.
Password-Based Key Encryption
The JWT password-based key encryption algorithms PBES2-HS256+A128KW
, PBES2-HS384+A192KW
, and PBES2-HS512+A256KW
are used when you want to use a password (character array) to encrypt and decrypt a JWT.
However, because passwords are usually too weak or problematic to use directly in cryptographic contexts, these algorithms utilize key derivation techniques with work factors (e.g. computation iterations) and secure-random salts to produce stronger cryptographic keys suitable for cryptographic operations.
This allows the payload to be encrypted with a random short-lived cryptographically-stronger key, reducing the need to expose the longer-lived (and potentially weaker) password.
Because these algorithms use a secret password, they are best suited when the JWE creator and receiver are the same, ensuring the secret password does not need to be shared with multiple parties.
During JWE creation, these algorithms:
- Generate a new secure-random Content Encryption Key (CEK) suitable for the desired encryption algorithm.
- Encrypt the JWE payload with the desired encryption algorithm using the new CEK, producing the JWE payload ciphertext.
- Derive a 'key encryption key' (KEK) with the desired "PBES2 with HMAC SHA" algorithm using the password, a suitable number of computational iterations, and a secure-random salt value.
- Encrypt the generated CEK with the corresponding AES Key Wrap algorithm using the password-derived KEK.
- Embed the payload ciphertext and encrypted CEK in the resulting JWE.
Note
Secure defaults: When using these algorithms, if you do not specify a work factor (i.e. number of computational iterations), JJWT will automatically use an OWASP PBKDF2 recommended default appropriate for the specified
PBES2
algorithm.
During JWE decryption, these algorithms:
- Retrieve the encrypted Content Encryption Key (CEK) embedded in the JWE.
- Derive the 'key encryption key' (KEK) with the discovered "PBES2 with HMAC SHA" algorithm using the password and the number of computational iterations and secure-random salt value discovered in the JWE header.
- Decrypt the encrypted CEK with the corresponding AES Key Unwrap algorithm using the password-derived KEK.
- Decrypt the JWE ciphertext payload with the JWE's identified encryption algorithm using the decrypted CEK.
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static Key Agreement
The JWT Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static key agreement algorithms ECDH-ES
, ECDH-ES+A128KW
,
ECDH-ES+A192KW
, and ECDH-ES+A256KW
are used when you want to use the JWE recipient's Elliptic Curve public key
during encryption. This ensures that only the JWE recipient can decrypt and read the JWE (using their Elliptic Curve
private key).
During JWE creation, these algorithms:
- Obtain the Content Encryption Key (CEK) used to encrypt the JWE payload as follows:
- Inspect the JWE recipient's Elliptic Curve public key and determine its Curve.
- Generate a new secure-random ephemeral Ellipic Curve public/private key pair on this same Curve.
- Add the ephemeral EC public key to the JWE epk header for inclusion in the final JWE.
- Produce an ECDH shared secret with the ECDH Key Agreement algorithm using the JWE recipient's EC public key and the ephemeral EC private key.
- Derive a symmetric secret key with the Concat Key Derivation Function (NIST.800-56A, Section 5.8.1) using this ECDH shared secret and any provided PartyUInfo and/or PartyVInfo.
- If the key algorithm is
ECDH-ES
:- Use the Concat KDF-derived symmetric secret key directly as the Content Encryption Key (CEK). No encrypted key is created, nor embedded in the resulting JWE.
- Otherwise, if the key algorithm is
ECDH-ES+A128KW
,ECDH-ES+A192KW
, orECDH-ES+A256KW
:- Generate a new secure-random Content Encryption Key (CEK) suitable for the desired encryption algorithm.
- Encrypt this new CEK with the corresponding AES Key Wrap algorithm using the Concat KDF-derived secret key, producing the encrypted CEK.
- Embed the encrypted CEK in the resulting JWE.
- Encrypt the JWE payload with the desired encryption algorithm using the obtained CEK, producing the JWE payload ciphertext.
- Embed the payload ciphertext in the resulting JWE.
During JWE decryption, these algorithms:
- Obtain the Content Encryption Key (CEK) used to decrypt the JWE payload as follows:
- Retrieve the required ephemeral Elliptic Curve public key from the JWE's epk header.
- Ensure the ephemeral EC public key exists on the same curve as the JWE recipient's EC private key.
- Produce the ECDH shared secret with the ECDH Key Agreement algorithm using the JWE recipient's EC private key and the ephemeral EC public key.
- Derive a symmetric secret key with the Concat Key Derivation Function (NIST.800-56A, Section 5.8.1) using this ECDH shared secret and any PartyUInfo and/or PartyVInfo found in the JWE header.
- If the key algorithm is
ECDH-ES
:- Use the Concat KDF-derived secret key directly as the Content Encryption Key (CEK). No encrypted key is used.
- Otherwise, if the key algorithm is
ECDH-ES+A128KW
,ECDH-ES+A192KW
, orECDH-ES+A256KW
:- Obtain the encrypted key ciphertext embedded in the JWE.
- Decrypt the encrypted key ciphertext with the associated AES Key Unwrap algorithm using the Concat KDF-derived secret key, producing the unencrypted Content Encryption Key (CEK).
- Decrypt the JWE payload ciphertext with the JWE's discovered encryption algorithm using the obtained CEK.
Creating a JWE
Now that we know the difference between a JWE Encryption Algorithm and a JWE Key Management Algorithm, how do we use them to encrypt a JWT?
You create an encrypted JWT (called a 'JWE') as follows:
- Use the
Jwts.builder()
method to create aJwtBuilder
instance. - Call
JwtBuilder
methods to set thepayload
content or claims and any header parameters as desired. - Call the
encryptWith
method, specifying the Key, Key Algorithm, and Encryption Algorithm you want to use. - Finally, call the
compact()
method to compact and encrypt, producing the final jwe.
For example:
String jwe = Jwts.builder() // (1)
.setSubject("Bob") // (2)
.encryptWith(key, keyAlgorithm, encryptionAlgorithm) // (3)
.compact(); // (4)
Before calling compact()
, you may set any header parameters and claims
exactly the same way as described for JWS.
JWE Compression
If your JWT payload or Claims set is large (contains a lot of data), you might want to compress the JWE to reduce its size. Please see the main Compression section to see how to compress and decompress JWTs.
Reading a JWE
You read (parse) a JWE as follows:
- Use the
Jwts.parserBuilder()
method to create aJwtParserBuilder
instance. - Call either setKeyLocator or
decryptWith
methods to determine the key used to decrypt the JWE. - Call the
JwtParserBuilder
'sbuild()
method to create a thread-safeJwtParser
. - Parse the jwe string with the
JwtParser
'sparseClaimsJwe
orparseContentJwe
method. - Wrap the entire call is in a try/catch block in case decryption or integrity verification fails.
For example:
Jwe<Claims> jwe;
try {
jwe = Jwts.parserBuilder() // (1)
.setKeyLocator(keyLocator) // (2) dynamically lookup decryption keys based on each JWE
//.decryptWith(key) // or a static key used to decrypt all encountered JWEs
.build() // (3)
.parseClaimsJwe(jweString); // (4) or parseContentJwe(jweString);
// we can safely trust the JWT
catch (JwtException ex) { // (5)
// we *cannot* use the JWT as intended by its creator
}
Note
Type-safe JWEs:
- If you are expecting a JWE with a Claims
payload
, call theJwtParser
'sparseClaimsJwe
method.- If you are expecting a JWE with a content
payload
, call theJwtParser
'sparseContentJwe
method.
Decryption Key
The most important thing to do when reading a JWE is to specify the key used during decryption. If decryption or integrity protection checks fail, the JWT cannot be safely trusted and should be discarded.
So which key do we use for decryption?
-
If the jwe was encrypted directly with a
SecretKey
, the sameSecretKey
must be specified on theJwtParserBuilder
. For example:Jwts.parserBuilder() .decryptWith(secretKey) // <---- .build() .parseClaimsJws(jwsString);
-
If the jwe was encrypted using a key produced by a Password-based key derivation
KeyAlgorithm
, the samePassword
must be specified on theJwtParserBuilder
. For example:Jwts.parserBuilder() .decryptWith(password) // <---- an `io.jsonwebtoken.security.Password` instance .build() .parseClaimsJws(jwsString);
-
If the jwe was encrypted with a key produced by an asymmetric
KeyAlgorithm
, the correspondingPrivateKey
(not thePublicKey
) must be specified on theJwtParserBuilder
. For example:Jwts.parserBuilder() .decryptWith(privateKey) // <---- a `PrivateKey`, not a `PublicKey` .build() .parseClaimsJws(jwsString);
Decryption Key Locator
What if your application doesn't use just a single SecretKey
or KeyPair
? What
if JWEs can be created with different SecretKey
s, Password
s or public/private keys, or a combination of all of
them? How do you know which key to specify if you can't inspect the JWT first?
In these cases, you can't call the JwtParserBuilder
's decryptWith
method with a single key - instead, you'll need
to use a Key Locator
. Please see the Key Lookup section to see how to dynamically obtain different
keys when parsing JWSs or JWEs.
JWE Decompression
If a JWE is compressed using the DEF
(DEFLATE) or GZIP
(GZIP) compression algorithms, it will automatically be decompressed
after decryption, and there is nothing you need to configure.
If, however, a custom compression algorithm was used to compress the JWE, you will need to tell the
JwtParserBuilder
how to resolve your CompressionCodec
to decompress the JWT.
Please see the Compression section below to see how to decompress JWTs during parsing.
JSON Web Keys (JWKs)
JSON Web Keys (JWKs) are JSON serializations of cryptographic keys, allowing key material to be embedded in JWTs or transmitted between parties in a standard JSON-based text format. They are essentially a JSON-based alternative to other text-based key formats, such as the DER, PEM and PKCS12 text strings or files commonly used when configuring TLS on web servers, for example.
For example, an identity web service may expose its RSA or Elliptic Curve Public Keys to 3rd parties in the JWK format. A client may then parse the public key JWKs to verify the service's JWS tokens, as well as send encrypted information to the service using JWEs.
JWKs can be converted to and from standard Java Key
types as expected using the same builder/parser patterns we've
seen for JWTs.
Create a JWK
You create a JWK as follows:
- Use the
Jwks.builder()
method to create aJwkBuilder
instance. - Call the
forKey
method with the Java key you wish to represent as a JWK. - Call builder methods to set any additional key fields or metadata, such as a
kid
(Key ID), X509 Certificates, etc as desired. - Call the
build()
method to produce the resulting JWK.
For example:
SecretKey key = getSecretKey(); // or RSA or EC PublicKey or PrivateKey
SecretJwk = Jwts.builder().forKey(key) // (1) and (2)
.setId("mySecretKeyId") // (3)
// ... etc ...
.build(); // (4)
Read a JWK
You can read/parse a JWK by building a JwkParser
and parsing the JWK JSON string with its parse
method:
String json = getJwkJsonString();
Jwk<?> jwk = Jwks.parser()
//.setProvider(aJcaProvider) // optional
//.deserializeJsonWith(deserializer) // optional
.build() // create the parser
.parse(json); // actually parse the JSON
Key key = jwk.toKey(); // convert to a Java Key instance
As shown above you can specify a custom JCA Provider or JSON deserializer in the same way as the JwtBuilder
.
PrivateKey JWKs
Unlike Java, the JWA specification requires a private JWKs to contain both public key and private key material (see RFC 7518, Section 6.1.1 and RFC 7518, Section 6.3.2).
In this sense, a private JWK (represented as a PrivateJwk
or a subtype, such as RsaPrivateJwk
, EcPrivateJwk
, etc)
can be thought of more like a Java KeyPair
instance. Consequently, when creating a PrivateJwk
instance,
the PrivateKey
's corresponding PublicKey
is required.
Private JWK PublicKey
If you do not provide a PublicKey
when creating a PrivateJwk
, JJWT will automatically derive the PublicKey
from
the PrivateKey
instance if possible. However, because this can add
some computing time, it is typically recommended to provide the PublicKey
when possible to avoid this extra work.
For example:
RSAPrivateKey rsaPrivateKey = getRSAPrivateKey(); // or ECPrivateKey
RsaPrivateJwk jwk = Jwks.builder().forKey(rsaPrivateKey)
//.setPublicKey(rsaPublicKey) // optional, but recommended to avoid extra computation work
.build();
Private JWK from KeyPair
If you have a Java KeyPair
instance, then you have both the public and private key material necessary to create a
PrivateJwk
. For example:
KeyPair rsaKeyPair = getRSAKeyPair();
RsaPrivateJwk rsaPrivJwk = Jwks.builder().forRsaKeyPair(rsaKeyPair).build();
KeyPair ecKeyPair = getECKeyPair();
EcPrivateJwk ecPrivJwk = Jwks.builder().forEcKeyPair(ecKeyPair).build();
KeyPair edEcKeyPair = getEdECKeyPair();
OctetPrivateJwk edEcPrivJwk = Jwks.builder().forOctetKeyPair(edEcKeyPair).build();
Note that:
- An exception will thrown when calling
forRsaKeyPair
if the specifiedKeyPair
instance does not containRSAPublicKey
andRSAPrivateKey
instances. - Similarly, an exception will be thrown when calling
forEcKeyPair
if theKeyPair
instance does not containECPublicKey
andECPrivateKey
instances. - Finally, an exception will be
thrown when calling
forOctetKeyPair
if theKeyPair
instance does not contain X25519, X448, Ed25519, or Ed448 keys (introduced in JDK 11 and 15 or when using BouncyCastle).
Private JWK Public Conversion
Because private JWKs contain public key material, you can always obtain the private JWK's corresponding public JWK and
Java PublicKey
or KeyPair
. For example:
RsaPrivateJwk privateJwk = Jwks.builder().forKey(rsaPrivateKey).build(); // or ecPrivateKey or edEcPrivateKey
// Get the matching public JWK and/or PublicKey:
RsaPublicJwk pubJwk = privateJwk.toPublicJwk(); // JWK instance
RSAPublicKey pubKey = pubJwk.toKey(); // Java PublicKey instance
KeyPair pair = privateJwk.toKeyPair(); // io.jsonwebtoken.security.KeyPair retains key types
java.security.KeyPair jdkPair = pair.toJavaKeyPair(); // does not retain pub/private key types
JWK Thumbprints
A JWK Thumbprint is a digest (aka hash) of a canonical JSON representation of a JWK's public properties. 'Canonical' in this case means that only RFC-specified values in any JWK are used in an exact order thumbprint calculation. This ensures that anyone can calculate a JWK's same exact thumbprint, regardless of custom fields or JSON key/value ordering differences in a JWK.
All Jwk
instances support JWK Thumbprints via the
thumbprint()
and thumbprint(HashAlgorithm)
methods:
HashAlgorithm hashAlg = Jwks.HASH.SHA256; // or SHA384, SHA512, etc.
Jwk<?> jwk = Jwks.builder(). /* ... */ .build();
JwkThumbprint sha256Thumbprint = jwk.thumbprint(); // SHA-256 thumbprint by default
JwkThumbprint anotherThumbprint = jwk.thumbprint(hashAlg); // thumbprint using specified hash algorithm
The resulting JwkThumbprint
instance provides some useful methods:
jwkThumbprint.toByteArray()
: the thumbprint's actual digest bytes - i.e. the raw output from the hash algorithmjwkThumbprint.toString()
: the digest bytes as a Base64URL-encoded stringjwkThumbprint.getHashAlgorithm()
: the specificHashAlgorithm
used to compute the thumbprintjwkThumbprint.toURI()
: the thumbprint's canonical URI as defined by the JWK Thumbprint URI specification
JWK Thumbprint as a Key ID
Because a thumbprint is an order-guaranteed unique digest of a JWK, JWK thumbprints are often used as convenient
unique identifiers for a JWK (e.g. the JWK's kid
(Key ID) value). These identifiers can be useful when
locating keys for JWS signature verification or JWE decryption, for example.
For example:
String kid = jwk.thumbprint().toString(); // Thumbprint bytes as a Base64URL-encoded string
Key key = findKey(kid);
assert jwk.toKey().equals(key);
However, because Jwk
instances are immutable, you can't set the key id after the JWK is created. For example, the
following is not possible:
String kid = jwk.thumbprint().toString();
jwk.setId(kid) // Jwks are immutable - there is no `setId` method
Instead, you may use the setIdFromThumbprint
methods on the JwkBuilder
when creating a Jwk
:
Jwk<?> jwk = Jwks.builder().forKey(aKey)
.setIdFromThumbprint() // or setIdFromThumbprint(hashAlgorithm)
.build();
Calling either setIdFromThumbprint
method will ensure that calling jwk.getId()
equals thumbprint.toString()
(which is Encoders.BASE64URL.encode(thumbprint.toByteArray())
).
JWK Thumbprint URI
A JWK's thumbprint's canonical URI as defined by the JWK Thumbprint URI
specification may be obtained by calling the thumbprint's toURI()
method:
URI canonicalThumbprintURI = jwk.thumbprint().toURI();
Per the RFC specification, if you call canonicalThumbprintURI.toString()
, you would see a string that looks like this:
urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:HASH_ALG_ID:BASE64URL_DIGEST
where:
urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:
is the URI scheme+prefixHASH_ALG_ID
is the standard identifier used to compute the thumbprint as defined in the IANA Named Information Hash Algorithm Registry. This is the same asthumbprint.getHashAlgorithm().getId()
.BASE64URL_DIGEST
is the Base64URL-encoded thumbprint bytes, equal tojwkThumbprint.toString()
.
JWK Security Considerations
Because they contain secret or private key material, SecretJwk
and PrivateJwk
(e.g. RsaPrivateJwk
,
EcPrivateJwk
, etc) instances should be used with great care and never accidentally transmitted to 3rd parties.
Even so, JJWT's Jwk
implementations will suppress certain values in toString()
output for safety as described
next.
JWK toString()
Safety
Because it would be incredibly easy to accidentally print key material to System.out.println()
or application
logs, all Jwk
implementations will print redacted values instead of actual secret or private key material.
For example, consider the following Secret JWK JSON example from RFC 7515, Appendix A.1.1:
{
"kty": "oct",
"k": "AyM1SysPpbyDfgZld3umj1qzKObwVMkoqQ-EstJQLr_T-1qS0gZH75aKtMN3Yj0iPS4hcgUuTwjAzZr1Z9CAow",
"kid": "HMAC key used in https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515#appendix-A.1.1 example."
}
The k
value (AyAyM1SysPpby...
) reflects secure key material and should never be accidentially
exposed.
If you were to parse this JSON as a Jwk
, calling toString()
will NOT print this value. It will
instead print the string literal <redacted>
for any secret or private key data field. For example:
String json = getExampleSecretKeyJson();
Jwk<?> jwk = Jwks.parser().build().parse(json);
System.out.printn(jwk);
This code would print the following string literal to the System console:
{kty=oct, k=<redacted>, kid=HMAC key used in https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515#appendix-A.1.1 example.}
This is true for all secret or private key members in SecretJwk
and PrivateJwk
(e.g. RsaPrivateJwk
,
EcPrivateJwk
, etc) instances.
Compression
The JWT specification only standardizes this feature for JWEs (Encrypted JWTs) however JJWT supports it for JWS (Signed JWTs) as well. If you are positive that a JWT you create with JJWT will also be parsed with JJWT, you can use this feature with both JWEs and JWSs, otherwise it is best to only use it for JWEs.
If a JWT's payload
is sufficiently large - that is, it is a large content byte array or JSON with a lot of
name/value pairs (or individual values are very large or verbose) - you can reduce the size of the compact JWT by
compressing the payload.
This might be important to you if the resulting JWT is used in a URL for example, since URLs are best kept under 4096 characters due to browser, user mail agent, or HTTP gateway compatibility issues. Smaller JWTs also help reduce bandwidth utilization, which may or may not be important depending on your application's volume or needs.
If you want to compress your JWT, you can use the JwtBuilder
's compressWith(CompressionAlgorithm)
method. For
example:
Jwts.builder()
.compressWith(CompressionCodecs.DEFLATE) // or CompressionCodecs.GZIP
// .. etc ...
If you use the DEFLATE
or GZIP
Compression Codecs - that's it, you're done. You don't have to do anything during
parsing or configure the JwtParserBuilder
for compression - JJWT will automatically decompress the payload as
expected.
Note
JJWT does not support compression for Unprotected JWTs because they are susceptible to various compression vulnerability attacks (memory exhaustion, denial of service, etc.).
Custom Compression Codec
If the default DEFLATE
or GZIP
compression codecs are not suitable for your needs, you can create your own
CompressionCodec
implementation(s).
Just as you would with the default codecs, you may specify that you want a JWT compressed by calling the JwtBuilder
's
compressWith
method, supplying your custom implementation instance. When you call compressWith
, the JWT payload
will be compressed with your algorithm, and the
zip
(Compression Algorithm)
header will automatically be set to the value returned by your codec's getId()
method as specified in the JWT
specification.
However, the JwtParser
needs to be aware of this custom codec as well, so it can use it while parsing. You do this
by calling the JwtParserBuilder
's addCompressionCodecs
method. For example:
CompressionCodec myCodec = new MyCompressionCodec();
Jwts.parserBuilder()
.addCompressionCodecs(Collections.of(myCodec)) // <----
// .. etc ...
This adds additional CompressionCodec
implementations to the parser's overall total set of supported codecs (which
already includes the DEFLATE
and GZIP
codecs by default).
The parser will then automatically check to see if the JWT zip
header has been set to see if a compression codec
algorithm has been used to compress the JWT. If set, the parser will automatically look up your CompressionCodec
by
its getId()
value, and use it to decompress the JWT.
Compression Codec Locator
If for some reason the default addCompressionCodecs
method and lookup-by-id behavior already supported by the
JwtParserBuilder
is not sufficient for your needs, you can implement your own Locator<CompressionCodec>
to look
up the codec.
Typically, a Locator<CompressionCodec>
implementation will inspect the zip
header to find out what algorithm was
used and then return a codec instance that supports that algorithm. For example:
public class MyCompressionCodecLocator implements Locator<CompressionCodec> {
@Override
public CompressionCodec locate(Header<?> header) {
String id = header.getCompressionAlgorithm(); // 'zip' header
CompressionCodec codec = getCompressionCodec(id); //implement me
return codec;
}
}
Your custom Locator<CompressionCodec>
can then inspect any other header as necessary.
You then provide your custom Locator<CompressionCodec>
to the JwtParserBuilder
as follows:
Locator<CompressionCodec> myCodecLocator = new MyCompressionCodecLocator();
Jwts.parserBuilder()
.setCompressionCodecLocator(myCodecLocator) // <----
// .. etc ...
Again, this is only necessary if the JWT-standard zip
header lookup default behavior already supported by the
JwtParser
is not sufficient.
JSON Support
A JwtBuilder
will serialize the Header
and Claims
maps (and potentially any Java objects they
contain) to JSON with a Serializer<Map<String, ?>>
instance. Similarly, a JwtParser
will
deserialize JSON into the Header
and Claims
using a Deserializer<Map<String, ?>>
instance.
If you don't explicitly configure a JwtBuilder
's Serializer
or a JwtParserBuilder
's Deserializer
, JJWT will
automatically attempt to discover and use the following JSON implementations if found in the runtime classpath.
They are checked in order, and the first one found is used:
-
Jackson: This will automatically be used if you specify
io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-jackson
as a project runtime dependency. Jackson supports POJOs as claims with full marshaling/unmarshaling as necessary. -
Gson: This will automatically be used if you specify
io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-gson
as a project runtime dependency. Gson also supports POJOs as claims with full marshaling/unmarshaling as necessary. -
JSON-Java (
org.json
): This will be used automatically if you specifyio.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-orgjson
as a project runtime dependency.Note
org.json
APIs are natively enabled in Android environments so this is the recommended JSON processor for Android applications unless you want to use POJOs as claims. Theorg.json
library supports simple Object-to-JSON marshaling, but it does not support JSON-to-Object unmarshalling.
If you want to use POJOs as claim values, use either the io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-jackson
or
io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-gson
dependency (or implement your own Serializer and Deserializer if desired). But beware,
Jackson will force a sizable (> 1 MB) dependency to an Android application thus increasing the app download size for
mobile users.
Custom JSON Processor
If you don't want to use JJWT's runtime dependency approach, or just want to customize how JSON serialization and
deserialization works, you can implement the Serializer
and Deserializer
interfaces and specify instances of
them on the JwtBuilder
and JwtParserBuilder
respectively. For example:
When creating a JWT:
Serializer<Map<String,?>> serializer = getMySerializer(); //implement me
Jwts.builder()
.serializeToJsonWith(serializer)
// ... etc ...
When reading a JWT:
Deserializer<Map<String,?>> deserializer = getMyDeserializer(); //implement me
Jwts.parserBuilder()
.deserializeJsonWith(deserializer)
// ... etc ...
Jackson JSON Processor
If you want to use Jackson for JSON processing, just including the io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-jackson
dependency as a
runtime dependency is all that is necessary in most projects, since Gradle and Maven will automatically pull in
the necessary Jackson dependencies as well.
After including this dependency, JJWT will automatically find the Jackson implementation on the runtime classpath and use it internally for JSON parsing. There is nothing else you need to do - JJWT will automatically create a new Jackson ObjectMapper for its needs as required.
However, if you have an application-wide Jackson ObjectMapper
(as is typically recommended for most applications),
you can configure JJWT to use your own ObjectMapper
instead.
You do this by declaring the io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-jackson
dependency with compile scope (not runtime
scope which is the typical JJWT default). That is:
Maven
<dependency>
<groupId>io.jsonwebtoken</groupId>
<artifactId>jjwt-jackson</artifactId>
<version>JJWT_RELEASE_VERSION</version>
<scope>compile</scope> <!-- Not runtime -->
</dependency>
Gradle or Android
dependencies {
implementation 'io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-jackson:JJWT_RELEASE_VERSION'
}
And then you can specify the JacksonSerializer
using your own ObjectMapper
on the JwtBuilder
:
ObjectMapper objectMapper = getMyObjectMapper(); //implement me
String jws = Jwts.builder()
.serializeToJsonWith(new JacksonSerializer(objectMapper))
// ... etc ...
and the JacksonDeserializer
using your ObjectMapper
on the JwtParserBuilder
:
ObjectMapper objectMapper = getMyObjectMapper(); //implement me
Jwts.parserBuilder()
.deserializeJsonWith(new JacksonDeserializer(objectMapper))
// ... etc ...
Parsing of Custom Claim Types
By default JJWT will only convert simple claim types: String, Date, Long, Integer, Short and Byte. If you need to deserialize other types you can configure the JacksonDeserializer
by passing a Map
of claim names to types in through a constructor. For example:
new JacksonDeserializer(Maps.of("user", User.class).build())
This would trigger the value in the user
claim to be deserialized into the custom type of User
. Given the claims
payload of:
{
"issuer": "https://example.com/issuer",
"user": {
"firstName": "Jill",
"lastName": "Coder"
}
}
The User
object could be retrieved from the user
claim with the following code:
Jwts.parserBuilder()
.deserializeJsonWith(new JacksonDeserializer(Maps.of("user", User.class).build())) // <-----
.build()
.parseClaimsJwt(aJwtString)
.getPayload()
.get("user", User.class) // <-----
Note
Using this constructor is mutually exclusive with the
JacksonDeserializer(ObjectMapper)
constructor described above. This is because JJWT configures anObjectMapper
directly and could have negative consequences for a sharedObjectMapper
instance. This should work for most applications, if you need a more advanced parsing options, configure the mapper directly.
Gson JSON Processor
If you want to use Gson for JSON processing, just including the io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-gson
dependency as a
runtime dependency is all that is necessary in most projects, since Gradle and Maven will automatically pull in
the necessary Gson dependencies as well.
After including this dependency, JJWT will automatically find the Gson implementation on the runtime classpath and use it internally for JSON parsing. There is nothing else you need to do - just declaring the dependency is all that is required, no code or config is necessary.
If you're curious, JJWT will automatically create an internal default Gson instance for its own needs as follows:
new GsonBuilder()
.registerTypeHierarchyAdapter(io.jsonwebtoken.lang.Supplier.class, GsonSupplierSerializer.INSTANCE)
.disableHtmlEscaping().create();
The registerTypeHierarchyAdapter
builder call is required to serialize JWKs with secret or private values.
However, if you prefer to use a different Gson instance instead of JJWT's default, you can configure JJWT to use your own - just don't forget to register the necessary JJWT type hierarchy adapter.
You do this by declaring the io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-gson
dependency with compile scope (not runtime
scope which is the typical JJWT default). That is:
Maven
<dependency>
<groupId>io.jsonwebtoken</groupId>
<artifactId>jjwt-gson</artifactId>
<version>JJWT_RELEASE_VERSION</version>
<scope>compile</scope> <!-- Not runtime -->
</dependency>
Gradle or Android
dependencies {
implementation 'io.jsonwebtoken:jjwt-gson:JJWT_RELEASE_VERSION'
}
And then you can specify the GsonSerializer
using your own Gson
instance on the JwtBuilder
:
Gson gson = new GsonBuilder()
// don't forget this line!:
.registerTypeHierarchyAdapter(io.jsonwebtoken.lang.Supplier.class, GsonSupplierSerializer.INSTANCE)
.disableHtmlEscaping().create();
String jws = Jwts.builder()
.serializeToJsonWith(new GsonSerializer(gson))
// ... etc ...
and the GsonDeserializer
using your Gson
instance on the JwtParser
:
Gson gson = getGson(); //implement me
Jwts.parser()
.deserializeJsonWith(new GsonDeserializer(gson))
// ... etc ...
Again, as shown above, it is critical to create your Gson
instance using the GsonBuilder
and include the line:
.registerTypeHierarchyAdapter(io.jsonwebtoken.lang.Supplier.class, GsonSupplierSerializer.INSTANCE)
to ensure JWK serialization works as expected.
Base64 Support
JJWT uses a very fast pure-Java Base64 codec for Base64 and Base64Url encoding and decoding that is guaranteed to work deterministically in all JDK and Android environments.
You can access JJWT's encoders and decoders using the io.jsonwebtoken.io.Encoders
and io.jsonwebtoken.io.Decoders
utility classes.
io.jsonwebtoken.io.Encoders
:
io.jsonwebtoken.io.Decoders
:
Understanding Base64 in Security Contexts
All cryptographic operations, like encryption and message digest calculations, result in binary data - raw byte arrays.
Because raw byte arrays cannot be represented natively in JSON, the JWT specifications employ the Base64URL encoding scheme to represent these raw byte values in JSON documents or compound structures like a JWT.
This means that the Base64 and Base64URL algorithms take a raw byte array and converts the bytes into a string suitable to use in text documents and protocols like HTTP. These algorithms can also convert these strings back into the original raw byte arrays for decryption or signature verification as necessary.
That's nice and convenient, but there are two very important properties of Base64 (and Base64URL) text strings that are critical to remember when they are used in security scenarios like with JWTs:
- Base64 is not encryption
- Changing Base64 characters does not automatically invalidate data.
Base64 is not encryption
Base64-encoded text is not encrypted.
While a byte array representation can be converted to text with the Base64 algorithms, anyone in the world can take Base64-encoded text, decode it with any standard Base64 decoder, and obtain the underlying raw byte array data. No key or secret is required to decode Base64 text - anyone can do it.
Based on this, when encoding sensitive byte data with Base64 - like a shared or private key - the resulting string is NOT safe to expose publicly.
A base64-encoded key is still sensitive information and must be kept as secret and as safe as the original source
of the bytes (e.g. a Java PrivateKey
or SecretKey
instance).
After Base64-encoding data into a string, it is possible to then encrypt the string to keep it safe from prying eyes if desired, but this is different. Encryption is not encoding. They are separate concepts.
Changing Base64 Characters
In an effort to see if signatures or encryption is truly validated correctly, some try to edit a JWT string - particularly the Base64-encoded signature part - to see if the edited string fails security validations.
This conceptually makes sense: change the signature string, you would assume that signature validation would fail.
But this doesn't always work. Changing base64 characters is an invalid test.
Why?
Because of the way the Base64 algorithm works, there are multiple Base64 strings that can represent the same raw byte array.
Going into the details of the Base64 algorithm is out of scope for this documentation, but there are many good Stackoverflow answers and JJWT issue comments that explain this in detail. Here's one good answer:
Remember that Base64 encodes each 8 bit entity into 6 bit chars. The resulting string then needs exactly 11 * 8 / 6 bytes, or 14 2/3 chars. But you can't write partial characters. Only the first 4 bits (or 2/3 of the last char) are significant. The last two bits are not decoded. Thus all of:
dGVzdCBzdHJpbmo dGVzdCBzdHJpbmp dGVzdCBzdHJpbmq dGVzdCBzdHJpbmr
All decode to the same 11 bytes (116, 101, 115, 116, 32, 115, 116, 114, 105, 110, 106).
As you can see by the above 4 examples, they all decode to the same exact 11 bytes. So just changing one or two characters at the end of a Base64 string may not work and can often result in an invalid test.
Adding Invalid Characters
JJWT's default Base64/Base64URL decoders automatically ignore illegal Base64 characters located in the beginning and
end of an encoded string. Therefore prepending or appending invalid characters like {
or ]
or similar will also
not fail JJWT's signature checks either. Why?
Because such edits - whether changing a trailing character or two, or appending invalid characters - do not actually change the real signature, which in cryptographic contexts, is always a byte array. Instead, tests like these change a text encoding of the byte array, and as we covered above, they are different things.
So JJWT 'cares' more about the real byte array and less about its text encoding because that is what actually matters in cryptographic operations. In this sense, JJWT follows the Robustness Principle in being slightly lenient on what is accepted per the rules of Base64, but if anything in the real underlying byte array is changed, then yes, JJWT's cryptographic assertions will definitely fail.
To help understand JJWT's approach, we have to remember why signatures exist. From our documentation above on signing JWTs:
- guarantees it was created by someone we know (it is authentic), as well as
- guarantees that no-one has manipulated or changed it after it was created (its integrity is maintained).
Just prepending or appending invalid text to try to 'trick' the algorithm doesn't change the integrity of the underlying claims or signature byte arrays, nor the authenticity of the claims byte array, because those byte arrays are still obtained intact.
Please see JJWT Issue #518 and its referenced issues and links for more information.
Custom Base64
If for some reason you want to specify your own Base64Url encoder and decoder, you can use the JwtBuilder
base64UrlEncodeWith
method to set the encoder:
Encoder<byte[], String> base64UrlEncoder = getMyBase64UrlEncoder(); //implement me
String jws = Jwts.builder()
.base64UrlEncodeWith(base64UrlEncoder)
// ... etc ...
and the JwtParserBuilder
's base64UrlDecodeWith
method to set the decoder:
Decoder<String, byte[]> base64UrlDecoder = getMyBase64UrlDecoder(); //implement me
Jwts.parserBuilder()
.base64UrlDecodeWith(base64UrlEncoder)
// ... etc ...
Examples
- JWS Signed with HMAC
- JWS Signed with RSA
- JWS Signed with ECDSA
- JWS Signed with EdDSA
- JWE Encrypted Directly with a SecretKey
- JWE Encrypted with RSA
- JWE Encrypted with AES Key Wrap
- JWE Encrypted with ECDH-ES
- JWE Encrypted with a Password
- SecretKey JWK
- RSA Public JWK
- RSA Private JWK
- Elliptic Curve Public JWK
- Elliptic Curve Private JWK
- Edwards Elliptic Curve Public JWK
- Edwards Elliptic Curve Private JWK
JWT Signed with HMAC
This is an example showing how to digitally sign a JWT using an HMAC (hash-based message authentication code). The JWT specifications define 3 standard HMAC signing algorithms:
HS256
: HMAC with SHA-256. This requires a 256-bit (32 byte)SecretKey
or larger.HS384
: HMAC with SHA-384. This requires a 384-bit (48 byte)SecretKey
or larger.HS512
: HMAC with SHA-512. This requires a 512-bit (64 byte)SecretKey
or larger.
Example:
// Create a test key suitable for the desired HMAC-SHA algorithm:
MacAlgorithm alg = Jwts.SIG.HS512; //or HS384 or HS256
SecretKey key = alg.keyBuilder().build();
String message = "Hello World!";
byte[] content = message.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
// Create the compact JWS:
String jws = Jwts.builder().setContent(content, "text/plain").signWith(key, alg).compact();
// Parse the compact JWS:
content = Jwts.parserBuilder().verifyWith(key).build().parseContentJws(jws).getPayload();
assert message.equals(new String(content, StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
JWT Signed with RSA
This is an example showing how to digitally sign and verify a JWT using RSA cryptography. The JWT specifications define 6 standard RSA signing algorithms. All 6 require that RSA keys 2048-bits or larger must be used.
In this example, Bob will sign a JWT using his RSA private key, and Alice can verify it came from Bob using Bob's RSA public key:
// Create a test key suitable for the desired RSA signature algorithm:
SignatureAlgorithm alg = Jwts.SIG.RS512; //or PS512, RS256, etc...
KeyPair pair = alg.keyPairBuilder().build();
// Bob creates the compact JWS with his RSA private key:
String jws = Jwts.builder().setSubject("Alice")
.signWith(pair.getPrivate(), alg) // <-- Bob's RSA private key
.compact();
// Alice receives and verifies the compact JWS came from Bob:
String subject = Jwts.parserBuilder()
.verifyWith(pair.getPublic()) // <-- Bob's RSA public key
.build().parseClaimsJws(jws).getPayload().getSubject();
assert "Alice".equals(subject);
JWT Signed with ECDSA
This is an example showing how to digitally sign and verify a JWT using the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm. The JWT specifications define 3 standard ECDSA signing algorithms:
ES256
: ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256. This requires an EC Key exactly 256 bits (32 bytes) long.ES384
: ECDSA using P-384 and SHA-384. This requires an EC Key exactly 384 bits (48 bytes) long.ES512
: ECDSA using P-521 and SHA-512. This requires an EC Key exactly 521 bits (65 or 66 bytes depending on format) long.
In this example, Bob will sign a JWT using his EC private key, and Alice can verify it came from Bob using Bob's EC public key:
// Create a test key suitable for the desired ECDSA signature algorithm:
SignatureAlgorithm alg = Jwts.SIG.ES512; //or ES256 or ES384
KeyPair pair = alg.keyPairBuilder().build();
// Bob creates the compact JWS with his EC private key:
String jws = Jwts.builder().setSubject("Alice")
.signWith(pair.getPrivate(), alg) // <-- Bob's EC private key
.compact();
// Alice receives and verifies the compact JWS came from Bob:
String subject = Jwts.parserBuilder()
.verifyWith(pair.getPublic()) // <-- Bob's EC public key
.build().parseClaimsJws(jws).getPayload().getSubject();
assert "Alice".equals(subject);
JWT Signed with EdDSA
This is an example showing how to digitally sign and verify a JWT using the
Edwards Curve Digital Signature Algorithm using
Ed25519
or Ed448
keys.
Note
The
Ed25519
andEd448
algorithms require JDK 15 or a compatible JCA Provider (like BouncyCastle) in the runtime classpath.If you are using JDK 14 or earlier and you want to use them, see the Installation section to see how to enable BouncyCastle.
The EdDSA
signature algorithm is defined for JWS in RFC 8037, Section 3.1
using keys for two Edwards curves:
Ed25519
:EdDSA
using curveEd25519
.Ed25519
algorithm keys must be 256 bits (32 bytes) long and produce signatures 512 bits (64 bytes) long.Ed448
:EdDSA
using curveEd448
.Ed448
algorithm keys must be 456 bits (57 bytes) long and produce signatures 912 bits (114 bytes) long.
In this example, Bob will sign a JWT using his Edwards Curve private key, and Alice can verify it came from Bob using Bob's Edwards Curve public key:
// Create a test key suitable for the EdDSA signature algorithm using Ed25519 or Ed448 keys:
SignatureAlgorithm alg = Jwts.SIG.Ed25519; //or Ed448
KeyPair pair = alg.keyPairBuilder().build();
// Bob creates the compact JWS with his Edwards Curve private key:
String jws = Jwts.builder().setSubject("Alice")
.signWith(pair.getPrivate(), alg) // <-- Bob's Edwards Curve private key
.compact();
// Alice receives and verifies the compact JWS came from Bob:
String subject = Jwts.parserBuilder()
.verifyWith(pair.getPublic()) // <-- Bob's Edwards Curve public key
.build().parseClaimsJws(jws).getPayload().getSubject();
assert "Alice".equals(subject);
JWT Encrypted Directly with a SecretKey
This is an example showing how to encrypt a JWT directly using a symmetric secret key. The JWT specifications define 6 standard AEAD Encryption algorithms:
A128GCM
: AES GCM using a 128-bit (16 byte)SecretKey
or larger.A192GCM
: AES GCM using a 192-bit (24 byte)SecretKey
or larger.A256GCM
: AES GCM using a 256-bit (32 byte)SecretKey
or larger.A128CBC-HS256
: AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 using a 256-bit (32 byte)SecretKey
.A192CBC-HS384
: AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 using a 384-bit (48 byte)SecretKey
.A256CBC-HS512
: AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 using a 512-bit (64 byte)SecretKey
.
The AES GCM (A128GCM
, A192GCM
and A256GCM
) algorithms are strongly recommended - they are faster and more
efficient than the A*CBC-HS*
variants, but they do require JDK 8 or later (or JDK 7 + BouncyCastle).
Example:
// Create a test key suitable for the desired payload encryption algorithm:
// (A*GCM algorithms are recommended, but require JDK >= 8 or BouncyCastle)
AeadAlgorithm enc = Jwts.ENC.A256GCM; //or A128GCM, A192GCM, A256CBC-HS512, etc...
SecretKey key = enc.keyBuilder().build();
String message = "Live long and prosper.";
byte[] content = message.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
// Create the compact JWE:
String jwe = Jwts.builder().setContent(content, "text/plain").encryptWith(key, enc).compact();
// Parse the compact JWE:
content = Jwts.parserBuilder().decryptWith(key).build().parseContentJwe(jwe).getPayload();
assert message.equals(new String(content, StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
JWT Encrypted with RSA
This is an example showing how to encrypt and decrypt a JWT using RSA cryptography.
Because RSA cannot encrypt much data, RSA is used to encrypt and decrypt a secure-random key, and that generated key in turn is used to actually encrypt the payload as described in the RSA Key Encryption section above. As such, RSA Key Algorithms must be paired with an AEAD Encryption Algorithm, as shown below.
In this example, Bob will encrypt a JWT using Alice's RSA public key to ensure only she may read it. Alice can then decrypt the JWT using her RSA private key:
// Create a test KeyPair suitable for the desired RSA key algorithm:
KeyPair pair = Jwts.SIG.RS512.keyPairBuilder().build();
// Choose the key algorithm used encrypt the payload key:
KeyAlgorithm<PublicKey, PrivateKey> alg = Jwts.KEY.RSA_OAEP_256; //or RSA_OAEP or RSA1_5
// Choose the Encryption Algorithm to encrypt the payload:
AeadAlgorithm enc = Jwts.ENC.A256GCM; //or A192GCM, A128GCM, A256CBC-HS512, etc...
// Bob creates the compact JWE with Alice's RSA public key so only she may read it:
String jwe = Jwts.builder().setAudience("Alice")
.encryptWith(pair.getPublic(), alg, enc) // <-- Alice's RSA public key
.compact();
// Alice receives and decrypts the compact JWE:
String audience = Jwts.parserBuilder()
.decryptWith(pair.getPrivate()) // <-- Alice's RSA private key
.build().parseClaimsJwe(jwe).getPayload().getAudience();
assert "Alice".equals(audience);
JWT Encrypted with AES Key Wrap
This is an example showing how to encrypt and decrypt a JWT using AES Key Wrap algorithms.
These algorithms use AES to encrypt and decrypt a secure-random key, and that generated key in turn is used to actually encrypt the payload as described in the AES Key Encryption section above. This allows the payload to be encrypted with a random short-lived key, reducing material exposure of the potentially longer-lived symmetric secret key. This approach requires the AES Key Wrap algorithms to be paired with an AEAD content encryption algorithm, as shown below.
The AES GCM Key Wrap algorithms (A128GCMKW
, A192GCMKW
and A256GCMKW
) are preferred - they are faster and more
efficient than the A*KW
variants, but they do require JDK 8 or later (or JDK 7 + BouncyCastle).
// Create a test SecretKey suitable for the desired AES Key Wrap algorithm:
SecretKeyAlgorithm alg = Jwts.KEY.A256GCMKW; //or A192GCMKW, A128GCMKW, A256KW, etc...
SecretKey key = alg.keyBuilder().build();
// Chooose the Encryption Algorithm used to encrypt the payload:
AeadAlgorithm enc = Jwts.ENC.A256GCM; //or A192GCM, A128GCM, A256CBC-HS512, etc...
// Create the compact JWE:
String jwe = Jwts.builder().setIssuer("me").encryptWith(key, alg, enc).compact();
// Parse the compact JWE:
String issuer = Jwts.parserBuilder().decryptWith(key).build()
.parseClaimsJwe(jwe).getPayload().getIssuer();
assert "me".equals(issuer);
JWT Encrypted with ECDH-ES
This is an example showing how to encrypt and decrypt a JWT using Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephmeral Static Key Agreement (ECDH-ES) algorithms.
These algorithms use ECDH-ES to encrypt and decrypt a secure-random key, and that generated key in turn is used to actually encrypt the payload as described in the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static Key Agreement section above. Because of this, ECDH-ES Key Algorithms must be paired with an AEAD Encryption Algorithm, as shown below.
In this example, Bob will encrypt a JWT using Alice's Elliptic Curve public key to ensure only she may read it.
Alice can then decrypt the JWT using her Elliptic Curve private key:
// Create a test KeyPair suitable for the desired EC key algorithm:
KeyPair pair = Jwts.SIG.ES512.keyPairBuilder().build();
// Choose the key algorithm used encrypt the payload key:
KeyAlgorithm<PublicKey, PrivateKey> alg = Jwts.KEY.ECDH_ES_A256KW; //ECDH_ES_A192KW, etc.
// Choose the Encryption Algorithm to encrypt the payload:
AeadAlgorithm enc = Jwts.ENC.A256GCM; //or A192GCM, A128GCM, A256CBC-HS512, etc...
// Bob creates the compact JWE with Alice's EC public key so only she may read it:
String jwe = Jwts.builder().setAudience("Alice")
.encryptWith(pair.getPublic(), alg, enc) // <-- Alice's EC public key
.compact();
// Alice receives and decrypts the compact JWE:
String audience = Jwts.parserBuilder()
.decryptWith(pair.getPrivate()) // <-- Alice's EC private key
.build().parseClaimsJwe(jwe).getPayload().getAudience();
assert "Alice".equals(audience);
JWT Encrypted with a Password
This is an example showing how to encrypt and decrypt a JWT using Password-based key-derivation algorithms.
These algorithms use a password to securely derive a random key, and that derived random key in turn is used to actually encrypt the payload as described in the Password-based Key Encryption section above. This allows the payload to be encrypted with a random short-lived cryptographically-stronger key, reducing the need to expose the longer-lived (and potentially weaker) password.
This approach requires the Password-based Key Wrap algorithms to be paired with an AEAD content encryption algorithm, as shown below.
//DO NOT use this example password in a real app, it is well-known to password crackers:
String pw = "correct horse battery staple";
Password password = Keys.forPassword(pw.toCharArray());
// Choose the desired PBES2 key derivation algorithm:
KeyAlgorithm<Password, Password> alg = Jwts.KEY.PBES2_HS512_A256KW; //or PBES2_HS384_A192KW or PBES2_HS256_A128KW
// Optionally choose the number of PBES2 computational iterations to use to derive the key.
// This is optional - if you do not specify a value, JJWT will automatically choose a value
// based on your chosen PBES2 algorithm and OWASP PBKDF2 recommendations here:
// https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html#pbkdf2
//
// If you do specify a value, ensure the iterations are large enough for your desired alg
//int pbkdf2Iterations = 120000; //for HS512. Needs to be much higher for smaller hash algs.
// Choose the Encryption Algorithm used to encrypt the payload:
AeadAlgorithm enc = Jwts.ENC.A256GCM; //or A192GCM, A128GCM, A256CBC-HS512, etc...
// Create the compact JWE:
String jwe = Jwts.builder().setIssuer("me")
// Optional work factor is specified in the header:
//.setHeader(Jwts.headerBuilder().setPbes2Count(pbkdf2Iterations))
.encryptWith(password, alg, enc)
.compact();
// Parse the compact JWE:
String issuer = Jwts.parserBuilder().decryptWith(password)
.build().parseClaimsJwe(jwe).getPayload().getIssuer();
assert "me".equals(issuer);
SecretKey JWK
Example creating and parsing a secret JWK:
SecretKey key = Jwts.SIG.HS512.keyBuilder().build(); // or HS384 or HS256
SecretJwk jwk = Jwks.builder().forKey(key).setIdFromThumbprint().build();
assert jwk.getId().equals(jwk.thumbprint().toString());
assert key.equals(jwk.toKey());
byte[] utf8Bytes = new JacksonSerializer().serialize(jwk); // or GsonSerializer(), etc
String jwkJson = new String(utf8Bytes, StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
Jwk<?> parsed = Jwks.parser().build().parse(jwkJson);
assert parsed instanceof SecretJwk;
assert jwk.equals(parsed);
RSA Public JWK
Example creating and parsing an RSA Public JWK:
RSAPublicKey key = (RSAPublicKey)Jwts.SIG.RS512.keyPairBuilder().build().getPublic();
RsaPublicJwk jwk = Jwks.builder().forKey(key).setIdFromThumbprint().build();
assert jwk.getId().equals(jwk.thumbprint().toString());
assert key.equals(jwk.toKey());
byte[] utf8Bytes = new JacksonSerializer().serialize(jwk); // or GsonSerializer(), etc
String jwkJson = new String(utf8Bytes, StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
Jwk<?> parsed = Jwks.parser().build().parse(jwkJson);
assert parsed instanceof RsaPublicJwk;
assert jwk.equals(parsed);
RSA Private JWK
Example creating and parsing an RSA Private JWK:
KeyPair pair = Jwts.SIG.RS512.keyPairBuilder().build();
RSAPublicKey pubKey = (RSAPublicKey) pair.getPublic();
RSAPrivateKey privKey = (RSAPrivateKey) pair.getPrivate();
RsaPrivateJwk privJwk = Jwks.builder().forKey(privKey).setIdFromThumbprint().build();
RsaPublicJwk pubJwk = privJwk.toPublicJwk();
assert privJwk.getId().equals(privJwk.thumbprint().toString());
assert pubJwk.getId().equals(pubJwk.thumbprint().toString());
assert privKey.equals(privJwk.toKey());
assert pubKey.equals(pubJwk.toKey());
byte[] utf8Bytes = new JacksonSerializer().serialize(privJwk); // or GsonSerializer(), etc
String jwkJson = new String(utf8Bytes, StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
Jwk<?> parsed = Jwks.parser().build().parse(jwkJson);
assert parsed instanceof RsaPrivateJwk;
assert privJwk.equals(parsed);
Elliptic Curve Public JWK
Example creating and parsing an Elliptic Curve Public JWK:
ECPublicKey key = (ECPublicKey) Jwts.SIG.ES512.keyPairBuilder().build().getPublic();
EcPublicJwk jwk = Jwks.builder().forKey(key).setIdFromThumbprint().build();
assert jwk.getId().equals(jwk.thumbprint().toString());
assert key.equals(jwk.toKey());
byte[] utf8Bytes = new JacksonSerializer().serialize(jwk); // or GsonSerializer(), etc
String jwkJson = new String(utf8Bytes, StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
Jwk<?> parsed = Jwks.parser().build().parse(jwkJson);
assert parsed instanceof EcPublicJwk;
assert jwk.equals(parsed);
Elliptic Curve Private JWK
Example creating and parsing an Elliptic Curve Private JWK:
KeyPair pair = Jwts.SIG.ES512.keyPairBuilder().build();
ECPublicKey pubKey = (ECPublicKey) pair.getPublic();
ECPrivateKey privKey = (ECPrivateKey) pair.getPrivate();
EcPrivateJwk privJwk = Jwks.builder().forKey(privKey).setIdFromThumbprint().build();
EcPublicJwk pubJwk = privJwk.toPublicJwk();
assert privJwk.getId().equals(privJwk.thumbprint().toString());
assert pubJwk.getId().equals(pubJwk.thumbprint().toString());
assert privKey.equals(privJwk.toKey());
assert pubKey.equals(pubJwk.toKey());
byte[] utf8Bytes = new JacksonSerializer().serialize(privJwk); // or GsonSerializer(), etc
String jwkJson = new String(utf8Bytes, StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
Jwk<?> parsed = Jwks.parser().build().parse(jwkJson);
assert parsed instanceof EcPrivateJwk;
assert privJwk.equals(parsed);
Edwards Elliptic Curve Public JWK
Example creating and parsing an Edwards Elliptic Curve (Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, X448) Public JWK
(the JWT RFC 8037 specification calls these Octet
keys, hence the
OctetPublicJwk
interface names):
PublicKey key = Jwts.SIG.Ed25519.keyPairBuilder().build().getPublic();
OctetPublicJwk<PublicKey> jwk = builder().forOctetKey(key).setIdFromThumbprint().build();
assert jwk.getId().equals(jwk.thumbprint().toString());
assert key.equals(jwk.toKey());
byte[] utf8Bytes = new JacksonSerializer().serialize(jwk); // or GsonSerializer(), etc
String jwkJson = new String(utf8Bytes, StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
Jwk<?> parsed = Jwks.parser().build().parse(jwkJson);
assert parsed instanceof OctetPublicJwk;
assert jwk.equals(parsed);
Edwards Elliptic Curve Private JWK
Example creating and parsing an Edwards Elliptic Curve (Ed25519, Ed448, X25519, X448) Private JWK
(the JWT RFC 8037 specification calls these Octet
keys, hence the
OctetPrivateJwk
and OctetPublicJwk
interface names):
KeyPair pair = Jwts.SIG.Ed448.keyPairBuilder().build();
PublicKey pubKey = pair.getPublic();
PrivateKey privKey = pair.getPrivate();
OctetPrivateJwk<PublicKey, PrivateKey> privJwk = builder().forOctetKey(privKey).setIdFromThumbprint().build();
OctetPublicJwk<PublicKey> pubJwk = privJwk.toPublicJwk();
assert privJwk.getId().equals(privJwk.thumbprint().toString());
assert pubJwk.getId().equals(pubJwk.thumbprint().toString());
assert privKey.equals(privJwk.toKey());
assert pubKey.equals(pubJwk.toKey());
byte[] utf8Bytes = new JacksonSerializer().serialize(privJwk); // or GsonSerializer(), etc
String jwkJson = new String(utf8Bytes, StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
Jwk<?> parsed = Jwks.parser().build().parse(jwkJson);
assert parsed instanceof OctetPrivateJwk;
assert privJwk.equals(parsed);
Learn More
- JSON Web Token for Java and Android
- How to Create and Verify JWTs in Java
- Where to Store Your JWTs - Cookies vs HTML5 Web Storage
- Use JWT the Right Way!
- Token Authentication for Java Applications
- JJWT Changelog
Author
Maintained by Les Hazlewood & the extended Java community ❤️
License
This project is open-source via the Apache 2.0 License.