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fix(core): use appropriate inert document strategy for Firefox & Safari (#17019) 

Both Firefox and Safari are vulnerable to XSS if we use an inert document
created via `document.implementation.createHTMLDocument()`.

Now we check for those vulnerabilities and then use a DOMParser or XHR
strategy if needed.

Further the platform-server has its own library for parsing HTML, so we
sniff for that (by checking whether DOMParser exists) and fall back to
the standard strategy.

Thanks to @cure53 for the heads up on this issue.

PR Close #17019
This commit is contained in:
Peter Bacon Darwin 2017-08-31 22:05:18 +01:00 committed by Miško Hevery
parent 3f5a3d6ea1
commit a751649c8d
4 changed files with 250 additions and 82 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

4
integration/_payload-limits.json
View File

@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
"master": {
"uncompressed": {
"inline": 1447,
"main": 151639,
"main": 154185,
"polyfills": 59179
}
}
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
"hello_world__closure": {
"master": {
"uncompressed": {
"bundle": 100661
"bundle": 101744
}
}
},

112
packages/platform-browser/src/security/html_sanitizer.ts
View File

@ -10,35 +10,9 @@ import {isDevMode} from '@angular/core';
import {DomAdapter, getDOM} from '../dom/dom_adapter';
import {InertBodyHelper} from './inert_body';
import {sanitizeSrcset, sanitizeUrl} from './url_sanitizer';
/** A <body> element that can be safely used to parse untrusted HTML. Lazily initialized below. */
let inertElement: HTMLElement|null = null;
/** Lazily initialized to make sure the DOM adapter gets set before use. */
let DOM: DomAdapter = null !;
/** Returns an HTML element that is guaranteed to not execute code when creating elements in it. */
function getInertElement() {
if (inertElement) return inertElement;
DOM = getDOM();
// Prefer using <template> element if supported.
const templateEl = DOM.createElement('template');
if ('content' in templateEl) return templateEl;
const doc = DOM.createHtmlDocument();
inertElement = DOM.querySelector(doc, 'body');
if (inertElement == null) {
// usually there should be only one body element in the document, but IE doesn't have any, so we
// need to create one.
const html = DOM.createElement('html', doc);
inertElement = DOM.createElement('body', doc);
DOM.appendChild(html, inertElement);
DOM.appendChild(doc, html);
}
return inertElement;
}
function tagSet(tags: string): {[k: string]: boolean} {
const res: {[k: string]: boolean} = {};
for (const t of tags.split(',')) res[t] = true;
@ -121,53 +95,54 @@ class SanitizingHtmlSerializer {
// because characters were re-encoded.
public sanitizedSomething = false;
private buf: string[] = [];
private DOM = getDOM();
sanitizeChildren(el: Element): string {
// This cannot use a TreeWalker, as it has to run on Angular's various DOM adapters.
// However this code never accesses properties off of `document` before deleting its contents
// again, so it shouldn't be vulnerable to DOM clobbering.
let current: Node = el.firstChild !;
let current: Node = this.DOM.firstChild(el) !;
while (current) {
if (DOM.isElementNode(current)) {
if (this.DOM.isElementNode(current)) {
this.startElement(current as Element);
} else if (DOM.isTextNode(current)) {
this.chars(DOM.nodeValue(current) !);
} else if (this.DOM.isTextNode(current)) {
this.chars(this.DOM.nodeValue(current) !);
} else {
// Strip non-element, non-text nodes.
this.sanitizedSomething = true;
}
if (DOM.firstChild(current)) {
current = DOM.firstChild(current) !;
if (this.DOM.firstChild(current)) {
current = this.DOM.firstChild(current) !;
continue;
}
while (current) {
// Leaving the element. Walk up and to the right, closing tags as we go.
if (DOM.isElementNode(current)) {
if (this.DOM.isElementNode(current)) {
this.endElement(current as Element);
}
let next = checkClobberedElement(current, DOM.nextSibling(current) !);
let next = this.checkClobberedElement(current, this.DOM.nextSibling(current) !);
if (next) {
current = next;
break;
}
current = checkClobberedElement(current, DOM.parentElement(current) !);
current = this.checkClobberedElement(current, this.DOM.parentElement(current) !);
}
}
return this.buf.join('');
}
private startElement(element: Element) {
const tagName = DOM.nodeName(element).toLowerCase();
const tagName = this.DOM.nodeName(element).toLowerCase();
if (!VALID_ELEMENTS.hasOwnProperty(tagName)) {
this.sanitizedSomething = true;
return;
}
this.buf.push('<');
this.buf.push(tagName);
DOM.attributeMap(element).forEach((value: string, attrName: string) => {
this.DOM.attributeMap(element).forEach((value: string, attrName: string) => {
const lower = attrName.toLowerCase();
if (!VALID_ATTRS.hasOwnProperty(lower)) {
this.sanitizedSomething = true;
@ -186,7 +161,7 @@ class SanitizingHtmlSerializer {
}
private endElement(current: Element) {
const tagName = DOM.nodeName(current).toLowerCase();
const tagName = this.DOM.nodeName(current).toLowerCase();
if (VALID_ELEMENTS.hasOwnProperty(tagName) && !VOID_ELEMENTS.hasOwnProperty(tagName)) {
this.buf.push('</');
this.buf.push(tagName);
@ -195,14 +170,14 @@ class SanitizingHtmlSerializer {
}
private chars(chars: string) { this.buf.push(encodeEntities(chars)); }
}
function checkClobberedElement(node: Node, nextNode: Node): Node {
if (nextNode && DOM.contains(node, nextNode)) {
checkClobberedElement(node: Node, nextNode: Node): Node {
if (nextNode && this.DOM.contains(node, nextNode)) {
throw new Error(
`Failed to sanitize html because the element is clobbered: ${DOM.getOuterHTML(node)}`);
`Failed to sanitize html because the element is clobbered: ${this.DOM.getOuterHTML(node)}`);
}
return nextNode;
}
}
// Regular Expressions for parsing tags and attributes
@ -232,33 +207,20 @@ function encodeEntities(value: string) {
.replace(/>/g, '&gt;');
}
/**
* When IE9-11 comes across an unknown namespaced attribute e.g. 'xlink:foo' it adds 'xmlns:ns1'
* attribute to declare ns1 namespace and prefixes the attribute with 'ns1' (e.g. 'ns1:xlink:foo').
*
* This is undesirable since we don't want to allow any of these custom attributes. This method
* strips them all.
*/
function stripCustomNsAttrs(el: Element) {
DOM.attributeMap(el).forEach((_, attrName) => {
if (attrName === 'xmlns:ns1' || attrName.indexOf('ns1:') === 0) {
DOM.removeAttribute(el, attrName);
}
});
for (const n of DOM.childNodesAsList(el)) {
if (DOM.isElementNode(n)) stripCustomNsAttrs(n as Element);
}
}
let inertBodyHelper: InertBodyHelper;
/**
* Sanitizes the given unsafe, untrusted HTML fragment, and returns HTML text that is safe to add to
* the DOM in a browser environment.
*/
export function sanitizeHtml(defaultDoc: any, unsafeHtmlInput: string): string {
const DOM = getDOM();
let inertBodyElement: HTMLElement|null = null;
try {
const containerEl = getInertElement();
inertBodyHelper = inertBodyHelper || new InertBodyHelper(defaultDoc, DOM);
// Make sure unsafeHtml is actually a string (TypeScript types are not enforced at runtime).
let unsafeHtml = unsafeHtmlInput ? String(unsafeHtmlInput) : '';
inertBodyElement = inertBodyHelper.getInertBodyElement(unsafeHtml);
// mXSS protection. Repeatedly parse the document to make sure it stabilizes, so that a browser
// trying to auto-correct incorrect HTML cannot cause formerly inert HTML to become dangerous.
@ -272,31 +234,25 @@ export function sanitizeHtml(defaultDoc: any, unsafeHtmlInput: string): string {
mXSSAttempts--;
unsafeHtml = parsedHtml;
DOM.setInnerHTML(containerEl, unsafeHtml);
if (defaultDoc.documentMode) {
// strip custom-namespaced attributes on IE<=11
stripCustomNsAttrs(containerEl);
}
parsedHtml = DOM.getInnerHTML(containerEl);
parsedHtml = DOM.getInnerHTML(inertBodyElement);
inertBodyElement = inertBodyHelper.getInertBodyElement(unsafeHtml);
} while (unsafeHtml !== parsedHtml);
const sanitizer = new SanitizingHtmlSerializer();
const safeHtml = sanitizer.sanitizeChildren(DOM.getTemplateContent(containerEl) || containerEl);
// Clear out the body element.
const parent = DOM.getTemplateContent(containerEl) || containerEl;
for (const child of DOM.childNodesAsList(parent)) {
DOM.removeChild(parent, child);
}
const safeHtml =
sanitizer.sanitizeChildren(DOM.getTemplateContent(inertBodyElement) || inertBodyElement);
if (isDevMode() && sanitizer.sanitizedSomething) {
DOM.log('WARNING: sanitizing HTML stripped some content (see http://g.co/ng/security#xss).');
}
return safeHtml;
} catch (e) {
} finally {
// In case anything goes wrong, clear out inertElement to reset the entire DOM structure.
inertElement = null;
throw e;
if (inertBodyElement) {
const parent = DOM.getTemplateContent(inertBodyElement) || inertBodyElement;
for (const child of DOM.childNodesAsList(parent)) {
DOM.removeChild(parent, child);
}
}
}
}

171
packages/platform-browser/src/security/inert_body.ts Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
/**
* @license
* Copyright Google Inc. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Use of this source code is governed by an MIT-style license that can be
* found in the LICENSE file at https://angular.io/license
*/
import {DomAdapter, getDOM} from '../dom/dom_adapter';
/**
* This helper class is used to get hold of an inert tree of DOM elements containing dirty HTML
* that needs sanitizing.
* Depending upon browser support we must use one of three strategies for doing this.
* Support: Safari 10.x -> XHR strategy
* Support: Firefox -> DomParser strategy
* Default: InertDocument strategy
*/
export class InertBodyHelper {
private inertBodyElement: HTMLElement;
constructor(private defaultDoc: any, private DOM: DomAdapter) {
const inertDocument = this.DOM.createHtmlDocument();
this.inertBodyElement = inertDocument.body;
if (this.inertBodyElement == null) {
// usually there should be only one body element in the document, but IE doesn't have any, so
// we need to create one.
const inertHtml = this.DOM.createElement('html', inertDocument);
this.inertBodyElement = this.DOM.createElement('body', inertDocument);
this.DOM.appendChild(inertHtml, this.inertBodyElement);
this.DOM.appendChild(inertDocument, inertHtml);
}
this.DOM.setInnerHTML(
this.inertBodyElement, '<svg><g onload="this.parentNode.remove()"></g></svg>');
if (this.inertBodyElement.querySelector && !this.inertBodyElement.querySelector('svg')) {
// We just hit the Safari 10.1 bug - which allows JS to run inside the SVG G element
// so use the XHR strategy.
this.getInertBodyElement = this.getInertBodyElement_XHR;
return;
}
this.DOM.setInnerHTML(
this.inertBodyElement, '<svg><p><style><img src="</style><img src=x onerror=alert(1)//">');
if (this.inertBodyElement.querySelector && this.inertBodyElement.querySelector('svg img')) {
// We just hit the Firefox bug - which prevents the inner img JS from being sanitized
// so use the DOMParser strategy, if it is available.
// If the DOMParser is not available then we are not in Firefox (Server/WebWorker?) so we
// fall through to the default strategy below.
if (isDOMParserAvailable()) {
this.getInertBodyElement = this.getInertBodyElement_DOMParser;
return;
}
}
// None of the bugs were hit so it is safe for us to use the default InertDocument strategy
this.getInertBodyElement = this.getInertBodyElement_InertDocument;
}
/**
* Get an inert DOM element containing DOM created from the dirty HTML string provided.
* The implementation of this is determined in the constructor, when the class is instantiated.
*/
getInertBodyElement: (html: string) => HTMLElement | null;
/**
* Use XHR to create and fill an inert body element (on Safari 10.1)
* See
* https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/a992d3a75031cb8bb032e5ea8399ba972bdf9a65/src/purify.js#L439-L449
*/
private getInertBodyElement_XHR(html: string) {
// We add these extra elements to ensure that the rest of the content is parsed as expected
// e.g. leading whitespace is maintained and tags like `<meta>` do not get hoisted to the
// `<head>` tag.
html = '<body><remove></remove>' + html + '</body>';
try {
html = encodeURI(html);
} catch (e) {
return null;
}
const xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
xhr.responseType = 'document';
xhr.open('GET', 'data:text/html;charset=utf-8,' + html, false);
xhr.send(null);
const body: HTMLBodyElement = xhr.response.body;
body.removeChild(body.firstChild !);
return body;
}
/**
* Use DOMParser to create and fill an inert body element (on Firefox)
* See https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/releases/tag/0.6.7
*
*/
private getInertBodyElement_DOMParser(html: string) {
// We add these extra elements to ensure that the rest of the content is parsed as expected
// e.g. leading whitespace is maintained and tags like `<meta>` do not get hoisted to the
// `<head>` tag.
html = '<body><remove></remove>' + html + '</body>';
try {
const body = new (window as any)
.DOMParser()
.parseFromString(html, 'text/html')
.body as HTMLBodyElement;
body.removeChild(body.firstChild !);
return body;
} catch (e) {
return null;
}
}
/**
* Use an HTML5 `template` element, if supported, or an inert body element created via
* `createHtmlDocument` to create and fill an inert DOM element.
* This is the default sane strategy to use if the browser does not require one of the specialised
* strategies above.
*/
private getInertBodyElement_InertDocument(html: string) {
// Prefer using <template> element if supported.
const templateEl = this.DOM.createElement('template');
if ('content' in templateEl) {
this.DOM.setInnerHTML(templateEl, html);
return templateEl;
}
this.DOM.setInnerHTML(this.inertBodyElement, html);
// Support: IE 9-11 only
// strip custom-namespaced attributes on IE<=11
if (this.defaultDoc.documentMode) {
this.stripCustomNsAttrs(this.inertBodyElement);
}
return this.inertBodyElement;
}
/**
* When IE9-11 comes across an unknown namespaced attribute e.g. 'xlink:foo' it adds 'xmlns:ns1'
* attribute to declare ns1 namespace and prefixes the attribute with 'ns1' (e.g.
* 'ns1:xlink:foo').
*
* This is undesirable since we don't want to allow any of these custom attributes. This method
* strips them all.
*/
private stripCustomNsAttrs(el: Element) {
this.DOM.attributeMap(el).forEach((_, attrName) => {
if (attrName === 'xmlns:ns1' || attrName.indexOf('ns1:') === 0) {
this.DOM.removeAttribute(el, attrName);
}
});
for (const n of this.DOM.childNodesAsList(el)) {
if (this.DOM.isElementNode(n)) this.stripCustomNsAttrs(n as Element);
}
}
}
/**
* We need to determine whether the DOMParser exists in the global context.
* The try-catch is because, on some browsers, trying to access this property
* on window can actually throw an error.
*
* @suppress {uselessCode}
*/
function isDOMParserAvailable() {
try {
return !!(window as any).DOMParser;
} catch (e) {
return false;
}
}

41
packages/platform-browser/test/security/html_sanitizer_spec.ts
View File

@ -134,6 +134,32 @@ import {sanitizeHtml} from '../../src/security/html_sanitizer';
}
});
// See
// https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/a992d3a75031cb8bb032e5ea8399ba972bdf9a65/src/purify.js#L439-L449
it('should not allow JavaScript execution when creating inert document', () => {
const output = sanitizeHtml(defaultDoc, '<svg><g onload="window.xxx = 100"></g></svg>');
const window = defaultDoc.defaultView;
if (window) {
expect(window.xxx).toBe(undefined);
window.xxx = undefined;
}
expect(output).toEqual('');
});
// See https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/releases/tag/0.6.7
it('should not allow JavaScript hidden in badly formed HTML to get through sanitization (Firefox bug)',
() => {
debugger;
expect(sanitizeHtml(
defaultDoc, '<svg><p><style><img src="</style><img src=x onerror=alert(1)//">'))
.toEqual(
isDOMParserAvailable() ?
// PlatformBrowser output
'<p>&lt;img src=&#34;<img src="x"></p>' :
// PlatformServer output
'<p><img src="&lt;/style&gt;&lt;img src=x onerror=alert(1)//"></p>');
});
if (browserDetection.isWebkit) {
it('should prevent mXSS attacks', function() {
// In Chrome Canary 62, the ideographic space character is kept as a stringified HTML entity
@ -143,3 +169,18 @@ import {sanitizeHtml} from '../../src/security/html_sanitizer';
}
});
}
/**
* We need to determine whether the DOMParser exists in the global context.
* The try-catch is because, on some browsers, trying to access this property
* on window can actually throw an error.
*
* @suppress {uselessCode}
*/
function isDOMParserAvailable() {
try {
return !!(window as any).DOMParser;
} catch (e) {
return false;
}
}