PEP 493: First draft as a standards track PEP

- now has 2 feature sections, and 3 backport recommendations
- features are for a new Python API and environment setting
- backports are all for targeting versions < 2.7.9
- Python 3 is excluded from scope
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PEP: 493
Title: HTTPS verification recommendations for Python 2.7 redistributors
Title: HTTPS verification migration tools for Python 2.7
Version: $Revision$
Last-Modified: $Date$
Author: Nick Coghlan <ncoghlan@gmail.com>,
Robert Kuska <rkuska@redhat.com>,
Marc-André Lemburg <mal@lemburg.com>
Status: Draft
Type: Informational
Type: Standards Track
Content-Type: text/x-rst
Created: 10-May-2015
Python-Version: 2.7.12
Post-History: 06-Jul-2015, 11-Nov-2015, 24-Nov-2015
Abstract
========
PEP 476 updated Python's default handling of HTTPS certificates to be
appropriate for communication over the public internet. The Python 2.7 long
term maintenance series was judged to be in scope for this change, with the
new behaviour introduced in the Python 2.7.9 maintenance release.
PEP 476 updated Python's default handling of HTTPS certificates in client
modules to align with certificate handling in web browsers, by validating
that the certificates received belonged to the server the client was attempting
to contact. The Python 2.7 long term maintenance series was judged to be in
scope for this change, with the new behaviour introduced in the Python 2.7.9
maintenance release.
This PEP provides recommendations to downstream redistributors wishing to
provide a smoother migration experience when helping their users to manage
this change in Python's default behaviour.
*Note that this PEP is not currently accepted, so it is a *proposed*
recommendation, rather than an active one.*
This has created a non-trivial barrier to adoption for affected Python 2.7
maintenance releases, so this PEP proposes additional Python 2.7 specific
features that allow system administrators and other users to more easily
decouple the decision to verify server certificates in HTTPS client modules
from the decision to update to newer Python 2.7 maintenance releases.
Rationale
=========
PEP 476 changed Python's default behaviour to better match the needs and
expectations of developers operating over the public internet, a category
which appears to include most new Python developers. It is the position of
the authors of this PEP that this was a correct decision.
PEP 476 changed Python's default behaviour to align with expectations
established by web browsers in regards to the semantics of HTTPS URLs:
starting with Python 2.7.9 and 3.4.3, HTTPS clients in the standard library
validate server certificates by default.
However, it is also the case that this change *does* cause problems for
infrastructure administrators operating private intranets that rely on
self-signed certificates, or otherwise encounter problems with the new default
certificate verification settings.
The long term answer for such environments is to update their internal
certificate management to at least match the standards set by the public
internet, but in the meantime, it is desirable to offer these administrators
a way to continue receiving maintenance updates to the Python 2.7 series,
without having to gate that on upgrades to their certificate management
infrastructure.
To manage these kinds of situations, web browsers provide users with "click
through" warnings that allow the user to add the server's certificate to the
browser's certificate store. Network client tools like ``curl`` and ``wget``
offer options to switch off certificate checking entirely (by way of
``curl --insecure`` and ``wget --no-check-certificate``, respectively).
PEP 476 did attempt to address this question, by covering how to revert the
new settings process wide by monkeypatching the ``ssl`` module to restore the
At a different layer of the technology stack, Linux security modules like
`SELinux` and `AppArmor`, while enabled by default by distribution vendors,
offer relatively straightforward mechanisms for turning them off.
At the moment, no such convenient mechanisms exist to disable Python's
default certificate checking for a whole process.
PEP 476 did attempt to address this question, by covering how to revert to the
old settings process wide by monkeypatching the ``ssl`` module to restore the
old behaviour. Unfortunately, the ``sitecustomize.py`` based technique proposed
to allow system administrators to disable the feature by default in their
Standard Operating Environment definition has been determined to be
insufficient in at least some cases. The specific case of interest to the
authors of this PEP is the one where a Linux distributor aims to provide
their users with a
insufficient in at least some cases. The specific case that led to the
initial creation of this PEP is the one where a Linux distributor aims to
provide their users with a
`smoother migration path <https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1173041>`__
than the standard one provided by consuming upstream CPython 2.7 releases
directly, but other potential challenges have also been pointed out with
updating embedded Python runtimes and other user level installations of Python.
Rather than allowing a plethora of mutually incompatibile migration techniques
to bloom, this PEP proposes two alternative approaches that redistributors
may take when addressing these problems. Redistributors may choose to implement
one, both, or neither of these approaches based on their assessment of the
needs of their particular userbase.
to bloom, this PEP proposes an additional feature to be added to Python 2.7.12
to make it easier to revert a process to the past behaviour of skipping
certificate validation in HTTPS client modules. It also provides additional
recommendations to redistributors backporting these features to versions of
Python prior to Python 2.7.9.
These designs are being proposed as a recommendation for redistributors, rather
than as new upstream features, as they are needed purely to support legacy
environments migrating from older versions of Python 2.7. Neither approach
is being proposed as an upstream Python 2.7 feature, nor as a feature in any
version of Python 3 (whether published directly by the Python Software
Foundation or by a redistributor).
These designs are being proposed purely as tools for helping to manage the
transition to the new default certificate handling behaviour in the context
of Python 2.7. They are not being proposed as new features for Python 3, as
it is expected that the vast majority of client applications affected by this
problem without the ability to update the application itself will be Python 2
applications.
It would likely be desirable for a future version of Python 3 to allow default
certificate handling for secure protocols to be configurable on a per-protocol
basis, but that question is beyond the scope of this PEP.
Alternatives
------------
@ -84,20 +97,20 @@ their customers. The main approaches available are:
* Continuing to rebase on new Python 2.7.x releases, while providing no
additional assistance beyond the mechanisms defined in PEP 476 in migrating
from unchecked to checked hostnames in standard library HTTPS clients
* Gating availability of the improved default handling of HTTPS connections on
upgrading from Python 2 to Python 3
* For Linux distribution vendors, gating availability of the improved default
* Gating availability of the changes in default handling of HTTPS connections
on upgrading from Python 2 to Python 3
* For Linux distribution vendors, gating availability of the changes in default
handling of HTTPS connections on upgrading to a new operating system version
* Implementing one or both of the design suggestions described in this PEP,
* Implementing one or both of the backport suggestions described in this PEP,
regardless of the formal status of the PEP
Requirements for capability detection
=====================================
As these recommendations are intended to cover backports to earlier Python
As the proposals in this PEP aim to facilitate backports to earlier Python
versions, the Python version number cannot be used as a reliable means for
detecting them. Instead, the recommendations are defined to allow the presence
detecting them. Instead, they are designed to allow the presence
or absence of the feature to be determined using the following technique::
python -c "import ssl; ssl._relevant_attribute"
@ -108,57 +121,99 @@ relevant capability is not available.
The marker attributes are prefixed with an underscore to indicate the
implementation dependent nature of these capabilities - not all Python
distributions will offer them, only those that are providing a multi-stage
migration process from the legacy HTTPS handling to the new default behaviour.
migration process from the original Python 2.7 HTTPS handling to the new
default behaviour.
Feature: Configuration API
==========================
This change is proposed for inclusion in CPython 2.7.12 and later CPython 2.7.x
releases. It consists of a new ``ssl._verify_https_certificates()`` to specify
the default handling of HTTPS certificates in standard library client libraries.
It is not proposed to forward port this change to Python 3, so Python 3
applications that need to support skipping certificate verification will still
need to define their own suitable security context.
Feature detection
-----------------
The marker attribute on the ``ssl`` module related to this feature is the
``ssl._verify_https_certificates`` function itself.
Specification
-------------
The ``ssl._verify_https_certificates`` function will work as follows::
def _verify_https_certificates(enable=True):
"""Verify server HTTPS certificates by default?"""
global _create_default_https_context
if enable:
_create_default_https_context = create_default_context
else:
_create_default_https_context = _create_unverified_context
If called without arguments, or with ``enable`` set to a true value, then
standard library client modules will subsequently verify HTTPS certificates by default, otherwise they will skip verification.
If called with ``enable`` set to a false value, then standard library client
modules will subsequently skip verifying HTTPS certificates by default.
Security Considerations
-----------------------
The inclusion of this feature will allow security sensitive applications to
include the following forward-compatible snippet in their code::
if hasattr(ssl, "_verify_https_certificates"):
ssl._verify_https_certificates()
Some developers may also choose to opt out of certificate checking using
``ssl._verify_https_certificates(enable=False)``. This doesn't introduce any
major new security concerns, as monkeypatching the affected internal APIs was
already possible.
Recommendation for an environment variable based security downgrade
===================================================================
Feature: environment based configuration
========================================
Some redistributors may wish to provide a per-application option to disable
certificate verification in selected applications that run on or embed CPython
without needing to modify the application itself.
This change is proposed for inclusion in CPython 2.7.12 and later CPython 2.7.x
releases. It consists of a new ``PYTHONHTTPSVERIFY`` environment variable that
allows the default verification to be disabled without modifying the
application source code (which may not even be available in cases of
bytecode-only application distribution)
In these cases, a configuration mechanism is needed that provides:
It is not proposed to forward port this change to Python 3, so Python 3
applications that need to support skipping certificate verification will still
need to define their own suitable security context.
* an opt-out model that allows certificate verification to be selectively
turned off for particular applications after upgrading to a version of
Python that verifies certificates by default
* the ability for all users to configure this setting on a per-application
basis, rather than on a per-system, or per-Python-installation basis
Feature detection
-----------------
This approach may be used for any redistributor provided version of Python 2.7,
including those that advertise themselves as providing Python 2.7.9 or later.
The marker attribute on the ``ssl`` module related to this feature is:
Required marker attribute
-------------------------
The required marker attribute on the ``ssl`` module when implementing this
recommendation is::
_https_verify_envvar = 'PYTHONHTTPSVERIFY'
* the ``ssl._https_verify_envvar`` attribute, giving the name of environment
variable affecting the default behaviour
This not only makes it straightforward to detect the presence (or absence) of
the capability, it also makes it possible to programmatically determine the
relevant environment variable name.
Specification
-------------
Recommended modifications to the Python standard library
--------------------------------------------------------
Rather than always defaulting to the use of ``ssl.create_default_context``,
the ``ssl`` module will be modified to:
The recommended approach to providing a per-application configuration setting
for HTTPS certificate verification that doesn't require modifications to the
application itself is to:
* modify the ``ssl`` module to read the ``PYTHONHTTPSVERIFY`` environment
variable when the module is first imported into a Python process
* read the ``PYTHONHTTPSVERIFY`` environment variable when the module is first
imported into a Python process
* set the ``ssl._create_default_https_context`` function to be an alias for
``ssl._create_unverified_context`` if this environment variable is present
and set to ``'0'``
* otherwise, set the ``ssl._create_default_https_context`` function to be an
alias for ``ssl.create_default_context`` as usual
Example implementation
----------------------
@ -175,14 +230,13 @@ Example implementation
_create_default_https_context = _get_https_context_factory()
Security Considerations
-----------------------
Relative to an unmodified version of CPython 2.7.9 or later, this approach
does introduce a new downgrade attack against the default security settings
that potentially allows a sufficiently determined attacker to revert Python
to the vulnerable configuration used in CPython 2.7.8 and earlier releases.
Relative to the behaviour in Python 3.4.3+ and Python 2.7.9->2.7.11, this
approach does introduce a new downgrade attack against the default security
settings that potentially allows a sufficiently determined attacker to revert
Python to the default behaviour used in CPython 2.7.8 and earlier releases.
However, such an attack requires the ability to modify the execution
environment of a Python process prior to the import of the ``ssl`` module,
and any attacker with such access would already be able to modify the
@ -191,13 +245,13 @@ behaviour of the underlying OpenSSL implementation.
Interaction with Python virtual environments
--------------------------------------------
This setting is read directly from the process environment, and hence works
the same way regardless of whether or not the interpreter is being run inside
an activated Python virtual environment.
The default setting is read directly from the process environment, and hence
works the same way regardless of whether or not the interpreter is being run
inside an activated Python virtual environment.
Recommendation for backporting to earlier Python versions
=========================================================
Backporting PEP 476 to earlier Python versions
==============================================
Some redistributors, most notably Linux distributions, may choose to backport
the PEP 476 HTTPS verification changes to modified Python versions based on
@ -214,17 +268,21 @@ mechanism is needed that provides:
installations that have been explicitly configured to skip verifying HTTPS
certificates by default
This approach should not be used for any Python installation that advertises
As it only affects backports to earlier releases of Python 2.7, this change is
not proposed for inclusion in upstream CPython, but rather is offered as
guidance to redistributors to reduce the likelihood of multiple mutually
incompatible approaches to backporting being adopted.
This approach SHOULD NOT be used for any Python installation that advertises
itself as providing Python 2.7.9 or later, as most Python users will have the
reasonable expectation that all such environments will validate HTTPS
certificates by default.
Required marker attribute
-------------------------
Feature detection
-----------------
The required marker attribute on the ``ssl`` module when implementing this
recommendation is::
The marker attribute on the ``ssl`` module related to this feature is::
_cert_verification_config = '<path to configuration file>'
@ -320,7 +378,7 @@ Example implementation
Security Considerations
-----------------------
The specific recommendations for the backporting case are designed to work for
The specific recommendations for this backporting case are designed to work for
privileged, security sensitive processes, even those being run in the following
locked down configuration:
@ -356,19 +414,108 @@ This setting is scoped by the interpreter installation and affects all Python
processes using that interpreter, regardless of whether or not the interpreter
is being run inside an activated Python virtual environment.
Origins of this recommendation
------------------------------
Combining the recommendations
=============================
This recommendation is based on the backporting approach adopted for Red Hat
Enterprise Linux 7.2, as published in the original July 2015 draft of this PEP
and described in detail in `this KnowledgeBase article
<https://access.redhat.com/articles/2039753>`__. Red Hat's patches implementing
this backport for Python 2.7.5 can be found in the `CentOS git repository
<https://git.centos.org/commit/rpms!python.git/refs!heads!c7>`__.
If a redistributor chooses to implement both recommendations, then the
environment variable should take precedence over the system-wide configuration
setting. This allows the setting to be changed for a given user, virtual
environment or application, regardless of the system-wide default behaviour.
Backporting this PEP to earlier Python versions
===============================================
The configuration file based backport described above is designed to cover
backporting the PEP 476 changes to default certificate handling without the
additional configuration mechanisms defined in this PEP.
If this PEP is accepted, then an additional backporting option becomes
available, which is to backport the per-process configuration mechanisms
defined in this PEP, without backporting the ability to change the default behaviour of the overall Python installation.
Such a backport would differ from the mechanism proposed in this PEP solely in
the default behaviour when ``PYTHONHTTPSVERIFY`` was not set at all: it would
continue to default to skipping certificate validation.
In this case, if the ``PYTHONHTTPSVERIFY`` environment variable is defined, and
set to anything *other* than ``'0'``, then HTTPS certificate verification
should be enabled.
Feature detection
-----------------
There's no specific attribute indicating that this situation applies. Rather,
it is indicated by the ``ssl._verify_https_certificates`` and
``ssl._https_verify_envvar`` attributes being present in a Python version that
is nominally older than Python 2.7.9.
Specification
-------------
Implementing this backport involves backporting the changes in PEP 466, 476 and
this PEP, with the following change to the handling of the
``PYTHONHTTPSVERIFY`` environment variable in the ``ssl`` module:
* read the ``PYTHONHTTPSVERIFY`` environment variable when the module is first
imported into a Python process
* set the ``ssl._create_default_https_context`` function to be an alias for
``ssl.create_default_context`` if this environment variable is present
and set to any value other than ``'0'``
* otherwise, set the ``ssl._create_default_https_context`` function to be an
alias for ``ssl._create_unverified_context``
Example implementation
----------------------
::
_https_verify_envvar = 'PYTHONHTTPSVERIFY'
def _get_https_context_factory():
if not sys.flags.ignore_environment:
config_setting = os.environ.get(_https_verify_envvar)
if config_setting != '0':
return create_default_context
return _create_unverified_context
_create_default_https_context = _get_https_context_factory()
def _disable_https_default_verification():
"""Skip verification of HTTPS certificates by default"""
global _create_default_https_context
_create_default_https_context = _create_unverified_context
Security Considerations
-----------------------
This change would be a strict security upgrade for any Python version that
currently defaults to skipping certificate validation in standard library
HTTPS clients. The technical trade-offs to be taken into account relate largely
to the magnitude of the PEP 466 backport also required rather than to anything
security related.
Interaction with Python virtual environments
--------------------------------------------
The default setting is read directly from the process environment, and hence
works the same way regardless of whether or not the interpreter is being run
inside an activated Python virtual environment.
Recommendation for combined feature backports
=============================================
If a redistributor chooses to backport the environment variable based
configuration setting from this PEP to a modified Python version that also
implements the configuration file based PEP 476 , then the environment
variable should take precedence over the system-wide configuration setting.
This allows the setting to be changed for a given user or application,
regardless of the installation-wide default behaviour.
Example implementation
----------------------