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PEP: 8012
Title: The Community Governance Model
Author: Barry Warsaw <barry@python.org>
Author: Łukasz Langa <lukasz@python.org>
Status: Active
Type: Informational
Content-Type: text/x-rst
Created: 2018-08-24
.. note:: This is just a placeholder until the actual governance PEPs are
written. It is possible that the title, content, model proposed,
and authorship will change once the PEP is actually written.
Created: 2018-10-03
Abstract
========
This PEP proposes a new model of Python governance based on consensus and
voting by the Python community, without the role of a centralized singular
leader or a governing council. It describes how, when, and why votes are
conducted for decisions affecting the Python language. It also describes the
criteria for voting eligibility.
This PEP proposes a new model of Python governance based on consensus
and voting by the Python community, without the role of a centralized
singular leader or a governing council. It describes how, when, and
why votes are conducted for decisions affecting the Python language.
It also describes the criteria for voting eligibility.
Should this model be adopted, it will be codified in PEP 13 along with the
names of all officeholders described in this PEP.
Should this model be adopted, it will be codified in PEP 13.
This model can be affectionately called "The Least Worst Governance
Model" by its property that while far from ideal, it's still the most
robust one compared to the others. Since avoiding issues inherent to
the other models is a paramount feature of the Community Governance
Model, we start the discussion a bit unusually: by rejecting the
other models.
Rejected Ideas
==============
Let's have another BDFL
-----------------------
This seems like a very attractive idea because it's a model we know.
One Dictator to rule us all.
There is no other Guido
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
There is no other single person with the unique skillset of Guido van
Rossum. Such person would have to combine the following characteristics
to be a successful leader of the project:
* cohesive long-term vision for the project;
* deep technical understanding of the runtime, the standard library,
and the wider third-party library context;
* ability to resolve contentious issues in ways acceptable to all
parties involved;
* continuous time involvement over periods of years to keep the
above-mentioned traits over time and exercise them.
Malevolent Dictator For Life
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
What if we got somebody who is not as well suited for the position as
our first Dictator? There are possible scenarios in which this could
lead to severe consequences.
The Dictator could gather insufficient trust due to missing technical
depth, a "close" election, inconsistent vision, poor ability to deal
with conflict or burnout, and so on. Given a controversial decision
decided by the Dictator in a specific way, a Dictator with
insufficient trust may cause a split within the project.
The Dictator setup invites lobbying concentrated on a single person.
Unless that person is immune to leverage due to wealth, health, and
a stable life situation, this poses risk of malicious actors steering
the project from behind the curtain.
Finally, the Dictator coming from a particular part of the community
may put more weight on the needs and interests of that particular part
of the user base, alienating others.
We don't actually need a Dictator
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The irony of the Dictator model is that it requires an election. Better
yet, we need an election to even decide on which governance model to
use.
If we are already able solve two problems of this gravity via the
community process, why not keep using it for all subsequent decisions?
The warm and fuzzy feeling of a vague proposal
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
One last thing worth mentioning is that when a BDFL model is suggested,
it's easy to bypass the criticism above by not mentioning *who* the BDFL
should be. That way the hopeful reader can project their best
expectations and wants onto the abstract BDFL, making the idea appear
more attractive. This is a mistake.
Without naming the BDFL in the model proposal we are not talking about
a concrete model. We can avoid asking and answering the hard questions.
We can imagine our best-case scenario, a candidate we'd like to serve
the role.
Omitting a name also puts the Community Model at an unfair disadvantage.
We already know the good, the bad, and the ugly of our core developer
group. It's no platonic ideal, no perfect sphere with no friction. In
fact, we expect there to be a fair amount of friction and imperfections.
Thus, to fairly assess the BDFL model proposal, dear reader, you
should imagine the worst possible person within our team as that
BDFL. A concrete human being. Imagine it's me.
Let's have a Council
--------------------
This group of people roughly sharing the responsibilities of a Dictator
can also be called a Triumvirate, a Quorum, Elders, Steering Committee,
and so on.
Like a Dictator, only worse
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This model favors a small group, between three to five people.
That way it shares most of the criticism with the Dictator model,
amplified. Having not one but, say, three people in position of power
dillutes responsibility while still providing high risk of lobbying,
insufficient trust, or alienating parts of the community.
Additionally, having multiple people share the responsibility of
governance creates ample opportunity for internal conflict,
inconsistent long-term vision of the project, and multiplies the
required continuous time involvement by its members (it's no Quorum
if they can't "reach quorum" due to other time commitments).
Just like with a frictionless spherical BDFL, reject ideas of
Councils without considering how would it work for you if that
Council consisted of three people you find inadequate for the role.
Imagine if I had two friends.
Most importantly, just like with a Dictator, we don't need a Council.
By the time we had one, we would have already had two successful
elections. Why not keep voting?
Motivation
==========
Now that we rejected all that we should, let's talk why we even need
a governance model on top of a loosely defined group of committers.
We want to block single committers from making wide-reaching changes
that impact the future of the language. Coherent vision and backwards
compatibility are important in any programming language, but they are
doubly important for Python which is very dynamic (e.g. has very complex
backwards compatibility implications). Moreover, Python is used by a
diverse group of users, from school children through scientists to
corporations with multi-million line codebases. We want to include
all our varied audiences.
We want to avoid stagnation. Python is a mature project but it needs
to keep evolving to stay relevant, both the runtime and the programming
language. To do that, people interested in improving a particular part
of the project should be able to do so without needless friction.
But for substantial changes, we want some friction to ensure they are
wise changes.
Rationale
=========
The Community Model is the most inclusive model. No single person or
a small group of people is in a distiguished position of power over
others. Contributors in this model are self-selecting.
This model ensures no user group is put at a disadvantage due to the
interests of a single person or a small group of people.
This model works. There is a number of large open-source projects run
this way (two of which, Rust and Django, are described in PEP 8002).
ECMAScript and C++ are similarly developed.
Specification
=============
Key people and their functions
------------------------------
The core team
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The Python project is developed by a team of core developers.
While membership is determined by presence in the "Python core" team
in the "python" organization on GitHub, contribution takes many forms:
* committing changes to the repository;
* reviewing pull requests by others;
* triaging bug reports on the issue tracker;
* discussing on official Python communication channels.
Some contributors are dormant, in other words they did not contribute
to the last two releases of CPython. Any dormant contributor can at
any time resume contribution.
Experts
~~~~~~~
The Python Developer's Guide lists a number of interest areas along with
names of core developers who are recognized as experts in the given
area. An expert or a sub-team of experts has the following
responsibilities:
* responding to issues on the bug tracker triaged to the given interest
area on a timely basis;
* reviewing pull requests identified as belonging to the given interest
area on a timely basis;
* overviewing cohesive design in the evolution of the given interest
area.
A core developer can assign and unassign themselves at will to
a given interest area. Existing experts listed for the given interest
area must be made aware of this change and have to unanimously agree to
it.
If a given interest area lists multiple experts, they form a sub-team
within the core team. They are responsible for the given interest area
together.
A core developer should avoid membership as an expert in too many
interest areas at the same time. This document deliberately doesn't
specify a maximum number, it simply signals that overexertion leads to
burnout and is a risk to the project's ability to function without
a given contributor.
Moderators
~~~~~~~~~~
There is a group of people, some of which are not core developers,
responsible for ensuring that discussions on official communication
channels adhere to the Code of Conduct. They take action in view of
violations.
Regular decision process
------------------------
Primary work happens through bug tracker issues and pull requests.
Core developers should avoind pushing their changes directly to the cpython
repository, instead relying on pull requests. Approving a pull
request by a core developer allows it to be merged without further
process.
Notifying relevant experts about a bug tracker issue or a pull request
is important. Reviews from experts in the given interest area are
strongly preferred, especially on pull request approvals. Failure to
do so might end up with the change being reverted by the relevant
expert.
Experts are not required to listen to the firehose of GitHub and bug
tracker activity at all times. Notifying an expert explicitly during
triage or bug/pull request creation may be necessary to get their
attention.
Controversial decision process
------------------------------
Substantial changes in a given interest area require a PEP. This
includes:
* Any semantic or syntactic change to the language.
* Backwards-incompatible changes to the standard library or the C API.
* Additions to the standard library, including substantial new
functionality within an existing library.
* Removing language, standard library, or C API features.
Failure to get a substantial change through the PEP process might result
with the change being reverted.
Changes that are bug fixes can be exempt from the PEP requirement. Use
your best judgement.
PEP, Enhanced
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The PEP process is augmented with the following changes and clarifications
over information already present in PEP 1:
* PEPs are not merged until the final decision is made on them; they are
open pull requests on GitHub until that moment;
* to make review easier, all changes to the PEP under review should be
made as separate commits, allowing for granular comparison;
* a submitted PEP needs to identify the area of interest and relevant
experts as the body that makes the final decision on it;
* if the PEP author is one of the experts of the relevant area of
interest, they must name another person from outside of that interest
area to contribute to the final decision in their place;
* the PEP author is responsible for gathering and integrating feedback
on the PEP using the official communication channels, with the goal of
building consensus;
* all community members must be enabled to give feedback;
* at some point, one of the named experts posts a "summary comment" that
lays out the current state of discussion, especially major points of
disagreement and tradeoffs; at the same time the expert proposes
a "motion for final comment period" (FCP), along with a proposed
disposition to either:
* accept;
* accept provisionally;
* reject; or
* defer the PEP.
* to enter the FCP, the PEP must be signed off by all experts of the
relevant area of interest;
* the FCP lasts for fourteen calendar days to allow stakeholders to file
any final objections before a decision is reached.
Very controversial PEPs
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
If a core contributor feels strongly against a particular PEP, during
its FCP they may raise a motion to reject it by vote. Voting details
are described below in "Voting Mechanics".
This should be a last resort and thus a rare occurrence. It splits the
core team and is a stressful event for all involved. However, the
experts filing for an FCP for a PEP should have a good sense whether
a motion to reject it by vote is likely. In such case, care should be
taken to avoid prematurely filing for FCP.
There is no recourse for the opposite situation, i.e. when the
experts want to reject a PEP but others would like it accepted. This
ensures that the relevant experts have the last say on what goes in.
If you really want that change, find a way to convince them.
Moderators on official communication channels enforce the Code of
Conduct first and foremost, to ensure healthy interaction between all
interested parties. Enforcement can result in a given participant
being excluded from further discussion and thus the decision process.
Revisiting deferred and rejected PEPs
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
If a PEP is deferred or rejected, the relevant experts should be
contacted first before another attempt at the same idea is made.
If the experts agree there is substantial evidence to justify
revisiting the idea, a pull request editing the deferred or rejected
PEP can be opened.
Failure to get proper expert buy-in beforehand will likely result in
immediate rejection of a pull request on a deferred or rejected PEP.
Other Voting Situations
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
* Nominating a new core developer;
* Removing a core developer from the core team;
* Disbanding the experts team for a given area of interest.
The latter two are votes of no confidence. Those describe a situation
where a core developer is forcefully removed from the core team or an
experts team is forcefully disbanded. Hopefully those will never have
to be exercised but they are explicitly mentioned to demonstrate how
a disfunctional area of interest can be healed.
If a core developer is removed by vote from the core team, they lose
the ability to interact with the project. It's up to the Moderators'
discretion to remove their ability to post on the bug tracker and GitHub
or just moderate their future behavior on a case-by-case basis.
If the experts team for an area of interest is disbanded, other core
developers can step up to fill the void at will. Members of the
disbanded experts team cannot self-nominate to return.
Voting Mechanics
----------------
Votes take fourteen calendar days. The starting date is taken looking at
the timezone of the person who filed for the motion to vote. The end
date is fourteen days later Anywhere-On-Earth.
Dormant core developers as defined in "Key people and their functions"
above are not counted towards the totals if they abstain. However, they
can vote if they choose to do so and that way they count as active.
Voting is a form of contribution.
Voting is done by a commit to a private repository in the "python"
organization on GitHub. The repository is archived and publicized after
the voting period is over. The repository's name should start with
"vote-".
Changes to one's vote during the voting period is allowed. Peeking
at other developers' cast votes during the time of the vote is possible.
Every situation requires a different vote percentage:
* PEP rejection by vote requires over 1/3rd of the non-dormant core
developer population to explicitly vote to reject. Note that if
more than 1/3rd of core developers decide against a PEP, this means
there exists no super-majority of core developers who are in favor
of the change. This strongly suggests the change should not be made
in the shape described by the PEP.
* New core developer nomination requires there to be no votes cast
against it.
* Votes of no confidence require a super-majority of at least 2/3rds of
the non-dormant core developer population to explicitly vote in favor
of the motion.
Omissions
=========
This document deliberately omits listing possible areas of interest
within the project.
Acknowledgements
================
Thank you to the authors of PEP 8002 which was a helpful resource in
shaping this document.
Thank you to Alex Crichton and the Rust team for a governance model
that was a major inspiration for this document.
Copyright