Use CVIS instead of a github repository (#830)
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Donald Stufft
Łukasz Langa
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pep-8001.rst
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pep-8001.rst
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@ -77,14 +77,43 @@ to November 30 (Anywhere-on-Earth).
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Where is the vote?
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------------------
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The vote will happen through a private GitHub repository named
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"vote-governance" within the Python organization. Every committer
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will push a single file named after their GitHub username. Inside the
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file, preferences should be stated one PEP per line.
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The vote will happen using a "private" poll on the
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`Condorcet Internet Voting Service <https://civs.cs.cornell.edu/>`_. Every committer
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will recieve an email with a link allowing them to rank the PEPs in their order of
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preference.
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Committers are allowed to change their vote while voting is open.
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The election wil be supervised by Ernest Durbin.
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The repository will be made read-only and public on December 1st.
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The results of the election, including anonymized ballots, will be made public on
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December 1st, after the election has closed.
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The following settings will be used for the vote in the CIVS system::
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[x] Private
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[ ] Make this a test poll: read all votes from a file.
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[ ] Do not release results to all voters.
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[x] Enable detailed ballot reporting.
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[ ] In detailed ballot report, also reveal the identity of the voter with each ballot.
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[ ] Allow voters to write in new choices.
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[ ] Present choices on voting page in exactly the given order.
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[ ] Allow voters to select “no opinion” for some choices.
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[ ] Enforce proportional representation
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Which will have the effect of:
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* Making the election "private", or in other words, invite only.
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* The results of the election will be released to all voters.
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* The contents of every ballot will be released to the public, along
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with a detailed report going over how the winner was elected.
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* The detailed ballots will *not* include any identifying information
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and the email addresses of the voters will be thrown away by the CIVS
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system as soon as the email with their voting link has been sent.
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* Voters will *not* be able to write in new choices, and will be limited
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only to the options specified in the election.
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* The default ordering for each ballot will be randomized to remove
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any influence that the order of the ballot may have on the election.
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* Voters will have to rank all choices somehow, but may rank multiple
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choices as equal.
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Voting mechanics
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----------------
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@ -94,30 +123,20 @@ orders all candidate PEPs from the most preferred to the least
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preferred. The vote will be tallied and a winner chosen using the
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`Condorcet method <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_method>`_.
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While the CIVS system does not provide an option for a "Pure"
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Condorcet election, any Condorcet method will select the "Pure"
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Condorcet winner if one exists and otherwise only vary if one
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doesn't exist. The CIVS system differentiates between a Condorcet
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winner and a non Condorcet winner by stating if the winner was a
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Condorcet winner, or if it merely wasn't defeated versus any other
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option. So a winner in the CIVS system will only be accepted if
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it states it was a Condorcet winner.
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In the unlikely case of a tie (or cycle as is possible under the
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Condorcet method), voting will be re-opened for another week to allow
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voters to change their ballots. This re-opening and allowing of vote
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changing for a week will continue until a winner is determined.
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An example ballot is::
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Please rank **every** choice -- starting at 1 and ending at 6 by entering your rankings
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between the square brackets (e.g. `[1]`, with 1 being your most preferred choice and
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6 being your least preferred).
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If you are currently an inactive core developer *who intends to remain inactive*,
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please abstain from voting.
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**DO NOT LEAVE ANY BRACKETS BLANK!**
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**DO NOT REPEAT A RANKING/NUMBER!**
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[] PEP 8010: The BDFL Governance Model (Warsaw)
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[] PEP 8011: Python Governance Model Lead by Trio of Pythonistas (Wijaya, Warsaw)
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[] PEP 8012: The Community Governance Model (Langa)
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[] PEP 8013: The External Council Governance Model (Dower)
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[] PEP 8014: The Commons Governance Model (Jansen)
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[] PEP 8015: Organization of the Python community (Stinner)
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[] Further discussion
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Condorcet method), a new election will be opened, limited to the
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options involved in the tie or cycle, to select a new winner from
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amongst the tied options. This new election will be open for a
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week, and will be repeated until a single winner is determined.
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Questions and Answers
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@ -152,15 +171,34 @@ developers to assess their skin in the game.
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Note: this is not an edict and will not be policed. We trust all
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members of the core team to act in the best interest of Python.
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Why should the vote be public?
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------------------------------
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Why should the vote be private?
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-------------------------------
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The population of Python core developers is very small. With an
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important decision like governance, we owe it to ourselves and the wider
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Python community to be transparent about how the choice was made.
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This removes ambiguity around *who* voted and *how*, as well as allows
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people to confirm whether any "tactical voting" occurred (which instant
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run-off ranked voting is criticized for; see below).
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When discussing the election system, a number of core developers expressed
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concerns with the idea of having public ballots, with at least one core
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developer stating that they were planning on abstaining from voting
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altogether due to the use of a public ballot.
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A secret ballot is considered by many to be a requirement for a free and
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fair election, allowing members to vote their true preferences without
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worry about social pressure or possible fallout for how they may have
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voted.
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Why the use of CIVS?
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--------------------
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In the resulting discussion of this PEP, it was determined that core
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developers wished to have a secret ballot. Unfortunately a secret ballot
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requires either novel cryptography or a trusted party to anonymize the
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ballots. Since there is not known to be any existing novel cryptographic
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systems for Condorcet ballots, the CIVS system was chosen to act as a
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trusted party.
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More information about the security and privacy afforded by CIVS, including
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how a malicous voter, election supervisor, or CIVS administrator can
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influence the election can be be found
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`here <https://civs.cs.cornell.edu/sec_priv.html>_`.
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Are there any deficiencies in the Condorcet method?
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------------------------------------------------------------
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