Move PEP 458 figures out of subdirectory.

2014-11-25 16:43:59 -08:00 · 2014-11-25 16:43:59 -08:00 · 906fec97d7
parent 59ea08e465
commit 906fec97d7
4 changed files with 3 additions and 3 deletions
--- a/pep-0458/figure1.png
+++ b/pep-0458/figure1.png
--- a/pep-0458/figure2.png
+++ b/pep-0458/figure2.png
--- a/pep-0458/figure3.png
+++ b/pep-0458/figure3.png
--- a/pep-0458.txt
+++ b/pep-0458.txt
@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ available target files (in our case, it will be all files on PyPI under the
 responsibilities without exception.  Figure 1 provides a table of the roles
 used in TUF.

-.. image:: pep-0458/figure1.png
+.. image:: pep-0458-1.png

 Figure 1: An overview of the TUF roles.

@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ also indicates the types of keys used to sign each role and which roles are
 trusted to sign for files available on PyPI.  The next two sections cover the
 details of signing repository files and the types of keys used for each role.

-.. image:: pep-0458/figure2.png
+.. image:: pep-0458-2.png

 Figure 2: An overview of the role metadata available on PyPI.

@ -957,7 +957,7 @@ all of the projects are signed by an online key.  An attacker can corrupt
 packages in the minimum security model, but not in the maximum model without
 also compromising a developer's key.

-.. image:: pep-0458/figure3.png
+.. image:: pep-0458-3.png

 Figure 3: An overview of the metadata layout in the maximum security model.
 The maximum security model supports continuous delivery and survivable key