[pep-8001] Define tactical voting

This commit is contained in:
Łukasz Langa 2018-10-15 06:03:29 -07:00
parent 1b1249aa7d
commit b77032006c
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: B26995E310250568
1 changed files with 29 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@ -144,7 +144,35 @@ important decision like governance, we owe it to ourselves and the wider
Python community to be transparent about how the choice was made.
This removes ambiguity around *who* voted and *how*, as well as allows
people to confirm whether any "tactical voting" occurred (which instant
run-off ranked voting is criticized for).
run-off ranked voting is criticized for; see below).
Are there any deficiencies of instant run-off ranked voting?
------------------------------------------------------------
There is no perfect voting method. It has been shown by the
`Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gibbard%E2%80%93Satterthwaite_theorem>`_
that any single-winner ranked voting method which is not dictatorial
must be susceptible to so-called "tactical voting".
Tactical voting occurs when a voter supports a candidate against their
*sincere preference* in order to prevent an outcome they find most
undesirable. There are `four major tactical voting strategies
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tactical_voting>`_
(compromising, burying, push-over, and bullet voting).
Instant run-off ranked voting is resistant to burying and bullet voting,
while being somewhat vulnerable to compromising (less than the plurality
method) and vulnerable to push-over voting. Let's summarize those two:
* compromising - the voter ranks a less desirable alternative higher
because they believe it has a higher chance of being elected; this is
sometimes called "casting a useful vote");
* push-over - if the voter is relatively sure their preferred candidate
will survive the first counting round, they may rank "the weakest"
alternative higher in the hope of that weak alternative being easily
beatable in a subsequent round.
Copyright