PEP: 493 Title: HTTPS verification migration tools for Python 2.7 Version: $Revision$ Last-Modified: $Date$ Author: Nick Coghlan , Robert Kuska , Marc-André Lemburg Status: Draft Type: Standards Track Content-Type: text/x-rst Created: 10-May-2015 Python-Version: 2.7.12 Post-History: 06-Jul-2015, 11-Nov-2015, 24-Nov-2015 Abstract ======== PEP 476 updated Python's default handling of HTTPS certificates in client modules to align with certificate handling in web browsers, by validating that the certificates received belonged to the server the client was attempting to contact. The Python 2.7 long term maintenance series was judged to be in scope for this change, with the new behaviour introduced in the Python 2.7.9 maintenance release. This has created a non-trivial barrier to adoption for affected Python 2.7 maintenance releases, so this PEP proposes additional Python 2.7 specific features that allow system administrators and other users to more easily decouple the decision to verify server certificates in HTTPS client modules from the decision to update to newer Python 2.7 maintenance releases. Rationale ========= PEP 476 changed Python's default behaviour to align with expectations established by web browsers in regards to the semantics of HTTPS URLs: starting with Python 2.7.9 and 3.4.3, HTTPS clients in the standard library validate server certificates by default. However, it is also the case that this change *does* cause problems for infrastructure administrators operating private intranets that rely on self-signed certificates, or otherwise encounter problems with the new default certificate verification settings. To manage these kinds of situations, web browsers provide users with "click through" warnings that allow the user to add the server's certificate to the browser's certificate store. Network client tools like ``curl`` and ``wget`` offer options to switch off certificate checking entirely (by way of ``curl --insecure`` and ``wget --no-check-certificate``, respectively). At a different layer of the technology stack, Linux security modules like `SELinux` and `AppArmor`, while enabled by default by distribution vendors, offer relatively straightforward mechanisms for turning them off. At the moment, no such convenient mechanisms exist to disable Python's default certificate checking for a whole process. PEP 476 did attempt to address this question, by covering how to revert to the old settings process wide by monkeypatching the ``ssl`` module to restore the old behaviour. Unfortunately, the ``sitecustomize.py`` based technique proposed to allow system administrators to disable the feature by default in their Standard Operating Environment definition has been determined to be insufficient in at least some cases. The specific case that led to the initial creation of this PEP is the one where a Linux distributor aims to provide their users with a `smoother migration path `__ than the standard one provided by consuming upstream CPython 2.7 releases directly, but other potential challenges have also been pointed out with updating embedded Python runtimes and other user level installations of Python. Rather than allowing a plethora of mutually incompatibile migration techniques to bloom, this PEP proposes an additional feature to be added to Python 2.7.12 to make it easier to revert a process to the past behaviour of skipping certificate validation in HTTPS client modules. It also provides additional recommendations to redistributors backporting these features to versions of Python prior to Python 2.7.9. These designs are being proposed purely as tools for helping to manage the transition to the new default certificate handling behaviour in the context of Python 2.7. They are not being proposed as new features for Python 3, as it is expected that the vast majority of client applications affected by this problem without the ability to update the application itself will be Python 2 applications. It would likely be desirable for a future version of Python 3 to allow default certificate handling for secure protocols to be configurable on a per-protocol basis, but that question is beyond the scope of this PEP. Alternatives ------------ In the absence of clear upstream guidance and recommendations, commercial redistributors will still make their own design decisions in the interests of their customers. The main approaches available are: * Continuing to rebase on new Python 2.7.x releases, while providing no additional assistance beyond the mechanisms defined in PEP 476 in migrating from unchecked to checked hostnames in standard library HTTPS clients * Gating availability of the changes in default handling of HTTPS connections on upgrading from Python 2 to Python 3 * For Linux distribution vendors, gating availability of the changes in default handling of HTTPS connections on upgrading to a new operating system version * Implementing one or both of the backport suggestions described in this PEP, regardless of the formal status of the PEP Requirements for capability detection ===================================== As the proposals in this PEP aim to facilitate backports to earlier Python versions, the Python version number cannot be used as a reliable means for detecting them. Instead, they are designed to allow the presence or absence of the feature to be determined using the following technique:: python -c "import ssl; ssl._relevant_attribute" This will fail with `AttributeError` (and hence a non-zero return code) if the relevant capability is not available. The marker attributes are prefixed with an underscore to indicate the implementation dependent nature of these capabilities - not all Python distributions will offer them, only those that are providing a multi-stage migration process from the original Python 2.7 HTTPS handling to the new default behaviour. Feature: Configuration API ========================== This change is proposed for inclusion in CPython 2.7.12 and later CPython 2.7.x releases. It consists of a new ``ssl._verify_https_certificates()`` to specify the default handling of HTTPS certificates in standard library client libraries. It is not proposed to forward port this change to Python 3, so Python 3 applications that need to support skipping certificate verification will still need to define their own suitable security context. Feature detection ----------------- The marker attribute on the ``ssl`` module related to this feature is the ``ssl._verify_https_certificates`` function itself. Specification ------------- The ``ssl._verify_https_certificates`` function will work as follows:: def _verify_https_certificates(enable=True): """Verify server HTTPS certificates by default?""" global _create_default_https_context if enable: _create_default_https_context = create_default_context else: _create_default_https_context = _create_unverified_context If called without arguments, or with ``enable`` set to a true value, then standard library client modules will subsequently verify HTTPS certificates by default, otherwise they will skip verification. If called with ``enable`` set to a false value, then standard library client modules will subsequently skip verifying HTTPS certificates by default. Security Considerations ----------------------- The inclusion of this feature will allow security sensitive applications to include the following forward-compatible snippet in their code:: if hasattr(ssl, "_verify_https_certificates"): ssl._verify_https_certificates() Some developers may also choose to opt out of certificate checking using ``ssl._verify_https_certificates(enable=False)``. This doesn't introduce any major new security concerns, as monkeypatching the affected internal APIs was already possible. Feature: environment based configuration ======================================== This change is proposed for inclusion in CPython 2.7.12 and later CPython 2.7.x releases. It consists of a new ``PYTHONHTTPSVERIFY`` environment variable that allows the default verification to be disabled without modifying the application source code (which may not even be available in cases of bytecode-only application distribution) It is not proposed to forward port this change to Python 3, so Python 3 applications that need to support skipping certificate verification will still need to define their own suitable security context. Feature detection ----------------- The marker attribute on the ``ssl`` module related to this feature is: * the ``ssl._https_verify_envvar`` attribute, giving the name of environment variable affecting the default behaviour This not only makes it straightforward to detect the presence (or absence) of the capability, it also makes it possible to programmatically determine the relevant environment variable name. Specification ------------- Rather than always defaulting to the use of ``ssl.create_default_context``, the ``ssl`` module will be modified to: * read the ``PYTHONHTTPSVERIFY`` environment variable when the module is first imported into a Python process * set the ``ssl._create_default_https_context`` function to be an alias for ``ssl._create_unverified_context`` if this environment variable is present and set to ``'0'`` * otherwise, set the ``ssl._create_default_https_context`` function to be an alias for ``ssl.create_default_context`` as usual Example implementation ---------------------- :: _https_verify_envvar = 'PYTHONHTTPSVERIFY' def _get_https_context_factory(): if not sys.flags.ignore_environment: config_setting = os.environ.get(_https_verify_envvar) if config_setting == '0': return _create_unverified_context return create_default_context _create_default_https_context = _get_https_context_factory() Security Considerations ----------------------- Relative to the behaviour in Python 3.4.3+ and Python 2.7.9->2.7.11, this approach does introduce a new downgrade attack against the default security settings that potentially allows a sufficiently determined attacker to revert Python to the default behaviour used in CPython 2.7.8 and earlier releases. However, such an attack requires the ability to modify the execution environment of a Python process prior to the import of the ``ssl`` module, and any attacker with such access would already be able to modify the behaviour of the underlying OpenSSL implementation. Interaction with Python virtual environments -------------------------------------------- The default setting is read directly from the process environment, and hence works the same way regardless of whether or not the interpreter is being run inside an activated Python virtual environment. Backporting PEP 476 to earlier Python versions ============================================== Some redistributors, most notably Linux distributions, may choose to backport the PEP 476 HTTPS verification changes to modified Python versions based on earlier Python 2 maintenance releases. In these cases, a configuration mechanism is needed that provides: * an opt-in model that allows the decision to enable HTTPS certificate verification to be made independently of the decision to upgrade to the Python version where the feature was first backported * the ability for system administrators to set the default behaviour of Python applications and scripts run directly in the system Python installation * the ability for the redistributor to consider changing the default behaviour of *new* installations at some point in the future without impacting existing installations that have been explicitly configured to skip verifying HTTPS certificates by default As it only affects backports to earlier releases of Python 2.7, this change is not proposed for inclusion in upstream CPython, but rather is offered as guidance to redistributors to reduce the likelihood of multiple mutually incompatible approaches to backporting being adopted. This approach SHOULD NOT be used for any Python installation that advertises itself as providing Python 2.7.9 or later, as most Python users will have the reasonable expectation that all such environments will validate HTTPS certificates by default. Feature detection ----------------- The marker attribute on the ``ssl`` module related to this feature is:: _cert_verification_config = '' This not only makes it straightforward to detect the presence (or absence) of the capability, it also makes it possible to programmatically determine the relevant configuration file name. Recommended modifications to the Python standard library -------------------------------------------------------- The recommended approach to backporting the PEP 476 modifications to an earlier point release is to implement the following changes relative to the default PEP 476 behaviour implemented in Python 2.7.9+: * modify the ``ssl`` module to read a system wide configuration file when the module is first imported into a Python process * define a platform default behaviour (either verifying or not verifying HTTPS certificates) to be used if this configuration file is not present * support selection between the following three modes of operation: * ensure HTTPS certificate verification is enabled * ensure HTTPS certificate verification is disabled * delegate the decision to the redistributor providing this Python version * set the ``ssl._create_default_https_context`` function to be an alias for either ``ssl.create_default_context`` or ``ssl._create_unverified_context`` based on the given configuration setting. Recommended file location ------------------------- As the PEP authors are not aware of any vendors providing long-term support releases targeting Windows, Mac OS X or \*BSD systems, this approach is currently only specifically defined for Linux system Python installations. The recommended configuration file name on Linux systems is ``/etc/python/cert-verification.cfg``. The ``.cfg`` filename extension is recommended for consistency with the ``pyvenv.cfg`` used by the ``venv`` module in Python 3's standard library. Recommended file format ----------------------- The configuration file should use a ConfigParser ini-style format with a single section named ``[https]`` containing one required setting ``verify``. The suggested section name is taken from the "https" URL schema passed to affected client APIs. Permitted values for ``verify`` are: * ``enable``: ensure HTTPS certificate verification is enabled by default * ``disable``: ensure HTTPS certificate verification is disabled by default * ``platform_default``: delegate the decision to the redistributor providing this particular Python version If the ``[https]`` section or the ``verify`` setting are missing, or if the ``verify`` setting is set to an unknown value, it should be treated as if the configuration file is not present. Example implementation ---------------------- :: _cert_verification_config = '/etc/python/cert-verification.cfg' def _get_https_context_factory(): # Check for a system-wide override of the default behaviour context_factories = { 'enable': create_default_context, 'disable': _create_unverified_context, 'platform_default': _create_unverified_context, # For now :) } import ConfigParser config = ConfigParser.RawConfigParser() config.read(_cert_verification_config) try: verify_mode = config.get('https', 'verify') except (ConfigParser.NoSectionError, ConfigParser.NoOptionError): verify_mode = 'platform_default' default_factory = context_factories.get('platform_default') return context_factories.get(verify_mode, default_factory) _create_default_https_context = _get_https_context_factory() Security Considerations ----------------------- The specific recommendations for this backporting case are designed to work for privileged, security sensitive processes, even those being run in the following locked down configuration: * run from a locked down administrator controlled directory rather than a normal user directory (preventing ``sys.path[0]`` based privilege escalation attacks) * run using the ``-E`` switch (preventing ``PYTHON*`` environment variable based privilege escalation attacks) * run using the ``-s`` switch (preventing user site directory based privilege escalation attacks) * run using the ``-S`` switch (preventing ``sitecustomize`` based privilege escalation attacks) The intent is that the *only* reason HTTPS verification should be getting turned off system wide when using this approach is because: * an end user is running a redistributor provided version of CPython rather than running upstream CPython directly * that redistributor has decided to provide a smoother migration path to verifying HTTPS certificates by default than that being provided by the upstream project * either the redistributor or the local infrastructure administrator has determined that it is appropriate to override the default upstream behaviour (at least for the time being) Using an administrator controlled configuration file rather than an environment variable has the essential feature of providing a smoother migration path, even for applications being run with the ``-E`` switch. Interaction with Python virtual environments -------------------------------------------- This setting is scoped by the interpreter installation and affects all Python processes using that interpreter, regardless of whether or not the interpreter is being run inside an activated Python virtual environment. Origins of this recommendation ------------------------------ This recommendation is based on the backporting approach adopted for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.2, as published in the original July 2015 draft of this PEP and described in detail in `this KnowledgeBase article `__. Red Hat's patches implementing this backport for Python 2.7.5 can be found in the `CentOS git repository `__. Backporting this PEP to earlier Python versions =============================================== The configuration file based backport described above is designed to cover backporting the PEP 476 changes to default certificate handling without the additional configuration mechanisms defined in this PEP. If this PEP is accepted, then an additional backporting option becomes available, which is to backport the per-process configuration mechanisms defined in this PEP, without backporting the ability to change the default behaviour of the overall Python installation. Such a backport would differ from the mechanism proposed in this PEP solely in the default behaviour when ``PYTHONHTTPSVERIFY`` was not set at all: it would continue to default to skipping certificate validation. In this case, if the ``PYTHONHTTPSVERIFY`` environment variable is defined, and set to anything *other* than ``'0'``, then HTTPS certificate verification should be enabled. Feature detection ----------------- There's no specific attribute indicating that this situation applies. Rather, it is indicated by the ``ssl._verify_https_certificates`` and ``ssl._https_verify_envvar`` attributes being present in a Python version that is nominally older than Python 2.7.9. Specification ------------- Implementing this backport involves backporting the changes in PEP 466, 476 and this PEP, with the following change to the handling of the ``PYTHONHTTPSVERIFY`` environment variable in the ``ssl`` module: * read the ``PYTHONHTTPSVERIFY`` environment variable when the module is first imported into a Python process * set the ``ssl._create_default_https_context`` function to be an alias for ``ssl.create_default_context`` if this environment variable is present and set to any value other than ``'0'`` * otherwise, set the ``ssl._create_default_https_context`` function to be an alias for ``ssl._create_unverified_context`` Example implementation ---------------------- :: _https_verify_envvar = 'PYTHONHTTPSVERIFY' def _get_https_context_factory(): if not sys.flags.ignore_environment: config_setting = os.environ.get(_https_verify_envvar) if config_setting != '0': return create_default_context return _create_unverified_context _create_default_https_context = _get_https_context_factory() def _disable_https_default_verification(): """Skip verification of HTTPS certificates by default""" global _create_default_https_context _create_default_https_context = _create_unverified_context Security Considerations ----------------------- This change would be a strict security upgrade for any Python version that currently defaults to skipping certificate validation in standard library HTTPS clients. The technical trade-offs to be taken into account relate largely to the magnitude of the PEP 466 backport also required rather than to anything security related. Interaction with Python virtual environments -------------------------------------------- The default setting is read directly from the process environment, and hence works the same way regardless of whether or not the interpreter is being run inside an activated Python virtual environment. Recommendation for combined feature backports ============================================= If a redistributor chooses to backport the environment variable based configuration setting from this PEP to a modified Python version that also implements the configuration file based PEP 476 , then the environment variable should take precedence over the system-wide configuration setting. This allows the setting to be changed for a given user or application, regardless of the installation-wide default behaviour. Example implementation ---------------------- :: _https_verify_envvar = 'PYTHONHTTPSVERIFY' _cert_verification_config = '/etc/python/cert-verification.cfg' def _get_https_context_factory(): # Check for an environmental override of the default behaviour if not sys.flags.ignore_environment: config_setting = os.environ.get(_https_verify_envvar) if config_setting is not None: if config_setting == '0': return _create_unverified_context return create_default_context # Check for a system-wide override of the default behaviour context_factories = { 'enable': create_default_context, 'disable': _create_unverified_context, 'platform_default': _create_unverified_context, # For now :) } import ConfigParser config = ConfigParser.RawConfigParser() config.read(_cert_verification_config) try: verify_mode = config.get('https', 'verify') except (ConfigParser.NoSectionError, ConfigParser.NoOptionError): verify_mode = 'platform_default' default_factory = context_factories.get('platform_default') return context_factories.get(verify_mode, default_factory) _create_default_https_context = _get_https_context_factory() Copyright ========= This document has been placed into the public domain. .. 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