PEP: 493 Title: HTTPS verification recommendations for Python 2.7 redistributors Version: $Revision$ Last-Modified: $Date$ Author: Nick Coghlan , Robert Kuska Status: Draft Type: Informational Content-Type: text/x-rst Created: 10-May-2015 Abstract ======== PEP 476 updated Python's default handling of HTTPS certificates to be appropriate for communication over the public internet. The Python 2.7 long term maintenance series was judged to be in scope for this change, with the new behaviour introduced in the Python 2.7.9 maintenance release. This PEP provides recommendations to downstream redistributors wishing to provide a smoother migration experience when helping their users to manage this change in Python's default behaviour. *Note that this PEP is not currently accepted, so it is a *proposed* recommendation, rather than an active one.* Rationale ========= PEP 476 changed Python's default behaviour to better match the needs and expectations of developers operating over the public internet, a category which appears to include most new Python developers. It is the position of the authors of this PEP that this was a correct decision. However, it is also the case that this change *does* cause problems for infrastructure administrators operating private intranets that rely on self-signed certificates, or otherwise encounter problems with the new default certificate verification settings. The long term answer for such environments is to update their internal certificate management to at least match the standards set by the public internet, but in the meantime, it is desirable to offer these administrators a way to continue receiving maintenance updates to the Python 2.7 series, without having to gate that on upgrades to their certificate management infrastructure. PEP 476 did attempt to address this question, by covering how to revert the new settings process wide by monkeypatching the ``ssl`` module to restore the old behaviour. Unfortunately, the ``sitecustomize.py`` based technique proposed to allow system administrators to disable the feature by default in their Standard Operating Environment definition has been determined to be insufficient in at least some cases. The specific case of interest to the authors of this PEP is the one where a Linux distributor aims to provide their users with a `smoother migration path `__ than the standard one provided by consuming upstream CPython 2.7 releases directly, but other potential challenges have also been pointed out with updating embedded Python runtimes and other user level installations of Python. Rather than allowing a plethora of mutually incompatibile migration techniques to bloom, this PEP proposes two alternative approaches that redistributors may take when addressing these problems. Redistributors may choose to implement one, both, or neither of these approaches based on their assessment of the needs of their particular userbase. These designs are being proposed as a recommendation for redistributors, rather than as new upstream features, as they are needed purely to support legacy environments migrating from older versions of Python 2.7. Neither approach is being proposed as an upstream Python 2.7 feature, nor as a feature in any version of Python 3 (whether published directly by the Python Software Foundation or by a redistributor). Recommendation for backporting to earlier Python versions ========================================================= Some redistributors, most notably Linux distributions, may choose to backport the PEP 476 HTTPS verification changes to modified Python versions based on earlier Python 2 maintenance releases. In these cases, a configuration mechanism is needed that provides: * an opt-in model that allows the decision to enable HTTPS certificate verification to be made independently of the decision to upgrade to the Python version where the feature was first backported * the ability for system administrators to set the default behaviour of Python applications and scripts run directly in the system Python installation * the ability for system administrators to set the default behaviour of Python applications and scripts run in a ``virtualenv`` created virtual environment * the ability for the redistributor to consider changing the default behaviour of *new* installations at some point in the future without impacting existing installations that have been explicitly configured to skip verifying HTTPS certificates by default The recommended solution for this scenario should also avoid introducing any new attack vectors that don't already allow direct attacks against the system certificate store. This approach should not be used for any Python installation that advertises itself as providing Python 2.7.9 or later, as most Python users will have the reasonable expectation that all such environments will validate HTTPS certificates by default. Recommended modifications to the Python standard library -------------------------------------------------------- The recommended approach to backporting the PEP 476 modifications to an earlier point release is to implement the following changes relative to the default PEP 476 behaviour implemented in Python 2.7.9+: * modify the ``ssl`` module to read a system wide configuration file when the module is first imported into a Python process * default to verifying HTTPS certificates if this configuration file is not present (this preserves the upstream default behaviour in the absence of the configuration file) * if the ``sys.real_prefix`` attribute is defined, read the configuration setting for virtual environments, otherwise read the configuration setting for the system Python * support selection between the following three modes of operation: * ensure HTTPS certificate verification is enabled * ensure HTTPS certificate verification is disabled * delegate the decision to the redistributor providing this Python version * set the ``ssl._create_default_https_context`` function to be an alias for either ``ssl.create_default_context`` or ``ssl._create_unverified_context`` based on the given configuration setting. Recommended file location ------------------------- This approach is currently only defined for \*nix system Python installations. The recommended configuration file name is (to be confirmed, currently ``/etc/python/cert-verification.cfg``). The ``.cfg`` filename extension is recommended for consistency with the ``pyvenv.cfg`` used by the ``venv`` module in Python 3's standard library. Recommended file format ----------------------- The configuration file should use a ConfigParser ini-style format with a single section named ``[https]`` containing one required setting ``verify``, and one optional setting ``verify_in_virtualenv``. Permitted values for ``verify`` and ``verify_in_virtualenv`` are: * ``enable``: ensure HTTPS certificate verification is enabled by default * ``disable``: ensure HTTPS certificate verification is disabled by default * ``platform_default``: delegate the decision to the redistributor providing this particular Python version If the ``[https]`` section or the ``verify`` setting are missing, or if the ``verify`` setting is set to an unknown value, it should be treated as if the configuration file is not present. If ``sys.real_prefix`` is set, and the ``verify_in_virtualenv`` setting is present and set to one of the known options, then it should be used in preference to the ``verify`` setting. Example implementation ---------------------- :: def _get_https_context_factory(): config_file = '/etc/python/cert-verification.conf' context_factories = { 'enable': create_default_context, 'disable': _create_unverified_context, 'platform_default': _create_unverified_context, # For now :) } # Check for a system-wide override of the default behaviour import configparser config = configparser.RawConfigParser() config.read(config_file) section = 'https' try: verify_mode = config.get('https', 'verify') except (ConfigParser.NoSectionError, ConfigParser.NoOptionError): verify_mode = 'enable' else: # Check if there's a different default for a virtual environment if hasattr(sys, "real_prefix"): try: verify_mode = config.get('https', 'verify_in_virtualenv') except (ConfigParser.NoOptionError): pass return context_factories.get(verify_mode, create_default_context) _create_default_https_context = _get_https_context_factory() Security Considerations ----------------------- The specific recommendations for the backporting case are designed to work for privileged, security sensitive processes, even those being run in the following locked down configuration: * run from a locked down administrator controlled directory rather than a normal user directory (preventing ``sys.path[0]`` based privilege escalation attacks) * run using the ``-E`` switch (preventing ``PYTHON*`` environment variable based privilege escalation attacks) * run using the ``-s`` switch (preventing user site directory based privilege escalation attacks) * run using the ``-S`` switch (preventing ``sitecustomize`` based privilege escalation attacks) The intent is that the *only* reason HTTPS verification should be getting turned off system wide when using this approach is because: * an end user is running a redistributor supported version of CPython rather than running upstream CPython directly * that redistributor has decided to provide a smoother migration path to verifying HTTPS certificates by default than that being provided by the upstream project * either the redistributor or the local infrastructure administrator has determined that it is appropriate to override the default upstream behaviour (at least for the time being) Using an administrator controlled configuration file rather than an environment variable not only provides compatibility with the ``-E`` switch, but also ensures that in any situation where an attacker gains sufficient access to allow them to modify the configuration file, they're likely already in a position to attack the system certificate store directly. Recommendation for an environment variable based security downgrade =================================================================== Some redistributors may wish to provide a per-application option to disable certificate verification in selected applications that run on or embed CPython without needing to modify the application itself. In these cases, a configuration mechanism is needed that provides: * an opt-out model that allows certificate verification to be selectively turned off for particular applications after upgrading to a version of Python that verifies certificates by default * the ability for all users to configure this setting on a per-application basis, rather than on a per-system, or per-Python-installation basis This recommendation is not considered appropriate for system wide Python installations, but may be suitable for user level Python installations and versions of Python embedded in or bundled with particular applications. This approach may be used for Python installations that advertises themselves as providing Python 2.7.9 or later. Recommended modifications to the Python standard library -------------------------------------------------------- The recommended approach to providing a per-application configuration setting for HTTPS certificate verification that doesn't require modifications to the application itself is to: * modify the ``ssl`` module to read the ``PYTHONHTTPSVERIFY`` environment variable when the module is first imported into a Python process * set the ``ssl._create_default_https_context`` function to be an alias for ``ssl._create_unverified_context`` if this environment variable is present and set to '0' * otherwise, set the ``ssl._create_default_https_context`` function to be an alias for ``ssl.create_default_context`` as usual Example implementation ---------------------- :: def _get_https_context_factory(): config_setting = os.environ.get('PYTHONHTTPSVERIFY') if config_setting == '0': return _create_unverified_context return create_default_context _create_default_https_context = _get_https_context_factory() Security Considerations ----------------------- Relative to an unmodified version of CPython 2.7.9 or later, this approach does introduce a new downgrade attack against the default security settings that potentially allows a sufficiently determined attacker to revert Python to the vulnerable configuration used in CPython 2.7.8 and earlier releases. Such an attack requires the ability to modify the execution environment of a Python process prior to the import of the ``ssl`` module. Redistributors should balance this marginal increase in risk against the ability to offer a smoother migration path to their users when deciding whether or not it is appropriate for them to implement this per-application "opt out" model. Copyright ========= This document has been placed into the public domain. .. Local Variables: mode: indented-text indent-tabs-mode: nil sentence-end-double-space: t fill-column: 70 coding: utf-8