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ReStructuredText
275 lines
11 KiB
ReStructuredText
PEP: 8001
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Title: Python Governance Voting Process
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Author: Brett Cannon <brett@python.org>,
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Christian Heimes <christian@python.org>,
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Donald Stufft <donald@stufft.io>,
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Eric Snow <ericsnowcurrently@gmail.com>,
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Gregory P. Smith <greg@krypto.org>,
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Łukasz Langa <lukasz@python.org>
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Mariatta Wijaya <mariatta@python.org>,
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Nathaniel J. Smith <njs@pobox.com>,
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Pablo Galindo Salgado <pablogsal@gmail.com>,
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Raymond Hettinger <python@rcn.com>,
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Tal Einat <taleinat@gmail.com>,
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Tim Peters <tim.peters@gmail.com>,
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Zachary Ware <zachary.ware@gmail.com>
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Status: Accepted
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Type: Process
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Content-Type: text/x-rst
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Created: 2018-08-24
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Abstract
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========
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This PEP outlines the process for how the new model of Python governance is
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selected, in the wake of `Guido's retirement
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<https://mail.python.org/pipermail/python-committers/2018-July/005664.html>`_.
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Once the model is chosen by the procedures outlined here, it will be codified
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in PEP 13.
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Motivation and Rationale
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========================
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Guido's stepping down from the BDFL role left us with a meta-problem of
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having to choose *how we will choose* how the Python project should be
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governed from now on.
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This document presents a concrete proposal how this choice can be made.
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It summarizes discussion and conclusions of the proceedings of a working
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group at the core sprint in Redmond in September 2018 (names of all
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attendees are listed as authors). This PEP also summarizes a
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`subsequent thread <https://discuss.python.org/t/python-governance-electoral-system/290>`_
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that took place on discuss.python.org .
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The governance situation should be resolved in a timely fashion.
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Ideally that should happen by the end of the 2018 which unblocks
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substantial improvements to be merged in time for Python 3.8. At the
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latest, the governance situation needs to be resolved by PyCon US 2019 to
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avoid a PR crisis.
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Implementation
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==============
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What are we voting for?
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-----------------------
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We are voting to choose which governance PEP should be implemented by
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the Python project. The list of candidate PEPs is listed in PEP 8000
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and consists of all PEPs numbered in the 801X range.
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To ensure the vote is legitimate, the aforementioned PEPs must not be
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modified during the voting period.
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Who gets to vote?
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-----------------
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Every CPython core developer is invited to vote. In the interest of
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transparency and fairness, we are asking core developers to self-select
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based on whether the governance situation will affect them directly.
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In other words, we are recommending for inactive core developers *who
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intend to remain inactive* to abstain from voting.
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When is the vote?
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-----------------
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November 16th, 2018 to November 30th, 2018 is the official governance
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PEP review period. We discourage the PEP authors from making major
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substantive changes during this period, although it is expected that
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minor tweaks may occur, as the result of this discussion period.
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The vote will happen in a 2-week-long window from December 1st, 2018
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to December 16th, 2018
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(`Anywhere on Earth <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anywhere_on_Earth>`_).
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Where is the vote?
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------------------
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The vote will happen using a "private" poll on the
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`Condorcet Internet Voting Service <https://civs.cs.cornell.edu/>`_. Every committer
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will receive an email with a link allowing them to rank the PEPs in their order of
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preference.
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The election will be supervised by Ernest W. Durbin III, The PSF Director of Infrastructure.
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The results of the election, including anonymized ballots, will be made public on
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December 17th, after the election has closed.
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The following settings will be used for the vote in the CIVS system::
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[x] Private
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[ ] Make this a test poll: read all votes from a file.
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[ ] Do not release results to all voters.
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[x] Enable detailed ballot reporting.
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[ ] In detailed ballot report, also reveal the identity of the voter with each ballot.
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[ ] Allow voters to write in new choices.
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[ ] Present choices on voting page in exactly the given order.
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[ ] Allow voters to select “no opinion” for some choices.
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[ ] Enforce proportional representation
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Which will have the effect of:
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* Making the election "private", or in other words, invite only.
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* The results of the election will be released to all voters.
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* The contents of every ballot will be released to the public, along
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with a detailed report going over how the winner was elected.
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* The detailed ballots will *not* include any identifying information
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and the email addresses of the voters will be thrown away by the CIVS
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system as soon as the email with their voting link has been sent.
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* Voters will *not* be able to write in new choices, meaning they will
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be limited only to the options specified in the election.
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* Voters will *not* have the ability to change their vote after casting
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a ballot. [no-changes]_
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* The default ordering for each ballot will be randomized to remove
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any influence that the order of the ballot may have on the election.
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* Voters will have to rank all choices somehow, but may rank multiple
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choices as equal.
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Voting mechanics
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----------------
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The vote will be by ranked ballot. Every voter
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orders all candidate PEPs from the most preferred to the least
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preferred. The vote will be tallied and a winner chosen using the
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`Condorcet method <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_method>`_.
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Note: each voter can only cast a single vote with no ability to
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revise their vote later. [no-changes]_ If you are not absolutely
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sure of your choices, hold off casting your ballot until later in
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the voting period. Votes cast on the last day of the election are
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just as valid as the ones cast on the first day.
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While the CIVS system does not provide an option for a "Pure"
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Condorcet election, any Condorcet method will select the "Pure"
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Condorcet winner if one exists and otherwise only vary if one
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doesn't exist. The CIVS system differentiates between a Condorcet
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winner and a non Condorcet winner by stating if the winner was a
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Condorcet winner, or if it merely wasn't defeated versus any other
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option. So a winner in the CIVS system will only be accepted if
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it states it was a Condorcet winner.
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In the unlikely case of a tie (or cycle as is possible under the
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Condorcet method), a new election will be opened, limited to the
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options involved in the tie or cycle, to select a new winner from
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amongst the tied options. This new election will be open for a
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week, and will be repeated until a single winner is determined.
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Questions and Answers
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=====================
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Why the Condorcet method?
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----------------------------------
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1. It allows voters to express preference by ranking PEPs
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2. It is `consensus decision-making <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consensus_decision-making#Condorcet_consensus>`_
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3. In a `poll <https://discuss.python.org/t/python-governance-electoral-system/290/26>`_
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open to only core developers and run using Approval voting, it was
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the clear preference
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Is omitting any candidate PEPs in the ranking allowed?
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------------------------------------------------------
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A vote which omits candidates in the ranking is invalid. This is
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because such votes are incompatible with the desired properties listed
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above, namely:
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* Making voters consider alternatives, as well as
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* Doing everything possible to reach a conclusion in a single election.
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Why recommend for dormant core developers to not vote?
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------------------------------------------------------
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The choice of the governance model will have far reaching and long-term
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consequences for Python and its community. We are inviting core
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developers to assess their skin in the game.
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Note: this is not an edict and will not be policed. We trust all
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members of the core team to act in the best interest of Python.
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Why should the vote be private?
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-------------------------------
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When discussing the election system, a number of core developers expressed
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concerns with the idea of having public ballots, with at least one core
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developer stating that they were planning on abstaining from voting
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altogether due to the use of a public ballot. A poll ran on Discourse
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identified the overwhelming majority of voters prefer private ballots.
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[private-vote]_
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A secret ballot is considered by many to be a requirement for a free and
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fair election, allowing members to vote their true preferences without
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worry about social pressure or possible fallout for how they may have
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voted.
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Why the use of CIVS?
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--------------------
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In the resulting discussion of this PEP, it was determined that core
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developers wished to have a secret ballot. [private-vote]_ Unfortunately
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a secret ballot requires either novel cryptography or a trusted party to
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anonymize the ballots. Since there is not known to be any existing novel
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cryptographic systems for Condorcet ballots, the CIVS system was chosen to
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act as a trusted party.
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More information about the security and privacy afforded by CIVS, including
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how a malicous voter, election supervisor, or CIVS administrator can
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influence the election can be be found
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`here <https://civs.cs.cornell.edu/sec_priv.html>`_.
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Why cannot voters change their vote?
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------------------------------------
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CIVS does not allow voters to update their vote and as part of its goal
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to prevent the election supervisor from being able to influence the
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votes.
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Are there any deficiencies in the Condorcet method?
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------------------------------------------------------------
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There is no perfect voting method. It has been shown by the
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`Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
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<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gibbard%E2%80%93Satterthwaite_theorem>`_
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that any single-winner ranked voting method which is not dictatorial
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must be susceptible to so-called "tactical voting". This can lead to
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people not voting as they truly believe in order to influence the
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outcome.
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The Condorcet method also has the possibility of having cycles (known as
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the `Condorcet paradox <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_paradox>`_).
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Due to the fact that the Condorcet method chooses a winner based on whether
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they would win against the other options in a 1-on-1 race, there is a
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possibility that PEP A > PEP B > PEP C > PEP A (or in terms of the game
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rock-paper-scissors, imagine a three-player game where someone played rock,
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another played paper, and the last person played scissors; no one wins that
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game as everyone is defeated by someone). The chances of this occurring when
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there are 21 or more voters, though, is
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`less than 1.5% <https://www.accuratedemocracy.com/l_cycles.htm>`_.
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References
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==========
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.. [no-changes] https://discuss.python.org/t/pep-8001-public-or-private-ballots/374/20
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.. [private-vote] https://discuss.python.org/t/pep-8001-public-or-private-ballots/374/4
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Copyright
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=========
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This document has been placed in the public domain.
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..
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Local Variables:
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mode: indented-text
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indent-tabs-mode: nil
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sentence-end-double-space: t
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fill-column: 70
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coding: utf-8
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End:
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