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ReStructuredText
364 lines
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ReStructuredText
PEP: 8013
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Title: The External Council Governance Model
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Author: Steve Dower <steve.dower@python.org>
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Status: Rejected
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Type: Informational
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Content-Type: text/x-rst
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Created: 2018-09-14
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Abstract
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========
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This PEP proposes a new model of Python governance based on a Council
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of Auditors (CoA) tasked with making final decisions for the language.
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It differs from PEP 8010 by specifically not proposing a central
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singular leader, and from PEP 8011 by disallowing core committers from
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being council members. It describes the size and role of the council,
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how the initial group of council members will be chosen, any term
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limits of the council members, and how successors will be elected.
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It also spends significant time discussing the intended behaviour of
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this model. By design, many processes are not specified here but are
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left to the people involved. In order to select people who will make
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the best decisions, it is important for those involved to understand
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the expectations of the CoA but it is equally important to allow the
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CoA the freedom to adjust process requirements for varying
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circumstances. This only works when process is unspecified, but all
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participants have similar expectations.
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This PEP does *not* name the members of the CoA. Should this model be
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adopted, it will be codified in PEP 13 along with the names of all
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officeholders described in this PEP.
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PEP Rejection
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=============
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PEP 8013 was rejected `by a core developer vote
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<https://discuss.python.org/t/python-governance-vote-december-2018-results/546/>`__
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described in PEP 8001 on Monday, December 17, 2018.
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PEP 8016 and the governance model it describes were chosen instead.
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The Importance of the Grey Area
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===============================
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In any actual decision-making process, there is going to be grey area.
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This includes unexpected scenarios, and cases where there is no
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"correct" answer.
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Many process plans attempt to minimise grey area by defining processes
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clearly enough that no flexibility is required.
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This proposal deliberately goes the other way. The aim is to provide a
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robust framework for choosing the best people to handle unexpected
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situations, without defining how those people should handle those
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situations.
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Examples are provided of "good" responses to some situations as an
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illustration. The hope is that the "best" people are the best because
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they would live up to those examples. The process that is proposed has
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been designed to minimise the damage that may be caused when those
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people turn out not to be the best.
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Grey area is guaranteed to exist. This proposal deliberately embraces
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and works within that, rather than attempting to prevent it.
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Model Overview
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==============
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Key people and their functions
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------------------------------
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The Council of Auditors (CoA) is a council of varying size, typically
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two to four people, who are elected for the duration of a Python
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release. One member of the CoA is considered the President, who has
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some minor points of authority over the other members.
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The CoA has responsibility for reviewing controversial decisions in
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the form of PEPs written by members of the core development team. The
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CoA may choose to accept a PEP exactly as presented, or may request
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clarification or changes. These changes may be of any form and for any
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reason. This flexibility is intentional, and allows the process to
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change over time as different members are elected to the CoA. See the
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later sections of this document for examples of the kinds of requests
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that are expected.
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The CoA only pronounces on PEPs submitted to python-committers. There
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is no expectation that the CoA follows or participates on any other
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mailing lists. (Note that this implies that only core developers may
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submit PEPs. Non-core developers may write and discuss proposals on
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other mailing lists, but without a core developer willing to support
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the proposal by requesting pronouncement, it cannot proceed to
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acceptance. This is essentially the same as the current system, but is
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made explicit here to ensure that members of the CoA are not expected
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to deal with proposals that are not supported by at least one core
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developer.)
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The CoA may not delegate authority to individuals who have not been
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elected by the core developer team. (One relevant case here is that
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this changes the implementation of the existing BDFL-Delegate system,
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though without necessarily changing the spirit of that system. See the
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later sections, particularly example scenario four, for more
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discussion on this point.)
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The Release Manager (RM) is also permitted the same ability to request
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changes on any PEPs that specify the release they are responsible for.
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After feature freeze, the RM retains this responsibility for their
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release, while the CoA rotates and begins to focus on the subsequent
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release. This is no different from the current process. The process
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for selection of a RM is not changed in this proposal.
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Core developers are responsible for electing members of the CoA, and
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have the ability to call a "vote of no confidence" against a member of
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the CoA. The details of these votes are discussed in a later section.
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Where discussions between core developers and members of the CoA
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appear to be ongoing but unfruitful, the President may step in to
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overrule either party. Where the discussion involves the President, it
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should be handled using a vote of no confidence.
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Members of the CoA may choose to resign at any point. If at least two
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members of the CoA remain, they may request a new election to refill
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the group. If only one member remains, the election is triggered
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automatically. (The scenario when the President resigns is described
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in a later section.)
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The intended balance of power is that the core developers will elect
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members of the CoA who reflect the direction and have the trust of the
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development team, and also have the ability to remove members who do
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not honour commitments made prior to election.
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Regular decision process
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------------------------
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Regular decisions continue to be made as at present.
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For the sake of clarity, controversial decisions require a PEP, and
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any decisions requiring a PEP are considered as controversial.
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The CoA may be asked to advise on whether a decision would be better
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made using the controversial decision process, or individual members
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of the CoA may volunteer such a suggestion, but the core development
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team is not bound by this advice.
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Controversial decision process
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------------------------------
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Controversial decisions are always written up as PEPs, following the
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existing process. The approver (formerly "BDFL-Delegate") is always
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the CoA, and can no longer be delegated. Note that this does not
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prevent the CoA from deciding to nominate a core developer to assess
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the proposal and provide the CoA with a recommendation, which is
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essentially the same as the current delegation process.
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The CoA will pronounce on PEPs submitted to python-committers with a
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request for pronouncement. Any member of the CoA, or the current RM,
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may request changes to a PEP for any reason, provided they include
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some indication of what additional work is required to meet their
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expectations. See later sections for examples of expected reasons.
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When all members of the CoA and the RM indicate that they have no
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concerns with a PEP, it is formally accepted. When one or more members
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of the CoA fail to respond in a reasonable time, the President of the
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CoA may choose to interpret that as implied approval. Failure of the
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President to respond should be handled using a vote of no confidence.
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Election terms
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--------------
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Members of the CoA are elected for the duration of a release. The
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members are elected prior to feature freeze for the previous release,
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and hold their position until feature freeze for their release.
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Members may seek re-election as many times as they like. There are no
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term limits. It is up to the core developers to prevent re-election of
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the CoA members where there is consensus that the individual should
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not serve again.
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Election voting process
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------------------------
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The election process for each member of the CoA proceeds as follows:
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* a nomination email is sent to python-committers
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* a seconding email is sent
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* the nominee is temporarily added to python-committers for the
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purpose of introducing themselves and presenting their position
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* voting opens two weeks prior to the scheduled feature freeze of the
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previous release
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* votes are contributed by modifying a document in a private github
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repository
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* each core developer may add +1 votes for as many candidates as they
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like
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* after seven days, voting closes
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* the nominee with the most votes is elected as President of the CoA
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* the next three nominees with the most votes and also at least 50%
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the number of votes received by the President are elected as the
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other members of the CoA
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* where ties need to be resolved, the RM may apply one extra vote for
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their preferred candidates
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* accepted nominees remain on python-committers; others are removed
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No-confidence voting process
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----------------------------
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A vote of no confidence proceeds as follows:
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* a vote of no confidence email is sent to python-committers, naming
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the affected member of the CoA, justifying the nomination, and
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optionally listing accepted PEPs that the nominator believes should
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be reverted
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* a seconding email is sent within seven days
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* the nominated member of the CoA is allowed seven days to respond,
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after which the nominator or the seconder may withdraw
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* if no nominator or seconder is available, no further action is
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taken
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* voting opens immediately
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* each core developer may add a +1 vote (remove the the CoA member) or
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a -1 vote (keep the the CoA member) by modifying a document in a
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private github repository
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* after seven days, voting closes
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* if +1 votes exceed -1 votes, the the CoA member is removed from
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python-committers and any nominated PEPs are reverted
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* if requested by the remaining members of the CoA, or if only one
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member of the CoA remains, a new election to replace the removed
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member may be held following the usual process.
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* in the case of removing the President of the CoA, the candidate
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who originally received the second-most votes becomes President
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Examples of intended behaviour
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==============================
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This section describes some examples of the kind of interactions that
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we hope to see between the CoA and the core developers. None of these
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are binding descriptions, but are intended to achieve some consensus
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on the types of processes we expect. The CoA candidates may campaign
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on the basis of whatever process they prefer, and core developers
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should allocate votes on this basis.
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Scenario 1 - The Case of the Vague PEP
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--------------------------------------
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Often in the past, initial proposals have lacked sufficient detail to
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be implementable by anyone other than the proposer. To avoid this,
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the CoA should read proposals "fresh" when submitted, and without
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inferring or using any implied context. Then, when an aspect of a PEP
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is not clear, the CoA can reject the proposal and request
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clarifications.
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Since the proposal is rejected, it must be modified and resubmitted in
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order to be reviewed again. The CoA will determine how much guidance
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to provide when rejecting the PEP, as that will affect how many times
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it will likely be resubmitted (and hence affect the CoA's own
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workload). This ensures that the final PEP text stands alone with all
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required information.
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Scenario 2 - The Case of the Endless Discussion
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-----------------------------------------------
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From time to time, a discussion between Python contributors may seem
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to be no longer providing value. For example, when a large number of
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emails are repeating points that have already been dealt with, or are
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actively hostile towards others, there is no point continuing the
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"discussion".
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When such a discussion is occurring on python-committers as part of a
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request for pronouncement, a member of the CoA should simply declare
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the thread over by rejecting the proposal. In most known cases,
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discussion of this sort indicates that not all concerns have been
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sufficiently addressed in the proposal and the author may need to
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enhance some sections.
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Alternatively, and in the absence of any rejection from the other
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members of the CoA, the President may declare the thread over by
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accepting the proposal. Ideally this would occur after directly
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confirming with the rest of the CoA and the RM that there are no
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concerns among them.
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When such a discussion is occurring on another list, members of the
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CoA should be viewed as respected voices similar to other core
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developers (particularly those core developers who are the named
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experts for the subject area). While none have specific authority to
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end a thread, preemptively stating an intent to block a proposal is a
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useful way to defuse potentially useless discussions. Members of the
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CoA who voluntarily follow discussions other than on python-committers
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are allowed to suggest the proposer withdraw, but can only actually
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approve or reject a proposal that is formally submitted for
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pronouncement.
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Scenario 3 - The Case of the Unconsidered Users
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-----------------------------------------------
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Some proposals in the past may be written up and submitted for
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pronouncement without considering the impact on particular groups of
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users. For example, a proposal that affects the dependencies required
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to use Python on various machines may have an adverse impact on some
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users, even if many are unaffected due to the dependencies being
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typically available by default.
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Where a proposal does not appear to consider all users, the CoA might
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choose to use their judgement and past experience to determine that
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more users are affected by the change than described in the PEP, and
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request that the PEP also address these users. They should identify
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the group of users clearly enough that the proposer is able to also
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identify these users, and either clarify how they were addressed, or
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made amendments to the PEP to explicitly address them. (Note that this
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does not involve evaluating the usefulness of the feature to various
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user groups, but simply whether the PEP indicates that the usefulness
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of the feature has been evaluated.)
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Where a proposal appears to have used flawed logic or incorrect data
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to come to a certain conclusion, the CoA might choose to use other
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sources of information (such as the prior discussion or a submission
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from other core developers) to request reconsideration of certain
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points. The proposer does not necessarily need to use the exact
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information obtained by the CoA to update their proposal, provided
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that whatever amendments they make are satisfactory to the CoA. For
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example, a PEP may indicate that 30% of users would be affected, while
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the CoA may argue that 70% of users are affected. A successful
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amendment may include a different but more reliable percentage, or may
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be rewritten to no longer depend on the number of affected users.
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Scenario 4 - The Case of the Delegated Decision
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-----------------------------------------------
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Some proposals may require review and approval from a specialist in
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the area. Historically, these would have been handled by appointing a
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BDFL-Delegate to make the final decision on the proposal. However, in
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this model, the CoA may not delegate the final decision making
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process. When the CoA believes that a subject matter expert should
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decide on a particular proposal, the CoA may nominate one or more
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individuals (or accept their self-nomination) to a similar position to
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a BDFL Delegate. The terms of these expert's role may be set as the
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CoA sees fit, though the CoA always retains the final approval.
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As a concrete example, assume a proposal is being discussed about a
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new language feature. Proponents claim that it will make the language
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easier for new developers to learn. Even before an official proposal
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is made, the CoA may indicate that they will not accept the proposal
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unless person X approves, since person X has a long history teaching
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Python and their judgement is trusted. (Note that person X need not be
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a core developer.)
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Having been given this role, person X is able to drive the discussion
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and quickly focus it on viable alternatives. Eventually, person X
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chooses the alternative they are most satisfied with and indicates to
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the CoA that they approve. The proposal is submitted as usual, and the
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CoA reviews and accepts it, factoring in person X's opinion.
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Copyright
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=========
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This document has been placed in the public domain.
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..
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Local Variables:
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indent-tabs-mode: nil
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coding: utf-8
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End:
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