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322 lines
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ReStructuredText
PEP: 8014
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Title: The Commons Governance Model
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Author: Jack Jansen
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Status: Active
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Type: Informational
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Content-Type: text/x-rst
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Created: 2018-09-16
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Abstract
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========
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This PEP proposes a governance model with as few procedures, defined terms and
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percentages as possible. It may also be called *The Anarchist Governance Model*
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but uses *Commons* for now because of possible negative connotations of the
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term *Anarchist* to some audiences.
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The basic idea is that all decisions are in principle voted on by the whole
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community, but in practice voted on by a only subset of the
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community. A subset, because although the whole community is
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entitled to vote in practice it will always be only a small subset that vote
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on a specific decision. The vote is overseen by an impartial council that
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judges whether the decision has passed or not. The intention is that this
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council bases its decision not only on the ratio of yes and no votes but
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also on the total number of votes, on the gravity of the proposal being
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voted on and possibly the individual voters and how they voted. Thereby this
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council becomes responsible for ensuring that each individual decision is
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carried by a sufficient majority.
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Introduction
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============
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The Commons Governance Model tries to ensure that all decisions are endorsed
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by, or at least is acceptable to, a sufficient majority of the Python
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community.
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Unfortunately the previous paragraph has two terms that are very hard to
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quantify in the general case: *sufficient majority* and *Python community*.
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This is because both terms in reality depend on the *specific* case that is
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being decided. To give an example of this difficulty: for a PEP that
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proposes a backward-compatible change to some API a simple majority of the
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core developers that were interested in voting on the PEP in the first place
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is probably sufficient. But for a change that has more farreaching
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consequences such as a Python3 to Python4 transition a real majority may be
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wanted, and a demonstration that at least there seems to be sufficient
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support in the user base. And for a change that transcends the
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Python-the-language, such as decisions on abolishing non-inclusive language,
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it becomes very vague.
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The Commons Governance Model attempts to sidestep this issue by *not*
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defining what the terms *sufficient majority* and *Python community* mean in
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the general case, by proposing a body that will decide so in *specific*
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cases.
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The model proposes creating a *Council of Elders* that oversees the decision
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process, determining whether a specific proposal has enough support on a
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case by case basis. There will be a vote on every individual PEP,
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and the Council of Elders will declare whether the
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outcome of the vote is sufficient to carry the decision *in this specific case*.
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The model addresses only the roles traditionally held by the BDFL in the
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decision process, not other roles.
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The term Commons_ in the model name is loosely based on its historic use as
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a shared resource to be used by all and cared for by all. The picture you
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should have in mind with this model is a sizeable group of peasants
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discussing some plan for the future on the village green on a warm summer
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evening, after which the vote is taken and the village elders pronounce
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the outcome. Then the banquet begins.
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.. _Commons: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commons
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The Commons Governance Model is different from most of the other governance
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proposals (with the possible exception of 8012), because it explicitly places
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supreme power with the whole community.
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Rationale
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=========
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The rationale for the model is that a model that casts everything in concrete will
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have unintended negative side effects. For example, a governance model that
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assigns voting rights to Python committers may cause an individual not
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to be accepted as a committer because there are already a lot of committers
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from the company the new candidate works for.
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As another example, setting a fixed percentage for PEP acceptance may lead
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to party-formation amongst the voters and individual PEPs no longer be being
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judged on individual merit but along party lines (if you support my PEP I
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will support yours).
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There is also the issue that one-person-one-vote is not the best model for
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something like Python. Again an example: in case of a split vote (or a vote
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sufficiently close to being split) the opinion of core developer Guido
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van Rossum should probably outweigh the opinion of core developer Jack
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Jansen. Trying to formalize this in a voting model is going to lead to a
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very complex model, that is going to be wrong on boundary cases anyway. The
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model presented here leaves deciding on such issues to the (hopefully
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sensible) council of elders.
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Decision Process
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================
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All important decisions go through a PEP process. Each PEP has someone
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responsible for it, called the *author* here, but that does not have to be a
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single person, and it does not have to be the person that actually wrote the
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text. So for author you could also read *champion* or *shepherd* or
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something like that.
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The PEP author is responsible for organizing a vote on the PEP. This vote is
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public, i.e. the voters are identified and the results are known to all.
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Voting may be simple +1/0/-1, but might also be extended with +2/-2 with a
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very terse explanation why the voter feels very strong about the issue. Such
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an annotation would serve as an explanation to the Council of Elders. Voters
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are annotated with their community status (core developer, etc).
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The vote is clearly separated from the discussion, by using a well-defined Discourse
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category or tag, a special mailing list or a similar technical method
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(such as a website vote.python.org where people have to log in so their
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community status can be automatically added, and their identity can be somewhat
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confirmed).
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The PEP author presents the PEP and the vote results to the Council of Elders.
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The council ponders two things:
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- the PEP gravity and its implications,
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- the measureable vote results (how many people voted, which individuals voted, what they voted).
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They pronounce a tentative decision on whether the vote passed and this decision is published.
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If the decision is that the vote results do not demonstrate enough support
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from the community for the decision the burden is on the author to try and
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gather more support and resubmit the vote at a later date. Alternatively the
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author can retract the proposal. The period for gathering more support is
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time-limited, a month seems a reasonable time, if no vote has been resubmitted
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after that period the proposal is rejected.
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If the tentative decision is that the results *do* demonstrate enough support
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a fairly short waiting period starts (in the order of weeks). During this
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period anyone can appeal to the Council of Elders, but *only* on the grounds
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that the vote does not reflect a sufficient majority of the community.
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After the waiting period the council pronounces a final decision. The PEP
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is either accepted or, if the council is swayed by an appeal, goes back to
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the state where more support has to be demonstrated.
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Council of Elders
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=================
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The intention of the Councel of Elders is that they, together, are capable
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of judging whether the will of the Python community is upheld in a specific
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vote.
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The Council of Elders is *not* a replacement of the BDFL by a group of
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people with the same power as the BDFL: it will not provide guidance on the
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direction of Python, it only attempts to ensure the outcome of a vote
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represents the will of the community.
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The Council of Elders is *not* like the US Supreme Court, which has actual
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decision power, the council only oversees the voting process to ensure that
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the community is represented in the vote. And the Council of Elders is most
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definitely not like the Spanish Inquisition, because fear, surprise and
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ruthless efficiency are things we can do without (but there is some merit in
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using the cute scarlet regalia).
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The council is somewhat like the dutch
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`Hoge Raad`_ (which is unfortunately often translated as Supreme Court in
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English) in that they judge the process and the procedures followed and can
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only send cases back for a renewed judgement.
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.. _Hoge Raad: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme_Court_of_the_Netherlands
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It is also somewhat like the *election commission* that many countries have
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(under different names) in that it oversees elections.
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Council operation
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-----------------
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The council members are volunteers, and most likely have other roles within
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the Python community as well (not to mention a life outside Python). This
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means that the workload on the members should be kept to a minimum. It also
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means that it should be clear when an individual council members speak as
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council member and when they speak as themselves. And we should care about
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the emotional load: council members should not be held accountable for
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decisions by random flamers on the Python mailing list.
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The proposal attempts to minimize the workload through two methods:
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- Most of the actual work is to be done by the PEP author and the community,
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the Council of Elders does not organize the vote and tally the results.
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- The idea behind the first tentative decision is mistakes by the Council
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of elders (misjudging how far-reaching a PEP is, most likely) are not fatal, because
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the community has a chance to point out these mistakes.
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Practically speaking this means that the tentative decision can be taken by
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a subset of the council, depending on the community to correct them.
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Getting seven hard-working professionals together every two weeks, even by
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email, may be a bit much to ask.
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Clarifying when an individual Elder speaks on behalf of the Council is
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probably best done by using a special email address, or some Discourse topic
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into which only Elders can post. There is an analogy here with the Pope
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speaking `Ex Cathedra`_ or just as himself (in which case he is not
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infallible). The elders are most likely respected members of the community
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and it would be a bad idea if they feel they cannot voice their personal opinion on
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a PEP because they are on the council.
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Discussion of community members *with* the Council of Elders, i.e. when appealing a
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decision, should be done in a different forum (Discourse topic, mailing list).
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The decisions of the Council of Elders should be seen as decisions of the
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council as a whole, not as decisions of the individual members. In a first implementation
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Elders should post under their own name (with the fact that they speak as a
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council member conferred by the topic they post to, or possibly a special badge).
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If it turns out that Elders become individual targets for ad-hominem attacks
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we should revisit this and come up with some method of anonimity.
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.. _Ex Cathedra: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Papal_infallibility
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Limitation of freedom
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---------------------
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If a specific vote has a true majority (for or against) of core team members
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(more than 50% + 1 of all core team members) that outcome passes. If a specific
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vote has a true majority (for or against) of PSF voting members
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(more than 50% + 1) that outcome passes. And, for completeness, if both of the
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previous statements are true but with opposite outcomes the core team members
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win.
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The main reason for having this limitation is that it allows decisions to be
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made (albeit with effort) if there is no functioning Council of Elders at
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any particular moment.
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Council composition
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-------------------
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The council should not be too big nor too small, probably somewhere between
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5 and 10 members. There is no reason to fix this number.
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The members should be knowledgeable about Python and the
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Python community, and willing to be impartial *while operating as part of
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the council*. Council members may be core developers but this is not a requirement.
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Everyone in the community should feel represented by the council so it would
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be good if the council is diverse:
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- scientists and technologists,
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- progressives and conservatives (with respect to the Python language),
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- people with different cultural backgrounds, genders, age,
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- etc
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But: this should hold for the council as a whole. Individual council members
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should not be seen as representing a specific interest group.
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Council membership
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------------------
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Because the powers of the council are purely procedural it is probably good
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if members serve for a fairly long time. However, it would still be good if
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the council was reinstated regularly. Therefore the suggestion is to have the council
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operate under the PSF umbrella and be subject of a yearly vote of confidence. This
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vote is for the council as a whole: people who vote against the council should be
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aware that they are basically saying "Python is better off without a Council of Elders
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than with you lot".
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The council normally co-opts new Elders, probably because an individual is seen
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to have knowledge about a specific part of the Python community (or language) in which
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the council is lacking. Everyone is free to suggest new Elders to the council
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(including themselves) but the council is free to ignore the suggestion.
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Council members should be free to retire at any time. An individual council
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member can be retired by a unanimous vote by the rest of the council.
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There is an emergency brake procedure to get rid of a non-functioning council.
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A single Elder or a group of 10 core developers or PSF voting members can ask for
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an immedeate reinstating vote of the council as a whole (presumably with the
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intention that the council lose their mandate). If this vote has been requested by an
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Elder that individual immedeately lose their council position, independent of
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the outcome of the vote. If the vote has been requested by community members and
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the council is reinstated this procedure cannot be invoked again for a year.
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If there is no functioning council (the current initial situation, or after the
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council have lost their mandate after a vote of no confidence) an initial
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council must be selected. Through the normal communication channels (discourse,
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mailing lists) members can be suggested by anyone (including themselves). After
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discussion amongst the nominees and in the whole community a group of at least
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three individuals should emerge that ask for an initial vote to instate them
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as Council of Elders. The intention of this procedure is that by the time such
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a group of individuals emerges and asks for a vote of confidence they expect an
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overwhelming mandate.
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Discussion
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==========
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This PEP does not handle other roles of the BDFL, only the voting process.
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Most importantly, the direction of Python in the long term is not expected
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to be handled by the Council of Elders. This falls to the community as a whole
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(or to individual members of the community, most likely).
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There is also the role of figurehead or spokesperson to represent Python and
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the Python community to the outside world. Again, this is *not* a role that
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should be handled by the Council of Elders, in my opionion, but by some
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other person or body.
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Note that this proposal most likely favors conservatism over progression. Or, at least, the
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danger of it leading to stagnation is bigger than the danger of it leading
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to reckless blazing ahead into unknown territories. So: we should realise
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that it is unlikely that a PEP like PEP 572 will pass if this model is in
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place.
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Copyright
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=========
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This document has been placed in the public domain.
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..
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Local Variables:
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mode: indented-text
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indent-tabs-mode: nil
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sentence-end-double-space: t
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fill-column: 70
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coding: utf-8
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End:
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