* DEV: Remove the margin from widget-dropdown
Generic components should not have a margin. Those should be styled in the place where they are used.
* DEV: Remove margin from the dropdown body
It triggered a warning in popper and was effectively a no-op as popper positions dropdowns on its own using `position: fixed` and `top/right/bottom/left` properties.
When creating a bookmark reminder that deletes the bookmark on reminder, if the user clicked on the notification and got taken to the post in the topic the bookmark icon still showed as blue with the reminder clock indicator. This was because the response JSON for reloading a topic post was not including the bookmark attributes, not even the bookmarked boolean.
We now return the correct attributes in the serializer, and if bookmarked is false we clear all the bookmark related attributes on the post for the notification to make sure nothing of the old bookmark remains in the UI.
This was only a problem if the user did not refresh the app completely inbetween setting the reminder and receiving the notification.
Follow up to https://github.com/discourse/discourse/pull/10188/files
There are still TopicUser records where bookmarked is true even though there are no Bookmark or PostAction records with the type of bookmark for the associated topic and user. This migration corrects this issue by setting bookmarked to false for these cases.
* Remove unused Discourse.SiteSettings
* Remove `Discourse.SiteSettings` from many tests
* REFACTOR: `lib:formatter` was using a lot of leaky state
* Remove more `Discourse.SiteSettings` from tests
* More SiteSettings removed from tests
It's a little awkward to test constants by re-assigning them so
I've added a new parameter to `Discourse.find_compatible_resource`
which can be used by tests.
Instead of loading all of the user bookmarks using all the post IDs in a topic, load all the bookmarks for a user using the topic ID. This eliminates a costly WHERE ID IN query.
* strip out the href and xlink:href attributes from use element that
are _not_ anchors in svgs which can be used for XSS
* adding the content-disposition: attachment ensures that
uploaded SVGs cannot be opened and executed using the XSS exploit.
svgs embedded using an img tag do not suffer from the same exploit
We have a couple of examples of enormous amounts of text being entered in the name column of bookmarks. This is not desirable...it is just meant to be a short note / reminder of why you bookmarked this.
This PR caps the column at 100 characters and truncates existing names in the database to 100 characters.
This is very minor, see: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j6w9-fv6q-3q52
An attacker can elevate own cookie usage to bypass server cookie restrictions
Technically this is a security commit, but the surface area is extremely
low, we do not expect any real world impact.